diff options
| author |   Vinod Ahuja <vahuja@unomaha.edu> | 2022-11-07 16:18:44 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org> | 2022-11-08 14:47:43 +0000 |
| commit | 8be9db6f309e1e1b547e187c5db6ceac15f85a50 (patch) | |
| tree | ca3a6179b37b381eaee1bf948aebf78c809883b4 /docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware.md | |
| parent | e660399f8b909146a699e44eb340b8c0b7e7f12f (diff) | |
Fixing the index numbering
Fixing the index numbering for all documentation
Bug-AGL: [SPEC-4470]
Signed-off-by: Vinod Ahuja <vahuja@unomaha.edu>
Change-Id: I96b482a3ab598f0739c692e301de66c0553ba0e4
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/c/AGL/documentation/+/28118
Reviewed-by: Walt Miner <wminer@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware.md | 64 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware.md deleted file mode 100644 index 328dd15..0000000 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ ---- -title: Hardware ---- - -The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL** -compliant applications and services. The platform includes the following -hardware: - -- SoC (System-on-Chip). -- Memory (RAM, ROM, storage, etc.). -- Peripherals. - -You will find in this first part everything that concerns the hardware security. -The goal is to protect system against all attacks that are trying to gain -additional privileges by recovering and/or changing cryptographic keys in order -to alter the integrity of the boot. We should also prevent hardware -modifications in order to achieve this goal. We will expose below some examples -of possible configurations. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Acronyms and Abbreviations - -The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document. - -Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description -------------------------- | -------------------------------------- -_HSM_ | **H**ardware **S**ecurity **M**odule -_NVM_ | **N**on-**V**olatile **M**emory -_SHE_ | **S**ecure **H**ardware **E**xtensions - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Integrity - -The board must store hardcoded cryptographic keys in order to verify among -others the _integrity_ of the _bootloader_. Manufacturers can use **HSM** and -**SHE** to enhance the security of their board. - -Domain | Object | Recommendations --------------------- | ---------- | ---------------------------------- -Hardware-Integrity-1 | Bootloader | Must control bootloader integrity. -Hardware-Integrity-2 | Board | Must use a HSM. -Hardware-Integrity-3 | RTC | Must not be alterable. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Certificates - -Domain | Object | Recommendations ----------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hardware-Certificate-1 | System | Shall allow storing dedicated certificates. -Hardware-Certificate-2 | ECU | The ECU must verify the certification authority hierarchy. -Hardware-Certificate-3 | System | Allow the modification of certificates only if the source can be authenticated by a certificate already stored or in the higher levels of the chain of trust. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Memory - -Domain | Object | Recommendations ------------------ | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -Hardware-Memory-1 | ECU | The ECU shall never expose the unencrypted key in RAM when using cryptographic keys. -Hardware-Memory-2 | Bootloader | Internal NVM only -Hardware-Module-3 | - | HSM must be used to secure keys.
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