diff options
| author |   Shankho Boron Ghosh <shankhoghosh123@gmail.com> | 2020-10-30 10:23:28 +0530 |
|---|---|---|
| committer |   Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org> | 2020-11-11 13:36:16 +0000 |
| commit | da6cd0b6c26ca9a3760d8a89ce68baf83eeaa1b1 (patch) | |
| tree | 5621912c4960ff1919f4664f95f4c4f62b347e5d /docs/2_Architecture_Guides | |
| parent | e76766d79c3063b873b75bd2080c654f3f6d71ba (diff) | |
Added [in-progress] Developer Guides
Updated mkdocs.yml, README.md.
Text wrap markdowns at 80.
Bug-AGL: [SPEC-3633]
Signed-off-by: Shankho Boron Ghosh <shankhoghosh123@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I2d7b43cb870e97786d3eb101c60a2071cc50f0be
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/c/AGL/documentation/+/25498
Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/2_Architecture_Guides')
38 files changed, 850 insertions, 689 deletions
diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/0_Build_Process.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/0_Build_Process.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dba54c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/0_Build_Process.md @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +--- +title: Overview +--- + + diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/0_Introduction/Introduction.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/0_Introduction/Introduction.md index b77d7e0..b4ccf37 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/0_Introduction/Introduction.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/0_Introduction/Introduction.md @@ -1,33 +1,50 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/README.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Introduction -Modern cars have become a lot more technologically sophisticated and different than those of the past. We are seeing a wider range of new features and functionality, with a lot more complex software. It is fair to say that the cars being introduced to the market today have much more in common with computing devices like cell phones, than their predecessors did. Modern car manufacturers are also integrating support for a broad range of communication technologies for these “connected” cars. With the advent of such vehicles, Linux has become a natural choice for the software platform, with Automotive Grade Linux as a promising example. - -From a security point of view, the remote capabilities of a connected car results in a much larger attack surface. This opens a whole new world of security vulnerabilities that need to be considered during the architectural design. History shows that physical access to a device is sufficient for a hacker to gain root privileges. This makes the car a hostile environment. - -The Security Blueprint documents the security features that are included as part of Automotive Grade Linux (AGL) and identifies areas that need to be addressed from a security perspective as part of AGL. It also gives guidance around existing technologies and solutions. - -Security domains will allow us to create a set of tests verifying the security of Automotive Grade Linux. +Modern cars have become a lot more technologically sophisticated and different +than those of the past. We are seeing a wider range of new features and +functionality, with a lot more complex software. It is fair to say that the cars +being introduced to the market today have much more in common with computing +devices like cell phones, than their predecessors did. Modern car manufacturers +are also integrating support for a broad range of communication technologies for +these “connected” cars. With the advent of such vehicles, Linux has become a +natural choice for the software platform, with Automotive Grade Linux as a +promising example. + +From a security point of view, the remote capabilities of a connected car +results in a much larger attack surface. This opens a whole new world of +security vulnerabilities that need to be considered during the architectural +design. History shows that physical access to a device is sufficient for a +hacker to gain root privileges. This makes the car a hostile environment. + +The Security Blueprint documents the security features that are included as part +of Automotive Grade Linux (AGL) and identifies areas that need to be addressed +from a security perspective as part of AGL. It also gives guidance around +existing technologies and solutions. + +Security domains will allow us to create a set of tests verifying the security +of Automotive Grade Linux. This document is firstly based on an existing AGL security-blueprint. -**For security to be effective, the concepts must be simple. And by default, anything that is not allowed is forbidden.** +**For security to be effective, the concepts must be simple. And by default, +anything that is not allowed is forbidden.** -We will cover topics starting from the lowest level (_Hardware_) up to the highest levels (_Connectivity_ and _Application_). We will move quickly on _Hardware_ and _Connectivity_ because this is not supported at our level. Solutions of connectivity problems concern updates and secured settings while hardware securing is related to the manufacturers. +We will cover topics starting from the lowest level (_Hardware_) up to the +highest levels (_Connectivity_ and _Application_). We will move quickly on +_Hardware_ and _Connectivity_ because this is not supported at our level. +Solutions of connectivity problems concern updates and secured settings while +hardware securing is related to the manufacturers. The document is filled with tags to easily identify important points: <!-- section-config --> -- The _config_ tag quickly identifies the configurations and the recommendations to take. +- The _config_ tag quickly identifies the configurations and the recommendations + to take. <!-- end-section-config --><!-- section-note --> @@ -47,29 +64,62 @@ Adversaries and attackers within the Automotive space. - Enthusiast Attackers -Enthusiast attackers have physical access to the Engine Control Units (ECUs) at the circuit board level. They can solder ‘mod chips’ onto the board and have access to probing tools. They also have information on ECUs that have been previously compromised and have access to softwares and instructions developed by other members of car modification forums. The goal of the enthusiast hacker could be, but is not limited to, adding extra horse power to the car or hacking it just for fun. +Enthusiast attackers have physical access to the Engine Control Units (ECUs) at +the circuit board level. They can solder ‘mod chips’ onto the board and have +access to probing tools. They also have information on ECUs that have been +previously compromised and have access to softwares and instructions developed +by other members of car modification forums. The goal of the enthusiast hacker +could be, but is not limited to, adding extra horse power to the car or hacking +it just for fun. - Corrupt Automotive Dealers -Corrupt automotive dealers are attackers that have access to the same capabilities as enthusiasts, but also have access to the car manufacturer’s (OEM) dealer network. They may also have access to standard debugging tools provided by the car manufacturer. Their goal may be to support local car theft gangs or organized criminals. +Corrupt automotive dealers are attackers that have access to the same +capabilities as enthusiasts, but also have access to the car manufacturer’s +(OEM) dealer network. They may also have access to standard debugging tools +provided by the car manufacturer. Their goal may be to support local car theft +gangs or organized criminals. - Organized Criminals -Organized criminals have access to all of the above tools but may also have some level of control over the internal network at many dealerships. They may have hacked and gained temporary control of the Over-The-Air (OTA) servers or the In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems. This is very much like the role of organized criminals in other industries such as paid media today. Their goal is to extort money from OEMs and/or governments by threatening to disable multiple vehicles. +Organized criminals have access to all of the above tools but may also have some +level of control over the internal network at many dealerships. They may have +hacked and gained temporary control of the Over-The-Air (OTA) servers or the +In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) systems. This is very much like the role of +organized criminals in other industries such as paid media today. Their goal is +to extort money from OEMs and/or governments by threatening to disable multiple +vehicles. - Malware Developers -Malware developers have developed malicious software to attack and compromise a large number of vehicles. The malicious software is usually designed to spread from one vehicle to another. Usually, the goal is to take control of multiple machines and then sell access to them for malicious purposes like denial-of-service (DoS) attacks or theft of private information and data. +Malware developers have developed malicious software to attack and compromise a +large number of vehicles. The malicious software is usually designed to spread +from one vehicle to another. Usually, the goal is to take control of multiple +machines and then sell access to them for malicious purposes like +denial-of-service (DoS) attacks or theft of private information and data. - Security Researchers -Security researchers are ‘self-publicized’ security consultants trying to make a name for themselves. They have access to standard tools for software security analysis. They also have physical access to the vehicle and standard hardware debugging tools (Logic Analyzers, Oscilloscopes, etc). Their goal is to publicize attacks for personal gain or just to gain personal understanding with a sense of helping make things more secure. +Security researchers are ‘self-publicized’ security consultants trying to make a +name for themselves. They have access to standard tools for software security +analysis. They also have physical access to the vehicle and standard hardware +debugging tools (Logic Analyzers, Oscilloscopes, etc). Their goal is to +publicize attacks for personal gain or just to gain personal understanding with +a sense of helping make things more secure. ## Attack Goals -In today’s connected vehicle, more and more functionality is moving to software control, meaning that the threat of attack becomes greater and greater. We see car features like navigation and summoning, car access/engine start, and motor/ECU upgrades all controlled through software and connections to the cloud. The risk of attack is high because there are high value targets in play. +In today’s connected vehicle, more and more functionality is moving to software +control, meaning that the threat of attack becomes greater and greater. We see +car features like navigation and summoning, car access/engine start, and +motor/ECU upgrades all controlled through software and connections to the cloud. +The risk of attack is high because there are high value targets in play. -Here, we outline some of the major threats categories along with some sample attackers, example attacks, and a relative importance. These threat categories are intended to be general examples. There can be many nuances to threat types. Additionally, there can be many sub-attacks that eventually lead to these higher level attack goals. +Here, we outline some of the major threats categories along with some sample +attackers, example attacks, and a relative importance. These threat categories +are intended to be general examples. There can be many nuances to threat types. +Additionally, there can be many sub-attacks that eventually lead to these higher +level attack goals. | Threat Category | Sample Attacker | Example Attacks | Relative Importance | |-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| @@ -78,13 +128,39 @@ Here, we outline some of the major threats categories along with some sample att | Vehicle hacking | Vehicle owner, competitor | Get content without paying, modify DRM licenses, unlock of after-market features, theft of IP | Loss of sales for content and features (Profit Now), lawsuits from content owners (Profit Later), loss of competitive advantage (Profit Later) | | Sensitive asset theft | Organized criminals, blackmailers | Steal credit card numbers, health information, camera data, steal bandwidth | Bad press (Brand Integrity), lawsuits from vehicle owners (Profit Later) | -The Automotive Grade Linux (AGL) initiative builds upon open-source software including Linux and Tizen to offer a flexible application framework. However, the security provisions of the app framework, Cynara, and the security manager only go so far in keeping the biggest threats at bay. As experience has shown, providing a constrained app (like that in the Android Open Source Platform) and store development flow, signature verification, DAC sandboxing, and MAC (SMACK) controls over the platform can have a certain amount of success with the security of the system. However, the openness of the system invites many researchers, hobbyists and hackers and financially motivated attackers to compromise the system for their own gains. - -As AGL arrives on modern automobiles, this is inevitably inviting many capable actors to modify, attack, and compromise these well thought-out systems and their applications. With concerns like safety and security, the auto industry cannot afford to go the way of consumer devices like phones and tablets where security problems are encountered on a frequent basis. It is imperative to use a layered approach and defense-in-depth to protect the system from inevitable attack. +The Automotive Grade Linux (AGL) initiative builds upon open-source software +including Linux and Tizen to offer a flexible application framework. However, +the security provisions of the app framework, Cynara, and the security manager +only go so far in keeping the biggest threats at bay. As experience has shown, +providing a constrained app (like that in the Android Open Source Platform) and +store development flow, signature verification, DAC sandboxing, and MAC (SMACK) +controls over the platform can have a certain amount of success with the +security of the system. However, the openness of the system invites many +researchers, hobbyists and hackers and financially motivated attackers to +compromise the system for their own gains. + +As AGL arrives on modern automobiles, this is inevitably inviting many capable +actors to modify, attack, and compromise these well thought-out systems and +their applications. With concerns like safety and security, the auto industry +cannot afford to go the way of consumer devices like phones and tablets where +security problems are encountered on a frequent basis. It is imperative to use a +layered approach and defense-in-depth to protect the system from inevitable +attack. ## Assets and Security Categorization -This section outlines some of the assets that are likely to be found in the vehicle and their relative sensitivity from an attack point of view. Additionally, the final column on the right lists some of the recommended protection types that can be applied to these types of assets (Note that the empty cells refer to the cells above them). A good protection approach will give priority to the most sensitive assets, using a defense-in-depth approach to cover these assets. Less sensitive assets are treated at a lower priority, typically protected with fewer protection techniques. A more fine-grained prioritization of the the assets in a concrete vehicle network can be achieved with detailed threat analysis which considers the topology of the vehicle network and access-controls that are in-place. e.g. the EVITA framework for attack trees. +This section outlines some of the assets that are likely to be found in the +vehicle and their relative sensitivity from an attack point of view. +Additionally, the final column on the right lists some of the recommended +protection types that can be applied to these types of assets (Note that the +empty cells refer to the cells above them). A good protection approach will give +priority to the most sensitive assets, using a defense-in-depth approach to +cover these assets. Less sensitive assets are treated at a lower priority, +typically protected with fewer protection techniques. A more fine-grained +prioritization of the the assets in a concrete vehicle network can be achieved +with detailed threat analysis which considers the topology of the vehicle +network and access-controls that are in-place. e.g. the EVITA framework for +attack trees. | Asset Category | Examples | Sensitivity | Recommended Protection Types | |-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| @@ -102,13 +178,18 @@ This section outlines some of the assets that are likely to be found in the vehi ## Hardening term -The term Hardening refers to the tools, techniques and processes required in order to reduce the attack surface on an embedded system, such as an embedded control unit (**ECU**) or other managed devices. The target for all hardening activities is to prevent the execution of invalid binaries on the device, and to prevent copying of security related data from the device. +The term Hardening refers to the tools, techniques and processes required in +order to reduce the attack surface on an embedded system, such as an embedded +control unit (**ECU**) or other managed devices. The target for all hardening +activities is to prevent the execution of invalid binaries on the device, and to +prevent copying of security related data from the device. <!-- pagebreak --> ## AGL security overview -AGL roots are based on security concepts. Those concepts are implemented by the security framework as shown in this picture: +AGL roots are based on security concepts. Those concepts are implemented by the +security framework as shown in this picture:  @@ -130,38 +211,65 @@ The following table lists the strongest terms utilized within all this document. # References - [security-blueprint](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/architecture/en/dev/reference/security/01-overview.html). - - _http:// docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/architecture/en/dev/reference/security/01-overview.html_ -- **[2017]** - [kernel security](https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/). + - _http:// + docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/architecture/en/dev/reference/security/01-overview.html_ +- **[2017]** - [kernel + security](https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/). - _https:// www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/_ -- **[2017]** - [Systemd integration and user management](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMM-Dresden/AGL-systemd.pdf). +- **[2017]** - [Systemd integration and user + management](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMM-Dresden/AGL-systemd.pdf). - _http:// iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMM-Dresden/AGL-systemd.pdf_ -- **[2017]** - [AGL - Application Framework Documentation](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf). +- **[2017]** - [AGL - Application Framework + Documentation](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf). - _http:// iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf_ -- **[2017]** - [Improving Vehicle Cybersecurity](https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/download.php/35648/ATIS-I-0000059.pdf). - - _https:// access.atis.org/apps/group_public/download.php/35648/ATIS-I-0000059.pdf_ -- **[2016]** - [AGL framework overview](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/apis_services/en/dev/reference/af-main/0-introduction.html). - - _http:// docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/apis_services/en/dev/reference/af-main/0-introduction.html_ -- **[2016]** - [SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2016/publications/SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates.pdf). - - _http:// iot.bzh/download/public/2016/publications/SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates.pdf_ -- **[2016]** - [Linux Automotive Security](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2016/security/Linux-Automotive-Security-v10.pdf). - - _http:// iot.bzh/download/public/2016/security/Linux-Automotive-Security-v10.pdf_ -- **[2016]** - [Automotive Security Best Practices](https://www.mcafee.com/it/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf). - - _https:// www.mcafee.com/it/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf_ -- **[2016]** - [Gattacking Bluetooth Smart Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf). +- **[2017]** - [Improving Vehicle + Cybersecurity](https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/download.php/35648/ATIS-I-0000059.pdf). + - _https:// + access.atis.org/apps/group_public/download.php/35648/ATIS-I-0000059.pdf_ +- **[2016]** - [AGL framework + overview](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/apis_services/en/dev/reference/af-main/0-introduction.html). + - _http:// + docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/apis_services/en/dev/reference/af-main/0-introduction.html_ +- **[2016]** - + [SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2016/publications/SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates.pdf). + - _http:// + iot.bzh/download/public/2016/publications/SecureBoot-SecureSoftwareUpdates.pdf_ +- **[2016]** - [Linux Automotive + Security](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2016/security/Linux-Automotive-Security-v10.pdf). + - _http:// + iot.bzh/download/public/2016/security/Linux-Automotive-Security-v10.pdf_ +- **[2016]** - [Automotive Security Best + Practices](https://www.mcafee.com/it/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf). + - _https:// + www.mcafee.com/it/resources/white-papers/wp-automotive-security.pdf_ +- **[2016]** - [Gattacking Bluetooth Smart + Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf). - _http:// gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf_ -- **[2015]** - [Comprehensive Experimental Analysis of Automotive Attack Surfaces](http://www.cs.wayne.edu/fengwei/15fa-csc6991/slides/8-CarHackingUsenixSecurity.pdf). - - _http:// www.cs.wayne.edu/fengwei/15fa-csc6991/slides/8-CarHackingUsenixSecurity.pdf_ -- **[2015]** - [Security in Automotive Bus Systems](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf). - - _http:// citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf_ -- **[2014]** - [IOActive Remote Attack Surface](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf). +- **[2015]** - [Comprehensive Experimental Analysis of Automotive Attack + Surfaces](http://www.cs.wayne.edu/fengwei/15fa-csc6991/slides/8-CarHackingUsenixSecurity.pdf). + - _http:// + www.cs.wayne.edu/fengwei/15fa-csc6991/slides/8-CarHackingUsenixSecurity.pdf_ +- **[2015]** - [Security in Automotive Bus + Systems](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf). + - _http:// + citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf_ +- **[2014]** - [IOActive Remote Attack + Surface](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf). - _https:// www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf_ -- **[2011]** - [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf). - - _https:// media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf_ -- **[2011]** - [Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf). +- **[2011]** - [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data + communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf). + - _https:// + media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf_ +- **[2011]** - [Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack + Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf). - _http:// www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf_ -- **[2010]** - [Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf). +- **[2010]** - [Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in + Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf). - _https:// eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf_ -- **[2010]** - [Wifi attacks wep wpa](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf). +- **[2010]** - [Wifi attacks wep + wpa](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf). - _https:// matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf_ -- **[2008]** - [SMACK](http://schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf). - - _http:// schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf_ +- **[2008]** - + [SMACK](http://schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf). + - _http:// + schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf_ diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.0_Abstract.md index 5cad4d9..bf4e936 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Annexes -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/annexes/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Annexes The first part resumed all the configurations you must implement without any diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.1_Config_Notes.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.1_Config_Notes.md index 3b403ea..293b6f3 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.1_Config_Notes.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.1_Config_Notes.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Config notes -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/annexes/ConfigNotes.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Config notes <!-- section-config --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.2_To_Do_Notes.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.2_To_Do_Notes.md index 23482a9..2f68994 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.2_To_Do_Notes.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/10_Annexes/1.2.10.2_To_Do_Notes.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Todo notes -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/annexes/todoNotes.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Todo notes <!-- section-todo --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware/Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware/Abstract.md index d9aeefb..7fe806f 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware/Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/1_Hardware/Abstract.md @@ -1,18 +1,14 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 1 - Hardware ## Abstract -The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL** compliant applications and services. -The platform includes the following hardware: +The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL** +compliant applications and services. The platform includes the following +hardware: - SoC (System-on-Chip). - Memory (RAM, ROM, storage, etc.). @@ -21,9 +17,9 @@ The platform includes the following hardware: You will find in this first part everything that concerns the hardware security. The goal is to protect system against all attacks that are trying to gain additional privileges by recovering and/or changing cryptographic keys in order -to alter the integrity of the boot. We should also prevent hardware modifications -in order to achieve this goal. We will expose below some examples of possible -configurations. +to alter the integrity of the boot. We should also prevent hardware +modifications in order to achieve this goal. We will expose below some examples +of possible configurations. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -41,9 +37,9 @@ _SHE_ | **S**ecure **H**ardware **E**xtensions ## Integrity -The board must store hardcoded cryptographic keys in order to verify among others -the _integrity_ of the _bootloader_. Manufacturers can use **HSM** and **SHE** to -enhance the security of their board. +The board must store hardcoded cryptographic keys in order to verify among +others the _integrity_ of the _bootloader_. Manufacturers can use **HSM** and +**SHE** to enhance the security of their board. <!-- section-config --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.0_Abstract.md index 9095b62..73a0cab 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-2/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 2 - Secure boot ## Abstract @@ -20,9 +15,10 @@ Boot-Abstract-1 | More generic and add examples (The chain of trust). <!-- end-section-todo --> Secure boot refers to preventing malicious software applications and -“unauthorized” operating systems from loading during the system start-up process. -The goal is to protect users from rootkits and other low-level malware attacks. -Modern bootloaders come with features that can be used to enable secure boot in the system. +“unauthorized” operating systems from loading during the system start-up +process. The goal is to protect users from rootkits and other low-level malware +attacks. Modern bootloaders come with features that can be used to enable secure +boot in the system. **Boot Hardening**: Steps/requirements to configure the boot sequence, in order to restrict the device from executing anything other than the approved software @@ -51,14 +47,14 @@ Boot-Abstract-1 | Review the definition of the "boot loader". <!-- end-section-todo --> -**Boot loader**: The boot loader consists of the Primary boot loader residing -in **OTP** memory, sboot, U-Boot and Secure loader residing in external flash -(NAND or SPI/NOR flash memory). The CPU on power on or reset executes the -primary boot loader. The **OTP** primary boot loader makes the necessary initial -system configuration and then loads the secondary boot loader sboot from -external flash memory to ram memory. The sboot then loads the U-Boot along with -the Secure loader. U-Boot then verifies the Kernel/system image integrity, then -loads the Kernel/system image before passing control to it. +**Boot loader**: The boot loader consists of the Primary boot loader residing in +**OTP** memory, sboot, U-Boot and Secure loader residing in external flash (NAND +or SPI/NOR flash memory). The CPU on power on or reset executes the primary boot +loader. The **OTP** primary boot loader makes the necessary initial system +configuration and then loads the secondary boot loader sboot from external flash +memory to ram memory. The sboot then loads the U-Boot along with the Secure +loader. U-Boot then verifies the Kernel/system image integrity, then loads the +Kernel/system image before passing control to it. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.1_Image.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.1_Image.md index 998c514..ad9b577 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.1_Image.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.1_Image.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Image -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-2/1-Image.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Image ## Image selection diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.2_Communication-modes.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.2_Communication-modes.md index 3381324..fc3ea47 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.2_Communication-modes.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.2_Communication-modes.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Communication modes -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-2/2-Communication-modes.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Communication modes ## Disable USB, Serial and DOCSIS Support @@ -56,8 +51,8 @@ Boot-Communication-USB-5 | `CONFIG_USB_HOST_ETHER` | _Not defined_ ## Disable all unused Network Interfaces -Only used network interfaces should be enabled. -Where possible, services should also be limited to those necessary. +Only used network interfaces should be enabled. Where possible, services should +also be limited to those necessary. <!-- section-config --> @@ -85,7 +80,8 @@ Boot-Communication-1 | `Services`, `ports` and `devices` | Restrict the `service In U-Boot following flash memory commands shall be disabled: -**NAND**: Support for nand flash access available through `do_nand` has to be disabled. +**NAND**: Support for nand flash access available through `do_nand` has to be +disabled. <!-- section-config --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.3_Consoles.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.3_Consoles.md index e578acd..0afb6f6 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.3_Consoles.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/2_Secure_Boot/1.2.2.3_Consoles.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Consoles -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-2/3-Consoles.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Consoles ## Disable serial console diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/3_Hypervisor/Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/3_Hypervisor/Abstract.md index 61d62c8..7cc3017 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/3_Hypervisor/Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/3_Hypervisor/Abstract.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-3/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 3 - Hypervisor Definition: "A hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM) is computer software, @@ -24,4 +19,5 @@ Hypervisor-Abstract-1 | Complete Hypervisor part ([jailhouse](https://github.com ## Native or Bare-metal hypervisors -These hypervisors run directly on the host's hardware to control the hardware and to manage guest operating systems. Those are the ones we're interested in. +These hypervisors run directly on the host's hardware to control the hardware +and to manage guest operating systems. Those are the ones we're interested in. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.0_Abstract.md index cff791b..4f23b13 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 4 - Kernel ## Abstract @@ -32,38 +27,39 @@ configurations that shall be required for deployment. The choice of kernel version for the AGL system is essential to its security. Depending on the type of board and eventual production system, different kernel -versions are used. For example, one of the systems under study uses the -Linux kernel version 3.10, while another uses the Linux kernel version 4.4. -For the Linux kernel version 3.10.31, there are 25 known vulnerabilities. -These vulnerabilities would allow an attacker to gain privileges, -bypass access restrictions, allow memory to be corrupted, or cause denial of service. -In contrast, the Linux kernel version of 4.4 has many fewer known vulnerabilities. -For this reason, we would in general recommend the later kernel version as a basis -for the platform. +versions are used. For example, one of the systems under study uses the Linux +kernel version 3.10, while another uses the Linux kernel version 4.4. For the +Linux kernel version 3.10.31, there are 25 known vulnerabilities. These +vulnerabilities would allow an attacker to gain privileges, bypass access +restrictions, allow memory to be corrupted, or cause denial of service. In +contrast, the Linux kernel version of 4.4 has many fewer known vulnerabilities. +For this reason, we would in general recommend the later kernel version as a +basis for the platform. -Note that, although there are fewer known vulnerabilities in the most recent kernel -versions there may be many unknown vulnerabilities underlying. -A rule of thumb is to update the kernel as much as possible to avoid the problems -you do know, but you should not be complacent in the trust that you place in it. -A defense-in-depth approach would then apply. +Note that, although there are fewer known vulnerabilities in the most recent +kernel versions there may be many unknown vulnerabilities underlying. A rule of +thumb is to update the kernel as much as possible to avoid the problems you do +know, but you should not be complacent in the trust that you place in it. A +defense-in-depth approach would then apply. If there are constraints and dependencies in upgrading to a newer kernel version (e.g. device drivers, board support providers) and you are forced to an older -Linux kernel version, there need to be additional provisions made to reduce -the risk of kernel exploits, which can include memory monitoring, watch-dog services, -and system call hooking. In this case, further defense-in-depth techniques -may be required to mitigate the risk of attacks to known vulnerabilities, -which can also include runtime integrity verification of components -that are vulnerable to tampering. +Linux kernel version, there need to be additional provisions made to reduce the +risk of kernel exploits, which can include memory monitoring, watch-dog +services, and system call hooking. In this case, further defense-in-depth +techniques may be required to mitigate the risk of attacks to known +vulnerabilities, which can also include runtime integrity verification of +components that are vulnerable to tampering. ## Kernel Build Configuration The kernel build configuration is extremely important for determining the level -of access to services and to reduce the breadth of the attack surface. -Linux contains a great and flexible number of capabilities and this is only controlled +of access to services and to reduce the breadth of the attack surface. Linux +contains a great and flexible number of capabilities and this is only controlled through the build configuration. For example, the `CONFIG_MODULES` parameter -allows kernel modules to be loaded at runtime extending the capabilities of the kernel. -This capability needs to be either inhibited or controlled at runtime through -other configuration parameters. For example, `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y` ensures -that only signed modules are loaded. There is a very large number of kernel -configuration parameters, and these are discussed in detail in this section. +allows kernel modules to be loaded at runtime extending the capabilities of the +kernel. This capability needs to be either inhibited or controlled at runtime +through other configuration parameters. For example, `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y` +ensures that only signed modules are loaded. There is a very large number of +kernel configuration parameters, and these are discussed in detail in this +section. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.1_General.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.1_General.md index 3d7fae0..dc685bf 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.1_General.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.1_General.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: General -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/1-General.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # General configuration ## Mandatory Access Control @@ -28,15 +23,19 @@ Kernel-General-MAC-8 | CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR | y <!-- end-section-config --> -Please also refer to the [**Mandatory Access Control** documentation in Platform](../part-5/1-MAC.html) part. -You can also find useful documentation and links on wikipedia about [**MAC**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) -and about [**SMACK**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplified_Mandatory_Access_Control_Kernel). +Please also refer to the [**Mandatory Access Control** documentation in +Platform](../part-5/1-MAC.html) part. You can also find useful documentation and +links on wikipedia about +[**MAC**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) and about +[**SMACK**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplified_Mandatory_Access_Control_Kernel). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## Disable kexec -**Kexec** is a system call that enables you to load and boot into another kernel from the currently running kernel. This feature is not required in a production environment. +**Kexec** is a system call that enables you to load and boot into another kernel +from the currently running kernel. This feature is not required in a production +environment. <!-- section-config --> @@ -48,7 +47,8 @@ Kernel-General-kexec-1 | `CONFIG_KEXEC` | `n` <!-- section-note --> -**kexec** can load arbitrary kernels but signing of new kernel can be enforced like it is can be enforced for new modules. +**kexec** can load arbitrary kernels but signing of new kernel can be enforced +like it is can be enforced for new modules. <!-- end-section-note --> @@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ Kernel-General-kexec-1 | `CONFIG_KEXEC` | `n` ## Disable kernel IP auto-configuration -It is preferable to have an IP configuration performed using a user-space tool as these tend to have more validation. We do not want the network interface coming up until the system has come up properly. +It is preferable to have an IP configuration performed using a user-space tool +as these tend to have more validation. We do not want the network interface +coming up until the system has come up properly. <!-- section-config --> @@ -70,7 +72,8 @@ Kernel-General-IPAutoConf-1 | `CONFIG_IP_PNP` | `n` ## Disable Sysctl syscall support -Enabling this will result in code being included that is hard to maintain and not well tested. +Enabling this will result in code being included that is hard to maintain and +not well tested. <!-- section-config --> @@ -84,7 +87,11 @@ Kernel-General-SysCtl_SysCall-1 | `CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL` | `n` ## Disable Legacy Linux Support -There are some Kernel Configs which are present only to support legacy binaries. See also "Consoles" part in order to disabling support for legacy binary formats. The `uselib` system call, in particular, has no valid use in any `libc6` or `uclibc` system in recent times. This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.15 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. +There are some Kernel Configs which are present only to support legacy binaries. +See also "Consoles" part in order to disabling support for legacy binary +formats. The `uselib` system call, in particular, has no valid use in any +`libc6` or `uclibc` system in recent times. This configuration is supported in +**Linux 3.15 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> @@ -98,7 +105,11 @@ Kernel-General-LegacyLinux-1 | `CONFIG_USELIB` | `n` ## Disable firmware auto-loading user mode helper -The firmware auto loading helper, which is a utility executed by the kernel on `hotplug` events requiring firmware, can to be set `setuid`. As a result of this, the helper utility is an attractive target for attackers with control of physical ports on the device. Disabling this configuration that is supported in **Linux 3.9 and greater**. +The firmware auto loading helper, which is a utility executed by the kernel on +`hotplug` events requiring firmware, can to be set `setuid`. As a result of +this, the helper utility is an attractive target for attackers with control of +physical ports on the device. Disabling this configuration that is supported in +**Linux 3.9 and greater**. <!-- section-config --> @@ -110,7 +121,8 @@ Kernel-General-FirmHelper-1 | `CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER` | `n` <!-- section-note --> -It doesn't strictly need to be `setuid`, there is an option of shipping firmware builtin into kernel without initrd/filesystem. +It doesn't strictly need to be `setuid`, there is an option of shipping firmware +builtin into kernel without initrd/filesystem. <!-- end-section-note --> @@ -118,9 +130,12 @@ It doesn't strictly need to be `setuid`, there is an option of shipping firmware ## Enable Kernel Panic on OOPS -When fuzzing the kernel or attempting kernel exploits attackers are likely to trigger kernel OOPSes. Setting the behavior on OOPS to PANIC can impede their progress. +When fuzzing the kernel or attempting kernel exploits attackers are likely to +trigger kernel OOPSes. Setting the behavior on OOPS to PANIC can impede their +progress. -This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should only be enabled for such versions. +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should +only be enabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> @@ -136,11 +151,14 @@ Kernel-General-PanicOnOOPS-1 | `CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS` | `y` ## Disable socket monitoring interface -These monitors can be used to inspect shared file descriptors on Unix Domain sockets or traffic on 'localhost' which is otherwise assumed to be confidential. +These monitors can be used to inspect shared file descriptors on Unix Domain +sockets or traffic on 'localhost' which is otherwise assumed to be confidential. -The `CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. +The `CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** +and thus should only be disabled for such versions. -The `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.3 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. +The `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.3 and greater** +and thus should only be disabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> @@ -157,7 +175,8 @@ Kernel-General-SocketMon-2 | `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` | `n` The BPF JIT can be used to create kernel-payloads from firewall table rules. -This configuration for is supported in **Linux 3.16 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. +This configuration for is supported in **Linux 3.16 and greater** and thus +should only be disabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> @@ -171,15 +190,17 @@ Kernel-General-BPF_JIT-1 | `CONFIG_BPF_JIT` | `n` ## Enable Enforced Module Signing -The kernel should never allow an unprivileged user the ability to load specific kernel modules, -since that would provide a facility to unexpectedly extend the available attack surface. +The kernel should never allow an unprivileged user the ability to load specific +kernel modules, since that would provide a facility to unexpectedly extend the +available attack surface. To protect against even privileged users, systems may need to either disable -module loading entirely, or provide signed modules -(e.g. `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE`, or dm-crypt with LoadPin), to keep from having -root load arbitrary kernel code via the module loader interface. +module loading entirely, or provide signed modules (e.g. +`CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE`, or dm-crypt with LoadPin), to keep from having root +load arbitrary kernel code via the module loader interface. -This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should only be enabled for such versions. +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should +only be enabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> @@ -189,7 +210,8 @@ Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-1 | `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE` | `y` <!-- end-section-config --> -It is also possible to block the loading of modules after startup with "kernel.modules_disabled". +It is also possible to block the loading of modules after startup with +"kernel.modules_disabled". <!-- section-config --> @@ -205,7 +227,9 @@ Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-2 | `kernel.modules_disabled` | `1` ## Disable all USB, PCMCIA (and other `hotplug` bus) drivers that aren't needed -To reduce the attack surface, the driver enumeration, probe, and operation happen in the kernel. The driver data is parsed by the kernel, so any logic bugs in these drivers can become kernel exploits. +To reduce the attack surface, the driver enumeration, probe, and operation +happen in the kernel. The driver data is parsed by the kernel, so any logic bugs +in these drivers can become kernel exploits. <!-- section-config --> @@ -243,7 +267,10 @@ Produce a position independent executable on targets which supports it. ## Prevent Overwrite Attacks -`-z,relro` linking option helps during program load, several ELF memory sections need to be written by the linker, but can be turned read-only before turning over control to the program. This prevents some Global Offset Table GOT overwrite attacks, or in the dtors section of the ELF binary. +`-z,relro` linking option helps during program load, several ELF memory sections +need to be written by the linker, but can be turned read-only before turning +over control to the program. This prevents some Global Offset Table GOT +overwrite attacks, or in the dtors section of the ELF binary. <!-- section-config --> @@ -254,7 +281,11 @@ Kernel-General-OverwriteAttacks-2 | `-z,now` | _Enable_ <!-- end-section-config --> -During program load, all dynamic symbols are resolved, allowing for the complete GOT to be marked read-only (due to `-z relro` above). This prevents GOT overwrite attacks. For very large application, this can incur some performance loss during initial load while symbols are resolved, but this shouldn't be an issue for daemons. +During program load, all dynamic symbols are resolved, allowing for the complete +GOT to be marked read-only (due to `-z relro` above). This prevents GOT +overwrite attacks. For very large application, this can incur some performance +loss during initial load while symbols are resolved, but this shouldn't be an +issue for daemons. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -270,7 +301,8 @@ Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Keep this part? <!-- end-section-todo --> -It is recommended that dynamic linking should generally not be allowed. This will avoid the user from replacing a library with malicious library. +It is recommended that dynamic linking should generally not be allowed. This +will avoid the user from replacing a library with malicious library. <!-- section-config --> @@ -282,6 +314,9 @@ Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Dynamic linking | Should generally not be allo <!-- section-note --> -Linking everything statically doesn't change anything wrt security as binaries will live under same user:group as libraries and setuid executables ignore `LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH`. It also increases RSS footprint and creates problems with upgrading. +Linking everything statically doesn't change anything wrt security as binaries +will live under same user:group as libraries and setuid executables ignore +`LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH`. It also increases RSS footprint and creates +problems with upgrading. <!-- end-section-note --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.2_Memory.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.2_Memory.md index 9c3fdb1..57cd9a3 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.2_Memory.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.2_Memory.md @@ -1,19 +1,18 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Memory -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/2-Memory.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Memory ## Restrict access to kernel memory -The /dev/kmem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to kernel virtual memory. This can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would have direct access to kernel virtual memory. +The /dev/kmem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to kernel virtual memory. +This can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would +have direct access to kernel virtual memory. -To disable the /dev/kmem file, which is very infrequently used by applications, the following kernel option should be set in the compile-time kernel configuration: +To disable the /dev/kmem file, which is very infrequently used by applications, +the following kernel option should be set in the compile-time kernel +configuration: <!-- section-config --> @@ -23,13 +22,15 @@ Kernel-Memory-RestrictAccess-1 | `CONFIG_DEVKMEM` | `n` <!-- end-section-config --> -In case applications in userspace need /dev/kmem support, it should be available only for authenticated applications. +In case applications in userspace need /dev/kmem support, it should be available +only for authenticated applications. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## Disable access to a kernel core dump -This kernel configuration disables access to a kernel core dump from user space. If enabled, it gives attackers a useful view into kernel memory. +This kernel configuration disables access to a kernel core dump from user space. +If enabled, it gives attackers a useful view into kernel memory. <!-- section-config --> @@ -43,7 +44,9 @@ Kernel-Memory-CoreDump-1 | `CONFIG_PROC_KCORE` | `n` ## Disable swap -If not disabled, attackers can enable swap at runtime, add pressure to the memory subsystem and then scour the pages written to swap for useful information. +If not disabled, attackers can enable swap at runtime, add pressure to the +memory subsystem and then scour the pages written to swap for useful +information. <!-- section-config --> @@ -68,7 +71,10 @@ Kernel-Memory-Swap-1 | `CONFIG_SWAP` | `n` ## Disable "Load All Symbols" -There is a /proc/kallsyms file which exposes the kernel memory space address of many kernel symbols (functions, variables, etc...). This information is useful to attackers in identifying kernel versions/configurations and in preparing payloads for the exploits of kernel space. +There is a /proc/kallsyms file which exposes the kernel memory space address of +many kernel symbols (functions, variables, etc...). This information is useful +to attackers in identifying kernel versions/configurations and in preparing +payloads for the exploits of kernel space. Both `KALLSYMS_ALL` and `KALLSYMS` shall be disabled; @@ -85,11 +91,14 @@ Kernel-Memory-LoadAllSymbols-2 | `CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL` | `n` ## Stack protection -To prevent stack-smashing, similar to the stack protector used for ELF programs in user-space, the kernel can protect its internal stacks as well. +To prevent stack-smashing, similar to the stack protector used for ELF programs +in user-space, the kernel can protect its internal stacks as well. -This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.11 and greater** and thus should only be enabled for such versions. +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.11 and greater** and thus should +only be enabled for such versions. -This configuration also requires building the kernel with the **gcc compiler 4.2 or greater**. +This configuration also requires building the kernel with the **gcc compiler 4.2 +or greater**. <!-- section-config --> @@ -105,9 +114,15 @@ Other defenses include things like shadow stacks. ## Disable access to /dev/mem -The /dev/mem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to physical memory. This can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would have direct access to physical memory through this convenient device file. It may not always be possible to disable such file, as some applications might need such support. In that case, then this device file should be available only for authenticated applications. +The /dev/mem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to physical memory. This +can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would have +direct access to physical memory through this convenient device file. It may not +always be possible to disable such file, as some applications might need such +support. In that case, then this device file should be available only for +authenticated applications. -This configuration is supported in **Linux 4.0 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. +This configuration is supported in **Linux 4.0 and greater** and thus should +only be disabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> @@ -123,9 +138,11 @@ Kernel-Memory-Access-1 | `CONFIG_DEVMEM` | `n` ## Disable cross-memory attach -Disable the process_vm_*v syscalls which allow one process to peek/poke the virtual memory of another. +Disable the process_vm_*v syscalls which allow one process to peek/poke the +virtual memory of another. -This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should +only be disabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.3_Consoles.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.3_Consoles.md index 59ccaf1..297950d 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.3_Consoles.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.3_Consoles.md @@ -1,17 +1,13 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Consoles -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/3-Consoles.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Serial ## Disable serial console -The serial console should be disabled to prevent an attacker from accessing this powerful interface. +The serial console should be disabled to prevent an attacker from accessing this +powerful interface. <!-- section-config --> @@ -28,9 +24,14 @@ Kernel-Consoles-Serial-4 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE_CONSOLE` | `n` ## Bake-in the kernel command-line -The kernel command-line is used to control many aspects of the booting kernel, and is prone to tampering as they are passed in RAM with little to no reverse validation on these parameters. To prevent this type of attack, the kernel shall be configured to ignore commands line arguments, and use pre-configured (compile time) options instead. +The kernel command-line is used to control many aspects of the booting kernel, +and is prone to tampering as they are passed in RAM with little to no reverse +validation on these parameters. To prevent this type of attack, the kernel shall +be configured to ignore commands line arguments, and use pre-configured (compile +time) options instead. -Set the kernel command line in the `CONFIG_CMDLINE KConfig` item and then pass no arguments from the bootloader. +Set the kernel command line in the `CONFIG_CMDLINE KConfig` item and then pass +no arguments from the bootloader. <!-- section-config --> @@ -42,13 +43,18 @@ Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-3 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE` | `y` <!-- end-section-config --> -It is recommended that any per-device settings (e.g: MAC addresses, serial numbers, etc.) be stored and accessed from read-only memory (or files), and that any such parameters be verified (signature checking) prior to their use. +It is recommended that any per-device settings (e.g: MAC addresses, serial +numbers, etc.) be stored and accessed from read-only memory (or files), and that +any such parameters be verified (signature checking) prior to their use. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ## Disable KGDB -The Linux kernel supports KGDB over USB and console ports. These mechanisms are controlled by the `kgdbdbgp` and `kgdboc` kernel command-line parameters. It is important to ensure that no shipping product contains a kernel with KGDB compiled-in. +The Linux kernel supports KGDB over USB and console ports. These mechanisms are +controlled by the `kgdbdbgp` and `kgdboc` kernel command-line parameters. It is +important to ensure that no shipping product contains a kernel with KGDB +compiled-in. <!-- section-config --> @@ -62,7 +68,10 @@ Kernel-Consoles-KDBG-1 | `CONFIG_KGDB` | `n` ## Disable magic sysrq support -On a few architectures, you can access a powerful debugger interface from the keyboard. The same powerful interface can be present on the serial console (responding to serial break) of Linux on other architectures. Disable to avoid potentially exposing this powerful backdoor. +On a few architectures, you can access a powerful debugger interface from the +keyboard. The same powerful interface can be present on the serial console +(responding to serial break) of Linux on other architectures. Disable to avoid +potentially exposing this powerful backdoor. <!-- section-config --> @@ -76,7 +85,10 @@ Kernel-Consoles-SysRQ-1 | `CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ` | `n` ## Disable support for binary formats other than ELF -This will make possible to plug wrapper-driven binary formats into the kernel. It enables support for binary formats other than ELF. Providing the ability to use alternate interpreters would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. +This will make possible to plug wrapper-driven binary formats into the kernel. +It enables support for binary formats other than ELF. Providing the ability to +use alternate interpreters would assist an attacker in discovering attack +vectors. <!-- section-config --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.4_Debug.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.4_Debug.md index 52b2e6c..e34839f 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.4_Debug.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.4_Debug.md @@ -1,19 +1,21 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Debug -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/4-Debug.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Debug -No debuggers shall be present on the file system. This includes, but is not limited to, the GNU Debugger client/server (commonly known in their short form names such as the `gdb` and `gdbserver` executable binaries respectively), the `LLDB` next generation debugger or the `TCF` (Target Communications Framework) agnostic framework. Including these binaries as part of the file system will facilitate an attacker's ability to reverse engineer and debug (either locally or remotely) any process that is currently executing on the device. +No debuggers shall be present on the file system. This includes, but is not +limited to, the GNU Debugger client/server (commonly known in their short form +names such as the `gdb` and `gdbserver` executable binaries respectively), the +`LLDB` next generation debugger or the `TCF` (Target Communications Framework) +agnostic framework. Including these binaries as part of the file system will +facilitate an attacker's ability to reverse engineer and debug (either locally +or remotely) any process that is currently executing on the device. ## Kernel debug symbols -Debug symbols should always be removed from production kernels as they provide a lot of information to attackers. +Debug symbols should always be removed from production kernels as they provide a +lot of information to attackers. <!-- section-config --> @@ -23,11 +25,14 @@ Kernel-Debug-Symbols-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` | `n` <!-- end-section-config --> -These kernel debug symbols are enabled by other config items in the kernel. Care should be taken to disable those also. If `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` cannot be disabled, then enabling `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` is second best. +These kernel debug symbols are enabled by other config items in the kernel. Care +should be taken to disable those also. If `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` cannot be +disabled, then enabling `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` is second best. <!-- section-note --> -At least `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` should be always enabled for developers to convert addresses in oops messages to line numbers. +At least `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` should be always enabled for developers to +convert addresses in oops messages to line numbers. <!-- end-section-note --> @@ -35,7 +40,10 @@ At least `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` should be always enabled for developers to ## Disable Kprobes -Kprobes enables you to dynamically break into any kernel routine and collect debugging and performance information non-disruptively. You can trap at almost any kernel code address, specifying a handler routine to be invoked when the breakpoint is hit. +Kprobes enables you to dynamically break into any kernel routine and collect +debugging and performance information non-disruptively. You can trap at almost +any kernel code address, specifying a handler routine to be invoked when the +breakpoint is hit. <!-- section-config --> @@ -49,7 +57,8 @@ Kernel-Debug-Kprobes-1 | `CONFIG_KPROBES` | `n` ## Disable Tracing -FTrace enables the kernel to trace every kernel function. Providing kernel trace functionality would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. +FTrace enables the kernel to trace every kernel function. Providing kernel trace +functionality would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. <!-- section-config --> @@ -63,7 +72,9 @@ Kernel-Debug-Tracing-1 | `CONFIG_FTRACE` | `n` ## Disable Profiling -Profiling and OProfile enables profiling the whole system, include the kernel, kernel modules, libraries, and applications. Providing profiling functionality would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. +Profiling and OProfile enables profiling the whole system, include the kernel, +kernel modules, libraries, and applications. Providing profiling functionality +would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. <!-- section-config --> @@ -78,7 +89,8 @@ Kernel-Debug-Profiling-2 | `CONFIG_PROFILING` | `n` ## Disable OOPS print on BUG() -The output from OOPS print can be helpful in Return Oriented Programming (ROP) when trying to determine the effectiveness of an exploit. +The output from OOPS print can be helpful in Return Oriented Programming (ROP) +when trying to determine the effectiveness of an exploit. <!-- section-config --> @@ -92,7 +104,8 @@ Kernel-Debug-OOPSOnBUG-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE` | `n` ## Disable Kernel Debugging -There are development-only branches of code in the kernel enabled by the `DEBUG_KERNEL` conf. This should be disabled to compile-out these branches. +There are development-only branches of code in the kernel enabled by the +`DEBUG_KERNEL` conf. This should be disabled to compile-out these branches. <!-- section-config --> @@ -103,7 +116,11 @@ Kernel-Debug-Dev-2 | `CONFIG_EMBEDDED` | `n` <!-- end-section-config --> -In some kernel versions, disabling this requires also disabling `CONFIG_EMBEDDED`, and `CONFIG_EXPERT`. Disabling `CONFIG_EXPERT` makes it impossible to disable `COREDUMP`, `DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE`, `NAMESPACES`, `KALLSYMS` and `BUG`. In which case it is better to leave this enabled than enable the others. +In some kernel versions, disabling this requires also disabling +`CONFIG_EMBEDDED`, and `CONFIG_EXPERT`. Disabling `CONFIG_EXPERT` makes it +impossible to disable `COREDUMP`, `DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE`, `NAMESPACES`, `KALLSYMS` +and `BUG`. In which case it is better to leave this enabled than enable the +others. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -111,7 +128,8 @@ In some kernel versions, disabling this requires also disabling `CONFIG_EMBEDDED ## Disable the kernel debug filesystem -The kernel debug filesystem presents a lot of useful information and means of manipulation of the kernel to an attacker. +The kernel debug filesystem presents a lot of useful information and means of +manipulation of the kernel to an attacker. <!-- section-config --> @@ -125,7 +143,8 @@ Kernel-Debug-FileSystem-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_FS` | `n` ## Disable BUG() support -The kernel will display backtrace and register information for BUGs and WARNs in kernel space, making it easier for attackers to develop exploits. +The kernel will display backtrace and register information for BUGs and WARNs in +kernel space, making it easier for attackers to develop exploits. <!-- section-config --> @@ -139,9 +158,11 @@ Kernel-Debug-BUG-1 | `CONFIG_BUG` | `n` ## Disable core dumps -Core dumps provide a lot of debug information for hackers. So disabling core dumps are recommended in production builds. +Core dumps provide a lot of debug information for hackers. So disabling core +dumps are recommended in production builds. -This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should +only be disabled for such versions. <!-- section-config --> @@ -157,9 +178,13 @@ Kernel-Debug-CoreDumps-1 | `CONFIG_COREDUMP` | `n` ## Kernel Address Display Restriction -When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for kernel vulnerabilities, they frequently need to know the location of internal kernel structures. By treating kernel addresses as sensitive information, those locations are not visible to regular local users. +When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for kernel +vulnerabilities, they frequently need to know the location of internal kernel +structures. By treating kernel addresses as sensitive information, those +locations are not visible to regular local users. -**/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict is set to "1"** to block the reporting of known kernel address leaks. +**/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict is set to "1"** to block the reporting of known +kernel address leaks. <!-- section-config --> @@ -169,7 +194,9 @@ Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict` | `1` <!-- end-section-config --> -Additionally, various files and directories should be readable only by the root user: `/boot/vmlinuz*`, `/boot/System.map*`, `/sys/kernel/debug/`, `/proc/slabinfo` +Additionally, various files and directories should be readable only by the root +user: `/boot/vmlinuz*`, `/boot/System.map*`, `/sys/kernel/debug/`, +`/proc/slabinfo` <!-- section-config --> @@ -186,9 +213,12 @@ Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-4 | `/proc/slabinfo` | _Readable Only for ## DMESG Restrictions -When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for vulnerabilities, they frequently will use `dmesg` output. By treating `dmesg` output as sensitive information, this output is not available to the attacker. +When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for vulnerabilities, they +frequently will use `dmesg` output. By treating `dmesg` output as sensitive +information, this output is not available to the attacker. -**/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict can be set to "1"** to treat dmesg output as sensitive. +**/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict can be set to "1"** to treat dmesg output as +sensitive. <!-- section-config --> @@ -198,7 +228,8 @@ Kernel-Debug-DMESG-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict` | `1` <!-- end-section-config --> -Enable the below compiler and linker options when building user-space applications to avoid stack smashing, buffer overflow attacks. +Enable the below compiler and linker options when building user-space +applications to avoid stack smashing, buffer overflow attacks. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -206,7 +237,10 @@ Enable the below compiler and linker options when building user-space applicatio ## Disable /proc/config.gz -It is extremely important to not expose the kernel configuration used on a production device to a potential attacker. With access to the kernel config, it could be possible for an attacker to build a custom kernel for the device that may disable critical security features. +It is extremely important to not expose the kernel configuration used on a +production device to a potential attacker. With access to the kernel config, it +could be possible for an attacker to build a custom kernel for the device that +may disable critical security features. <!-- section-config --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.5_FileSystems.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.5_FileSystems.md index 0d60d9d..14f8c53 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.5_FileSystems.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/4_Kernel/1.2.4.5_FileSystems.md @@ -1,21 +1,19 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: File Systems -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/5-FileSystems.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # File System ## Disable all file systems not needed -To reduce the attack surface, file system data is parsed by the kernel, so any logic bugs in file system drivers can become kernel exploits. +To reduce the attack surface, file system data is parsed by the kernel, so any +logic bugs in file system drivers can become kernel exploits. ### Disable NFS file system -NFS FileSystems are useful during development phases, but this can be a very helpful way for an attacker to get files when you are in production mode, so we must disable them. +NFS FileSystems are useful during development phases, but this can be a very +helpful way for an attacker to get files when you are in production mode, so we +must disable them. <!-- section-config --> @@ -32,9 +30,11 @@ Kernel-FileSystems-NFS-2 | `CONFIG_NFS_FS` | `n` ## Partition Mount Options -There are several security restrictions that can be set on a filesystem when it is mounted. Some common security options include, but are not limited to: +There are several security restrictions that can be set on a filesystem when it +is mounted. Some common security options include, but are not limited to: -`nosuid` - Do not allow set-user-identifier or set-group-identifier bits to take effect. +`nosuid` - Do not allow set-user-identifier or set-group-identifier bits to take +effect. `nodev` - Do not interpret character or block special devices on the filesystem. @@ -58,7 +58,9 @@ Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-7 | `/dev` | Add `nosuid` and `noexec`. <!-- end-section-config --> <!-- section-note --> -If `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` is set, then the kernel will mount /dev and will not apply the `nosuid`, `noexec` options. Either disable `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` or add a remount with `noexec` and `nosuid` options to system startup. +If `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` is set, then the kernel will mount /dev and will not +apply the `nosuid`, `noexec` options. Either disable `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` or +add a remount with `noexec` and `nosuid` options to system startup. <!-- end-section-note --> <!-- section-config --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.0_Abstract.md index db911d2..4074b6f 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,18 +1,14 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 5 - Platform ## Abstract -The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL** compliant applications and services. -The platform includes the following software: +The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL** +compliant applications and services. The platform includes the following +software: - Linux **BSP** configured for reference boards. - Proprietary device drivers for common peripherals on reference boards. @@ -34,19 +30,20 @@ This part focuses on the AGL platform including all tools and techniques used to upgrade the security and downgrade the danger. It must be possible to apply the two fundamental principles written at the very beginning of the document. First of all, security management must remain simple. You must also prohibit -everything by default, and then define a set of authorization rules. As cases -to deal with, we must: +everything by default, and then define a set of authorization rules. As cases to +deal with, we must: - Implement a **MAC** for processes and files. - Limit communication between applications (_SystemBus_ and _SystemD_ part). -- Prohibit all tools used during development mode (_Utilities_ and _Services_ part). +- Prohibit all tools used during development mode (_Utilities_ and _Services_ + part). - Manage user capabilities (_Users_ part). - Manage application permissions and policies (_AGLFw_ part). <!-- section-note --> -The tools and concepts used to meet these needs are only examples. -Any other tool that meets the need can be used. +The tools and concepts used to meet these needs are only examples. Any other +tool that meets the need can be used. <!-- end-section-note --> @@ -61,31 +58,33 @@ permissions are granted. ## Discretionary Access Control -**D**iscretionary **A**ccess **C**ontrol (**DAC**) is the traditional Linux method of separating -users and groups from one another. In a shared environment where multiple users -have access to a computer or network, Unix IDs have offered a way to contain access -within privilege areas for individuals, or shared among the group or system. -The Android system took this one step further, assigning new user IDs for each App. -This was never the original intention of Linux UIDs, but was able to provide -Android’s initial security element: the ability to sandbox applications. +**D**iscretionary **A**ccess **C**ontrol (**DAC**) is the traditional Linux +method of separating users and groups from one another. In a shared environment +where multiple users have access to a computer or network, Unix IDs have offered +a way to contain access within privilege areas for individuals, or shared among +the group or system. The Android system took this one step further, assigning +new user IDs for each App. This was never the original intention of Linux UIDs, +but was able to provide Android’s initial security element: the ability to +sandbox applications. Although AGL mentions use of **DAC** for security isolation, the weight of the -security responsibility lies in the **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol (**MAC**) and **Cynara**. -Furthermore, there are system services with unique UIDs. however,the system -does not go to the extreme of Android, where every application has its own UID. -All sandboxing (app isolation) in AGL is handled in the **MAC** contexts. +security responsibility lies in the **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol +(**MAC**) and **Cynara**. Furthermore, there are system services with unique +UIDs. however,the system does not go to the extreme of Android, where every +application has its own UID. All sandboxing (app isolation) in AGL is handled in +the **MAC** contexts. ## Mandatory Access Control **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol (**MAC**) is an extension to **DAC**, -whereby extended attributes (xattr) are associated with the filesystem. -In the case of AGL, the smackfs filesystem allows files and directories -to be associated with a SMACK label, providing the ability of further -discrimination on access control. A SMACK label is a simple null terminated -character string with a maximum of 255 bytes. While it doesn’t offer the -richness of an SELinux label, which provides a user, role,type, and level, -the simplicity of a single value makes the overall design far less complex. -There is arguably less chance of the security author making mistakes in the policies set forth. +whereby extended attributes (xattr) are associated with the filesystem. In the +case of AGL, the smackfs filesystem allows files and directories to be +associated with a SMACK label, providing the ability of further discrimination +on access control. A SMACK label is a simple null terminated character string +with a maximum of 255 bytes. While it doesn’t offer the richness of an SELinux +label, which provides a user, role,type, and level, the simplicity of a single +value makes the overall design far less complex. There is arguably less chance +of the security author making mistakes in the policies set forth. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.1_Mandatory_Access_Control.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.1_Mandatory_Access_Control.md index 4b027f6..a8226dd 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.1_Mandatory_Access_Control.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.1_Mandatory_Access_Control.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Mandatory Access Control -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/1-MAC.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Mandatory Access Control <!-- section-note --> @@ -24,9 +19,9 @@ uses an **LSM** called **S**implified **M**andatory **A**ccess **C**ontrol labels as part of the extended attributes **SMACK** labels to the file extended attributes. And a policy is also created to define the behaviour of each label. -The kernel access controls is based on these labels and this policy. If there -is no rule, no access will be granted and as a consequence, what is not -explicitly authorized is forbidden. +The kernel access controls is based on these labels and this policy. If there is +no rule, no access will be granted and as a consequence, what is not explicitly +authorized is forbidden. There are two types of **SMACK** labels: @@ -45,7 +40,10 @@ into the following domains: - System. - Applications, Services and User. -See [AGL security framework review](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMMQ1Tokyo/AGL-security-framework-review.pdf) and [Smack White Paper](http://schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf) +See [AGL security framework +review](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/AMMQ1Tokyo/AGL-security-framework-review.pdf) +and [Smack White +Paper](http://schaufler-ca.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/SmackWhitePaper.257153003.pdf) for more information. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -153,22 +151,26 @@ There are 4 major components to the system: - Basic utilities for policy management and checking. - The policy/configuration data. -As with any mandatory access system, the policy management needs to be carefully separated -from the checking, as the management utilities can become a convenient point of attack. -Dynamic additions to the policy system need to be carefully verified, as the ability to -update the policies is often needed, but introduces a possible threat. Finally, -even if the policy management is well secured, the policy checking and failure response -to that checking is also of vital importance to the smooth operation of the system. +As with any mandatory access system, the policy management needs to be carefully +separated from the checking, as the management utilities can become a convenient +point of attack. Dynamic additions to the policy system need to be carefully +verified, as the ability to update the policies is often needed, but introduces +a possible threat. Finally, even if the policy management is well secured, the +policy checking and failure response to that checking is also of vital +importance to the smooth operation of the system. -While **MAC** is a certainly a step up in security when compared to DAC, there are still -many ways to compromise a SMACK-enabled Linux system. Some of these ways are as follows: +While **MAC** is a certainly a step up in security when compared to DAC, there +are still many ways to compromise a SMACK-enabled Linux system. Some of these +ways are as follows: -- Disabling SMACK at invocation of the kernel (with command-line: security=none). +- Disabling SMACK at invocation of the kernel (with command-line: + security=none). - Disabling SMACK in the kernel build and redeploying the kernel. - Changing a SMACK attribute of a file or directory at install time. - Tampering with a process with the CAP_MAC_ADMIN privilege. - Setting/Re-setting the SMACK label of a file. -- Tampering with the default domains (i.e. /etc/smack/accesses.d/default-access-domains). +- Tampering with the default domains (i.e. + /etc/smack/accesses.d/default-access-domains). - Disabling or tampering with the SMACK filesystem (i.e. /smackfs). - Adding policies with `smackload` (adding the utility if not present). - Changing labels with `chsmack` (adding the utility if not present). diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.2_SystemD.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.2_SystemD.md index 739ffcb..0ccd4e4 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.2_SystemD.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.2_SystemD.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: SystemD -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/2-SystemD.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # SystemD `afm-system-daemon` is used to: diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.3_SystemBus.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.3_SystemBus.md index 0e37e20..71a2212 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.3_SystemBus.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.3_SystemBus.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: SystemBus -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/3-SystemBus.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # D-Bus D-Bus is a well-known **IPC** (Inter-Process Communication) protocol (and @@ -14,12 +9,14 @@ daemon) that helps applications to talk to each other. The use of D-Bus is great because it allows to implement discovery and signaling. The D-Bus session is by default addressed by environment variable -`DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS`. Using **systemd** variable `DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS` -is automatically set for user sessions. D-Bus usage is linked to permissions. - -D-Bus has already had several [security issues](https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-13442/D-bus-Project.html) -(mostly **DoS** issues), to allow applications to keep talking to each other. -It is important to protect against this type of attack to keep the system more +`DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS`. Using **systemd** variable +`DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS` is automatically set for user sessions. D-Bus usage +is linked to permissions. + +D-Bus has already had several [security +issues](https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-13442/D-bus-Project.html) +(mostly **DoS** issues), to allow applications to keep talking to each other. It +is important to protect against this type of attack to keep the system more stable. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.4_Services.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.4_Services.md index 426ce52..c3aec00 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.4_Services.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.4_Services.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: System services and daemons -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/4-Services.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # System services and daemons <!-- section-todo --> @@ -24,13 +19,13 @@ Platform-Services-2 | Secure daemon ? few resources as possible. It is a fully modular system that can be extended, through plug-ins, to support all kinds of wired or wireless technologies. - **bluez** is a Bluetooth stack. Its goal is to program an implementation of - the Bluetooth wireless standards specifications. In addition to the basic stack, - the `bluez-utils` and `bluez-firmware` packages contain low level utilities such - as `dfutool` which can interrogate the Bluetooth adapter chipset in order to - determine whether its firmware can be upgraded. -- **gstreamer** is a pipeline-based multimedia framework. It can be used to build - a system that reads files in one format, processes them, and exports them in - another format. + the Bluetooth wireless standards specifications. In addition to the basic + stack, the `bluez-utils` and `bluez-firmware` packages contain low level + utilities such as `dfutool` which can interrogate the Bluetooth adapter + chipset in order to determine whether its firmware can be upgraded. +- **gstreamer** is a pipeline-based multimedia framework. It can be used to + build a system that reads files in one format, processes them, and exports + them in another format. - **alsa** is a software framework and part of the Linux kernel that provides an **API** for sound card device drivers. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.5_Application_framework.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.5_Application_framework.md index d491801..3ce894d 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.5_Application_framework.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.5_Application_framework.md @@ -1,24 +1,24 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Application Framework -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/5-AppFw.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Application framework/model (**AppFw**) The AGL application framework consists of several inter-working parts: -- **SMACK**: The kernel level **LSM** (**L**inux **S**ecurity **M**odule) that performs extended access control of the system. -- **Cynara**: the native gatekeeper daemon used for policy handling, updating to the database and policy checking. -- Security Manager: a master service, through which all security events are intended to take place. -- Several native application framework utilities: `afm-main-binding`, `afm-user-daemon`, `afm-system-daemon`. +- **SMACK**: The kernel level **LSM** (**L**inux **S**ecurity **M**odule) that + performs extended access control of the system. +- **Cynara**: the native gatekeeper daemon used for policy handling, updating to + the database and policy checking. +- Security Manager: a master service, through which all security events are + intended to take place. +- Several native application framework utilities: `afm-main-binding`, + `afm-user-daemon`, `afm-system-daemon`. The application framework manages: -- The applications and services management: Installing, Uninstalling, Listing, ... +- The applications and services management: Installing, Uninstalling, Listing, + ... - The life cycle of applications: Start -> (Pause, Resume) -> Stop. - Events and signals propagation. - Privileges granting and checking. @@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ The application framework manages: implementation detail that should not impact the layers above the application framework. -- The **security model** refers to how **DAC** (**D**iscretionary **A**ccess **C**ontrol), - **MAC** (Mandatory Access Control) and `Capabilities` are used by the system to - ensure security and privacy. It also includes features of reporting using - audit features and by managing logs and alerts. +- The **security model** refers to how **DAC** (**D**iscretionary **A**ccess + **C**ontrol), **MAC** (Mandatory Access Control) and `Capabilities` are used + by the system to ensure security and privacy. It also includes features of + reporting using audit features and by managing logs and alerts. <!-- end-section-note --> @@ -50,21 +50,24 @@ Platform-AGLFw-AppFw-1 | Security model | Use the AppFw as Security model. <!-- end-section-config --> -See [AGL AppFw Privileges Management](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/devguides/en/dev/reference/iotbzh2016/appfw/03-AGL-AppFW-Privileges-Management.pdf) and [AGL - Application Framework Documentation](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf) for more -information. +See [AGL AppFw Privileges +Management](http://docs.automotivelinux.org/docs/devguides/en/dev/reference/iotbzh2016/appfw/03-AGL-AppFW-Privileges-Management.pdf) +and [AGL - Application Framework +Documentation](http://iot.bzh/download/public/2017/SDK/AppFw-Documentation-v3.1.pdf) +for more information. <!-- pagebreak --> -The Security Manager communicates policy information to **Cynara**, -which retains information in its own database in the format of a text -file with comma-separated values (CSV). There are provisions to retain -a copy of the CSV text file when the file is being updated. +The Security Manager communicates policy information to **Cynara**, which +retains information in its own database in the format of a text file with +comma-separated values (CSV). There are provisions to retain a copy of the CSV +text file when the file is being updated. -Runtime checking occurs through **Cynara**. Each application that is -added to the framework has its own instantiation of a SMACK context -and D-bus bindings. The afb_daemon and Binder form a web-service that -is communicated to through http or a websocket from the application-proper. -This http or websocket interface uses a standard unique web token for API communication. +Runtime checking occurs through **Cynara**. Each application that is added to +the framework has its own instantiation of a SMACK context and D-bus bindings. +The afb_daemon and Binder form a web-service that is communicated to through +http or a websocket from the application-proper. This http or websocket +interface uses a standard unique web token for API communication.  @@ -81,14 +84,16 @@ Cynara interact with **D-Bus** in order to deliver this information. Cynara consists of several parts: -- Cynara: a daemon for controlling policies and responding to access control requests. +- Cynara: a daemon for controlling policies and responding to access control + requests. - Database: a spot to hold policies. - Libraries: several static and dynamic libraries for communicating with Cynara. -The daemon communicates to the libraries over Unix domain sockets. -The database storage format is a series of CSV-like files with an index file. +The daemon communicates to the libraries over Unix domain sockets. The database +storage format is a series of CSV-like files with an index file. -There are several ways that an attacker can manipulate policies of the Cynara system: +There are several ways that an attacker can manipulate policies of the Cynara +system: - Disable Cynara by killing the process. - Tamper with the Cynara binary on-disk or in-memory. @@ -96,9 +101,9 @@ There are several ways that an attacker can manipulate policies of the Cynara sy - Tamper with the database controlled by Cynara. - Highjack the communication between Cynara and the database. -The text-based database is the weakest part of the system and although there are some -consistency mechanisms in place (i.e. the backup guard), these mechanisms are weak at best -and can be countered by an attacker very easily. +The text-based database is the weakest part of the system and although there are +some consistency mechanisms in place (i.e. the backup guard), these mechanisms +are weak at best and can be countered by an attacker very easily. <!-- section-config --> @@ -127,36 +132,39 @@ Platform-AGLFw-Cynara-1 | Permissions | Use Cynara as policy-checker service. Policies are kept in buckets. Buckets are set of policies which have additional a property of default answer, the default answer is yielded if no policy matches -searched key. Buckets have names which might be used in policies (for directions). +searched key. Buckets have names which might be used in policies (for +directions). ## Attack Vectors The following attack vectors are not completely independent. While attackers may -have varying levels of access to an AGL system, experience has shown that a typical -attack can start with direct access to a system, find the vulnerabilities, -then proceed to automate the attack such that it can be invoked from less accessible -standpoint (e.g. remotely). Therefore, it is important to assess all threat levels, -and protect the system appropriately understanding that direct access attacks -are the door-way into remote attacks. +have varying levels of access to an AGL system, experience has shown that a +typical attack can start with direct access to a system, find the +vulnerabilities, then proceed to automate the attack such that it can be invoked +from less accessible standpoint (e.g. remotely). Therefore, it is important to +assess all threat levels, and protect the system appropriately understanding +that direct access attacks are the door-way into remote attacks. ### Remote Attacks -The local web server interface used for applications is the first point of attack, -as web service APIs are well understood and easily intercepted. The local web server -could potentially be exploited by redirecting web requests through the local service -and exploiting the APIs. While there is the use of a security token on the web -service API, this is weak textual matching at best. This will not be difficult to spoof. -It is well known that [API Keys do not provide any real security](http://nordicapis.com/why-api-keys-are-not-enough/). +The local web server interface used for applications is the first point of +attack, as web service APIs are well understood and easily intercepted. The +local web server could potentially be exploited by redirecting web requests +through the local service and exploiting the APIs. While there is the use of a +security token on the web service API, this is weak textual matching at best. +This will not be difficult to spoof. It is well known that [API Keys do not +provide any real security](http://nordicapis.com/why-api-keys-are-not-enough/). It is likely that the architectural inclusion of an http / web-service interface -provided the most flexibility for applications to be written natively or in HTML5. -However, this flexibility may trade-off with security concerns. For example, -if a native application were linked directly to the underlying framework services, -there would be fewer concerns over remote attacks coming through the web-service interface. +provided the most flexibility for applications to be written natively or in +HTML5. However, this flexibility may trade-off with security concerns. For +example, if a native application were linked directly to the underlying +framework services, there would be fewer concerns over remote attacks coming +through the web-service interface. Leaving the interface as designed, mitigations to attacks could include further -securing the interface layer with cryptographic protocols: -e.g. encrypted information passing, key exchange (e.g. Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman). +securing the interface layer with cryptographic protocols: e.g. encrypted +information passing, key exchange (e.g. Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman). ### User-level Native Attacks @@ -167,49 +175,55 @@ e.g. encrypted information passing, key exchange (e.g. Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hel - Spoofing the D-bus Interface - Adding executables/libraries -With direct access to the device, there are many security concerns on the native level. -For example, as **Cynara** uses a text file data-base with comma-separated values (CSV), -an attacker could simply modify the data-base to escalate privileges of an application. -Once a single application has all the privileges possible on the system, exploits can -come through in this manner. Similarly the SQLite database used by the Security Manager -is not much different than a simple text file. There are many tools available to add, -remove, modify entries in an SQLite data-base. - -On the next level, a common point of attack is to modify binaries or daemons for exploiting -functionality. There are many Linux tools available to aid in this regard, -including: [IDA Pro](https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/index.shtml), -and [radare2](https://rada.re/r/). With the ability to modify binaries, -an attacker can do any number of activities including: removing calls to security checks, -redirecting control to bypass verification functionality, ignoring security policy handling, -escalating privileges, etc. - -Additionally, another attack vector would be to spoof the D-bus interface. D-bus is a -message passing system built upon Inter-Process Communication (IPC), where structured -messages are passed based upon a protocol. The interface is generic and well documented. -Therefore, modifying or adding binaries/libraries to spoof this interface is a relatively -straight-forward process. Once the interface has been spoofed, the attacker can issue any -number of commands that lead into control of low-level functionality. - -Protecting a system from native attacks requires a methodical approach. First, the system -should reject processes that are not sanctioned to run. Signature-level verification at -installation time will help in this regard, but run-time integrity verification is much better. -Signatures need to originate from authorized parties, which is discussed further -in a later section on the Application Store. - -On the next level, executables should not be allowed to do things where they have not been -granted permission. DAC and SMACK policies can help in this regard. On the other hand, -there remain concerns with memory accesses, system calls, and other process activity -that may go undetected. For this reason, a secure environment which monitors all activity -can give indication of all unauthorized activity on the system. +With direct access to the device, there are many security concerns on the native +level. For example, as **Cynara** uses a text file data-base with +comma-separated values (CSV), an attacker could simply modify the data-base to +escalate privileges of an application. Once a single application has all the +privileges possible on the system, exploits can come through in this manner. +Similarly the SQLite database used by the Security Manager is not much different +than a simple text file. There are many tools available to add, remove, modify +entries in an SQLite data-base. + +On the next level, a common point of attack is to modify binaries or daemons for +exploiting functionality. There are many Linux tools available to aid in this +regard, including: [IDA Pro](https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/index.shtml), +and [radare2](https://rada.re/r/). With the ability to modify binaries, an +attacker can do any number of activities including: removing calls to security +checks, redirecting control to bypass verification functionality, ignoring +security policy handling, escalating privileges, etc. + +Additionally, another attack vector would be to spoof the D-bus interface. D-bus +is a message passing system built upon Inter-Process Communication (IPC), where +structured messages are passed based upon a protocol. The interface is generic +and well documented. Therefore, modifying or adding binaries/libraries to spoof +this interface is a relatively straight-forward process. Once the interface has +been spoofed, the attacker can issue any number of commands that lead into +control of low-level functionality. + +Protecting a system from native attacks requires a methodical approach. First, +the system should reject processes that are not sanctioned to run. +Signature-level verification at installation time will help in this regard, but +run-time integrity verification is much better. Signatures need to originate +from authorized parties, which is discussed further in a later section on the +Application Store. + +On the next level, executables should not be allowed to do things where they +have not been granted permission. DAC and SMACK policies can help in this +regard. On the other hand, there remain concerns with memory accesses, system +calls, and other process activity that may go undetected. For this reason, a +secure environment which monitors all activity can give indication of all +unauthorized activity on the system. Finally, it is very difficult to catch attacks of direct tampering in a system. -These types of attacks require a defense-in-depth approach, where complementary software -protection and hardening techniques are needed. Tamper-resistance and anti-reverse-engineering -technologies include program transformations/obfuscation, integrity verification, -and white-box cryptography. If applied in a mutually-dependent fashion and considering -performance/security tradeoffs, the approach can provide an effective barrier -to direct attacks to the system. Furthermore, the use of threat monitoring provides a -valuable telemetry/analytics capability and the ability to react and renew a system under attack. +These types of attacks require a defense-in-depth approach, where complementary +software protection and hardening techniques are needed. Tamper-resistance and +anti-reverse-engineering technologies include program +transformations/obfuscation, integrity verification, and white-box cryptography. +If applied in a mutually-dependent fashion and considering performance/security +tradeoffs, the approach can provide an effective barrier to direct attacks to +the system. Furthermore, the use of threat monitoring provides a valuable +telemetry/analytics capability and the ability to react and renew a system under +attack. ### Root-level Native Attacks @@ -219,58 +233,70 @@ valuable telemetry/analytics capability and the ability to react and renew a sys - Disabling SMACK - Tampering the kernel -Once root-level access (i.e. su) has been achieved on the device, there are many ways -to compromise the system. The system daemon, **Cynara**, and the security manager are -vulnerable to tampering attacks. For example, an executable can be modified in memory -to jam a branch, jump to an address, or disregard a check. This can be as simple as replacing -a branch instruction with a NOP, changing a memory value, or using a debugger (e.g. gdb, IDA) -to change an instruction. Tampering these executables would mean that policies can be -ignored and verification checks can be bypassed. - -Without going so far as to tamper an executable, the **SMACK** system is also vulnerable to attack. -For example, if the kernel is stopped and restarted with the *security=none* flag, -then SMACK is not enabled. Furthermore, `systemd` starts the loading of **SMACK** rules during -start-up. If this start-up process is interfered with, then **SMACK** will not run. -Alternatively, new policies can be added with `smackload` allowing unforseen privileges -to alternative applications/executables. - -Another intrusion on the kernel level is to rebuild the kernel (as it is open-source) -and replace it with a copy that has **SMACK** disabled, or even just the **SMACK** filesystem -(`smackfs`) disabled. Without the extended label attributes, the **SMACK** system is disabled. - -Root-level access to the device has ultimate power, where the entire system can be compromised. -More so, a system with this level access allows an attacker to craft a simpler *point-attack* -which can operate on a level requiring fewer privileges (e.g. remote access, user-level access). +Once root-level access (i.e. su) has been achieved on the device, there are many +ways to compromise the system. The system daemon, **Cynara**, and the security +manager are vulnerable to tampering attacks. For example, an executable can be +modified in memory to jam a branch, jump to an address, or disregard a check. +This can be as simple as replacing a branch instruction with a NOP, changing a +memory value, or using a debugger (e.g. gdb, IDA) to change an instruction. +Tampering these executables would mean that policies can be ignored and +verification checks can be bypassed. + +Without going so far as to tamper an executable, the **SMACK** system is also +vulnerable to attack. For example, if the kernel is stopped and restarted with +the *security=none* flag, then SMACK is not enabled. Furthermore, `systemd` +starts the loading of **SMACK** rules during start-up. If this start-up process +is interfered with, then **SMACK** will not run. Alternatively, new policies can +be added with `smackload` allowing unforseen privileges to alternative +applications/executables. + +Another intrusion on the kernel level is to rebuild the kernel (as it is +open-source) and replace it with a copy that has **SMACK** disabled, or even +just the **SMACK** filesystem (`smackfs`) disabled. Without the extended label +attributes, the **SMACK** system is disabled. + +Root-level access to the device has ultimate power, where the entire system can +be compromised. More so, a system with this level access allows an attacker to +craft a simpler *point-attack* which can operate on a level requiring fewer +privileges (e.g. remote access, user-level access). ## Vulnerable Resources ### Resource: `afm-user-daemon` -The `afm-user-daemon` is in charge of handling applications on behalf of a user. Its main tasks are: +The `afm-user-daemon` is in charge of handling applications on behalf of a user. +Its main tasks are: -- Enumerate applications that the end user can run and keep this list available on demand. -- Start applications on behalf of the end user, set user running environment, set user security context. +- Enumerate applications that the end user can run and keep this list available + on demand. +- Start applications on behalf of the end user, set user running environment, + set user security context. - List current runnable or running applications. -- Stop (aka pause), continue (aka resume), terminate a running instance of a given application. -- Transfer requests for installation/uninstallation of applications to the corresponding system daemon afm-system-daemon. - -The `afm-user-daemon` launches applications. It builds a secure environment for the application -before starting it within that environment. Different kinds of applications can be launched, -based on a configuration file that describes how to launch an application of a given kind within -a given launching mode: local or remote. Launching an application locally means that -the application and its binder are launched together. Launching an application remotely -translates in only launching the application binder. - -The UI by itself has to be activated remotely by a request (i.e. HTML5 homescreen in a browser). -Once launched, running instances of the application receive a `runid` that identifies them. -`afm-user-daemon` manages the list of applications that it has launched. -When owning the right permissions, a client can get the list of running instances and details -about a specific running instance. It can also terminate, stop or continue a given application. -If the client owns the right permissions, `afm-user-daemon` delegates the task of +- Stop (aka pause), continue (aka resume), terminate a running instance of a + given application. +- Transfer requests for installation/uninstallation of applications to the + corresponding system daemon afm-system-daemon. + +The `afm-user-daemon` launches applications. It builds a secure environment for +the application before starting it within that environment. Different kinds of +applications can be launched, based on a configuration file that describes how +to launch an application of a given kind within a given launching mode: local or +remote. Launching an application locally means that the application and its +binder are launched together. Launching an application remotely translates in +only launching the application binder. + +The UI by itself has to be activated remotely by a request (i.e. HTML5 +homescreen in a browser). Once launched, running instances of the application +receive a `runid` that identifies them. `afm-user-daemon` manages the list of +applications that it has launched. When owning the right permissions, a client +can get the list of running instances and details about a specific running +instance. It can also terminate, stop or continue a given application. If the +client owns the right permissions, `afm-user-daemon` delegates the task of installing and uninstalling applications to `afm-system-daemon`. `afm-user-daemon` is launched as a `systemd` service attached to a user session. -Normally, the service file is located at /usr/lib/systemd/user/afm-user-daemon.service. +Normally, the service file is located at +/usr/lib/systemd/user/afm-user-daemon.service. Attacker goals: @@ -286,13 +312,16 @@ Attacker goals: ### Resource: `afm-system-daemon` -The `afm-system-daemon` is in charge of installing applications on the AGL system. Its main tasks are: +The `afm-system-daemon` is in charge of installing applications on the AGL +system. Its main tasks are: -- Install applications and setup security framework for newly installed applications. +- Install applications and setup security framework for newly installed + applications. - Uninstall applications. -`afm-system-daemon` is launched as a `systemd` service attached to system. Normally, -the service file is located at /lib/systemd/system/afm-systemdaemon.service. +`afm-system-daemon` is launched as a `systemd` service attached to system. +Normally, the service file is located at +/lib/systemd/system/afm-systemdaemon.service. Attacker goals: @@ -302,23 +331,27 @@ Attacker goals: ### Resource `afb-daemon` -`afb-binder` is in charge of serving resources and features through an HTTP interface. -`afb-daemon` is in charge of binding one instance of an application to the AGL framework -and AGL system. The application and its companion binder run in a secured and isolated -environment set for them. Applications are intended to access to AGL system through the binder. -`afb-daemon` binders serve files through HTTP protocol and offers developers the capability -to expose application API methods through HTTP or WebSocket protocol. +`afb-binder` is in charge of serving resources and features through an HTTP +interface. `afb-daemon` is in charge of binding one instance of an application +to the AGL framework and AGL system. The application and its companion binder +run in a secured and isolated environment set for them. Applications are +intended to access to AGL system through the binder. `afb-daemon` binders serve +files through HTTP protocol and offers developers the capability to expose +application API methods through HTTP or WebSocket protocol. -Binder bindings are used to add APIs to `afb-daemon`. The user can write a binding for `afb-daemon`. -The binder `afb-daemon` serves multiple purposes: +Binder bindings are used to add APIs to `afb-daemon`. The user can write a +binding for `afb-daemon`. The binder `afb-daemon` serves multiple purposes: 1. It acts as a gateway for the application to access the system. 2. It acts as an HTTP server for serving files to HTML5 applications. -3. It allows HTML5 applications to have native extensions subject to security enforcement for accessing hardware resources or for speeding up parts of algorithm. +3. It allows HTML5 applications to have native extensions subject to security + enforcement for accessing hardware resources or for speeding up parts of + algorithm. Attacker goals: - Break from isolation. - Disable `afb-daemon`. - Tamper `afb-demon` on disk or in memory. -- Tamper **capabilities** by creating/installing custom bindings for `afb-daemon`.
\ No newline at end of file +- Tamper **capabilities** by creating/installing custom bindings for + `afb-daemon`.
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.6_Utilities.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.6_Utilities.md index 8036a6f..6e69658 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.6_Utilities.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.6_Utilities.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Utilities -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/6-Utilities.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Utilities - **busybox**: Software that provides several stripped-down Unix tools in a diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.7_Users.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.7_Users.md index f520baa..c1a8506 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.7_Users.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/5_Platform/1.2.5.7_Users.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Users -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-5/7-Users.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Users The user policy can group users by function within the car. For example, we can @@ -83,4 +78,5 @@ a capability. These capabilities are divided into three groups: - e: Effective: This means the capability is “activated”. - p: Permitted: This means the capability can be used/is allowed. -- i: Inherited: The capability is kept by child/subprocesses upon execve() for example. +- i: Inherited: The capability is kept by child/subprocesses upon execve() for + example. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md index ae7b7dc..2925efb 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-6/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 6 - Application ## Abstract @@ -38,35 +33,40 @@ AGL provides a framework for applications to be written in different forms: - Native application: in C While there is no harm in providing multiple types of applications, from a -security perspective this does increase the attack surface for an intruder. -The application framework (**AppFw**) consists of a number of utilities and -daemons which provide context for the applications. -Isolation is provided through **SMACK** labels. +security perspective this does increase the attack surface for an intruder. The +application framework (**AppFw**) consists of a number of utilities and daemons +which provide context for the applications. Isolation is provided through +**SMACK** labels. ## Application Store -Although the Tizen system has defined a [system of App signing and signing flow](https://wiki.tizen.org/Security/Tizen_3.X_Overview#Application_Singing_and_Certificates) -to avoid the spread of unauthorized Apps that might contain malware. -At this point, it is unclear how much of this flow AGL will adopt. -However, judging from the experience, it is an essential topic. For example, -the Google Play Store controls the authorization of Apps through signing, and still, -there are [many accounts of Apps containing malware on the store](http://www.eweek.com/mobile/researchers-find-132-malware-infected-android-apps-on-google-play). - -Tizen defines 5 levels of certificates and signing at each level, including an author, -testing distributor, public level store distributor, partner level store distributor, -and platform level store distributor. AGL may define a different number of third parties, -but at a minimum an author and store distributor should be defined. +Although the Tizen system has defined a [system of App signing and signing +flow](https://wiki.tizen.org/Security/Tizen_3.X_Overview#Application_Singing_and_Certificates) +to avoid the spread of unauthorized Apps that might contain malware. At this +point, it is unclear how much of this flow AGL will adopt. However, judging from +the experience, it is an essential topic. For example, the Google Play Store +controls the authorization of Apps through signing, and still, there are [many +accounts of Apps containing malware on the +store](http://www.eweek.com/mobile/researchers-find-132-malware-infected-android-apps-on-google-play). + +Tizen defines 5 levels of certificates and signing at each level, including an +author, testing distributor, public level store distributor, partner level store +distributor, and platform level store distributor. AGL may define a different +number of third parties, but at a minimum an author and store distributor should +be defined.  -Once the number of signatures has been established, verification of those signatures needs -to be done at a minimum at installation time on the AGL device. It is important to ensure -the robustness/integrity of the public key used for signature verification. If the public key is modified, -then this compromised key can be used to verify an attacker's private key signature. +Once the number of signatures has been established, verification of those +signatures needs to be done at a minimum at installation time on the AGL device. +It is important to ensure the robustness/integrity of the public key used for +signature verification. If the public key is modified, then this compromised key +can be used to verify an attacker's private key signature. -Further to this, installation-time verification is limited. Attacks can happen to apps in-memory -at runtime. Any modifications made after installation will be missed by installation-time verification. -Integrity verification that runs during execution makes for a more complete security story. +Further to this, installation-time verification is limited. Attacks can happen +to apps in-memory at runtime. Any modifications made after installation will be +missed by installation-time verification. Integrity verification that runs +during execution makes for a more complete security story. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.1_Installation.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.1_Installation.md index 70b572f..9279be8 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.1_Installation.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.1_Installation.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Installation -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-6/1-Installation.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Local <!-- section-todo --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.2_Privilege_Management.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.2_Privilege_Management.md index e085929..69445ac 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.2_Privilege_Management.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.2_Privilege_Management.md @@ -1,16 +1,11 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Privilege management -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-6/2-PrivilegeManagement.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Local ## Privilege Management -Application privileges are managed by **Cynara** and the security manager in -the **AppFw**. For more details, please refer to the **AppFw** documentation -in Platform part. +Application privileges are managed by **Cynara** and the security manager in the +**AppFw**. For more details, please refer to the **AppFw** documentation in +Platform part. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.3_Signature.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.3_Signature.md index 73c17f9..671de13 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.3_Signature.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.3_Signature.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Signature -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-6/3-Signature.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # App Signature <!-- section-todo --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.4_Services.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.4_Services.md index b9653a2..ccd809c 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.4_Services.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.4_Services.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Services -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-6/4-Services.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Services <!-- section-todo --> diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.0_Abstract.md index ad11649..499d858 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-7/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 7 - Connectivity ## Abstract diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.1_Bus_And_Connectors.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.1_Bus_And_Connectors.md index 4403d41..c7b577a 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.1_Bus_And_Connectors.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.1_Bus_And_Connectors.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Bus and connectors -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Bus We only speak about the **CAN** bus to take an example, because the different @@ -15,8 +10,8 @@ engineering and the main argument to improve their security is to encrypt data packets. We just describe them a bit: - **CAN**: Controller Area Network, developed in the early 1980s, is an - event-triggered controller network for serial communication with data rates - up to one MBit/s. **CAN** messages are classified over their respective + event-triggered controller network for serial communication with data rates up + to one MBit/s. **CAN** messages are classified over their respective identifier. **CAN** controller broadcast their messages to all connected nodes and all receiving nodes decide independently if they process the message. - **FlewRay**: Is a deterministic and error-tolerant high-speed bus. With a data @@ -37,16 +32,17 @@ packets. We just describe them a bit: On just about every vehicle, **ECU**s (**E**lectronic **C**ontrol **U**nits) communicate over a CAN bus, which is a two-wire bus using hardware arbitration for messages sent on the shared medium. This is essentially a *trusted* network -where all traffic is visible to all controllers and any controller can send any message. +where all traffic is visible to all controllers and any controller can send any +message. A malicious **ECU** on the CAN bus can easily inject messages destined for any other device, including things like the instrument cluster and the head unit. -There are common ways for hardware to do USB to CAN and open source software to send -and receive messages. For example, there is a driver included in the Linux kernel -that can be used to send/receive CAN signals. A malicious device on the CAN bus can -cause a great number of harmful things to happen to the system, including: sending -bogus information to other devices, sending unintended commands to ECUs, -causing DOS (Denial Of Service) on the CAN bus, etc. +There are common ways for hardware to do USB to CAN and open source software to +send and receive messages. For example, there is a driver included in the Linux +kernel that can be used to send/receive CAN signals. A malicious device on the +CAN bus can cause a great number of harmful things to happen to the system, +including: sending bogus information to other devices, sending unintended +commands to ECUs, causing DOS (Denial Of Service) on the CAN bus, etc. <!-- section-config --> @@ -56,7 +52,9 @@ Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Bus-1 | CAN | Implement hardware solution in <!-- end-section-config --> -See [Security in Automotive Bus Systems](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf) for more information. +See [Security in Automotive Bus +Systems](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf) +for more information. # Connectors diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.2_Wireless.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.2_Wireless.md index 1be314d..ce0259e 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.2_Wireless.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.2_Wireless.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Wireless -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-7/2-Wireless.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Wireless In this part, we talk about possible remote attacks on a car, according to the @@ -46,16 +41,21 @@ Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Add communication channels (RFID, ZigBee?). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For existing automotive-specific means, we take examples of existing system -attacks from the _IOActive_ document ([A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf)) -and from the ETH document ([Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf)). +attacks from the _IOActive_ document ([A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack +Surfaces](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf)) +and from the ETH document ([Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start +Systems in Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf)). - [Telematics](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A40%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) -- [Passive Anti-Theft System (PATS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A11%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C574%2C0%5D) +- [Passive Anti-Theft System + (PATS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A11%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C574%2C0%5D) -- [Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A17%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) +- [Tire Pressure Monitoring System + (TPMS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A17%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) -- [Remote Keyless Entry/Start (RKE)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A26%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) +- [Remote Keyless Entry/Start + (RKE)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A26%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) - [Passive Keyless Entry (PKE)](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf) @@ -85,10 +85,11 @@ We can differentiate existing attacks on wifi in two categories: Those on - **WPA** attacks: - **Beck and Tews**: Exploit weakness in **TKIP**. "Allow the attacker to - decrypt **ARP** packets and to inject traffic into a network, even - allowing him to perform a **DoS** or an **ARP** poisoning". + decrypt **ARP** packets and to inject traffic into a network, even allowing + him to perform a **DoS** or an **ARP** poisoning". - [KRACK](https://github.com/kristate/krackinfo): (K)ey (R)einstallation - (A)tta(ck) ([jira AGL SPEC-1017](https://jira.automotivelinux.org/browse/SPEC-1017)). + (A)tta(ck) ([jira AGL + SPEC-1017](https://jira.automotivelinux.org/browse/SPEC-1017)). ### Recommendations @@ -110,9 +111,9 @@ Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-5 | Device | Upgraded easily in software <!-- end-section-config --> -See [Wifi attacks WEP WPA](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf) -and [Breaking wep and wpa (Beck and Tews)](https://dl.aircrack-ng.org/breakingwepandwpa.pdf) -for more information. +See [Wifi attacks WEP WPA](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf) and +[Breaking wep and wpa (Beck and +Tews)](https://dl.aircrack-ng.org/breakingwepandwpa.pdf) for more information. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -132,7 +133,8 @@ for more information. features but is limited by the transmitting power of class 2 Bluetooth radios, normally capping its range at 10-15 meters. - **Bluejacking** is the sending of unsolicited messages. -- **BLE**: **B**luetooth **L**ow **E**nergy [attacks](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf). +- **BLE**: **B**luetooth **L**ow **E**nergy + [attacks](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf). - **DoS**: Drain a device's battery or temporarily paralyze the phone. ### Recommendations @@ -142,8 +144,8 @@ for more information. - Monitoring. - Use **BLE** with caution. - For v2.1 and later devices using **S**ecure **S**imple **P**airing (**SSP**), - avoid using the "Just Works" association model. The device must verify that - an authenticated link key was generated during pairing. + avoid using the "Just Works" association model. The device must verify that an + authenticated link key was generated during pairing. <!-- section-config --> @@ -157,10 +159,13 @@ Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-5 | Anti-scanning | Used, inter alia, to slow do <!-- end-section-config --> -See [Low energy and the automotive transformation](http://www.ti.com/lit/wp/sway008/sway008.pdf), -[Gattacking Bluetooth Smart Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf), -[Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf) -and [With Low Energy comes Low Security](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf) +See [Low energy and the automotive +transformation](http://www.ti.com/lit/wp/sway008/sway008.pdf), [Gattacking +Bluetooth Smart Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf), [Comprehensive +Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack +Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf) and [With Low +Energy comes Low +Security](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf) for more information. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -177,7 +182,8 @@ for more information. the service provider's real towers, it is considered a man-in-the-middle (**MITM**) attack. -- Lack of mutual authentication (**GPRS**/**EDGE**) and encryption with **GEA0**. +- Lack of mutual authentication (**GPRS**/**EDGE**) and encryption with + **GEA0**. - **Fall back** from **UMTS**/**HSPA** to **GPRS**/**EDGE** (Jamming against **UMTS**/**HSPA**). @@ -197,7 +203,8 @@ Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-2 | UMTS/HSPA | Protected against Jamming. <!-- end-section-config --> -See [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf) +See [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data +communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf) for more information. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -234,7 +241,8 @@ Connectivity-Wireless-Radio-1 | RDS | Only audio output and meta concernin ### Recommendations -- Should implements protection against relay and replay attacks (Tokens, etc...). +- Should implements protection against relay and replay attacks (Tokens, + etc...). - Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles. - NFC should be use encrypted link (secure channel). A standard key agreement protocol like Diffie-Hellmann based on RSA or Elliptic Curves could be applied diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.3_Cloud.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.3_Cloud.md index 36c4df8..d4112fc 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.3_Cloud.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/7_Connectivity/1.2.7.3_Cloud.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Cloud -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-7/3-Cloud.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Cloud ## Download @@ -16,8 +11,8 @@ origin_url: >- characteristics bound to that device, entity or person. - **Authorization**: Parses the network to allow access to some or all network -functionality by providing rules and allowing access or denying access based -on a subscriber's profile and services purchased. + functionality by providing rules and allowing access or denying access based + on a subscriber's profile and services purchased. <!-- section-config --> @@ -75,10 +70,10 @@ Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-5 | App integrity | Applications must be signed ## Transport -For data transport, it is necessary to **encrypt data end-to-end**. To prevent **MITM** attacks, -no third party should be able to interpret transported data. Another aspect -is the data anonymization in order to protect the leakage of private information -on the user or any other third party. +For data transport, it is necessary to **encrypt data end-to-end**. To prevent +**MITM** attacks, no third party should be able to interpret transported data. +Another aspect is the data anonymization in order to protect the leakage of +private information on the user or any other third party. The use of standards such as **IPSec** provides "_private and secure communications over IP networks, through the use of cryptographic security @@ -99,8 +94,8 @@ to configure each application to **IPSec** standards. - Integrity: A service that consists in ensuring that data has not been tampered with accidentally or fraudulently. - Replay Protection: A service that prevents attacks by re-sending a valid - intercepted packet to the network for the same authorization. - This service is provided by the presence of a sequence number. + intercepted packet to the network for the same authorization. This service is + provided by the presence of a sequence number. - Key management: Mechanism for negotiating the length of encryption keys between two **IPSec** elements and exchange of these keys. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.0_Abstract.md index f153ea9..cd47ed0 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,73 +1,82 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-8/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 8 - Update (**OTA**) ## Abstract Updating applications and firmware is essential for the development of new -features and even more to fix security bugs. -However, if a malicious third party manages to alter the content during -transport, it could -alter the functioning of the system and/or applications. The security of the -updates is therefore a critical point to evaluate in order to guarantee the -integrity, the confidentiality and the legitimacy of the transmitted data. +features and even more to fix security bugs. However, if a malicious third party +manages to alter the content during transport, it could alter the functioning of +the system and/or applications. The security of the updates is therefore a +critical point to evaluate in order to guarantee the integrity, the +confidentiality and the legitimacy of the transmitted data. ## Attack Vectors -Updates Over The Air are one of the most common points where an attacker -will penetrate. An OTA update mechanism is one of the highest threats in the system. +Updates Over The Air are one of the most common points where an attacker will +penetrate. An OTA update mechanism is one of the highest threats in the system. If an attacker is able to install his own application or firmware on the system, -he can get the same level of access that the original application or firmware had. -From that point, the intruder can get unfettered access to the rest of the system, -which might include making modifications, downloading other pieces of software, -and stealing assets. +he can get the same level of access that the original application or firmware +had. From that point, the intruder can get unfettered access to the rest of the +system, which might include making modifications, downloading other pieces of +software, and stealing assets. ### Man In The Middle (MITM) -The man-in-the-middle attack is the most classic example of an attack, where an adversary -inserts himself between two communicating entities and grabs whatever is being communicated. -In the case of OTA attacks, the connection in the network may be intercepted: +The man-in-the-middle attack is the most classic example of an attack, where an +adversary inserts himself between two communicating entities and grabs whatever +is being communicated. In the case of OTA attacks, the connection in the network +may be intercepted: * On the internet, before the cloud back-end. * At the base station, 3G,4G,5G connection to the internet. * At the receiving antenna, connection to the car. -* Between the receiving antenna and the gateway router (if present), connection within the car. -* Between the gateway router and the target component (IVI, In-Vehicle Infotainment unit). - -There are many ways to mount a MITM attack. For example, proxy tools like Burp Proxy can -be used to intercept web traffic as a man-in-the-middle. Under the guise of being a testing tool, -the proxy server is often used in attack scenarios. It runs on a variety of platforms. - -As another example, false base station attacks are known to be fairly easy to set-up. -The problem is apparently fairly prevalent in countries like China and in the UK. -These fake base stations are sometimes just eavesdropping on the communication, -but others have the potential to do serious harm. - -Defenses against MITM attacks include encrypted and signed data pipes. Furthermore, -architects and developers are also recommended to encrypt and sign the payloads that are -being passed over these pipes, to defend against perusal of the data. +* Between the receiving antenna and the gateway router (if present), connection + within the car. +* Between the gateway router and the target component (IVI, In-Vehicle + Infotainment unit). + +There are many ways to mount a MITM attack. For example, proxy tools like Burp +Proxy can be used to intercept web traffic as a man-in-the-middle. Under the +guise of being a testing tool, the proxy server is often used in attack +scenarios. It runs on a variety of platforms. + +As another example, false base station attacks are known to be fairly easy to +set-up. The problem is apparently fairly prevalent in countries like China and +in the UK. These fake base stations are sometimes just eavesdropping on the +communication, but others have the potential to do serious harm. + +Defenses against MITM attacks include encrypted and signed data pipes. +Furthermore, architects and developers are also recommended to encrypt and sign +the payloads that are being passed over these pipes, to defend against perusal +of the data. ### Man At The End (MATE) -The man-at-the-end attack is when an intruder analyzes the end-point of the communication when -software is accessing the data communication. This is a more severe attack type where the attacker can: +The man-at-the-end attack is when an intruder analyzes the end-point of the +communication when software is accessing the data communication. This is a more +severe attack type where the attacker can: * Steal keys. - * For example, a simple debugging session in running software could reveal a key used in memory. + * For example, a simple debugging session in running software could reveal a + key used in memory. * Tamper software. - * For example, replacing just one function call in software with a NOP (i.e. no operation) can drastically change the behavior of the program. + * For example, replacing just one function call in software with a NOP (i.e. + no operation) can drastically change the behavior of the program. * Jam branches of control. - * For example, making a program take one branch of control rather than the intended branch can mean the difference between an authorized and a non-authorized installation. + * For example, making a program take one branch of control rather than the + intended branch can mean the difference between an authorized and a + non-authorized installation. * Modify important data. - * For example, if the data changed is a key or data leading to a control path, then this attack can be severe. - * In the case of OTA updates, MATE attacks are particularly problematic for the system. One of the consequences of MATE attacks can be installed software that allows installation of any other software. For example, an attacker might install remote access software to control any part of the system. + * For example, if the data changed is a key or data leading to a control path, + then this attack can be severe. + * In the case of OTA updates, MATE attacks are particularly problematic for + the system. One of the consequences of MATE attacks can be installed + software that allows installation of any other software. For example, an + attacker might install remote access software to control any part of the + system. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.1_Firmware_Over_The_Air.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.1_Firmware_Over_The_Air.md index 0f7bed0..34761e3 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.1_Firmware_Over_The_Air.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.1_Firmware_Over_The_Air.md @@ -1,28 +1,26 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: FOTA -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-8/1-FOTA.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Firmware Over The Air The firmware update is critical since its alteration back to compromise the -entire system. It is therefore necessary to take appropriate protective measures. - -AGL includes the _meta-updater_ Yocto layer that enables OTA software -updates via [Uptane](https://uptane.github.io), an automotive-specific extension -to [The Update Framework](https://theupdateframework.github.io/). Uptane and TUF -are open standards that define a secure protocol for delivering and verifying -updates even when the servers and network--internet and car-internal--aren't fully trusted. - -_meta-updater_ includes the application [`aktualizr`](https://github.com/advancedtelematic/aktualizr), -developed Advanced Telematic Systems (now part of HERE Technologies) that enables -OTA for an ECU. `aktualizr` combined with Uptane is suitable for updating the -firmware, software, and other packages on even functionally critical ECUs. -`aktualizr` can be enabled with the free, open souce backend +entire system. It is therefore necessary to take appropriate protective +measures. + +AGL includes the _meta-updater_ Yocto layer that enables OTA software updates +via [Uptane](https://uptane.github.io), an automotive-specific extension to [The +Update Framework](https://theupdateframework.github.io/). Uptane and TUF are +open standards that define a secure protocol for delivering and verifying +updates even when the servers and network--internet and car-internal--aren't +fully trusted. + +_meta-updater_ includes the application +[`aktualizr`](https://github.com/advancedtelematic/aktualizr), developed +Advanced Telematic Systems (now part of HERE Technologies) that enables OTA for +an ECU. `aktualizr` combined with Uptane is suitable for updating the firmware, +software, and other packages on even functionally critical ECUs. `aktualizr` can +be enabled with the free, open souce backend [`ota-community-edition`](https://github.com/advancedtelematic/ota-community-edition). This FOTA update mechanism can be enabled through the `agl-sota` feature. @@ -35,16 +33,17 @@ To build an AGL image that uses `aktualizr`, the following can be used. source meta-agl/scripts/aglsetup.sh -m <machine> agl-sota <other-features...> ``` -During the build, _meta-updater_ will use credentials downloaded from `ota-community-edition` -to sign metadata verifying the build as authentic. These signatures are part of the Uptane -framework and are used to verify FOTA updates. +During the build, _meta-updater_ will use credentials downloaded from +`ota-community-edition` to sign metadata verifying the build as authentic. These +signatures are part of the Uptane framework and are used to verify FOTA updates. ## Atomic Upgrades with Rollbacks -`aktualizr`'s primary method of updating firmware is to use `libostree` with binary diffs. -The binary diffs use the least amout of bandwidth, and by it's nature `libostree` stores -current and previous firmware versions on disk or in flash memory to allow for rollbacks. +`aktualizr`'s primary method of updating firmware is to use `libostree` with +binary diffs. The binary diffs use the least amout of bandwidth, and by it's +nature `libostree` stores current and previous firmware versions on disk or in +flash memory to allow for rollbacks. -`libostree` is a content addressable object store much like `git`. Versions are specified -via SHA2-256. These hashes are signed in the Uptane metadata and are robust against -cryptographic compromise. +`libostree` is a content addressable object store much like `git`. Versions are +specified via SHA2-256. These hashes are signed in the Uptane metadata and are +robust against cryptographic compromise. diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.2_Software_Over_The_Air.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.2_Software_Over_The_Air.md index 8004f52..bd4142f 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.2_Software_Over_The_Air.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/8_Update_(Over_The_Air)/1.2.8.2_Software_Over_The_Air.md @@ -1,21 +1,17 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: SOTA -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-8/2-SOTA.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Software Over The Air Software updates in connected vehicles are a very useful feature, which can -deliver significant benefits. If not implemented with security in mind, -software updates can incur serious vulnerabilities. Any software update system -must ensure that not only are the software updates to devices done in a secure way, +deliver significant benefits. If not implemented with security in mind, software +updates can incur serious vulnerabilities. Any software update system must +ensure that not only are the software updates to devices done in a secure way, but also that the repositories and servers hosting these updates are adequately -protected. As the process of updating software migrates from a Dealership update model -towards an **OTA** update model, securing these processes becomes a high priority. +protected. As the process of updating software migrates from a Dealership update +model towards an **OTA** update model, securing these processes becomes a high +priority. **SOTA** is made possible by **AppFw** (See Platform part). It will be possible to manage in a simple way the packets (i.g. Android like). diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/9_Secure_development/1.2.9.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/9_Secure_development/1.2.9.0_Abstract.md index ddc86a9..bfceefe 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/9_Secure_development/1.2.9.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/9_Secure_development/1.2.9.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,15 +1,11 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-9/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 9 - Secure development -In order to save a lot of time in code auditing, developers must follow coding guidelines. +In order to save a lot of time in code auditing, developers must follow coding +guidelines. ## Secure build @@ -18,7 +14,8 @@ In order to save a lot of time in code auditing, developers must follow coding g Tools like: - [Code optimisation](https://github.com/jduck/lk-reducer). -- [Kernel Drivers test](https://github.com/ucsb-seclab/dr_checker) with [docs](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-machiry.pdf). +- [Kernel Drivers test](https://github.com/ucsb-seclab/dr_checker) with + [docs](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity17/sec17-machiry.pdf). <!-- section-todo --> @@ -56,16 +53,20 @@ SecureDev-CodeAudit-2 | [OSSTMM](http://www.isecom.org/mirror/OSSTMM.3.pdf). ### SATS -- [RATS](https://github.com/andrew-d/rough-auditing-tool-for-security) (Maybe to old). +- [RATS](https://github.com/andrew-d/rough-auditing-tool-for-security) (Maybe to + old). - [Flaw Finder](https://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/). -- [wiki list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis). +- [wiki + list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis). -- [Mathematical approach](https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/david.lubicz/planches/David_Pichardie.pdf). +- [Mathematical + approach](https://perso.univ-rennes1.fr/david.lubicz/planches/David_Pichardie.pdf). It is necessary to verify that the application code does not use functions that are depreciated and recognized as unsecured or cause problems. ### DATS -- [wiki list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_program_analysis#Example_tools). +- [wiki + list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_program_analysis#Example_tools). |