From ede19ea0c47fb23f3fc779833d1e57cf76f3371e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yannick GICQUEL Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 15:57:07 +0200 Subject: kernel: smack security backport from kernel 4 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Here is the backport of all patches relating to smack support on kernel side. For more details, see file: meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/README Please note that patches are applied only if "smack" is in the ditro features. Here are the 2 lines to add in the local.conf OVERRIDES .= ":smack" DISTRO_FEATURES_append = " smack" Change-Id: I147a3532aec531f977d6ec34c576261835711f1e Signed-off-by: Yannick GICQUEL Signed-off-by: José Bollo --- ...ck-unify-all-ptrace-accesses-in-the-smack.patch | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 185 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0025-Smack-unify-all-ptrace-accesses-in-the-smack.patch (limited to 'meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0025-Smack-unify-all-ptrace-accesses-in-the-smack.patch') diff --git a/meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0025-Smack-unify-all-ptrace-accesses-in-the-smack.patch b/meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0025-Smack-unify-all-ptrace-accesses-in-the-smack.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2619497 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0025-Smack-unify-all-ptrace-accesses-in-the-smack.patch @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +From ff5f986cfb30bb75d4972b2b2e36fec368c13f1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lukasz Pawelczyk +Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 17:07:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 25/54] Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack + +The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following +functions: + smack_ptrace_traceme() + smack_ptrace_access_check() + smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced) + +This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that +checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check(). + +This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the +TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process. + +Additional bugs fixed: +- The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly + translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1. + PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ. + PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE. +- Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds(). +- Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info + in case this flag is set. + +Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk +Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa +--- + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +index 0bea427..72438156 100644 +--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c ++++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +@@ -157,6 +157,54 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, + return rc; + } + ++/** ++ * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_* ++ * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_* ++ * ++ * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules ++ */ ++static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode) ++{ ++ switch (mode) { ++ case PTRACE_MODE_READ: ++ return MAY_READ; ++ case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH: ++ return MAY_READWRITE; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++/** ++ * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access ++ * @tracer: tracer process ++ * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced ++ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*) ++ * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit ++ * ++ * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error ++ */ ++static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label, ++ unsigned int mode, const char *func) ++{ ++ int rc; ++ struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL; ++ struct task_smack *tsp; ++ struct smack_known *skp; ++ ++ if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) { ++ smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); ++ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer); ++ saip = &ad; ++ } ++ ++ tsp = task_security(tracer); ++ skp = smk_of_task(tsp); ++ ++ rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip); ++ return rc; ++} ++ + /* + * LSM hooks. + * We he, that is fun! +@@ -165,16 +213,15 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, + /** + * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH + * @ctp: child task pointer +- * @mode: ptrace attachment mode ++ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*) + * + * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise + * +- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write. ++ * Do the capability checks. + */ + static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) + { + int rc; +- struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp; + + rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode); +@@ -182,10 +229,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) + return rc; + + skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp)); +- smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); +- smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp); + +- rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad); ++ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__); + return rc; + } + +@@ -195,12 +240,11 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) + * + * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise + * +- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write. ++ * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH. + */ + static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) + { + int rc; +- struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct smack_known *skp; + + rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp); +@@ -208,10 +252,9 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp) + return rc; + + skp = smk_of_task(current_security()); +- smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); +- smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp); + +- rc = smk_tskacc(ptp, skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad); ++ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known, ++ PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__); + return rc; + } + +@@ -455,7 +498,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) + * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec + * @bprm: the exec information + * +- * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise ++ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise + */ + static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) + { +@@ -475,7 +518,22 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) + if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task) + return 0; + +- if (bprm->unsafe) ++ if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { ++ struct task_struct *tracer; ++ rc = 0; ++ ++ rcu_read_lock(); ++ tracer = ptrace_parent(current); ++ if (likely(tracer != NULL)) ++ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer, ++ isp->smk_task->smk_known, ++ PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, ++ __func__); ++ rcu_read_unlock(); ++ ++ if (rc != 0) ++ return rc; ++ } else if (bprm->unsafe) + return -EPERM; + + bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task; +-- +2.1.4 + -- cgit 1.2.3-korg