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authorVinod Ahuja <vahuja@unomaha.edu>2022-11-19 13:59:20 -0600
committerJan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>2022-11-21 11:21:04 +0000
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treef9cc1835cc14536f0397d3cfbbae744695d42bf1 /docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint
parent33727f4e9619f9da65fdfc608a10a92887c7257c (diff)
Updating documentation: 1. Renamed all the files and folder following 01-99 index numbering 2. Matched title name and file name 3. Inserted title in the files where ever missing 4. Updated all the reference links in the documentation Bug-AGL: [SPEC-4470] Signed-off-by: Vinod Ahuja <vahuja@unomaha.edu> Change-Id: Ib73e1f91107646e11b5b19ab6ead4080add506e4 Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/c/AGL/documentation/+/28170 Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org> Tested-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>
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+---
+title: Overview
+---
+
+Modern cars have become a lot more technologically sophisticated and different
+than those of the past. We are seeing a wider range of new features and
+functionality, with a lot more complex software. It is fair to say that the cars
+being introduced to the market today have much more in common with computing
+devices like cell phones, than their predecessors did. Modern car manufacturers
+are also integrating support for a broad range of communication technologies for
+these “connected” cars. With the advent of such vehicles, Linux has become a
+natural choice for the software platform, with Automotive Grade Linux as a
+promising example.
+
+From a security point of view, the remote capabilities of a connected car
+results in a much larger attack surface. This opens a whole new world of
+security vulnerabilities that need to be considered during the architectural
+design. History shows that physical access to a device is sufficient for a
+hacker to gain root privileges. This makes the car a hostile environment.
+
+The Security Blueprint documents the security features that are included as part
+of Automotive Grade Linux (AGL) and identifies areas that need to be addressed
+from a security perspective as part of AGL. It also gives guidance around
+existing technologies and solutions.
+
+Security domains will allow us to create a set of tests verifying the security
+of Automotive Grade Linux.
+
+This document is firstly based on an existing AGL security-blueprint.
+
+**For security to be effective, the concepts must be simple. And by default,
+anything that is not allowed is forbidden.**
+
+We will cover topics starting from the lowest level (_Hardware_) up to the
+highest levels (_Connectivity_ and _Application_). We will move quickly on
+_Hardware_ and _Connectivity_ because this is not supported at our level.
+Solutions of connectivity problems concern updates and secured settings while
+hardware securing is related to the manufacturers.
+
+## Adversaries
+
+Adversaries and attackers within the Automotive space.
+
+- Enthusiast Attackers
+
+Enthusiast attackers have physical access to the Engine Control Units (ECUs) at
+the circuit board level. They can solder ‘mod chips’ onto the board and have
+access to probing tools. They also have information on ECUs that have been
+previously compromised and have access to softwares and instructions developed
+by other members of car modification forums. The goal of the enthusiast hacker
+could be, but is not limited to, adding extra horse power to the car or hacking
+it just for fun.
+
+- Corrupt Automotive Dealers
+
+Corrupt automotive dealers are attackers that have access to the same
+capabilities as enthusiasts, but also have access to the car manufacturer’s
+(OEM) dealer network. They may also have access to standard debugging tools
+provided by the car manufacturer. Their goal may be to support local car theft
+gangs or organized criminals.
+
+- Organized Criminals
+
+Organized criminals have access to all of the above tools but may also have some
+level of control over the internal network at many dealerships. They may have
+hacked and gained temporary control of the Over-The-Air (OTA) servers or the
+In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems. This is very much like the role of
+organized criminals in other industries such as paid media today. Their goal is
+to extort money from OEMs and/or governments by threatening to disable multiple
+vehicles.
+
+- Malware Developers
+
+Malware developers have developed malicious software to attack and compromise a
+large number of vehicles. The malicious software is usually designed to spread
+from one vehicle to another. Usually, the goal is to take control of multiple
+machines and then sell access to them for malicious purposes like
+denial-of-service (DoS) attacks or theft of private information and data.
+
+- Security Researchers
+
+Security researchers are ‘self-publicized’ security consultants trying to make a
+name for themselves. They have access to standard tools for software security
+analysis. They also have physical access to the vehicle and standard hardware
+debugging tools (Logic Analyzers, Oscilloscopes, etc). Their goal is to
+publicize attacks for personal gain or just to gain personal understanding with
+a sense of helping make things more secure.
+
+## Attack Goals
+
+In today’s connected vehicle, more and more functionality is moving to software
+control, meaning that the threat of attack becomes greater and greater. We see
+car features like navigation and summoning, car access/engine start, and
+motor/ECU upgrades all controlled through software and connections to the cloud.
+The risk of attack is high because there are high value targets in play.
+
+Here, we outline some of the major threats categories along with some sample
+attackers, example attacks, and a relative importance. These threat categories
+are intended to be general examples. There can be many nuances to threat types.
+Additionally, there can be many sub-attacks that eventually lead to these higher
+level attack goals.
+
+| Threat Category | Sample Attacker | Example Attacks | Relative Importance |
+|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Vehicle theft | Individual, organized criminals | Send the car to an unplanned destination, get a key for the car, gain control of the unlock mechanism | Reduced likelihood of future vehicle purchases (Profit Later), bad press (Brand Integrity) |
+| Reduced vehicle functionality | Terrorist groups, disgruntled employees | Lock the driver out of the car, cause the car to crash, block access to infotainment system | Inability sell paid-for apps and content (Profit Now), bad press (Brand Integrity), possible loss of life (Physical Injury) |
+| Vehicle hacking | Vehicle owner, competitor | Get content without paying, modify DRM licenses, unlock of after-market features, theft of IP | Loss of sales for content and features (Profit Now), lawsuits from content owners (Profit Later), loss of competitive advantage (Profit Later) |
+| Sensitive asset theft | Organized criminals, blackmailers | Steal credit card numbers, health information, camera data, steal bandwidth | Bad press (Brand Integrity), lawsuits from vehicle owners (Profit Later) |
+
+The Automotive Grade Linux (AGL) initiative builds upon open-source software
+including Linux and Tizen to offer a flexible application framework. However,
+the security provisions of the app framework, Cynara, and the security manager
+only go so far in keeping the biggest threats at bay. As experience has shown,
+providing a constrained app (like that in the Android Open Source Platform) and
+store development flow, signature verification, DAC sandboxing, and MAC (SMACK)
+controls over the platform can have a certain amount of success with the
+security of the system. However, the openness of the system invites many
+researchers, hobbyists and hackers and financially motivated attackers to
+compromise the system for their own gains.
+
+As AGL arrives on modern automobiles, this is inevitably inviting many capable
+actors to modify, attack, and compromise these well thought-out systems and
+their applications. With concerns like safety and security, the auto industry
+cannot afford to go the way of consumer devices like phones and tablets where
+security problems are encountered on a frequent basis. It is imperative to use a
+layered approach and defense-in-depth to protect the system from inevitable
+attack.
+
+## Assets and Security Categorization
+
+This section outlines some of the assets that are likely to be found in the
+vehicle and their relative sensitivity from an attack point of view.
+Additionally, the final column on the right lists some of the recommended
+protection types that can be applied to these types of assets (Note that the
+empty cells refer to the cells above them). A good protection approach will give
+priority to the most sensitive assets, using a defense-in-depth approach to
+cover these assets. Less sensitive assets are treated at a lower priority,
+typically protected with fewer protection techniques. A more fine-grained
+prioritization of the the assets in a concrete vehicle network can be achieved
+with detailed threat analysis which considers the topology of the vehicle
+network and access-controls that are in-place. e.g. the EVITA framework for
+attack trees.
+
+| Asset Category | Examples | Sensitivity | Recommended Protection Types |
+|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Software | ECU software, infotainment software, OS images | Critical | Key Management, Mutual Asymmetric Authentication, HSM and WhiteBox Encryption, Message Integrity Checks, Hardening/SW Protection, Program Transforms/ Obfuscation, Integrity Verification, Secure OS |
+| Car Access | Biometric data, car keys | | |
+| Payment Data | Credit cards, User profile critical data | | |
+| Recordings | Internal camera recording, internal audio recording, external camera recording | High | Encryption, Message Integrity Checks, Hardening/SW Protection, Program Transforms / Obfuscation |
+| User Profile | Usernames and passwords, customization, calendar, contacts | | |
+| Location | GPS coordinates, vehicle usage data | | |
+| Purchased Content | Video, audio, licenses | | |
+| Teleconference | Chat, audio, video | Medium | SW Protection, Program Transforms / Obfuscation, Authenticated encryption for transmission |
+| Vehicle data | Vehicle info, sensor data | | |
+| Navigation data | Static and dynamic maps | | |
+| 3rd party data | Home automation commands, cloud game data | | |
+
+## Hardening term
+
+The term Hardening refers to the tools, techniques and processes required in
+order to reduce the attack surface on an embedded system, such as an embedded
+control unit (**ECU**) or other managed devices. The target for all hardening
+activities is to prevent the execution of invalid binaries on the device, and to
+prevent copying of security related data from the device.
+
+## AGL security overview
+
+AGL roots are based on security concepts. Those concepts are implemented by the
+security framework as shown in this picture:
+
+![AGL architecture](images/WhiteBoxArchi.png)
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the strongest terms utilized within all this document.
+
+| Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description |
+|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
+| _AGL_ | **A**utomotive **G**rade **L**inux |
+| _ECU_ | **E**lectronic **C**ontrol **U**nit |
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# References
+
+- [security-blueprint](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/architecture/en/dev/reference/security/01-overview.html).
+ - _http://
+ docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/architecture/en/dev/reference/security/01-overview.html_
+- **[2017]** - [kernel
+ security](https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/).
+ - _https:// www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/_
+- **[2017]** - [Systemd integration and user
+ management](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMM-Dresden/AGL-systemd.pdf).
+ - _http:// iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMM-Dresden/AGL-systemd.pdf_
+- **[2017]** - [AGL - Application Framework
+ Documentation](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf).
+ - _http:// iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf_
+- **[2017]** - [Improving Vehicle
+ Cybersecurity](https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/download.php/35648/ATIS-I-0000059.pdf).
+ - _https://
+ access.atis.org/apps/group_public/download.php/35648/ATIS-I-0000059.pdf_
+- **[2016]** - [AGL framework
+ overview](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/apis_services/en/dev/reference/af-main/0-introduction.html).
+ - _http://
+ docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/apis_services/en/dev/reference/af-main/0-introduction.html_
+- **[2016]** -
+ [SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2016/publications/SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates.pdf).
+ - _http://
+ iot.bzh/download/public/2016/publications/SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates.pdf_
+- **[2016]** - [Linux Automotive
+ Security](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2016/security/Linux-Automotive-Security-v10.pdf).
+ - _http://
+ iot.bzh/download/public/2016/security/Linux-Automotive-Security-v10.pdf_
+- **[2016]** - [Automotive Security Best
+ Practices](https://www.mcafee.com/it/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf).
+ - _https://
+ www.mcafee.com/it/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf_
+- **[2016]** - [Gattacking Bluetooth Smart
+ Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf).
+ - _http:// gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf_
+- **[2015]** - [Comprehensive Experimental Analysis of Automotive Attack
+ Surfaces](http://www.cs.wayne.edu/fengwei/15fa-csc6991/slides/8-CarHackingUsenixSecurity.pdf).
+ - _http://
+ www.cs.wayne.edu/fengwei/15fa-csc6991/slides/8-CarHackingUsenixSecurity.pdf_
+- **[2015]** - [Security in Automotive Bus
+ Systems](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf).
+ - _http://
+ citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf_
+- **[2014]** - [IOActive Remote Attack
+ Surface](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf).
+ - _https:// www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf_
+- **[2011]** - [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data
+ communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf).
+ - _https://
+ media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf_
+- **[2011]** - [Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack
+ Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf).
+ - _http:// www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf_
+- **[2010]** - [Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in
+ Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf).
+ - _https:// eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf_
+- **[2010]** - [Wifi attacks wep
+ wpa](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf).
+ - _https:// matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf_
+- **[2008]** -
+ [SMACK](http://schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf).
+ - _http://
+ schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf_
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/02_Hardware.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/02_Hardware.md
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+---
+title: Hardware
+---
+
+The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL**
+compliant applications and services. The platform includes the following
+hardware:
+
+- SoC (System-on-Chip).
+- Memory (RAM, ROM, storage, etc.).
+- Peripherals.
+
+You will find in this first part everything that concerns the hardware security.
+The goal is to protect system against all attacks that are trying to gain
+additional privileges by recovering and/or changing cryptographic keys in order
+to alter the integrity of the boot. We should also prevent hardware
+modifications in order to achieve this goal. We will expose below some examples
+of possible configurations.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
+
+Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
+------------------------- | --------------------------------------
+_HSM_ | **H**ardware **S**ecurity **M**odule
+_NVM_ | **N**on-**V**olatile **M**emory
+_SHE_ | **S**ecure **H**ardware **E**xtensions
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Integrity
+
+The board must store hardcoded cryptographic keys in order to verify among
+others the _integrity_ of the _bootloader_. Manufacturers can use **HSM** and
+**SHE** to enhance the security of their board.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+-------------------- | ---------- | ----------------------------------
+Hardware-Integrity-1 | Bootloader | Must control bootloader integrity.
+Hardware-Integrity-2 | Board | Must use a HSM.
+Hardware-Integrity-3 | RTC | Must not be alterable.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Certificates
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------- | ------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Hardware-Certificate-1 | System | Shall allow storing dedicated certificates.
+Hardware-Certificate-2 | ECU | The ECU must verify the certification authority hierarchy.
+Hardware-Certificate-3 | System | Allow the modification of certificates only if the source can be authenticated by a certificate already stored or in the higher levels of the chain of trust.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Memory
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------- | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Hardware-Memory-1 | ECU | The ECU shall never expose the unencrypted key in RAM when using cryptographic keys.
+Hardware-Memory-2 | Bootloader | Internal NVM only
+Hardware-Module-3 | - | HSM must be used to secure keys. \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/03_Secure_Boot.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/03_Secure_Boot.md
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+---
+title: Secure Boot
+---
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------- | ----------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Abstract-1 | More generic and add examples (The chain of trust).
+
+Secure boot refers to preventing malicious software applications and
+“unauthorized” operating systems from loading during the system start-up
+process. The goal is to protect users from rootkits and other low-level malware
+attacks. Modern bootloaders come with features that can be used to enable secure
+boot in the system.
+
+**Boot Hardening**: Steps/requirements to configure the boot sequence, in order
+to restrict the device from executing anything other than the approved software
+image.
+
+In this part, we will see a series of settings that will allow us to improve
+security during boot phase. For the purposes of reference and explanation, we
+are providing guidance on how to configure an embedded device that runs with a
+3.10.17 Linux kernel. If the integrity is not checked or if a critical error
+occurs, the system must boot on a very stable backup image.
+
+**Requirements**: These requirements must be met even if an alternative version
+of the Linux kernel is chosen.
+
+**Recommendations**: Detailed best practices that should be applied in order to
+secure a device. Although they are not currently listed as hard requirements,
+they may be upgraded to requirements status in the future. In addition, specific
+operators may change some of these recommendations into requirements based on
+their specific needs and objectives.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------- | -------------------------------------------
+Boot-Abstract-1 | Review the definition of the "boot loader".
+
+**Boot loader**: The boot loader consists of the Primary boot loader residing in
+**OTP** memory, sboot, U-Boot and Secure loader residing in external flash (NAND
+or SPI/NOR flash memory). The CPU on power on or reset executes the primary boot
+loader. The **OTP** primary boot loader makes the necessary initial system
+configuration and then loads the secondary boot loader sboot from external flash
+memory to ram memory. The sboot then loads the U-Boot along with the Secure
+loader. U-Boot then verifies the Kernel/system image integrity, then loads the
+Kernel/system image before passing control to it.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
+
+Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
+------------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+_FUSE_ | **F**ilesystem in **U**ser**S**pac**E**
+_OTP_ | **O**ne-**T**ime-**P**rogrammable
+_DOCSIS_ | **D**ata **O**ver **C**able **S**ervice **I**nterface **S**pecification
+
+# Image
+
+## Image selection
+
+The boot process shall be uninterruptible and shall irrevocably boot the image
+as specified in the boot environment.
+
+In U-Boot set the "_bootdelay_" environment variable and/or define
+`CONFIG_BOOTDELAY` to _-2_.
+
+Domain | _Variable_ / `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | -------------------------- | -------
+Boot-Image-Selection-1 | `CONFIG_BOOTDELAY` | `-2`
+Boot-Image-Selection-2 | _bootdelay_ | `-2`
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Image authenticity
+
+It shall not be possible to boot from an unverified image. The secure boot
+feature in U-Boot shall be enabled. The secure boot feature is available from
+U-Boot 2013.07 version. To enable the secure boot feature, enable the following
+features:
+
+```sh
+CONFIG_FIT: Enables support for Flat Image Tree (FIT) uImage format.
+CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE: Enables signature verification of FIT images.
+CONFIG_RSA: Enables RSA algorithm used for FIT image verification.
+CONFIG_OF_CONTROL: Enables Flattened Device Tree (FDT) configuration.
+CONFIG_OF_SEPARATE: Enables separate build of u-Boot from the device tree.
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE: Specifies the default Device Tree used for the run-time configuration of U-Boot.
+```
+
+Generate the U-Boot image with public keys to validate and load the image. It
+shall use RSA2048 and SHA256 for authentication.
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_
+------------------------- | ---------------------------- | --------
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-1 | `CONFIG_FIT` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-2 | `CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-3 | `CONFIG_RSA` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-4 | `CONFIG_OF_CONTROL` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-5 | `CONFIG_OF_SEPARATE` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-6 | `CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE` | _Enable_
+
+# Communication modes
+
+## Disable USB, Serial and DOCSIS Support
+
+To disable USB support in U-Boot, following config's shall not be defined:
+
+```
+CONFIG_CMD_USB: Enables basic USB support and the usb command.
+CONFIG_USB_UHCI: Defines the lowlevel part.
+CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD: Enables the USB Keyboard.
+CONFIG_USB_STORAGE: Enables the USB storage devices.
+CONFIG_USB_HOST_ETHER: Enables USB Ethernet adapter support.
+```
+
+In addition, disable unnecessary communication modes like Ethernet, Serial
+ports, DOCSIS in U-Boot and sboot that are not necessary.
+
+Linux Kernel support for USB should be compiled-out if not required. If it is
+needed, the Linux Kernel should be configured to only enable the minimum
+required USB devices. User-initiated USB-filesystems should be treated with
+special care. Whether or not the filesystems are mounted in userspace
+(**FUSE**), restricted mount options should be observed.
+
+Domain | Communication modes | _State_
+-------------------- | ------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Communication-1 | `USB` | _Disabled_ and _Compiled-out_ if not required.
+Boot-Communication-2 | `USB` | Else, Kernel should be configured to only enable the minimum required USB devices and filesystems should be treated with special care.
+Boot-Communication-3 | `Ethernet` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Communication-4 | U-boot and sboot `DOCSIS` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Communication-5 | `Serial ports` | _Disabled_
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_
+------------------------ | ----------------------- | -------------
+Boot-Communication-USB-1 | `CONFIG_CMD_USB` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-2 | `CONFIG_USB_UHCI` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-3 | `CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-4 | `CONFIG_USB_STORAGE` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-5 | `CONFIG_USB_HOST_ETHER` | _Not defined_
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable all unused Network Interfaces
+
+Only used network interfaces should be enabled. Where possible, services should
+also be limited to those necessary.
+
+Domain | Communication modes | _State_
+-------------------- | -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Communication-1 | `Network interfaces` | Preferably _no network interface is allowed_, otherwise, restrict the services to those used.
+
+## Remove or Disable Unnecessary Services, Ports, and Devices
+
+Restrict the `services`, `ports` and `devices` to those used.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+-------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Communication-1 | `Services`, `ports` and `devices` | Restrict the `services`, `ports` and `devices` to those used.
+
+## Disable flash access
+
+**Recommendation**:
+
+In U-Boot following flash memory commands shall be disabled:
+
+**NAND**: Support for nand flash access available through `do_nand` has to be
+disabled.
+
+Domain | `Command` name | _State_
+-------------------------- | -------------- | ---------
+Boot-Communication-Flash-1 | `do_nand` | _Disable_
+
+Similarly sboot should disable flash access support through command line if any.
+
+# Consoles
+
+## Disable serial console
+
+Serial console output shall be disabled. To disable console output in U-Boot,
+set the following macros:
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | --------------------------------------- | ---------
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-1 | `CONFIG_SILENT_CONSOLE` | `Disable`
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-2 | `CONFIG_SYS_DEVICE_NULLDEV` | `Disable`
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-3 | `CONFIG_SILENT_CONSOLE_UPDATE_ON_RELOC` | `Disable`
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------- | ------------------------------------
+Boot-Consoles-1 | Secure loader: No reference earlier?
+
+And set "**silent**" environment variable. For the Secure loader, disable the
+traces by not defining the below macro:
+
+Domain | `Environment variable` name | _State_
+---------------------- | --------------------------- | -------------
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-1 | `INC_DEBUG_PRINT` | _Not defined_
+
+For sboot proper configuration needs to be done to disable the serial console.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Immutable environment variables
+
+In U-Boot, ensure Kernel command line, boot commands, boot delay and other
+environment variables are immutable. This will prevent side-loading of alternate
+images, by restricting the boot selection to only the image in FLASH.
+
+The environment variables shall be part of the text region in U-Boot as default
+environment variable and not in non-volatile memory.
+
+Remove configuration options related to non-volatile memory, such as:
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_
+-------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-1 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_MMC` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-2 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_EEPROM` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-3 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_FLASH` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-4 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_DATAFLASH` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-5 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_FAT` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-6 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_NAND` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-7 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_NVRAM` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-8 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_ONENAND` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-9 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_SPI_FLASH` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-10 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_REMOTE` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-11 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_UBI` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-12 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_NOWHERE` | `#define`
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## (Recommendation) Removal of memory dump commands
+
+In U-Boot, following commands shall be disabled to avoid memory dumps:
+
+```
+md : Memory Display command.
+mm : Memory modify command - auto incrementing address.
+nm : Memory modify command - constant address.
+mw : Memory write.
+cp : Memory copy.
+mwc : Memory write cyclic.
+mdc : Memory display cyclic.
+mtest : Simple ram read/write test.
+loopw : Infinite write loop on address range.
+```
+
+Domain | `Command` name | _State_
+----------------------- | -------------- | ----------
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-1 | `md` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-2 | `mm` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-3 | `nm` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-4 | `mw` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-5 | `cp` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-6 | `mwc` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-7 | `mdc` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-8 | `mtest` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-9 | `loopw` | _Disabled_
+
+Similarly, memory dump support shall be disabled from sboot. \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/04_Hypervisor.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/04_Hypervisor.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61cc227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/04_Hypervisor.md
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+---
+title: Hypervisor
+---
+
+**Definition** : "A hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM) is computer
+software, firmware or hardware that creates and runs virtual machines".
+
+It must include a signature verification (possibly delegated).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Hypervisor-Abstract-1 | Complete Hypervisor part ([jailhouse](https://github.com/siemens/jailhouse) / [KVM](https://www.linux-kvm.org/page/Main_Page) / [Xen](https://www.xenproject.org/developers/teams/embedded-and-automotive.html)).
+
+## Native or Bare-metal hypervisors
+
+These hypervisors run directly on the host's hardware to control the hardware
+and to manage guest operating systems. Those are the ones we're interested in. \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/05_Kernel.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/05_Kernel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33e24d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/05_Kernel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+---
+title: Kernel
+---
+
+**System Hardening:** Best practices associated with the configuration of an
+embedded Linux based operating system. This section includes both hardening of
+the kernel itself, as well as specific configurations and patches used to
+protect against known vulnerabilities within the build and configuration of the
+root filesystem.
+
+At the Kernel level, we must ensure that no console can be launched. It could be
+used to change the behavior of the system or to have more information about it.
+Another aspect is the protection of the memory used by the Kernel.
+
+The next sub-sections contain information on various kernel configuration
+options to enhance the security in the kernel (3.10.17) and also for
+applications compiled to take advantage of these security features.
+Additionally, there are also configuration options that protect from known
+vulnerable configuration options. Here's a high level summary of various kernel
+configurations that shall be required for deployment.
+
+## Kernel Version
+
+The choice of kernel version for the AGL system is essential to its security.
+Depending on the type of board and eventual production system, different kernel
+versions are used. For example, one of the systems under study uses the Linux
+kernel version 3.10, while another uses the Linux kernel version 4.4. For the
+Linux kernel version 3.10.31, there are 25 known vulnerabilities. These
+vulnerabilities would allow an attacker to gain privileges, bypass access
+restrictions, allow memory to be corrupted, or cause denial of service. In
+contrast, the Linux kernel version of 4.4 has many fewer known vulnerabilities.
+For this reason, we would in general recommend the later kernel version as a
+basis for the platform.
+
+Note that, although there are fewer known vulnerabilities in the most recent
+kernel versions there may be many unknown vulnerabilities underlying. A rule of
+thumb is to update the kernel as much as possible to avoid the problems you do
+know, but you should not be complacent in the trust that you place in it. A
+defense-in-depth approach would then apply.
+
+If there are constraints and dependencies in upgrading to a newer kernel version
+(e.g. device drivers, board support providers) and you are forced to an older
+Linux kernel version, there need to be additional provisions made to reduce the
+risk of kernel exploits, which can include memory monitoring, watch-dog
+services, and system call hooking. In this case, further defense-in-depth
+techniques may be required to mitigate the risk of attacks to known
+vulnerabilities, which can also include runtime integrity verification of
+components that are vulnerable to tampering.
+
+## Kernel Build Configuration
+
+The kernel build configuration is extremely important for determining the level
+of access to services and to reduce the breadth of the attack surface. Linux
+contains a great and flexible number of capabilities and this is only controlled
+through the build configuration. For example, the `CONFIG_MODULES` parameter
+allows kernel modules to be loaded at runtime extending the capabilities of the
+kernel. This capability needs to be either inhibited or controlled at runtime
+through other configuration parameters. For example, `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y`
+ensures that only signed modules are loaded. There is a very large number of
+kernel configuration parameters, and these are discussed in detail in this
+section.
+
+# General configuration
+
+## Mandatory Access Control
+
+Kernel should controls access with labels and policy.
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+-------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------
+Kernel-General-MAC-1 | CONFIG_IP_NF_SECURITY | m
+Kernel-General-MAC-2 | CONFIG_IP6_NF_SECURITY | m
+Kernel-General-MAC-3 | CONFIG_EXT2_FS_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-4 | CONFIG_EXT3_FS_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-5 | CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-6 | CONFIG_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-7 | CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-8 | CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR | y
+
+Please also refer to the [Mandatory Access Control documentation in
+Platform](5_Platform.md). You can also find useful documentation and
+links on wikipedia about
+[**MAC**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) and about
+[**SMACK**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplified_Mandatory_Access_Control_Kernel).
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable kexec
+
+**Kexec** is a system call that enables you to load and boot into another kernel
+from the currently running kernel. This feature is not required in a production
+environment.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | -------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-kexec-1 | `CONFIG_KEXEC` | `n`
+
+
+
+
+
+**kexec** can load arbitrary kernels but signing of new kernel can be enforced
+like it is can be enforced for new modules.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable kernel IP auto-configuration
+
+It is preferable to have an IP configuration performed using a user-space tool
+as these tend to have more validation. We do not want the network interface
+coming up until the system has come up properly.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-IPAutoConf-1 | `CONFIG_IP_PNP` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable Sysctl syscall support
+
+Enabling this will result in code being included that is hard to maintain and
+not well tested.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------- | ----------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-SysCtl_SysCall-1 | `CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable Legacy Linux Support
+
+There are some Kernel Configs which are present only to support legacy binaries.
+See also "Consoles" part in order to disabling support for legacy binary
+formats. The `uselib` system call, in particular, has no valid use in any
+`libc6` or `uclibc` system in recent times. This configuration is supported in
+**Linux 3.15 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-LegacyLinux-1 | `CONFIG_USELIB` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable firmware auto-loading user mode helper
+
+The firmware auto loading helper, which is a utility executed by the kernel on
+`hotplug` events requiring firmware, can to be set `setuid`. As a result of
+this, the helper utility is an attractive target for attackers with control of
+physical ports on the device. Disabling this configuration that is supported in
+**Linux 3.9 and greater**.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------------- | ------------------------------ | -------
+Kernel-General-FirmHelper-1 | `CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER` | `n`
+
+
+
+
+
+It doesn't strictly need to be `setuid`, there is an option of shipping firmware
+builtin into kernel without initrd/filesystem.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Enable Kernel Panic on OOPS
+
+When fuzzing the kernel or attempting kernel exploits attackers are likely to
+trigger kernel OOPSes. Setting the behavior on OOPS to PANIC can impede their
+progress.
+
+This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should
+only be enabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------------- | ---------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-PanicOnOOPS-1 | `CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS` | `y`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Disable socket monitoring interface
+
+These monitors can be used to inspect shared file descriptors on Unix Domain
+sockets or traffic on 'localhost' which is otherwise assumed to be confidential.
+
+The `CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater**
+and thus should only be disabled for such versions.
+
+The `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.3 and greater**
+and thus should only be disabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+-------------------------- | -------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-SocketMon-1 | `CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG` | `n`
+Kernel-General-SocketMon-2 | `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable BPF JIT
+
+The BPF JIT can be used to create kernel-payloads from firewall table rules.
+
+This configuration for is supported in **Linux 3.16 and greater** and thus
+should only be disabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ---------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-BPF_JIT-1 | `CONFIG_BPF_JIT` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Enable Enforced Module Signing
+
+The kernel should never allow an unprivileged user the ability to load specific
+kernel modules, since that would provide a facility to unexpectedly extend the
+available attack surface.
+
+To protect against even privileged users, systems may need to either disable
+module loading entirely, or provide signed modules (e.g.
+`CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE`, or dm-crypt with LoadPin), to keep from having root
+load arbitrary kernel code via the module loader interface.
+
+This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should
+only be enabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | ------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-1 | `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE` | `y`
+
+
+
+It is also possible to block the loading of modules after startup with
+"kernel.modules_disabled".
+
+
+
+Domain | `Variable` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | ------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-2 | `kernel.modules_disabled` | `1`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Disable all USB, PCMCIA (and other `hotplug` bus) drivers that aren't needed
+
+To reduce the attack surface, the driver enumeration, probe, and operation
+happen in the kernel. The driver data is parsed by the kernel, so any logic bugs
+in these drivers can become kernel exploits.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | _State_
+------------------------ | ------------------- | ----------
+Kernel-General-Drivers-1 | `USB` | _Disabled_
+Kernel-General-Drivers-2 | `PCMCIA` | _Disabled_
+Kernel-General-Drivers-3 | Other `hotplug` bus | _Disabled_
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Position Independent Executables
+
+
+
+Domain | Improvement
+-------------------------------- | -----------------------------
+Kernel-General-IndependentExec-1 | Kernel or/and platform part ?
+
+
+
+
+
+Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_
+-------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | --------
+Kernel-General-IndependentExec-1 | `-pie -fpic` | _Enable_
+
+
+
+Produce a position independent executable on targets which supports it.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Prevent Overwrite Attacks
+
+`-z,relro` linking option helps during program load, several ELF memory sections
+need to be written by the linker, but can be turned read-only before turning
+over control to the program. This prevents some Global Offset Table GOT
+overwrite attacks, or in the dtors section of the ELF binary.
+
+
+
+Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_
+--------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | --------
+Kernel-General-OverwriteAttacks-1 | `-z,relro` | _Enable_
+Kernel-General-OverwriteAttacks-2 | `-z,now` | _Enable_
+
+
+
+During program load, all dynamic symbols are resolved, allowing for the complete
+GOT to be marked read-only (due to `-z relro` above). This prevents GOT
+overwrite attacks. For very large application, this can incur some performance
+loss during initial load while symbols are resolved, but this shouldn't be an
+issue for daemons.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Library linking
+
+
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------------------------- | ---------------
+Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Keep this part?
+
+
+
+It is recommended that dynamic linking should generally not be allowed. This
+will avoid the user from replacing a library with malicious library.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+------------------------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------
+Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Dynamic linking | Should generally not be allowed.
+
+Linking everything statically doesn't change anything wrt security as binaries
+will live under same user:group as libraries and setuid executables ignore
+`LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH`. It also increases RSS footprint and creates
+problems with upgrading.
+
+# Memory
+
+## Restrict access to kernel memory
+
+The /dev/kmem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to kernel virtual memory.
+This can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would
+have direct access to kernel virtual memory.
+
+To disable the /dev/kmem file, which is very infrequently used by applications,
+the following kernel option should be set in the compile-time kernel
+configuration:
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | ---------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-RestrictAccess-1 | `CONFIG_DEVKMEM` | `n`
+
+In case applications in userspace need /dev/kmem support, it should be available
+only for authenticated applications.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable access to a kernel core dump
+
+This kernel configuration disables access to a kernel core dump from user space.
+If enabled, it gives attackers a useful view into kernel memory.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-CoreDump-1 | `CONFIG_PROC_KCORE` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable swap
+
+If not disabled, attackers can enable swap at runtime, add pressure to the
+memory subsystem and then scour the pages written to swap for useful
+information.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+-------------------- | ------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-Swap-1 | `CONFIG_SWAP` | `n`
+
+
+
+
+
+- Enabling swap at runtime require `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`.
+- Swap block device is usually under root:disk.
+- Linux never swaps kernel pages.
+- If swap disabling is not possible, swap encryption should be enabled.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Disable "Load All Symbols"
+
+There is a /proc/kallsyms file which exposes the kernel memory space address of
+many kernel symbols (functions, variables, etc...). This information is useful
+to attackers in identifying kernel versions/configurations and in preparing
+payloads for the exploits of kernel space.
+
+Both `KALLSYMS_ALL` and `KALLSYMS` shall be disabled;
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | --------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-LoadAllSymbols-1 | `CONFIG_KALLSYMS` | `n`
+Kernel-Memory-LoadAllSymbols-2 | `CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Stack protection
+
+To prevent stack-smashing, similar to the stack protector used for ELF programs
+in user-space, the kernel can protect its internal stacks as well.
+
+This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.11 and greater** and thus should
+only be enabled for such versions.
+
+This configuration also requires building the kernel with the **gcc compiler 4.2
+or greater**.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------- | -------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-Stack-1 | `CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR` | `y`
+
+
+
+Other defenses include things like shadow stacks.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable access to /dev/mem
+
+The /dev/mem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to physical memory. This
+can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would have
+direct access to physical memory through this convenient device file. It may not
+always be possible to disable such file, as some applications might need such
+support. In that case, then this device file should be available only for
+authenticated applications.
+
+This configuration is supported in **Linux 4.0 and greater** and thus should
+only be disabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-Access-1 | `CONFIG_DEVMEM` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Disable cross-memory attach
+
+Disable the process_vm_*v syscalls which allow one process to peek/poke the
+virtual memory of another.
+
+This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should
+only be disabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | --------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-CrossMemAttach-1 | `CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Stack Smashing Attacks
+
+
+
+Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_
+----------------------------- | ------------------------------- | --------
+Kernel-Memory-StackSmashing-1 | `-fstack-protector-all` | _Enable_
+
+
+
+Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack smashing attacks.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Detect Buffer Overflows
+
+Domain | `compiler` options and `config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | -------
+Kernel-Memory-BufferOverflows-1 | `-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE` | `2`
+Kernel-Memory-BufferOverflows-2 | `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE` | `y`
+
+Helps detect some buffer overflow errors.
+
+# Serial
+
+## Disable serial console
+
+The serial console should be disabled to prevent an attacker from accessing this
+powerful interface.
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ---------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-1 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_8250` | `n`
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-2 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE` | `n`
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-3 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE` | `n`
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-4 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE_CONSOLE` | `n`
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Bake-in the kernel command-line
+
+The kernel command-line is used to control many aspects of the booting kernel,
+and is prone to tampering as they are passed in RAM with little to no reverse
+validation on these parameters. To prevent this type of attack, the kernel shall
+be configured to ignore commands line arguments, and use pre-configured (compile
+time) options instead.
+
+Set the kernel command line in the `CONFIG_CMDLINE KConfig` item and then pass
+no arguments from the bootloader.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+----------------------------- | ------------------------- | -----------------------------------
+Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-1 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL` | `y`
+Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-2 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE` | `"insert kernel command line here"`
+Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-3 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE` | `y`
+
+
+
+It is recommended that any per-device settings (e.g: MAC addresses, serial
+numbers, etc.) be stored and accessed from read-only memory (or files), and that
+any such parameters be verified (signature checking) prior to their use.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable KGDB
+
+The Linux kernel supports KGDB over USB and console ports. These mechanisms are
+controlled by the `kgdbdbgp` and `kgdboc` kernel command-line parameters. It is
+important to ensure that no shipping product contains a kernel with KGDB
+compiled-in.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | ------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-KDBG-1 | `CONFIG_KGDB` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable magic sysrq support
+
+On a few architectures, you can access a powerful debugger interface from the
+keyboard. The same powerful interface can be present on the serial console
+(responding to serial break) of Linux on other architectures. Disable to avoid
+potentially exposing this powerful backdoor.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+----------------------- | -------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-SysRQ-1 | `CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable support for binary formats other than ELF
+
+This will make possible to plug wrapper-driven binary formats into the kernel.
+It enables support for binary formats other than ELF. Providing the ability to
+use alternate interpreters would assist an attacker in discovering attack
+vectors.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | -------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-BinaryFormat-1 | `CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC` | `n`
+
+# Debug
+
+No debuggers shall be present on the file system. This includes, but is not
+limited to, the GNU Debugger client/server (commonly known in their short form
+names such as the `gdb` and `gdbserver` executable binaries respectively), the
+`LLDB` next generation debugger or the `TCF` (Target Communications Framework)
+agnostic framework. Including these binaries as part of the file system will
+facilitate an attacker's ability to reverse engineer and debug (either locally
+or remotely) any process that is currently executing on the device.
+
+## Kernel debug symbols
+
+Debug symbols should always be removed from production kernels as they provide a
+lot of information to attackers.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | ------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Symbols-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` | `n`
+
+
+
+These kernel debug symbols are enabled by other config items in the kernel. Care
+should be taken to disable those also. If `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` cannot be
+disabled, then enabling `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` is second best.
+
+
+
+At least `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` should be always enabled for developers to
+convert addresses in oops messages to line numbers.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable Kprobes
+
+Kprobes enables you to dynamically break into any kernel routine and collect
+debugging and performance information non-disruptively. You can trap at almost
+any kernel code address, specifying a handler routine to be invoked when the
+breakpoint is hit.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | ---------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Kprobes-1 | `CONFIG_KPROBES` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable Tracing
+
+FTrace enables the kernel to trace every kernel function. Providing kernel trace
+functionality would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Tracing-1 | `CONFIG_FTRACE` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable Profiling
+
+Profiling and OProfile enables profiling the whole system, include the kernel,
+kernel modules, libraries, and applications. Providing profiling functionality
+would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ------------------ | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Profiling-1 | `CONFIG_OPROFILE` | `n`
+Kernel-Debug-Profiling-2 | `CONFIG_PROFILING` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable OOPS print on BUG()
+
+The output from OOPS print can be helpful in Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+when trying to determine the effectiveness of an exploit.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-OOPSOnBUG-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable Kernel Debugging
+
+There are development-only branches of code in the kernel enabled by the
+`DEBUG_KERNEL` conf. This should be disabled to compile-out these branches.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------ | --------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Dev-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL` | `n`
+Kernel-Debug-Dev-2 | `CONFIG_EMBEDDED` | `n`
+
+
+
+In some kernel versions, disabling this requires also disabling
+`CONFIG_EMBEDDED`, and `CONFIG_EXPERT`. Disabling `CONFIG_EXPERT` makes it
+impossible to disable `COREDUMP`, `DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE`, `NAMESPACES`, `KALLSYMS`
+and `BUG`. In which case it is better to leave this enabled than enable the
+others.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Disable the kernel debug filesystem
+
+The kernel debug filesystem presents a lot of useful information and means of
+manipulation of the kernel to an attacker.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------- | ----------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-FileSystem-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_FS` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable BUG() support
+
+The kernel will display backtrace and register information for BUGs and WARNs in
+kernel space, making it easier for attackers to develop exploits.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------ | ------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-BUG-1 | `CONFIG_BUG` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Disable core dumps
+
+Core dumps provide a lot of debug information for hackers. So disabling core
+dumps are recommended in production builds.
+
+This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should
+only be disabled for such versions.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ----------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-CoreDumps-1 | `CONFIG_COREDUMP` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Kernel Address Display Restriction
+
+When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for kernel
+vulnerabilities, they frequently need to know the location of internal kernel
+structures. By treating kernel addresses as sensitive information, those
+locations are not visible to regular local users.
+
+**/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict is set to "1"** to block the reporting of known
+kernel address leaks.
+
+
+
+Domain | `File` name | `Value`
+---------------------------- | -------------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict` | `1`
+
+
+
+Additionally, various files and directories should be readable only by the root
+user: `/boot/vmlinuz*`, `/boot/System.map*`, `/sys/kernel/debug/`,
+`/proc/slabinfo`
+
+
+
+Domain | `File` or `Directorie` name | _State_
+---------------------------- | --------------------------- | -----------------------------
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-1 | `/boot/vmlinuz*` | _Readable Only for root user_
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-2 | `/boot/System.map*` | _Readable Only for root user_
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-3 | `/sys/kernel/debug/` | _Readable Only for root user_
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-4 | `/proc/slabinfo` | _Readable Only for root user_
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## DMESG Restrictions
+
+When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for vulnerabilities, they
+frequently will use `dmesg` output. By treating `dmesg` output as sensitive
+information, this output is not available to the attacker.
+
+**/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict can be set to "1"** to treat dmesg output as
+sensitive.
+
+
+
+Domain | `File` name | `Value`
+-------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-DMESG-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict` | `1`
+
+
+
+Enable the below compiler and linker options when building user-space
+applications to avoid stack smashing, buffer overflow attacks.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Disable /proc/config.gz
+
+It is extremely important to not expose the kernel configuration used on a
+production device to a potential attacker. With access to the kernel config, it
+could be possible for an attacker to build a custom kernel for the device that
+may disable critical security features.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------- | ----------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Config-1 | `CONFIG_IKCONFIG` | `n`
+
+# File System
+
+## Disable all file systems not needed
+
+To reduce the attack surface, file system data is parsed by the kernel, so any
+logic bugs in file system drivers can become kernel exploits.
+
+### Disable NFS file system
+
+NFS FileSystems are useful during development phases, but this can be a very
+helpful way for an attacker to get files when you are in production mode, so we
+must disable them.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-FileSystems-NFS-1 | `CONFIG_NFSD` | `n`
+Kernel-FileSystems-NFS-2 | `CONFIG_NFS_FS` | `n`
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Partition Mount Options
+
+There are several security restrictions that can be set on a filesystem when it
+is mounted. Some common security options include, but are not limited to:
+
+`nosuid` - Do not allow set-user-identifier or set-group-identifier bits to take
+effect.
+
+`nodev` - Do not interpret character or block special devices on the filesystem.
+
+`noexec` - Do not allow execution of any binaries on the mounted filesystem.
+
+`ro` - Mount filesystem as read-only.
+
+The following flags shall be used for mounting common filesystems:
+
+
+
+Domain | `Partition` | `Value`
+-------------------------- | ------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-1 | `/boot` | `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-2 | `/var` & `/tmp` | In `/etc/fstab` or `vfstab`, add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-3 | _Non-root local_ | If type is `ext2` or `ext3` and mount point not '/', add `nodev`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-4 | _Removable storage_ | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-5 | _Temporary storage_ | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-6 | `/dev/shm` | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-7 | `/dev` | Add `nosuid` and `noexec`.
+
+
+
+If `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` is set, then the kernel will mount /dev and will not
+apply the `nosuid`, `noexec` options. Either disable `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` or
+add a remount with `noexec` and `nosuid` options to system startup.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_ or `Value`
+-------------------------- | ----------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-1 | `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` | _Disabled_ or add remount with `noexec` and `nosuid` to system startup. \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/06_Platform.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/06_Platform.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2112fdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/06_Platform.md
@@ -0,0 +1,921 @@
+---
+title: Platform
+---
+
+The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL**
+compliant applications and services. The platform includes the following
+software:
+
+- Linux **BSP** configured for reference boards.
+- Proprietary device drivers for common peripherals on reference boards.
+- Application framework.
+- Windows/layer management (graphics).
+- Sound resource management.
+- An atomic software update system (chapter Update).
+- Building and debug tools (based on Yocto project).
+
+
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------------- | --------------------------------
+Platform-Abstract-1 | Create a graphics and sound part.
+
+
+
+This part focuses on the AGL platform including all tools and techniques used to
+upgrade the security and downgrade the danger. It must be possible to apply the
+two fundamental principles written at the very beginning of the document. First
+of all, security management must remain simple. You must also prohibit
+everything by default, and then define a set of authorization rules. As cases to
+deal with, we must:
+
+- Implement a **MAC** for processes and files.
+- Limit communication between applications (_SystemBus_ and _SystemD_ part).
+- Prohibit all tools used during development mode (_Utilities_ and _Services_
+ part).
+- Manage user capabilities (_Users_ part).
+- Manage application permissions and policies (_AGLFw_ part).
+
+
+
+The tools and concepts used to meet these needs are only examples. Any other
+tool that meets the need can be used.
+
+
+
+In AGL, as in many other embedded systems, different security mechanisms settle
+in the core layers to ensure isolation and data privacy. While the Mandatory
+Access Control layer (**SMACK**) provides global security and isolation, other
+mechanisms like **Cynara** are required to check application's permissions at
+runtime. Applicative permissions (also called "_privileges_") may vary depending
+on the user and the application being run: an application should have access to
+a given service only if it is run by the proper user and if the appropriate
+permissions are granted.
+
+## Discretionary Access Control
+
+**D**iscretionary **A**ccess **C**ontrol (**DAC**) is the traditional Linux
+method of separating users and groups from one another. In a shared environment
+where multiple users have access to a computer or network, Unix IDs have offered
+a way to contain access within privilege areas for individuals, or shared among
+the group or system. The Android system took this one step further, assigning
+new user IDs for each App. This was never the original intention of Linux UIDs,
+but was able to provide Android’s initial security element: the ability to
+sandbox applications.
+
+Although AGL mentions use of **DAC** for security isolation, the weight of the
+security responsibility lies in the **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol
+(**MAC**) and **Cynara**. Furthermore, there are system services with unique
+UIDs. however,the system does not go to the extreme of Android, where every
+application has its own UID. All sandboxing (app isolation) in AGL is handled in
+the **MAC** contexts.
+
+## Mandatory Access Control
+
+**M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol (**MAC**) is an extension to **DAC**,
+whereby extended attributes (xattr) are associated with the filesystem. In the
+case of AGL, the smackfs filesystem allows files and directories to be
+associated with a SMACK label, providing the ability of further discrimination
+on access control. A SMACK label is a simple null terminated character string
+with a maximum of 255 bytes. While it doesn’t offer the richness of an SELinux
+label, which provides a user, role,type, and level, the simplicity of a single
+value makes the overall design far less complex. There is arguably less chance
+of the security author making mistakes in the policies set forth.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
+
+Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
+------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------
+_ACL_ | **A**ccess **C**ontrol **L**ists
+_alsa_ | **A**dvanced **L**inux **S**ound **A**rchitecture
+_API_ | **A**pplication **P**rogramming **I**nterface
+_AppFw_ | **App**lication **F**rame**w**ork
+_BSP_ | **B**oard **S**upport **P**ackage
+_Cap_ | **Cap**abilities
+_DAC_ | **D**iscretionary **A**ccess **C**ontrol
+_DDOS_ | **D**istributed **D**enial **O**f **S**ervice
+_DOS_ | **D**enial **O**f **S**ervice
+_IPC_ | **I**nter-**P**rocess **C**ommunication
+_MAC_ | **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol
+_PAM_ | **P**luggable **A**uthentication **M**odules
+_SMACK_ | **S**implified **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol **K**ernel
+
+# Mandatory Access Control
+
+
+
+We decided to put the **MAC** protection on the platform part despite the fact
+that it applies to the kernel too, since its use will be mainly at the platform
+level (except floor part).
+
+
+
+**M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol (**MAC**) is a protection provided by the
+Linux kernel that requires a **L**inux **S**ecurity **M**odule (**LSM**). AGL
+uses an **LSM** called **S**implified **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol
+**K**ernel (**SMACK**). This protection involves the creation of **SMACK**
+labels as part of the extended attributes **SMACK** labels to the file extended
+attributes. And a policy is also created to define the behaviour of each label.
+
+The kernel access controls is based on these labels and this policy. If there is
+no rule, no access will be granted and as a consequence, what is not explicitly
+authorized is forbidden.
+
+There are two types of **SMACK** labels:
+
+- **Execution SMACK** (Attached to the process): Defines how files are
+ _accessed_ and _created_ by that process.
+- **File Access SMACK** (Written to the extended attribute of the file): Defines
+ _which_ process can access the file.
+
+By default a process executes with its File Access **SMACK** label unless an
+Execution **SMACK** label is defined.
+
+AGL's **SMACK** scheme is based on the _Tizen 3 Q2/2015_. It divides the System
+into the following domains:
+
+- Floor.
+- System.
+- Applications, Services and User.
+
+See [AGL security framework
+review](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMMQ1Tokyo/AGL-security-framework-review.pdf)
+and [Smack White
+Paper](http://schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf)
+for more information.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Floor
+
+The _floor_ domain includes the base system services and any associated data and
+libraries. This data remains unchanged at runtime. Writing to floor files or
+directories is allowed only in development mode or during software installation
+or upgrade.
+
+The following table details the _floor_ domain:
+
+Label | Name | Execution **SMACK** | File Access **SMACK**
+----- | ----- | ------------------- | ---------------------------------------
+`-` | Floor | `r-x` for all | Only kernel and internal kernel thread.
+`^` | Hat | `---` for all | `rx` on all domains.
+`*` | Star | `rwx` for all | None
+
+
+
+- The Hat label is Only for privileged system services (currently only
+ systemd-journal). Useful for backup or virus scans. No file with this label
+ should exist except in the debug log.
+
+- The Star label is used for device files or `/tmp` Access restriction managed
+ via **DAC**. Individual files remain protected by their **SMACK** label.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Label` name | Recommendations
+------------------ | ------------ | -----------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-MAC-Floor-1 | `^` | Only for privileged system services.
+Kernel-MAC-Floor-2 | `*` | Used for device files or `/tmp` Access restriction via DAC.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## System
+
+The _system_ domain includes a reduced set of core system services of the OS and
+any associated data. This data may change at runtime.
+
+The following table details the _system_ domain:
+
+Label | Name | Execution **SMACK** | File Access **SMACK**
+---------------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------------- | ---------------------
+`System` | System | None | Privileged processes
+`System::Run` | Run | `rwxatl` for User and System label | None
+`System::Shared` | Shared | `rwxatl` for system domain `r-x` for User label | None
+`System::Log` | Log | `rwa` for System label `xa` for user label | None
+`System::Sub` | SubSystem | Subsystem Config files | SubSystem only
+
+
+
+Domain | `Label` name | Recommendations
+------------------- | ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-MAC-System-1 | `System` | Process should write only to file with transmute attribute.
+Kernel-MAC-System-2 | `System::run` | Files are created with the directory label from user and system domain (transmute) Lock is implicit with `w`.
+Kernel-MAC-System-3 | `System::Shared` | Files are created with the directory label from system domain (transmute) User domain has locked privilege.
+Kernel-MAC-System-4 | `System::Log` | Some limitation may impose to add `w` to enable append.
+Kernel-MAC-System-5 | `System::Sub` | Isolation of risky Subsystem.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Applications, Services and User
+
+The _application_, _services_ and _user_ domain includes code that provides
+services to the system and user, as well as any associated data. All code
+running on this domain is under _Cynara_ control.
+
+The following table details the _application_, _services_ and _user_ domain:
+
+Label | Name | Execution **SMACK** | File Access **SMACK**
+------------------- | ------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------
+`User::Pkg::$AppID` | AppID | `rwx` (for files created by the App). `rx` for files installed by **AppFw** | $App runtime executing $App
+`User::Home` | Home | `rwx-t` from System label `r-x-l` from App | None
+`User::App-Shared` | Shared | `rwxat` from System and User domains label of $User | None
+
+
+
+Domain | `Label` name | Recommendations
+------------------- | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-MAC-System-1 | `User::Pkg::$AppID` | Only one Label is allowed per App. A data directory is created by the AppFw in `rwx` mode.
+Kernel-MAC-System-2 | `User::Home` | AppFw needs to create a directory in `/home/$USER/App-Shared` at first launch if not present with label app-data access is `User::App-Shared` without transmute.
+Kernel-MAC-System-3 | `User::App-Shared` | Shared space between all App running for a given user.
+
+
+
+## Attack Vectors
+
+There are 4 major components to the system:
+
+- The LSM kernel module.
+- The `smackfs` filesystem.
+- Basic utilities for policy management and checking.
+- The policy/configuration data.
+
+As with any mandatory access system, the policy management needs to be carefully
+separated from the checking, as the management utilities can become a convenient
+point of attack. Dynamic additions to the policy system need to be carefully
+verified, as the ability to update the policies is often needed, but introduces
+a possible threat. Finally, even if the policy management is well secured, the
+policy checking and failure response to that checking is also of vital
+importance to the smooth operation of the system.
+
+While **MAC** is a certainly a step up in security when compared to DAC, there
+are still many ways to compromise a SMACK-enabled Linux system. Some of these
+ways are as follows:
+
+- Disabling SMACK at invocation of the kernel (with command-line:
+ security=none).
+- Disabling SMACK in the kernel build and redeploying the kernel.
+- Changing a SMACK attribute of a file or directory at install time.
+- Tampering with a process with the CAP_MAC_ADMIN privilege.
+- Setting/Re-setting the SMACK label of a file.
+- Tampering with the default domains (i.e.
+ /etc/smack/accesses.d/default-access-domains).
+- Disabling or tampering with the SMACK filesystem (i.e. /smackfs).
+- Adding policies with `smackload` (adding the utility if not present).
+- Changing labels with `chsmack` (adding the utility if not present).
+
+# SystemD
+
+`afm-system-daemon` is used to:
+
+- Manage users and user sessions.
+- Setup applications and services (_CGroups_, _namespaces_, autostart,
+ permissions).
+- Use of `libsystemd` for its programs (event management, **D-Bus** interface).
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+------------------ | -------------- | ------------------------------------
+Platform-SystemD-1 | Security model | Use Namespaces for containerization.
+Platform-SystemD-2 | Security model | Use CGroups to organise processes.
+
+
+
+See [systemd integration and user
+management](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMM-Dresden/AGL-systemd.pdf) for
+more information.
+
+## Benefits
+
+- Removal of one privileged process: **afm-user-daemon**
+- Access and use of high level features:
+
+ - Socket activation.
+ - Management of users and integration of **PAM**.
+ - Dependency resolution to services.
+ - `Cgroups` and resource control.
+ - `Namespaces` containerization.
+ - Autostart of required API.
+ - Permissions and security settings.
+ - Network management.
+
+
+
+## CGroups
+
+Control Groups offer a lot of features, with the most useful ones you can
+control: Memory usage, how much CPU time is allocated, how much device I/O is
+allowed or which devices can be accessed. **SystemD** uses _CGroups_ to organise
+processes (each service is a _CGroups_, and all processes started by that
+service use that _CGroups_). By default, **SystemD** automatically creates a
+hierarchy of slice, scope and service units to provide a unified structure for
+the _CGroups_ tree. With the `systemctl` command, you can further modify this
+structure by creating custom slices. Currently, in AGL, there are 2 slices
+(**user.slice** and **system.slice**).
+
+## Namespaces
+
+### User side
+
+There are several ways of authenticating users (Key Radio Frequency, Phone,
+Gesture, ...). Each authentication provides dynamic allocation of **uids** to
+authenticated users. **Uids** is used to ensure privacy of users and **SMACK**
+for applications privacy.
+
+First, the user initiates authentication with **PAM** activation. **PAM**
+Standard offers highly configurable authentication with modular design like face
+recognition, Voice identification or with a password. Then users should access
+identity services with services and applications.
+
+# D-Bus
+
+D-Bus is a well-known **IPC** (Inter-Process Communication) protocol (and
+daemon) that helps applications to talk to each other. The use of D-Bus is great
+because it allows to implement discovery and signaling.
+
+The D-Bus session is by default addressed by environment variable
+`DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS`. Using **systemd** variable
+`DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS` is automatically set for user sessions. D-Bus usage
+is linked to permissions.
+
+D-Bus has already had several [security
+issues](https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-13442/D-bus-Project.html)
+(mostly **DoS** issues), to allow applications to keep talking to each other. It
+is important to protect against this type of attack to keep the system more
+stable.
+
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+--------------- | -------------- | ------------------------------------
+Platform-DBus-1 | Security model | Use D-Bus as IPC.
+Platform-DBus-2 | Security model | Apply D-BUS security patches: [D-Bus CVE](https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-13442/D-bus-Project.html)
+
+
+
+# System services and daemons
+
+
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------------- | -----------
+Platform-Services-1 | SystemD ?
+Platform-Services-2 | Secure daemon ?
+
+
+
+## Tools
+
+- **connman**: An internet connection manager designed to be slim and to use as
+ few resources as possible. It is a fully modular system that can be extended,
+ through plug-ins, to support all kinds of wired or wireless technologies.
+- **bluez** is a Bluetooth stack. Its goal is to program an implementation of
+ the Bluetooth wireless standards specifications. In addition to the basic
+ stack, the `bluez-utils` and `bluez-firmware` packages contain low level
+ utilities such as `dfutool` which can interrogate the Bluetooth adapter
+ chipset in order to determine whether its firmware can be upgraded.
+- **gstreamer** is a pipeline-based multimedia framework. It can be used to
+ build a system that reads files in one format, processes them, and exports
+ them in another format.
+- **alsa** is a software framework and part of the Linux kernel that provides an
+ **API** for sound card device drivers.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Tool` name | _State_
+-------------------- | ----------- | -------
+Platform-Utilities-1 | `connman` | _Used_ as a connection manager.
+Platform-Utilities-2 | `bluez` | _Used_ as a Bluetooth manager.
+Platform-Utilities-3 | `gstreamer` | _Used_ to manage multimedia file format.
+Platform-Utilities-4 | `alsa` | _Used_ to provides an API for sound card device drivers.
+
+
+
+# Application framework/model (**AppFw**)
+
+The AGL application framework consists of several inter-working parts:
+
+- **SMACK**: The kernel level **LSM** (**L**inux **S**ecurity **M**odule) that
+ performs extended access control of the system.
+- **Cynara**: the native gatekeeper daemon used for policy handling, updating to
+ the database and policy checking.
+- Security Manager: a master service, through which all security events are
+ intended to take place.
+- Several native application framework utilities: `afm-main-binding`,
+ `afm-user-daemon`, `afm-system-daemon`.
+
+The application framework manages:
+
+- The applications and services management: Installing, Uninstalling, Listing,
+ ...
+- The life cycle of applications: Start -> (Pause, Resume) -> Stop.
+- Events and signals propagation.
+- Privileges granting and checking.
+- API for interaction with applications.
+
+
+
+- The **security model** refers to the security model used to ensure security
+ and to the tools that are provided for implementing that model. It's an
+ implementation detail that should not impact the layers above the application
+ framework.
+
+- The **security model** refers to how **DAC** (**D**iscretionary **A**ccess
+ **C**ontrol), **MAC** (Mandatory Access Control) and `Capabilities` are used
+ by the system to ensure security and privacy. It also includes features of
+ reporting using audit features and by managing logs and alerts.
+
+
+
+The **AppFw** uses the security model to ensure the security and the privacy of
+the applications that it manages. It must be compliant with the underlying
+security model. But it should hide it to the applications.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------
+Platform-AGLFw-AppFw-1 | Security model | Use the AppFw as Security model.
+
+
+
+See [AGL AppFw Privileges
+Management](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/devguides/en/dev/reference/iotbzh2016/appfw/03-AGL-AppFW-Privileges-Management.pdf)
+and [AGL - Application Framework
+Documentation](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf)
+for more information.
+
+
+
+The Security Manager communicates policy information to **Cynara**, which
+retains information in its own database in the format of a text file with
+comma-separated values (CSV). There are provisions to retain a copy of the CSV
+text file when the file is being updated.
+
+Runtime checking occurs through **Cynara**. Each application that is added to
+the framework has its own instantiation of a SMACK context and D-bus bindings.
+The afb_daemon and Binder form a web-service that is communicated to through
+http or a websocket from the application-proper. This http or websocket
+interface uses a standard unique web token for API communication.
+
+![Application Framework Flow](images/App-flow.png)
+
+## Cynara
+
+There's a need for another mechanism responsible for checking applicative
+permissions: Currently in AGL, this task depends on a policy-checker service
+(**Cynara**).
+
+- Stores complex policies in databases.
+- "Soft" security (access is checked by the framework).
+
+Cynara interact with **D-Bus** in order to deliver this information.
+
+Cynara consists of several parts:
+
+- Cynara: a daemon for controlling policies and responding to access control
+ requests.
+- Database: a spot to hold policies.
+- Libraries: several static and dynamic libraries for communicating with Cynara.
+
+The daemon communicates to the libraries over Unix domain sockets. The database
+storage format is a series of CSV-like files with an index file.
+
+There are several ways that an attacker can manipulate policies of the Cynara
+system:
+
+- Disable Cynara by killing the process.
+- Tamper with the Cynara binary on-disk or in-memory.
+- Corrupt the database controlled by Cynara.
+- Tamper with the database controlled by Cynara.
+- Highjack the communication between Cynara and the database.
+
+The text-based database is the weakest part of the system and although there are
+some consistency mechanisms in place (i.e. the backup guard), these mechanisms
+are weak at best and can be countered by an attacker very easily.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------------- | ----------- | -------------------------------------
+Platform-AGLFw-Cynara-1 | Permissions | Use Cynara as policy-checker service.
+
+
+
+### Policies
+
+- Policy rules:
+
+ - Are simple - for pair [application context, privilege] there is straight
+ answer (single Policy Type): [ALLOW / DENY / ...].
+ - No code is executed (no script).
+ - Can be easily cached and managed.
+
+- Application context (describes id of the user and the application credentials)
+ It is build of:
+
+ - UID of the user that runs the application.
+ - **SMACK** label of application.
+
+## Holding policies
+
+Policies are kept in buckets. Buckets are set of policies which have additional
+a property of default answer, the default answer is yielded if no policy matches
+searched key. Buckets have names which might be used in policies (for
+directions).
+
+## Attack Vectors
+
+The following attack vectors are not completely independent. While attackers may
+have varying levels of access to an AGL system, experience has shown that a
+typical attack can start with direct access to a system, find the
+vulnerabilities, then proceed to automate the attack such that it can be invoked
+from less accessible standpoint (e.g. remotely). Therefore, it is important to
+assess all threat levels, and protect the system appropriately understanding
+that direct access attacks are the door-way into remote attacks.
+
+### Remote Attacks
+
+The local web server interface used for applications is the first point of
+attack, as web service APIs are well understood and easily intercepted. The
+local web server could potentially be exploited by redirecting web requests
+through the local service and exploiting the APIs. While there is the use of a
+security token on the web service API, this is weak textual matching at best.
+This will not be difficult to spoof. It is well known that [API Keys do not
+provide any real security](http://nordicapis.com/why-api-keys-are-not-enough/).
+
+It is likely that the architectural inclusion of an http / web-service interface
+provided the most flexibility for applications to be written natively or in
+HTML5. However, this flexibility may trade-off with security concerns. For
+example, if a native application were linked directly to the underlying
+framework services, there would be fewer concerns over remote attacks coming
+through the web-service interface.
+
+Leaving the interface as designed, mitigations to attacks could include further
+securing the interface layer with cryptographic protocols: e.g. encrypted
+information passing, key exchange (e.g. Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman).
+
+### User-level Native Attacks
+
+- Modifying the CSV data-base
+- Modifying the SQLite DB
+- Tampering with the user-level binaries
+- Tampering with the user daemons
+- Spoofing the D-bus Interface
+- Adding executables/libraries
+
+With direct access to the device, there are many security concerns on the native
+level. For example, as **Cynara** uses a text file data-base with
+comma-separated values (CSV), an attacker could simply modify the data-base to
+escalate privileges of an application. Once a single application has all the
+privileges possible on the system, exploits can come through in this manner.
+Similarly the SQLite database used by the Security Manager is not much different
+than a simple text file. There are many tools available to add, remove, modify
+entries in an SQLite data-base.
+
+On the next level, a common point of attack is to modify binaries or daemons for
+exploiting functionality. There are many Linux tools available to aid in this
+regard, including: [IDA Pro](https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/index.shtml),
+and [radare2](https://rada.re/r/). With the ability to modify binaries, an
+attacker can do any number of activities including: removing calls to security
+checks, redirecting control to bypass verification functionality, ignoring
+security policy handling, escalating privileges, etc.
+
+Additionally, another attack vector would be to spoof the D-bus interface. D-bus
+is a message passing system built upon Inter-Process Communication (IPC), where
+structured messages are passed based upon a protocol. The interface is generic
+and well documented. Therefore, modifying or adding binaries/libraries to spoof
+this interface is a relatively straight-forward process. Once the interface has
+been spoofed, the attacker can issue any number of commands that lead into
+control of low-level functionality.
+
+Protecting a system from native attacks requires a methodical approach. First,
+the system should reject processes that are not sanctioned to run.
+Signature-level verification at installation time will help in this regard, but
+run-time integrity verification is much better. Signatures need to originate
+from authorized parties, which is discussed further in a later section on the
+Application Store.
+
+On the next level, executables should not be allowed to do things where they
+have not been granted permission. DAC and SMACK policies can help in this
+regard. On the other hand, there remain concerns with memory accesses, system
+calls, and other process activity that may go undetected. For this reason, a
+secure environment which monitors all activity can give indication of all
+unauthorized activity on the system.
+
+Finally, it is very difficult to catch attacks of direct tampering in a system.
+These types of attacks require a defense-in-depth approach, where complementary
+software protection and hardening techniques are needed. Tamper-resistance and
+anti-reverse-engineering technologies include program
+transformations/obfuscation, integrity verification, and white-box cryptography.
+If applied in a mutually-dependent fashion and considering performance/security
+tradeoffs, the approach can provide an effective barrier to direct attacks to
+the system. Furthermore, the use of threat monitoring provides a valuable
+telemetry/analytics capability and the ability to react and renew a system under
+attack.
+
+### Root-level Native Attacks
+
+- Tampering the system daemon
+- Tampering Cynara
+- Tampering the security manager
+- Disabling SMACK
+- Tampering the kernel
+
+Once root-level access (i.e. su) has been achieved on the device, there are many
+ways to compromise the system. The system daemon, **Cynara**, and the security
+manager are vulnerable to tampering attacks. For example, an executable can be
+modified in memory to jam a branch, jump to an address, or disregard a check.
+This can be as simple as replacing a branch instruction with a NOP, changing a
+memory value, or using a debugger (e.g. gdb, IDA) to change an instruction.
+Tampering these executables would mean that policies can be ignored and
+verification checks can be bypassed.
+
+Without going so far as to tamper an executable, the **SMACK** system is also
+vulnerable to attack. For example, if the kernel is stopped and restarted with
+the *security=none* flag, then SMACK is not enabled. Furthermore, `systemd`
+starts the loading of **SMACK** rules during start-up. If this start-up process
+is interfered with, then **SMACK** will not run. Alternatively, new policies can
+be added with `smackload` allowing unforeseen privileges to alternative
+applications/executables.
+
+Another intrusion on the kernel level is to rebuild the kernel (as it is
+open-source) and replace it with a copy that has **SMACK** disabled, or even
+just the **SMACK** filesystem (`smackfs`) disabled. Without the extended label
+attributes, the **SMACK** system is disabled.
+
+Root-level access to the device has ultimate power, where the entire system can
+be compromised. More so, a system with this level access allows an attacker to
+craft a simpler *point-attack* which can operate on a level requiring fewer
+privileges (e.g. remote access, user-level access).
+
+## Vulnerable Resources
+
+### Resource: `afm-user-daemon`
+
+The `afm-user-daemon` is in charge of handling applications on behalf of a user.
+Its main tasks are:
+
+- Enumerate applications that the end user can run and keep this list available
+ on demand.
+- Start applications on behalf of the end user, set user running environment,
+ set user security context.
+- List current runnable or running applications.
+- Stop (aka pause), continue (aka resume), terminate a running instance of a
+ given application.
+- Transfer requests for installation/uninstallation of applications to the
+ corresponding system daemon afm-system-daemon.
+
+The `afm-user-daemon` launches applications. It builds a secure environment for
+the application before starting it within that environment. Different kinds of
+applications can be launched, based on a configuration file that describes how
+to launch an application of a given kind within a given launching mode: local or
+remote. Launching an application locally means that the application and its
+binder are launched together. Launching an application remotely translates in
+only launching the application binder.
+
+The UI by itself has to be activated remotely by a request (i.e. HTML5
+homescreen in a browser). Once launched, running instances of the application
+receive a `runid` that identifies them. `afm-user-daemon` manages the list of
+applications that it has launched. When owning the right permissions, a client
+can get the list of running instances and details about a specific running
+instance. It can also terminate, stop or continue a given application. If the
+client owns the right permissions, `afm-user-daemon` delegates the task of
+installing and uninstalling applications to `afm-system-daemon`.
+
+`afm-user-daemon` is launched as a `systemd` service attached to a user session.
+Normally, the service file is located at
+/usr/lib/systemd/user/afm-user-daemon.service.
+
+Attacker goals:
+
+- Disable `afm-user-daemon`.
+- Tamper with the `afm-user-daemon` configuration.
+ - /usr/lib/systemd/user/afm-user-daemon.service.
+ - Application(widget) config.xml file.
+ - /etc/afm/afm-launch.conf (launcher configuration).
+
+- Escalate user privileges to gain more access with `afm-user-daemon`.
+- Install malicious application (widget).
+- Tamper with `afm-user-daemon` on disk or in memory.
+
+### Resource: `afm-system-daemon`
+
+The `afm-system-daemon` is in charge of installing applications on the AGL
+system. Its main tasks are:
+
+- Install applications and setup security framework for newly installed
+ applications.
+- Uninstall applications.
+
+`afm-system-daemon` is launched as a `systemd` service attached to system.
+Normally, the service file is located at
+/lib/systemd/system/afm-systemdaemon.service.
+
+Attacker goals:
+
+- Disable `afm-system-daemon`.
+- Tamper with the `afm-system-daemon` configuration.
+- Tamper `afm-system-daemon` on disk or in memory.
+
+### Resource `afb-daemon`
+
+`afb-binder` is in charge of serving resources and features through an HTTP
+interface. `afb-daemon` is in charge of binding one instance of an application
+to the AGL framework and AGL system. The application and its companion binder
+run in a secured and isolated environment set for them. Applications are
+intended to access to AGL system through the binder. `afb-daemon` binders serve
+files through HTTP protocol and offers developers the capability to expose
+application API methods through HTTP or WebSocket protocol.
+
+Binder bindings are used to add APIs to `afb-daemon`. The user can write a
+binding for `afb-daemon`. The binder `afb-daemon` serves multiple purposes:
+
+1. It acts as a gateway for the application to access the system.
+2. It acts as an HTTP server for serving files to HTML5 applications.
+3. It allows HTML5 applications to have native extensions subject to security
+ enforcement for accessing hardware resources or for speeding up parts of
+ algorithm.
+
+Attacker goals:
+
+- Break from isolation.
+- Disable `afb-daemon`.
+- Tamper `afb-demon` on disk or in memory.
+- Tamper **capabilities** by creating/installing custom bindings for
+ `afb-daemon`.
+
+# Utilities
+
+- **busybox**: Software that provides several stripped-down Unix tools in a
+ single executable file. Of course, it will be necessary to use a "production"
+ version of **busybox** in order to avoid all the tools useful only in
+ development mode.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Tool` name | _State_
+-------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Platform-Utilities-1 | `busybox` | _Used_ to provide a number of tools. Do not compile development tools.
+
+
+
+## Functionalities to exclude in production mode
+
+In production mode, a number of tools must be disabled to prevent an attacker
+from finding logs for example. This is useful to limit the visible surface and
+thus complicate the fault finding process. The tools used only in development
+mode are marked by an '**agl-devel**' feature. When building in production mode,
+these tools will not be compiled.
+
+
+
+Domain | `Utility` name and normal `path` | _State_
+--------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- | ----------
+Platform-Utilities-1 | `chgrp` in `/bin/chgrp` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-2 | `chmod` in `/bin/chmod` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-3 | `chown` in `/bin/chown` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-4 | `dmesg` in `/bin/dmesg` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-5 | `Dnsdomainname` in `/bin/dnsdomainname` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-6 | `dropbear`, Remove "dropbear" from `/etc/init.d/rcs` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-7 | `Editors` in (vi) `/bin/vi` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-8 | `find` in `/bin/find` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-9 | `gdbserver` in `/bin/gdbserver` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-10 | `hexdump` in `/bin/hexdump` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-11 | `hostname` in `/bin/hostname` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-12 | `install` in `/bin/install` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-13 | `iostat` in `/bin/iostat` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-14 | `killall` in `/bin/killall` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-15 | `klogd` in `/sbin/klogd` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-16 | `logger` in `/bin/logger` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-17 | `lsmod` in `/sbin/lsmod` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-18 | `pmap` in `/bin/pmap` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-19 | `ps` in `/bin/ps` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-20 | `ps` in `/bin/ps` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-21 | `rpm` in `/bin/rpm` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-22 | `SSH` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-23 | `stbhotplug` in `/sbin/stbhotplug` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-24 | `strace` in `/bin/trace` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-25 | `su` in `/bin/su` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-26 | `syslogd` in (logger) `/bin/logger` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-27 | `top` in `/bin/top` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-28 | `UART` in `/proc/tty/driver/` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-29 | `which` in `/bin/which` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-30 | `who` and `whoami` in `/bin/whoami` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-31 | `awk` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-32 | `cut` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-33 | `df` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-34 | `echo` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-35 | `fdisk` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-36 | `grep` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-37 | `mkdir` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-38 | `mount` (vfat) (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-39 | `printf` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-40 | `sed` in `/bin/sed` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-41 | `tail` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-42 | `tee` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-43 | `test` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+
+
+
+The _Enabled_ Unix/Linux utilities above shall be permitted as they are often
+used in the start-up scripts and for USB logging. If any of these utilities are
+not required by the device then those should be removed.
+
+
+
+# Users
+
+The user policy can group users by function within the car. For example, we can
+consider a driver and his passengers. Each user is assigned to a single group to
+simplify the management of space security.
+
+## Root Access
+
+The main applications, those that provide the principal functionality of the
+embedded device, should not execute with root identity or any capability.
+
+If the main application is allowed to execute at any capability, then the entire
+system is at the mercy of the said application's good behaviour. Problems arise
+when an application is compromised and able to execute commands which could
+consistently and persistently compromise the system by implanting rogue
+applications.
+
+It is suggested that the middleware and the UI should run in a context on a user
+with no capability and all persistent resources should be maintained without any
+capability.
+
+One way to ensure this is by implementing a server-client paradigm. Services
+provided by the system's drivers can be shared this way. The other advantage of
+this approach is that multiple applications can share the same resources at the
+same time.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+--------------------- | ---------------- | -----------------------------------------------------
+Platform-Users-root-1 | Main application | Should not execute as root.
+Platform-Users-root-2 | UI | Should run in a context on a user with no capability.
+
+
+
+Root access should not be allowed for the following utilities:
+
+
+
+Domain | `Utility` name | _State_
+--------------------- | -------------- | -------------
+Platform-Users-root-3 | `login` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-4 | `su` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-5 | `ssh` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-6 | `scp` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-7 | `sftp` | _Not allowed_
+
+
+
+Root access should not be allowed for the console device. The development
+environment should allow users to login with pre-created user accounts.
+
+Switching to elevated privileges shall be allowed in the development environment
+via `sudo`.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Capabilities
+
+
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------------- | ------------------------
+Platform-Users-Capabilities-1 | Kernel or Platform-user?
+Platform-Users-Capabilities-2 | Add config note.
+
+
+
+The goal is to restrict functionality that will not be useful in **AGL**. They
+are integrated into the **LSM**. Each privileged transaction is associated with
+a capability. These capabilities are divided into three groups:
+
+- e: Effective: This means the capability is “activated”.
+- p: Permitted: This means the capability can be used/is allowed.
+- i: Inherited: The capability is kept by child/subprocesses upon execve() for
+ example.
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/07_Application.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/07_Application.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c08d06e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/07_Application.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+title: Application
+---
+
+**Application Hardening**: Best practices to apply to the build and release of
+user space applications, in order to reduce the number of attack surfaces used
+by potential attackers.
+
+The term of Application (App) has a very wide definition in **AGL**. Almost
+anything which is not in the core Operating System (OS) is an Application.
+Applications can be included in the base software package (image) or can be
+added at run-time.
+
+Application containment is achieved using the following protections:
+
+- Linux Native protection
+ - Mandatory Access Control (**MAC**)
+- AGL Platform protections
+ - Origin Tracking and Validation
+ - Application Privilege Management and Enforcement via Cynara
+ - Authenticated Transport via D-Bus
+
+## Application Types
+
+AGL provides a framework for applications to be written in different forms:
+
+- Web application: HTML5 + JavaScript
+- Qt application: in a QML file
+- Native application: in C
+
+While there is no harm in providing multiple types of applications, from a
+security perspective this does increase the attack surface for an intruder. The
+application framework (**AppFw**) consists of a number of utilities and daemons
+which provide context for the applications. Isolation is provided through
+**SMACK** labels.
+
+## Application Store
+
+Although the Tizen system has defined a [system of App signing and signing
+flow](https://wiki.tizen.org/Security/Tizen_3.X_Overview#Application_Singing_and_Certificates)
+to avoid the spread of unauthorized Apps that might contain malware. At this
+point, it is unclear how much of this flow AGL will adopt. However, judging from
+the experience, it is an essential topic. For example, the Google Play Store
+controls the authorization of Apps through signing, and still, there are [many
+accounts of Apps containing malware on the
+store](http://www.eweek.com/mobile/researchers-find-132-malware-infected-android-apps-on-google-play).
+
+Tizen defines 5 levels of certificates and signing at each level, including an
+author, testing distributor, public level store distributor, partner level store
+distributor, and platform level store distributor. AGL may define a different
+number of third parties, but at a minimum an author and store distributor should
+be defined.
+
+![App Signing Flow](images/App_signing_flow.png)
+
+Once the number of signatures has been established, verification of those
+signatures needs to be done at a minimum at installation time on the AGL device.
+It is important to ensure the robustness/integrity of the public key used for
+signature verification. If the public key is modified, then this compromised key
+can be used to verify an attacker's private key signature.
+
+Further to this, installation-time verification is limited. Attacks can happen
+to apps in-memory at runtime. Any modifications made after installation will be
+missed by installation-time verification. Integrity verification that runs
+during execution makes for a more complete security story.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
+
+Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
+------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------
+_3GPP_ | **3**rd **G**eneration **P**artnership **P**roject
+_CASB_ | **C**loud **A**ccess **S**ecurity **B**roker
+_DAST_ | **D**ynamic **A**pplication **S**ecurity **T**esting
+_DPI_ | **D**eep **P**acket **I**nspection
+_IDS_ | **I**ntrusion **D**etection **S**ystems
+_IPS_ | **I**ntrusion **P**revention **S**ystems
+_IPSec_ | **I**nternet **P**rotocol **Sec**urity
+_LSM_ | **L**inux **S**ecurity **M**odule
+_MITM_ | **M**an **I**n **T**he **M**iddle
+_OSI_ | **O**pen **S**ystems **I**nterconnection
+_SATS_ | **S**tatic **A**pplication **S**ecurity **T**esting
+
+# Local
+
+Domain | Improvement
+-------------------------- | ------------------------------
+Application-Installation-1 | Talk about AppFw offline mode.
+
+## Installation
+
+Applications can be delivered and installed with the base image using a special
+offline-mode provided by the **AppFw**. Apps can also be installed at run time.
+
+During early release, default Apps are installed on the image at first boot.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+-------------------------- | --------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Installation-1 | AppFw | Provide offline-mode in order to install app with the base image.
+Application-Installation-2 | Integrity | Allow the installation of applications only if their integrity is good.
+
+# Local
+
+## Privilege Management
+
+Application privileges are managed by **Cynara** and the security manager in the
+**AppFw**. For more details, please refer to the **AppFw** documentation in
+Platform part.
+
+# App Signature
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Signature-1 | Add content (see secure build in Secure development part).
+
+
+# Services
+
+Domain | Improvement
+---------------------- | ------------
+Application-Services-1 | Add content (Which services?).
+Application-Services-2 | Add Binder. \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/08_Connectivity.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/08_Connectivity.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..076c0e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/08_Connectivity.md
@@ -0,0 +1,487 @@
+---
+title: Connectivity
+---
+
+This part shows different Connectivity attacks on the car.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | -----------------
+Connectivity-Abstract-1 | Improve abstract.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
+
+Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
+------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+_ARP_ | **A**ddress **R**esolution **P**rotocol
+_BLE_ | **B**luetooth **L**ow **E**nergy
+_CAN_ | **C**ar **A**rea **N**etwork
+_CCMP_ | **C**ounter-Mode/**C**BC-**M**ac **P**rotocol
+_EDGE_ | **E**nhanced **D**ata **R**ates for **GSM** **E**volution - Evolution of **GPRS**
+_GEA_ | **G**PRS **E**ncryption **A**lgorithm
+_GPRS_ | **G**eneral **P**acket **R**adio **S**ervice (2,5G, 2G+)
+_GSM_ | **G**lobal **S**ystem for **M**obile Communications (2G)
+_HSPA_ | **H**igh **S**peed **P**acket **A**ccess (3G+)
+_IMEI_ | **I**nternational **M**obile **E**quipment **I**dentity
+_LIN_ | **L**ocal **I**nterconnect **N**etwork
+_MOST_ | **M**edia **O**riented **S**ystem **T**ransport
+_NFC_ | **N**ear **F**ield **C**ommunication
+_OBD_ | **O**n-**B**oard **D**iagnostics
+_PATS_ | **P**assive **A**nti-**T**heft **S**ystem
+_PKE_ | **P**assive **K**eyless **E**ntry
+_PSK_ | **P**hase-**S**hift **K**eying
+_RDS_ | **R**adio **D**ata **S**ystem
+_RFID_ | **R**adio **F**requency **I**dentification
+_RKE_ | **R**emote **K**eyless **E**ntry
+_SDR_ | **S**oftware **D**efined **R**adio
+_SSP_ | **S**ecure **S**imple **P**airing
+_TKIP_ | **T**emporal **K**ey **I**ntegrity **P**rotocol
+_TPMS_ | **T**ire **P**ressure **M**onitoring **S**ystem
+_UMTS_ | **U**niversal **M**obile **T**elecommunications **S**ystem (3G)
+_USB_ | **U**niversal **S**erial **B**us
+_WEP_ | **W**ired **E**quivalent **P**rivacy
+_WPA_ | **W**ifi **P**rotected **A**ccess
+
+# Bus
+
+We only speak about the **CAN** bus to take an example, because the different
+attacks on bus like _FlewRay_, _ByteFlight_, _Most_ and _Lin_ use retro
+engineering and the main argument to improve their security is to encrypt data
+packets. We just describe them a bit:
+
+- **CAN**: Controller Area Network, developed in the early 1980s, is an
+ event-triggered controller network for serial communication with data rates up
+ to one MBit/s. **CAN** messages are classified over their respective
+ identifier. **CAN** controller broadcast their messages to all connected nodes
+ and all receiving nodes decide independently if they process the message.
+- **FlewRay**: Is a deterministic and error-tolerant high-speed bus. With a data
+ rate up to 10 MBit/s.
+- **ByteFlight**: Is used for safety-critical applications in motor vehicles
+ like air-bags. Byteflight runs at 10Mbps over 2 or 3 wires plastic optical
+ fibers.
+- **Most**: Media Oriented System Transport, is used for transmitting audio,
+ video, voice, and control data via fiber optic cables. The speed is, for the
+ synchronous way, up to 24 MBit/s and asynchronous way up to 14 MBit/s.
+ **MOST** messages include always a clear sender and receiver address.
+- **LIN**: Local Interconnect Network, is a single-wire subnet work for
+ low-cost, serial communication between smart sensors and actuators with
+ typical data rates up to 20 kBit/s. It is intended to be used from the year
+ 2001 on everywhere in a car, where the bandwidth and versatility of a **CAN**
+ network is not required.
+
+On just about every vehicle, **ECU**s (**E**lectronic **C**ontrol **U**nits)
+communicate over a CAN bus, which is a two-wire bus using hardware arbitration
+for messages sent on the shared medium. This is essentially a *trusted* network
+where all traffic is visible to all controllers and any controller can send any
+message.
+
+A malicious **ECU** on the CAN bus can easily inject messages destined for any
+other device, including things like the instrument cluster and the head unit.
+There are common ways for hardware to do USB to CAN and open source software to
+send and receive messages. For example, there is a driver included in the Linux
+kernel that can be used to send/receive CAN signals. A malicious device on the
+CAN bus can cause a great number of harmful things to happen to the system,
+including: sending bogus information to other devices, sending unintended
+commands to ECUs, causing DOS (Denial Of Service) on the CAN bus, etc.
+
+
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+---------------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Bus-1 | CAN | Implement hardware solution in order to prohibit sending unwanted signals.
+
+
+
+See [Security in Automotive Bus
+Systems](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf)
+for more information.
+
+# Connectors
+
+For the connectors, we supposed that they were disabled by default. For example,
+the **USB** must be disabled to avoid attacks like BadUSB. If not, configure the
+Kernel to only enable the minimum require **USB** devices. The connectors used
+to diagnose the car like **OBD-II** must be disabled outside garages.
+
+
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+----------------------------------------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-1 | USB | Must be disabled. If not, only enable the minimum require USB devices.
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-2 | USB | Confidential data exchanged with the ECU over USB must be secure.
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-3 | USB | USB Boot on a ECU must be disable.
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-4 | OBD-II | Must be disabled outside garages.
+
+
+
+# Wireless
+
+In this part, we talk about possible remote attacks on a car, according to the
+different areas of possible attacks. For each communication channels, we
+describe attacks and how to prevent them with some recommendations. The main
+recommendation is to always follow the latest updates of these remote
+communication channels.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Update | Always follow the latest updates of remote communication channels.
+
+
+
+We will see the following parts:
+
+- [Wifi](#wifi)
+
+- [Bluetooth](#bluetooth)
+
+- [Cellular](#cellular)
+
+- [Radio](#radio)
+
+- [NFC](#nfc)
+
+
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | -------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Add communication channels (RFID, ZigBee?).
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+For existing automotive-specific means, we take examples of existing system
+attacks from the _IOActive_ document ([A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack
+Surfaces](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf))
+and from the ETH document ([Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start
+Systems in Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf)).
+
+- [Telematics](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A40%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D)
+
+- [Passive Anti-Theft System
+ (PATS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A11%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C574%2C0%5D)
+
+- [Tire Pressure Monitoring System
+ (TPMS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A17%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D)
+
+- [Remote Keyless Entry/Start
+ (RKE)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A26%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D)
+
+- [Passive Keyless Entry (PKE)](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf)
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Wifi
+
+### Attacks
+
+We can differentiate existing attacks on wifi in two categories: Those on
+**WEP** and those on **WPA**.
+
+- **WEP** attacks:
+
+ - **FMS**: (**F**luhrer, **M**antin and **S**hamir attack) is a "Stream cipher
+ attack on the widely used RC4 stream cipher. The attack allows an attacker
+ to recover the key in an RC4 encrypted stream from a large number of
+ messages in that stream."
+ - **KoreK**: "Allows the attacker to reduce the key space".
+ - **PTW**: (**P**yshkin **T**ews **W**einmann attack).
+ - **Chopchop**: Found by KoreK, "Weakness of the CRC32 checksum and the lack
+ of replay protection."
+ - **Fragmentation**
+
+- **WPA** attacks:
+
+ - **Beck and Tews**: Exploit weakness in **TKIP**. "Allow the attacker to
+ decrypt **ARP** packets and to inject traffic into a network, even allowing
+ him to perform a **DoS** or an **ARP** poisoning".
+ - [KRACK](https://github.com/kristate/krackinfo): (K)ey (R)einstallation
+ (A)tta(ck) ([jira AGL
+ SPEC-1017](https://jira.automotivelinux.org/browse/SPEC-1017)).
+
+### Recommendations
+
+- Do not use **WEP**, **PSK** and **TKIP**.
+
+- Use **WPA2** with **CCMP**.
+
+- Should protect data sniffing.
+
+
+
+Domain | Tech name or object | Recommendations
+---------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-1 | WEP, PSK, TKIP | Disabled
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-2 | WPA2 and AES-CCMP | Used
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-3 | WPA2 | Should protect data sniffing.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-4 | PSK | Changing regularly the password.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-5 | Device | Upgraded easily in software or firmware to have the last security update.
+
+
+
+See [Wifi attacks WEP WPA](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf) and
+[Breaking wep and wpa (Beck and
+Tews)](https://dl.aircrack-ng.org/breakingwepandwpa.pdf) for more information.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Bluetooth
+
+### Attacks
+
+- **Bluesnarfing** attacks involve an attacker covertly gaining access to your
+ Bluetooth-enabled device for the purpose of retrieving information, including
+ addresses, calendar information or even the device's **I**nternational
+ **M**obile **E**quipment **I**dentity. With the **IMEI**, an attacker could
+ route your incoming calls to his cell phone.
+- **Bluebugging** is a form of Bluetooth attack often caused by a lack of
+ awareness. Similar to bluesnarfing, bluebugging accesses and uses all phone
+ features but is limited by the transmitting power of class 2 Bluetooth radios,
+ normally capping its range at 10-15 meters.
+- **Bluejacking** is the sending of unsolicited messages.
+- **BLE**: **B**luetooth **L**ow **E**nergy
+ [attacks](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf).
+- **DoS**: Drain a device's battery or temporarily paralyze the phone.
+
+### Recommendations
+
+- Not allowing Bluetooth pairing attempts without the driver's first manually
+ placing the vehicle in pairing mode.
+- Monitoring.
+- Use **BLE** with caution.
+- For v2.1 and later devices using **S**ecure **S**imple **P**airing (**SSP**),
+ avoid using the "Just Works" association model. The device must verify that an
+ authenticated link key was generated during pairing.
+
+
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+--------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-1 | BLE | Use with caution.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-2 | Bluetooth | Monitoring
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-3 | SSP | Avoid using the "Just Works" association model.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-4 | Visibility | Configured by default as undiscoverable. Except when needed.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-5 | Anti-scanning | Used, inter alia, to slow down brute force attacks.
+
+
+
+See [Low energy and the automotive
+transformation](http://www.ti.com/lit/wp/sway008/sway008.pdf), [Gattacking
+Bluetooth Smart Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf), [Comprehensive
+Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack
+Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf) and [With Low
+Energy comes Low
+Security](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf)
+for more information.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## Cellular
+
+### Attacks
+
+- **IMSI-Catcher**: Is a telephone eavesdropping device used for intercepting
+ mobile phone traffic and tracking location data of mobile phone users.
+ Essentially a "fake" mobile tower acting between the target mobile phone and
+ the service provider's real towers, it is considered a man-in-the-middle
+ (**MITM**) attack.
+
+- Lack of mutual authentication (**GPRS**/**EDGE**) and encryption with
+ **GEA0**.
+
+- **Fall back** from **UMTS**/**HSPA** to **GPRS**/**EDGE** (Jamming against
+ **UMTS**/**HSPA**).
+
+- 4G **DoS** attack.
+
+### Recommendations
+
+- Check antenna legitimacy.
+
+
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+-------------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-1 | GPRS/EDGE | Avoid
+Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-2 | UMTS/HSPA | Protected against Jamming.
+
+
+
+See [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data
+communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf)
+for more information.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Radio
+
+### Attacks
+
+- Interception of data with low cost material (**SDR** with hijacked DVB-T/DAB
+ for example).
+
+### Recommendations
+
+- Use the **R**adio **D**ata **S**ystem (**RDS**) only to send signals for audio
+ output and meta concerning radio.
+
+
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+----------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Radio-1 | RDS | Only audio output and meta concerning radio.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+## NFC
+
+### Attacks
+
+- **MITM**: Relay and replay attack.
+
+### Recommendations
+
+- Should implements protection against relay and replay attacks (Tokens,
+ etc...).
+- Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles.
+- NFC should be use encrypted link (secure channel). A standard key agreement
+ protocol like Diffie-Hellmann based on RSA or Elliptic Curves could be applied
+ to establish a shared secret between two devices.
+- Automotive NFC device should be certified by NFC forum entity: The NFC Forum
+ Certification Mark shows that products meet global interoperability standards.
+- NFC Modified Miller coding is preferred over NFC Manchester coding.
+
+
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+--------------------------- | --------- | ------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-1 | NFC | Protected against relay and replay attacks.
+Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-2 | Device | Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles.
+
+
+
+# Cloud
+
+## Download
+
+- **authentication**: Authentication is the security process that validates the
+ claimed identity of a device, entity or person, relying on one or more
+ characteristics bound to that device, entity or person.
+
+- **Authorization**: Parses the network to allow access to some or all network
+ functionality by providing rules and allowing access or denying access based
+ on a subscriber's profile and services purchased.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------
+Application-Cloud-Download-1 | authentication | Must implement authentication process.
+Application-Cloud-Download-2 | Authorization | Must implement Authorization process.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Infrastructure
+
+- **Deep Packet Inspection**: **DPI** provides techniques to analyze the payload
+ of each packet, adding an extra layer of security. **DPI** can detect and
+ neutralize attacks that would be missed by other security mechanisms.
+
+- A **DoS** protection in order to avoid that the Infrastructure is no more
+ accessible for a period of time.
+
+- **Scanning tools** such as **SATS** and **DAST** assessments perform
+ vulnerability scans on the source code and data flows on web applications.
+ Many of these scanning tools run different security tests that stress
+ applications under certain attack scenarios to discover security issues.
+
+- **IDS & IPS**: **IDS** detect and log inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous
+ activity. **IDS** can be located in the telecommunications networks and/or
+ within the host server or computer. Telecommunications carriers build
+ intrusion detection capability in all network connections to routers and
+ servers, as well as offering it as a service to enterprise customers. Once
+ **IDS** systems have identified an attack, **IPS** ensures that malicious
+ packets are blocked before they cause any harm to backend systems and
+ networks. **IDS** typically functions via one or more of three systems:
+
+ 1. Pattern matching.
+ 2. Anomaly detection.
+ 3. Protocol behavior.
+
+
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------------------- | ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-1 | Packet | Should implement a DPI.
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-2 | DoS | Must implement a DoS protection.
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-3 | Test | Should implement scanning tools like SATS and DAST.
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-4 | Log | Should implement security tools (IDS and IPS).
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-5 | App integrity | Applications must be signed by the code signing authority.
+
+
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Transport
+
+For data transport, it is necessary to **encrypt data end-to-end**. To prevent
+**MITM** attacks, no third party should be able to interpret transported data.
+Another aspect is the data anonymization in order to protect the leakage of
+private information on the user or any other third party.
+
+The use of standards such as **IPSec** provides "_private and secure
+communications over IP networks, through the use of cryptographic security
+services, is a set of protocols using algorithms to transport secure data over
+an IP network._". In addition, **IPSec** operates at the network layer of the
+**OSI** model, contrary to previous standards that operate at the application
+layer. This makes its application independent and means that users do not need
+to configure each application to **IPSec** standards.
+
+**IPSec** provides the services below :
+
+- Confidentiality: A service that makes it impossible to interpret data if it is
+ not the recipient. It is the encryption function that provides this service by
+ transforming intelligible (unencrypted) data into unintelligible (encrypted)
+ data.
+- Authentication: A service that ensures that a piece of data comes from where
+ it is supposed to come from.
+- Integrity: A service that consists in ensuring that data has not been tampered
+ with accidentally or fraudulently.
+- Replay Protection: A service that prevents attacks by re-sending a valid
+ intercepted packet to the network for the same authorization. This service is
+ provided by the presence of a sequence number.
+- Key management: Mechanism for negotiating the length of encryption keys
+ between two **IPSec** elements and exchange of these keys.
+
+An additional means of protection would be to do the monitoring between users
+and the cloud as a **CASB** will provide.
+
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------
+Application-Cloud-Transport-1 | Integrity, confidentiality and legitimacy | Should implement IPSec standards.
+
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/09_Update_(Over_The_Air).md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/09_Update_(Over_The_Air).md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0476b7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/09_Update_(Over_The_Air).md
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+---
+title: Update (Over The Air)
+---
+
+Updating applications and firmware is essential for the development of new
+features and even more to fix security bugs. However, if a malicious third party
+manages to alter the content during transport, it could alter the functioning of
+the system and/or applications. The security of the updates is therefore a
+critical point to evaluate in order to guarantee the integrity, the
+confidentiality and the legitimacy of the transmitted data.
+
+## Attack Vectors
+
+Updates Over The Air (OTA) are one of the most common points where an attacker will
+penetrate. An OTA update mechanism is one of the highest threats in the system.
+If an attacker is able to install his own application or firmware on the system,
+he can get the same level of access that the original application or firmware
+had. From that point, the intruder can get unfettered access to the rest of the
+system, which might include making modifications, downloading other pieces of
+software, and stealing assets.
+
+### Man In The Middle (MITM)
+
+The man-in-the-middle attack is the most classic example of an attack, where an
+adversary inserts himself between two communicating entities and grabs whatever
+is being communicated. In the case of OTA attacks, the connection in the network
+may be intercepted:
+
+* On the internet, before the cloud back-end.
+* At the base station, 3G,4G,5G connection to the internet.
+* At the receiving antenna, connection to the car.
+* Between the receiving antenna and the gateway router (if present), connection
+ within the car.
+* Between the gateway router and the target component (IVI, In-Vehicle
+ Infotainment unit).
+
+There are many ways to mount a MITM attack. For example, proxy tools like Burp
+Proxy can be used to intercept web traffic as a man-in-the-middle. Under the
+guise of being a testing tool, the proxy server is often used in attack
+scenarios. It runs on a variety of platforms.
+
+As another example, false base station attacks are known to be fairly easy to
+set-up. The problem is apparently fairly prevalent in countries like China and
+in the UK. These fake base stations are sometimes just eavesdropping on the
+communication, but others have the potential to do serious harm.
+
+Defenses against MITM attacks include encrypted and signed data pipes.
+Furthermore, architects and developers are also recommended to encrypt and sign
+the payloads that are being passed over these pipes, to defend against perusal
+of the data.
+
+### Man At The End (MATE)
+
+The man-at-the-end attack is when an intruder analyzes the end-point of the
+communication when software is accessing the data communication. This is a more
+severe attack type where the attacker can:
+
+* Steal keys.
+ * For example, a simple debugging session in running software could reveal a
+ key used in memory.
+* Tamper software.
+ * For example, replacing just one function call in software with a NOP (i.e.
+ no operation) can drastically change the behavior of the program.
+* Jam branches of control.
+ * For example, making a program take one branch of control rather than the
+ intended branch can mean the difference between an authorized and a
+ non-authorized installation.
+* Modify important data.
+ * For example, if the data changed is a key or data leading to a control path,
+ then this attack can be severe.
+ * In the case of OTA updates, MATE attacks are particularly problematic for
+ the system. One of the consequences of MATE attacks can be installed
+ software that allows installation of any other software. For example, an
+ attacker might install remote access software to control any part of the
+ system.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
+
+Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
+------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+_FOTA_ | **F**irmware **O**ver **T**he **A**ir
+_MATE_ | **M**an **A**t **T**he **E**nd
+_MITM_ | **M**an **I**n **T**he **M**iddle
+_OTA_ | **O**ver **T**he **A**ir
+_SOTA_ | **S**oftware **O**ver **T**he **A**ir
+_TUF_ | **T**he **U**pdate **F**ramework
+
+# Firmware Over The Air
+
+The firmware update is critical since its alteration back to compromise the
+entire system. It is therefore necessary to take appropriate protective
+measures.
+
+AGL includes the _meta-updater_ Yocto layer that enables OTA software updates
+via [Uptane](https://uptane.github.io), an automotive-specific extension to [The
+Update Framework](https://theupdateframework.github.io/). Uptane and TUF are
+open standards that define a secure protocol for delivering and verifying
+updates even when the servers and network--internet and car-internal--aren't
+fully trusted.
+
+_meta-updater_ includes the application
+[`aktualizr`](https://github.com/advancedtelematic/aktualizr), developed
+Advanced Telematic Systems (now part of HERE Technologies) that enables OTA for
+an ECU. `aktualizr` combined with Uptane is suitable for updating the firmware,
+software, and other packages on even functionally critical ECUs. `aktualizr` can
+be enabled with the free, open souce backend
+[`ota-community-edition`](https://github.com/advancedtelematic/ota-community-edition).
+
+This FOTA update mechanism can be enabled through the `agl-sota` feature.
+
+## Building
+
+To build an AGL image that uses `aktualizr`, the following can be used.
+
+```
+source meta-agl/scripts/aglsetup.sh -m <machine> agl-sota <other-features...>
+```
+
+During the build, _meta-updater_ will use credentials downloaded from
+`ota-community-edition` to sign metadata verifying the build as authentic. These
+signatures are part of the Uptane framework and are used to verify FOTA updates.
+
+## Atomic Upgrades with Rollbacks
+
+`aktualizr`'s primary method of updating firmware is to use `libostree` with
+binary diffs. The binary diffs use the least amout of bandwidth, and by it's
+nature `libostree` stores current and previous firmware versions on disk or in
+flash memory to allow for rollbacks.
+
+`libostree` is a content addressable object store much like `git`. Versions are
+specified via SHA2-256. These hashes are signed in the Uptane metadata and are
+robust against cryptographic compromise.
+
+# Software Over The Air
+
+Software updates in connected vehicles are a very useful feature, which can
+deliver significant benefits. If not implemented with security in mind, software
+updates can incur serious vulnerabilities. Any software update system must
+ensure that not only are the software updates to devices done in a secure way,
+but also that the repositories and servers hosting these updates are adequately
+protected. As the process of updating software migrates from a Dealership update
+model towards an **OTA** update model, securing these processes becomes a high
+priority.
+
+**SOTA** is made possible by **AppFw** (See Platform part). It will be possible
+to manage in a simple way the packets (i.g. Android like).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------- | -----------------
+Update-SOTA-1 | Part to complete.
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/10_Secure_development.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/10_Secure_development.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cbe3b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/10_Secure_development.md
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+---
+title: Secure development
+---
+
+In order to save a lot of time in code auditing, developers must follow coding
+guidelines.
+
+## Secure build
+
+### Kernel build
+
+Tools like:
+
+- [Code optimisation](https://github.com/jduck/lk-reducer).
+- [Kernel Drivers test](https://github.com/ucsb-seclab/dr_checker) with
+ [docs](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-machiry.pdf).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | ------------
+SecureDev-SecureBuild-1 | Add content.
+
+## App/Widget signatures
+
+Domain | Improvement
+---------------------- | ------------
+SecureDev-Signatures-1 | Add content.
+
+## Code audit
+
+These tools are used to check the correct implementation of functionalities and
+compliance with related good practices.
+
+- [Continuous Code Quality](https://www.sonarqube.org/).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------
+SecureDev-CodeAudit-1 | Add CVE analyser.
+SecureDev-CodeAudit-2 | [OSSTMM](http://www.isecom.org/mirror/OSSTMM.3.pdf).
+
+### SATS
+
+- [RATS](https://github.com/andrew-d/rough-auditing-tool-for-security) (Maybe to
+ old).
+- [Flaw Finder](https://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/).
+
+- [wiki
+ list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis).
+
+- [Mathematical
+ approach](https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/david.lubicz/planches/David_Pichardie.pdf).
+
+It is necessary to verify that the application code does not use functions that
+are depreciated and recognized as unsecured or cause problems.
+
+### DATS
+
+- [wiki
+ list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_program_analysis#Example_tools). \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/11_Annexes.md b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/11_Annexes.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c279203
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/03_Architecture_Guides/02_Security_Blueprint/11_Annexes.md
@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+---
+title: Annexes
+---
+
+The first part resumed all the configurations you must implement without any
+explications since all the explanations are given as and when in the document.
+
+- The _config_ tag quickly identifies the configurations and the recommendations
+ to take.
+
+- The _note_ tag allows you to notify some additional details.
+
+- The _todo_ tag shows the possible improvements.
+
+The second one allows to visualize all the todo notes in order to have a global
+vision of the possible improvements of the document.
+
+# Config notes
+
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+-------------------- | ---------- | ----------------------------------
+Hardware-Integrity-1 | Bootloader | Must control bootloader integrity.
+Hardware-Integrity-2 | Board | Must use a HSM.
+Hardware-Integrity-3 | RTC | Must not be alterable.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------- | ------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Hardware-Certificate-1 | System | Shall allow storing dedicated certificates.
+Hardware-Certificate-2 | ECU | The ECU must verify the certification authority hierarchy.
+Hardware-Certificate-3 | System | Allow the modification of certificates only if the source can be authenticated by a certificate already stored or in the higher levels of the chain of trust.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------- | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Hardware-Memory-1 | ECU | The ECU shall never expose the unencrypted key in RAM when using cryptographic keys.
+Hardware-Memory-2 | Bootloader | Internal NVM only
+Hardware-Module-3 | - | HSM must be used to secure keys.
+
+Domain | _Variable_ / `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | -------------------------- | -------
+Boot-Image-Selection-1 | `CONFIG_BOOTDELAY` | `-2`
+Boot-Image-Selection-2 | _bootdelay_ | `-2`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_
+------------------------- | ---------------------------- | --------
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-1 | `CONFIG_FIT` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-2 | `CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-3 | `CONFIG_RSA` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-4 | `CONFIG_OF_CONTROL` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-5 | `CONFIG_OF_SEPARATE` | _Enable_
+Boot-Image-Authenticity-6 | `CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE` | _Enable_
+
+Domain | Communication modes | _State_
+-------------------- | ------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Communication-1 | `USB` | _Disabled_ and _Compiled-out_ if not required.
+Boot-Communication-2 | `USB` | Else, Kernel should be configured to only enable the minimum required USB devices and filesystems should be treated with special care.
+Boot-Communication-3 | `Ethernet` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Communication-4 | U-boot and sboot `DOCSIS` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Communication-5 | `Serial ports` | _Disabled_
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_
+------------------------ | ----------------------- | -------------
+Boot-Communication-USB-1 | `CONFIG_CMD_USB` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-2 | `CONFIG_USB_UHCI` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-3 | `CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-4 | `CONFIG_USB_STORAGE` | _Not defined_
+Boot-Communication-USB-5 | `CONFIG_USB_HOST_ETHER` | _Not defined_
+
+Domain | Communication modes | _State_
+-------------------- | -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Communication-1 | `Network interfaces` | Preferably _no network interface is allowed_, otherwise, restrict the services to those used.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+-------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Communication-1 | `Services`, `ports` and `devices` | Restrict the `services`, `ports` and `devices` to those used.
+
+Domain | `Command` name | _State_
+-------------------------- | -------------- | ---------
+Boot-Communication-Flash-1 | `do_nand` | _Disable_
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | --------------------------------------- | ---------
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-1 | `CONFIG_SILENT_CONSOLE` | `Disable`
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-2 | `CONFIG_SYS_DEVICE_NULLDEV` | `Disable`
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-3 | `CONFIG_SILENT_CONSOLE_UPDATE_ON_RELOC` | `Disable`
+
+Domain | `Environment variable` name | _State_
+---------------------- | --------------------------- | -------------
+Boot-Consoles-Serial-1 | `INC_DEBUG_PRINT` | _Not defined_
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_
+-------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-1 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_MMC` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-2 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_EEPROM` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-3 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_FLASH` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-4 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_DATAFLASH` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-5 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_FAT` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-6 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_NAND` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-7 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_NVRAM` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-8 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_ONENAND` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-9 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_SPI_FLASH` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-10 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_REMOTE` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-11 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_IN_UBI` | `#undef`
+Boot-Consoles-Variables-12 | `CONFIG_ENV_IS_NOWHERE` | `#define`
+
+Domain | `Command` name | _State_
+----------------------- | -------------- | ----------
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-1 | `md` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-2 | `mm` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-3 | `nm` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-4 | `mw` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-5 | `cp` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-6 | `mwc` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-7 | `mdc` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-8 | `mtest` | _Disabled_
+Boot-Consoles-MemDump-9 | `loopw` | _Disabled_
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+-------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------
+Kernel-General-MAC-1 | CONFIG_IP_NF_SECURITY | m
+Kernel-General-MAC-2 | CONFIG_IP6_NF_SECURITY | m
+Kernel-General-MAC-3 | CONFIG_EXT2_FS_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-4 | CONFIG_EXT3_FS_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-5 | CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-6 | CONFIG_SECURITY | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-7 | CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK | y
+Kernel-General-MAC-8 | CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR | y
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | -------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-kexec-1 | `CONFIG_KEXEC` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-IPAutoConf-1 | `CONFIG_IP_PNP` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------- | ----------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-SysCtl_SysCall-1 | `CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-LegacyLinux-1 | `CONFIG_USELIB` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------------- | ------------------------------ | -------
+Kernel-General-FirmHelper-1 | `CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------------- | ---------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-PanicOnOOPS-1 | `CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS` | `y`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+-------------------------- | -------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-SocketMon-1 | `CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG` | `n`
+Kernel-General-SocketMon-2 | `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ---------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-BPF_JIT-1 | `CONFIG_BPF_JIT` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | ------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-1 | `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE` | `y`
+
+Domain | `Variable` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | ------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-2 | `kernel.modules_disabled` | `1`
+
+Domain | Object | _State_
+------------------------ | ------------------- | ----------
+Kernel-General-Drivers-1 | `USB` | _Disabled_
+Kernel-General-Drivers-2 | `PCMCIA` | _Disabled_
+Kernel-General-Drivers-3 | Other `hotplug` bus | _Disabled_
+
+Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_
+-------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | --------
+Kernel-General-IndependentExec-1 | `-pie -fpic` | _Enable_
+
+Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_
+--------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | --------
+Kernel-General-OverwriteAttacks-1 | `-z,relro` | _Enable_
+Kernel-General-OverwriteAttacks-2 | `-z,now` | _Enable_
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+------------------------------- | --------------- | --------------------------------
+Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Dynamic linking | Should generally not be allowed.
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | ---------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-RestrictAccess-1 | `CONFIG_DEVKMEM` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-CoreDump-1 | `CONFIG_PROC_KCORE` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+-------------------- | ------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-Swap-1 | `CONFIG_SWAP` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | --------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-LoadAllSymbols-1 | `CONFIG_KALLSYMS` | `n`
+Kernel-Memory-LoadAllSymbols-2 | `CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------- | -------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-Stack-1 | `CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR` | `y`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-Access-1 | `CONFIG_DEVMEM` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | --------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Memory-CrossMemAttach-1 | `CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH` | `n`
+
+Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_
+----------------------------- | ------------------------------- | --------
+Kernel-Memory-StackSmashing-1 | `-fstack-protector-all` | _Enable_
+
+Domain | `compiler` options and `config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | -------
+Kernel-Memory-BufferOverflows-1 | `-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE` | `2`
+Kernel-Memory-BufferOverflows-2 | `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE` | `y`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ---------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-1 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_8250` | `n`
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-2 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE` | `n`
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-3 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE` | `n`
+Kernel-Consoles-Serial-4 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE_CONSOLE` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+----------------------------- | ------------------------- | -----------------------------------
+Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-1 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL` | `y`
+Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-2 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE` | `"insert kernel command line here"`
+Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-3 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE` | `y`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | ------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-KDBG-1 | `CONFIG_KGDB` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+----------------------- | -------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-SysRQ-1 | `CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------------ | -------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Consoles-BinaryFormat-1 | `CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | ------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Symbols-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | ---------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Kprobes-1 | `CONFIG_KPROBES` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+---------------------- | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Tracing-1 | `CONFIG_FTRACE` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ------------------ | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Profiling-1 | `CONFIG_OPROFILE` | `n`
+Kernel-Debug-Profiling-2 | `CONFIG_PROFILING` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-OOPSOnBUG-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------ | --------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Dev-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL` | `n`
+Kernel-Debug-Dev-2 | `CONFIG_EMBEDDED` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------- | ----------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-FileSystem-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_FS` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------ | ------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-BUG-1 | `CONFIG_BUG` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | ----------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-CoreDumps-1 | `CONFIG_COREDUMP` | `n`
+
+Domain | `File` name | `Value`
+---------------------------- | -------------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict` | `1`
+
+Domain | `File` or `Directorie` name | _State_
+---------------------------- | --------------------------- | -----------------------------
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-1 | `/boot/vmlinuz*` | _Readable Only for root user_
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-2 | `/boot/System.map*` | _Readable Only for root user_
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-3 | `/sys/kernel/debug/` | _Readable Only for root user_
+Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-4 | `/proc/slabinfo` | _Readable Only for root user_
+
+Domain | `File` name | `Value`
+-------------------- | --------------------------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-DMESG-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict` | `1`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+--------------------- | ----------------- | -------
+Kernel-Debug-Config-1 | `CONFIG_IKCONFIG` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Config` name | `Value`
+------------------------ | --------------- | -------
+Kernel-FileSystems-NFS-1 | `CONFIG_NFSD` | `n`
+Kernel-FileSystems-NFS-2 | `CONFIG_NFS_FS` | `n`
+
+Domain | `Partition` | `Value`
+-------------------------- | ------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-1 | `/boot` | `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-2 | `/var` & `/tmp` | In `/etc/fstab` or `vfstab`, add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-3 | _Non-root local_ | If type is `ext2` or `ext3` and mount point not '/', add `nodev`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-4 | _Removable storage_ | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-5 | _Temporary storage_ | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-6 | `/dev/shm` | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`.
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-7 | `/dev` | Add `nosuid` and `noexec`.
+
+Domain | `Config` name | _State_ or `Value`
+-------------------------- | ----------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-1 | `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` | _Disabled_ or add remount with `noexec` and `nosuid` to system startup.
+
+Domain | `Label` name | Recommendations
+------------------ | ------------ | -----------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-MAC-Floor-1 | `^` | Only for privileged system services.
+Kernel-MAC-Floor-2 | `*` | Used for device files or `/tmp` Access restriction via DAC.
+
+Domain | `Label` name | Recommendations
+------------------- | ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-MAC-System-1 | `System` | Process should write only to file with transmute attribute.
+Kernel-MAC-System-2 | `System::run` | Files are created with the directory label from user and system domain (transmute) Lock is implicit with `w`.
+Kernel-MAC-System-3 | `System::Shared` | Files are created with the directory label from system domain (transmute) User domain has locked privilege.
+Kernel-MAC-System-4 | `System::Log` | Some limitation may impose to add `w` to enable append.
+Kernel-MAC-System-5 | `System::Sub` | Isolation of risky Subsystem.
+
+Domain | `Label` name | Recommendations
+------------------- | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Kernel-MAC-System-1 | `User::Pkg::$AppID` | Only one Label is allowed per App. A data directory is created by the AppFw in `rwx` mode.
+Kernel-MAC-System-2 | `User::Home` | AppFw needs to create a directory in `/home/$USER/App-Shared` at first launch if not present with label app-data access is `User::App-Shared` without transmute.
+Kernel-MAC-System-3 | `User::App-Shared` | Shared space between all App running for a given user.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+------------------ | -------------- | ------------------------------------
+Platform-SystemD-1 | Security model | Use Namespaces for containerization.
+Platform-SystemD-2 | Security model | Use CGroups to organise processes.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+--------------- | -------------- | ------------------------------------
+Platform-DBus-1 | Security model | Use D-Bus as IPC.
+Platform-DBus-2 | Security model | Apply D-BUS security patches: [D-Bus CVE](https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-13442/D-bus-Project.html)
+
+Domain | `Tool` name | _State_
+-------------------- | ----------- | -------
+Platform-Utilities-1 | `connman` | _Used_ as a connection manager.
+Platform-Utilities-2 | `bluez` | _Used_ as a Bluetooth manager.
+Platform-Utilities-3 | `gstreamer` | _Used_ to manage multimedia file format.
+Platform-Utilities-4 | `alsa` | _Used_ to provides an API for sound card device drivers.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------
+Platform-AGLFw-AppFw-1 | Security model | Use the AppFw as Security model.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------------- | ----------- | -------------------------------------
+Platform-AGLFw-Cynara-1 | Permissions | Use Cynara as policy-checker service.
+
+Domain | `Tool` name | _State_
+-------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Platform-Utilities-1 | `busybox` | _Used_ to provide a number of tools. Do not compile development tools.
+
+Domain | `Utility` name and normal `path` | _State_
+--------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------- | ----------
+Platform-Utilities-1 | `chgrp` in `/bin/chgrp` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-2 | `chmod` in `/bin/chmod` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-3 | `chown` in `/bin/chown` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-4 | `dmesg` in `/bin/dmesg` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-5 | `Dnsdomainname` in `/bin/dnsdomainname` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-6 | `dropbear`, Remove "dropbear" from `/etc/init.d/rcs` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-7 | `Editors` in (vi) `/bin/vi` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-8 | `find` in `/bin/find` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-9 | `gdbserver` in `/bin/gdbserver` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-10 | `hexdump` in `/bin/hexdump` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-11 | `hostname` in `/bin/hostname` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-12 | `install` in `/bin/install` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-13 | `iostat` in `/bin/iostat` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-14 | `killall` in `/bin/killall` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-15 | `klogd` in `/sbin/klogd` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-16 | `logger` in `/bin/logger` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-17 | `lsmod` in `/sbin/lsmod` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-18 | `pmap` in `/bin/pmap` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-19 | `ps` in `/bin/ps` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-20 | `ps` in `/bin/ps` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-21 | `rpm` in `/bin/rpm` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-22 | `SSH` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-23 | `stbhotplug` in `/sbin/stbhotplug` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-24 | `strace` in `/bin/trace` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-25 | `su` in `/bin/su` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-26 | `syslogd` in (logger) `/bin/logger` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-27 | `top` in `/bin/top` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-28 | `UART` in `/proc/tty/driver/` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-29 | `which` in `/bin/which` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-30 | `who` and `whoami` in `/bin/whoami` | _Disabled_
+Platform-Utilities-31 | `awk` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-32 | `cut` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-33 | `df` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-34 | `echo` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-35 | `fdisk` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-36 | `grep` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-37 | `mkdir` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-38 | `mount` (vfat) (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-39 | `printf` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-40 | `sed` in `/bin/sed` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-41 | `tail` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-42 | `tee` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+Platform-Utilities-43 | `test` (busybox) | _Enabled_
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+--------------------- | ---------------- | -----------------------------------------------------
+Platform-Users-root-1 | Main application | Should not execute as root.
+Platform-Users-root-2 | UI | Should run in a context on a user with no capability.
+
+Domain | `Utility` name | _State_
+--------------------- | -------------- | -------------
+Platform-Users-root-3 | `login` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-4 | `su` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-5 | `ssh` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-6 | `scp` | _Not allowed_
+Platform-Users-root-7 | `sftp` | _Not allowed_
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+-------------------------- | --------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Installation-1 | AppFw | Provide offline-mode in order to install app with the base image.
+Application-Installation-2 | Integrity | Allow the installation of applications only if their integrity is good.
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+---------------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Bus-1 | CAN | Implement hardware solution in order to prohibit sending unwanted signals.
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+----------------------------------------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-1 | USB | Must be disabled. If not, only enable the minimum require USB devices.
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-2 | USB | Confidential data exchanged with the ECU over USB must be secure.
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-3 | USB | USB Boot on a ECU must be disable.
+Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-4 | OBD-II | Must be disabled outside garages.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Update | Always follow the latest updates of remote communication channels.
+
+Domain | Tech name or object | Recommendations
+---------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-1 | WEP, PSK, TKIP | Disabled
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-2 | WPA2 and AES-CCMP | Used
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-3 | WPA2 | Should protect data sniffing.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-4 | PSK | Changing regularly the password.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-5 | Device | Upgraded easily in software or firmware to have the last security update.
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+--------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-1 | BLE | Use with caution.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-2 | Bluetooth | Monitoring
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-3 | SSP | Avoid using the "Just Works" association model.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-4 | Visibility | Configured by default as undiscoverable. Except when needed.
+Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-5 | Anti-scanning | Used, inter alia, to slow down brute force attacks.
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+-------------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-1 | GPRS/EDGE | Avoid
+Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-2 | UMTS/HSPA | Protected against Jamming.
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+----------------------------- | --------- | --------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-Radio-1 | RDS | Only audio output and meta concerning radio.
+
+Domain | Tech name | Recommendations
+--------------------------- | --------- | ------------------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-1 | NFC | Protected against relay and replay attacks.
+Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-2 | Device | Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------------- | -------------- | --------------------------------------
+Application-Cloud-Download-1 | authentication | Must implement authentication process.
+Application-Cloud-Download-2 | Authorization | Must implement Authorization process.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+---------------------------------- | ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-1 | Packet | Should implement a DPI.
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-2 | DoS | Must implement a DoS protection.
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-3 | Test | Should implement scanning tools like SATS and DAST.
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-4 | Log | Should implement security tools (IDS and IPS).
+Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-5 | App integrity | Applications must be signed by the code signing authority.
+
+Domain | Object | Recommendations
+----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------
+Application-Cloud-Transport-1 | Integrity, confidentiality and legitimacy | Should implement IPSec standards.
+
+# Todo notes
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------- | ----------------------------------------------------
+Boot-Abstract-1 | More generic and add examples (The chain of trust).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------- | -------------------------------------------
+Boot-Abstract-1 | Review the definition of the "boot loader".
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------- | ------------------------------------
+Boot-Consoles-1 | Secure loader: No reference earlier?
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+Hypervisor-Abstract-1 | Complete Hypervisor part ([jailhouse](https://github.com/siemens/jailhouse) / [KVM](https://www.linux-kvm.org/page/Main_Page) / [Xen](https://www.xenproject.org/developers/teams/embedded-and-automotive.html)).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+-------------------------------- | -----------------------------
+Kernel-General-IndependentExec-1 | Kernel or/and platform part ?
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------------------------- | ---------------
+Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Keep this part?
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------------- | --------------------------------
+Platform-Abstract-1 | Create a graphics and sound part.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------------- | -----------
+Platform-Services-1 | SystemD ?
+Platform-Services-2 | Secure daemon ?
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------------- | ------------------------
+Platform-Users-Capabilities-1 | Kernel or Platform-user?
+Platform-Users-Capabilities-2 | Add config note.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+-------------------------- | ------------------------------
+Application-Installation-1 | Talk about AppFw offline mode.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Signature-1 | Add content (see secure build in Secure development part).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+---------------------- | ------------
+Application-Services-1 | Add content (Which services?).
+Application-Services-2 | Add Binder.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | -----------------
+Connectivity-Abstract-1 | Improve abstract.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | -------------------------------------------
+Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Add communication channels (RFID, ZigBee?).
+
+Domain | Improvement
+------------- | -----------------
+Update-SOTA-1 | Part to complete.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+----------------------- | ------------
+SecureDev-SecureBuild-1 | Add content.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+---------------------- | ------------
+SecureDev-Signatures-1 | Add content.
+
+Domain | Improvement
+--------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------
+SecureDev-CodeAudit-1 | Add CVE analyser.
+SecureDev-CodeAudit-2 | [OSSTMM](http://www.isecom.org/mirror/OSSTMM.3.pdf). \ No newline at end of file
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