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----
-title: Hardware
----
-
-The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL**
-compliant applications and services. The platform includes the following
-hardware:
-
-- SoC (System-on-Chip).
-- Memory (RAM, ROM, storage, etc.).
-- Peripherals.
-
-You will find in this first part everything that concerns the hardware security.
-The goal is to protect system against all attacks that are trying to gain
-additional privileges by recovering and/or changing cryptographic keys in order
-to alter the integrity of the boot. We should also prevent hardware
-modifications in order to achieve this goal. We will expose below some examples
-of possible configurations.
-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-## Acronyms and Abbreviations
-
-The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
-
-Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
-------------------------- | --------------------------------------
-_HSM_ | **H**ardware **S**ecurity **M**odule
-_NVM_ | **N**on-**V**olatile **M**emory
-_SHE_ | **S**ecure **H**ardware **E**xtensions
-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-## Integrity
-
-The board must store hardcoded cryptographic keys in order to verify among
-others the _integrity_ of the _bootloader_. Manufacturers can use **HSM** and
-**SHE** to enhance the security of their board.
-
-Domain | Object | Recommendations
--------------------- | ---------- | ----------------------------------
-Hardware-Integrity-1 | Bootloader | Must control bootloader integrity.
-Hardware-Integrity-2 | Board | Must use a HSM.
-Hardware-Integrity-3 | RTC | Must not be alterable.
-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-## Certificates
-
-Domain | Object | Recommendations
----------------------- | ------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Hardware-Certificate-1 | System | Shall allow storing dedicated certificates.
-Hardware-Certificate-2 | ECU | The ECU must verify the certification authority hierarchy.
-Hardware-Certificate-3 | System | Allow the modification of certificates only if the source can be authenticated by a certificate already stored or in the higher levels of the chain of trust.
-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-## Memory
-
-Domain | Object | Recommendations
------------------ | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Hardware-Memory-1 | ECU | The ECU shall never expose the unencrypted key in RAM when using cryptographic keys.
-Hardware-Memory-2 | Bootloader | Internal NVM only
-Hardware-Module-3 | - | HSM must be used to secure keys. \ No newline at end of file