From ede19ea0c47fb23f3fc779833d1e57cf76f3371e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yannick GICQUEL Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2015 15:57:07 +0200 Subject: kernel: smack security backport from kernel 4 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Here is the backport of all patches relating to smack support on kernel side. For more details, see file: meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/README Please note that patches are applied only if "smack" is in the ditro features. Here are the 2 lines to add in the local.conf OVERRIDES .= ":smack" DISTRO_FEATURES_append = " smack" Change-Id: I147a3532aec531f977d6ec34c576261835711f1e Signed-off-by: Yannick GICQUEL Signed-off-by: José Bollo --- .../smack/0049-Smack-Rework-file-hooks.patch | 172 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 172 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0049-Smack-Rework-file-hooks.patch (limited to 'meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0049-Smack-Rework-file-hooks.patch') diff --git a/meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0049-Smack-Rework-file-hooks.patch b/meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0049-Smack-Rework-file-hooks.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bceea97 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-rcar-gen2/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-renesas/smack/0049-Smack-Rework-file-hooks.patch @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +From d27c9576dedafae4f315dc8a64501c1d4aef5cff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Casey Schaufler +Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 17:19:19 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 49/54] Smack: Rework file hooks + +This is one of those cases where you look at code you did +years ago and wonder what you might have been thinking. +There are a number of LSM hooks that work off of file pointers, +and most of them really want the security data from the inode. +Some, however, really want the security context that the process +had when the file was opened. The difference went undetected in +Smack until it started getting used in a real system with real +testing. At that point it was clear that something was amiss. + +This patch corrects the misuse of the f_security value in several +of the hooks. The behavior will not usually be any different, as +the process had to be able to open the file in the first place, and +the old check almost always succeeded, as will the new, but for +different reasons. + +Thanks to the Samsung Tizen development team that identified this. + +Change-Id: If23494f46eaf27e0247a5f0daf31a4415ae936c8 +Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler +--- + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +index c6f8664..9aa34d3 100644 +--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c ++++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc) + { + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task; +- struct inode *inode = file->f_inode; ++ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; + + if (rc <= 0) +@@ -1347,6 +1347,9 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) + * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master + * label list, so no allocation is done. + * ++ * f_security is the owner security information. It ++ * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio. ++ * + * Returns 0 + */ + static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) +@@ -1384,17 +1387,18 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + { + int rc = 0; + struct smk_audit_info ad; ++ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); + + if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) { +- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); ++ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc); + } + + if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) { +- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad); ++ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc); + } + +@@ -1412,10 +1416,11 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) + { + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; ++ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); +- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad); ++ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc); + return rc; + } +@@ -1437,7 +1442,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + { + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc = 0; +- ++ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + switch (cmd) { + case F_GETLK: +@@ -1446,14 +1451,14 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + case F_SETLKW: + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); +- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad); ++ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc); + break; + case F_SETOWN: + case F_SETSIG: + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); +- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); ++ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc); + break; + default: +@@ -1571,14 +1576,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, + * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value + * @file: object in question + * +- * Returns 0 +- * Further research may be required on this one. + */ + static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) + { +- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); +- +- file->f_security = skp; ++ file->f_security = smk_of_current(); + return 0; + } + +@@ -1631,6 +1632,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) + int rc; + int may = 0; + struct smk_audit_info ad; ++ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); +@@ -1642,7 +1644,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) + may |= MAY_WRITE; + +- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad); ++ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc); + return rc; + } +@@ -1662,21 +1664,17 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) + static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) + { + struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; +- struct inode_smack *isp = file_inode(file)->i_security; ++ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); + struct smk_audit_info ad; + int rc; + +- if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) { +- file->f_security = isp->smk_inode; ++ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + return 0; +- } + + smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); + smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); +- rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode, MAY_READ, &ad); ++ rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); +- if (rc == 0) +- file->f_security = isp->smk_inode; + + return rc; + } +-- +2.1.4 + -- cgit 1.2.3-korg