From 0eba225fb27ec0b87bfa80361314fec5ab901caa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephane Desneux Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 13:10:46 +0200 Subject: Import from docs-agl/docs Change-Id: Id524561d87410e5463cddd123b30eb63d75b62bd Signed-off-by: Stephane Desneux --- docs/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md (limited to 'docs/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md') diff --git a/docs/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md b/docs/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e13c464 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +# Part 1 - Hardware + +## Abstract + +The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL** compliant applications and services. +The platform includes the following hardware: + +- SoC (System-on-Chip). +- Memory (RAM, ROM, storage, etc.). +- Peripherals. + +You will find in this first part everything that concerns the hardware security. +The goal is to protect system against all attacks that are trying to gain +additional privileges by recovering and/or changing cryptographic keys in order +to alter the integrity of the boot. We should also prevent hardware modifications +in order to achieve this goal. We will expose below some examples of possible +configurations. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Acronyms and Abbreviations + +The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document. + +Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description +------------------------- | -------------------------------------- +_HSM_ | **H**ardware **S**ecurity **M**odule +_NVM_ | **N**on-**V**olatile **M**emory +_SHE_ | **S**ecure **H**ardware **E**xtensions + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Integrity + +The board must store hardcoded cryptographic keys in order to verify among others +the _integrity_ of the _bootloader_. Manufacturers can use **HSM** and **SHE** to +enhance the security of their board. + + + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +-------------------- | ---------- | ---------------------------------- +Hardware-Integrity-1 | Bootloader | Must control bootloader integrity. +Hardware-Integrity-2 | Board | Must use a HSM. +Hardware-Integrity-3 | RTC | Must not be alterable. + + + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + + +## Certificates + + + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +---------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Hardware-Certificate-1 | System | Shall allow storing dedicated certificates. +Hardware-Certificate-2 | ECU | The ECU must verify the certification authority hierarchy. +Hardware-Certificate-3 | System | Allow the modification of certificates only if the source can be authenticated by a certificate already stored or in the higher levels of the chain of trust. + + + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Memory + + + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +----------------- | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +Hardware-Memory-1 | ECU | The ECU shall never expose the unencrypted key in RAM when using cryptographic keys. +Hardware-Memory-2 | Bootloader | Internal NVM only +Hardware-Module-3 | - | HSM must be used to secure keys. + + -- cgit 1.2.3-korg