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diff --git a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md index ae7b7dc..2925efb 100644 --- a/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md +++ b/docs/2_Architecture_Guides/2.2_Security_Blueprint/6_Application/1.2.6.0_Abstract.md @@ -1,12 +1,7 @@ --- -edit_link: '' title: Introduction -origin_url: >- - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/automotive-grade-linux/docs-sources/master/docs/security-blueprint/part-6/0_Abstract.md --- -<!-- WARNING: This file is generated by fetch_docs.js using /home/boron/Documents/AGL/docs-webtemplate/site/_data/tocs/architecture/master/security_blueprint-security-blueprint-book.yml --> - # Part 6 - Application ## Abstract @@ -38,35 +33,40 @@ AGL provides a framework for applications to be written in different forms: - Native application: in C While there is no harm in providing multiple types of applications, from a -security perspective this does increase the attack surface for an intruder. -The application framework (**AppFw**) consists of a number of utilities and -daemons which provide context for the applications. -Isolation is provided through **SMACK** labels. +security perspective this does increase the attack surface for an intruder. The +application framework (**AppFw**) consists of a number of utilities and daemons +which provide context for the applications. Isolation is provided through +**SMACK** labels. ## Application Store -Although the Tizen system has defined a [system of App signing and signing flow](https://wiki.tizen.org/Security/Tizen_3.X_Overview#Application_Singing_and_Certificates) -to avoid the spread of unauthorized Apps that might contain malware. -At this point, it is unclear how much of this flow AGL will adopt. -However, judging from the experience, it is an essential topic. For example, -the Google Play Store controls the authorization of Apps through signing, and still, -there are [many accounts of Apps containing malware on the store](http://www.eweek.com/mobile/researchers-find-132-malware-infected-android-apps-on-google-play). - -Tizen defines 5 levels of certificates and signing at each level, including an author, -testing distributor, public level store distributor, partner level store distributor, -and platform level store distributor. AGL may define a different number of third parties, -but at a minimum an author and store distributor should be defined. +Although the Tizen system has defined a [system of App signing and signing +flow](https://wiki.tizen.org/Security/Tizen_3.X_Overview#Application_Singing_and_Certificates) +to avoid the spread of unauthorized Apps that might contain malware. At this +point, it is unclear how much of this flow AGL will adopt. However, judging from +the experience, it is an essential topic. For example, the Google Play Store +controls the authorization of Apps through signing, and still, there are [many +accounts of Apps containing malware on the +store](http://www.eweek.com/mobile/researchers-find-132-malware-infected-android-apps-on-google-play). + +Tizen defines 5 levels of certificates and signing at each level, including an +author, testing distributor, public level store distributor, partner level store +distributor, and platform level store distributor. AGL may define a different +number of third parties, but at a minimum an author and store distributor should +be defined.  -Once the number of signatures has been established, verification of those signatures needs -to be done at a minimum at installation time on the AGL device. It is important to ensure -the robustness/integrity of the public key used for signature verification. If the public key is modified, -then this compromised key can be used to verify an attacker's private key signature. +Once the number of signatures has been established, verification of those +signatures needs to be done at a minimum at installation time on the AGL device. +It is important to ensure the robustness/integrity of the public key used for +signature verification. If the public key is modified, then this compromised key +can be used to verify an attacker's private key signature. -Further to this, installation-time verification is limited. Attacks can happen to apps in-memory -at runtime. Any modifications made after installation will be missed by installation-time verification. -Integrity verification that runs during execution makes for a more complete security story. +Further to this, installation-time verification is limited. Attacks can happen +to apps in-memory at runtime. Any modifications made after installation will be +missed by installation-time verification. Integrity verification that runs +during execution makes for a more complete security story. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |