From af1a266670d040d2f4083ff309d732d648afba2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Angelos Mouzakitis <a.mouzakitis@virtualopensystems.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 14:33:42 +0000
Subject: Add submodule dependency files
Change-Id: Iaf8d18082d3991dec7c0ebbea540f092188eb4ec
---
.../Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStub.c | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 210 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 roms/edk2/MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStub.c
(limited to 'roms/edk2/MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStub.c')
diff --git a/roms/edk2/MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStub.c b/roms/edk2/MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStub.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..79f98b28e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/roms/edk2/MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/** @file
+ This driver produces Security2 and Security architectural protocol based on SecurityManagementLib.
+
+ Copyright (c) 2006 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
+
+**/
+
+
+#include <Uefi.h>
+#include <Protocol/Security.h>
+#include <Protocol/Security2.h>
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiBootServicesTableLib.h>
+#include <Library/UefiDriverEntryPoint.h>
+#include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h>
+#include "Defer3rdPartyImageLoad.h"
+
+//
+// Handle for the Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver
+//
+EFI_HANDLE mSecurityArchProtocolHandle = NULL;
+
+/**
+ The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL (SAP) is used to abstract platform-specific
+ policy from the DXE core response to an attempt to use a file that returns a
+ given status for the authentication check from the section extraction protocol.
+
+ The possible responses in a given SAP implementation may include locking
+ flash upon failure to authenticate, attestation logging for all signed drivers,
+ and other exception operations. The File parameter allows for possible logging
+ within the SAP of the driver.
+
+ If File is NULL, then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned.
+
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
+ AuthenticationStatus is safe for the DXE Core to use, then EFI_SUCCESS is returned.
+
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
+ AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use under any circumstances,
+ then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is returned.
+
+ If the file specified by File with an authentication status specified by
+ AuthenticationStatus is not safe for the DXE Core to use right now, but it
+ might be possible to use it at a future time, then EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION is
+ returned.
+
+ @param This The EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
+ @param AuthenticationStatus
+ This is the authentication type returned from the Section
+ Extraction protocol. See the Section Extraction Protocol
+ Specification for details on this type.
+ @param File This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is
+ being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Do nothing and return success.
+ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER File is NULL.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecurityStubAuthenticateState (
+ IN CONST EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN UINT32 AuthenticationStatus,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ Status = ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_AUTHENTICATION_STATE,
+ AuthenticationStatus,
+ File,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ FALSE
+ );
+ if (Status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ Status = ExecuteSecurityHandlers (AuthenticationStatus, File);
+ }
+
+ return Status;
+}
+
+/**
+ The DXE Foundation uses this service to measure and/or verify a UEFI image.
+
+ This service abstracts the invocation of Trusted Computing Group (TCG) measured boot, UEFI
+ Secure boot, and UEFI User Identity infrastructure. For the former two, the DXE Foundation
+ invokes the FileAuthentication() with a DevicePath and corresponding image in
+ FileBuffer memory. The TCG measurement code will record the FileBuffer contents into the
+ appropriate PCR. The image verification logic will confirm the integrity and provenance of the
+ image in FileBuffer of length FileSize . The origin of the image will be DevicePath in
+ these cases.
+ If the FileBuffer is NULL, the interface will determine if the DevicePath can be connected
+ in order to support the User Identification policy.
+
+ @param This The EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL instance.
+ @param File A pointer to the device path of the file that is
+ being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.
+ @param FileBuffer A pointer to the buffer with the UEFI file image.
+ @param FileSize The size of the file.
+ @param BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service. If
+ FileAuthentication() is invoked not from the LoadImage(),
+ BootPolicy must be set to FALSE.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The file specified by DevicePath and non-NULL
+ FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform policy dictates
+ that the DXE Foundation may use the file.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The device path specified by NULL device path DevicePath
+ and non-NULL FileBuffer did authenticate, and the platform
+ policy dictates that the DXE Foundation may execute the image in
+ FileBuffer.
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS FileBuffer is NULL and current user has permission to start
+ UEFI device drivers on the device path specified by DevicePath.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION The file specified by DevicePath and FileBuffer did not
+ authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the file should be
+ placed in the untrusted state. The image has been added to the file
+ execution table.
+ @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not
+ authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE
+ Foundation many not use File.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is NULL and the user has no
+ permission to start UEFI device drivers on the device path specified
+ by DevicePath.
+ @retval EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION FileBuffer is not NULL and the user has no permission to load
+ drivers from the device path specified by DevicePath. The
+ image has been added into the list of the deferred images.
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+Security2StubAuthenticate (
+ IN CONST EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL *This,
+ IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *File, OPTIONAL
+ IN VOID *FileBuffer,
+ IN UINTN FileSize,
+ IN BOOLEAN BootPolicy
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ if (FileBuffer != NULL) {
+ Status = Defer3rdPartyImageLoad (File, BootPolicy);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return Status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ExecuteSecurity2Handlers (EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_VERIFY_IMAGE |
+ EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_DEFER_IMAGE_LOAD |
+ EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_MEASURE_IMAGE |
+ EFI_AUTH_OPERATION_CONNECT_POLICY,
+ 0,
+ File,
+ FileBuffer,
+ FileSize,
+ BootPolicy
+ );
+}
+
+//
+// Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol instance produced by this driver
+//
+EFI_SECURITY_ARCH_PROTOCOL mSecurityStub = {
+ SecurityStubAuthenticateState
+};
+
+EFI_SECURITY2_ARCH_PROTOCOL mSecurity2Stub = {
+ Security2StubAuthenticate
+};
+
+/**
+ Installs Security2 and Security Architectural Protocol.
+
+ @param ImageHandle The image handle of this driver.
+ @param SystemTable A pointer to the EFI System Table.
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Install the sample Security Architectural Protocol successfully.
+
+**/
+EFI_STATUS
+EFIAPI
+SecurityStubInitialize (
+ IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
+ IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+
+ //
+ // Make sure the Security Architectural Protocol is not already installed in the system
+ //
+ ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid);
+ ASSERT_PROTOCOL_ALREADY_INSTALLED (NULL, &gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid);
+
+ //
+ // Install the Security Architectural Protocol onto a new handle
+ //
+ Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
+ &mSecurityArchProtocolHandle,
+ &gEfiSecurity2ArchProtocolGuid,
+ &mSecurity2Stub,
+ &gEfiSecurityArchProtocolGuid,
+ &mSecurityStub,
+ NULL
+ );
+ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
+
+ Defer3rdPartyImageLoadInitialize ();
+
+ return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
--
cgit