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| author |   Stephane Desneux <stephane.desneux@iot.bzh> | 2018-10-16 13:10:46 +0200 |
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| committer | Stephane Desneux <stephane.desneux@iot.bzh> | 2018-10-16 13:13:14 +0200 |
| commit | 0eba225fb27ec0b87bfa80361314fec5ab901caa (patch) | |
| tree | 02baf13e25b4d8989dc25051ff7ce3256ffb7bbd /security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md | |
| parent | 536b42be464af2f29fc5061489821c8903a6690a (diff) | |
Import from docs-agl/docs
Change-Id: Id524561d87410e5463cddd123b30eb63d75b62bd
Signed-off-by: Stephane Desneux <stephane.desneux@iot.bzh>
Diffstat (limited to 'security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md | 77 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 77 deletions
diff --git a/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md b/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md deleted file mode 100644 index e13c464..0000000 --- a/security-blueprint/part-1/0_Abstract.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -# Part 1 - Hardware - -## Abstract - -The Automotive Grade Linux platform is a Linux distribution with **AGL** compliant applications and services. -The platform includes the following hardware: - -- SoC (System-on-Chip). -- Memory (RAM, ROM, storage, etc.). -- Peripherals. - -You will find in this first part everything that concerns the hardware security. -The goal is to protect system against all attacks that are trying to gain -additional privileges by recovering and/or changing cryptographic keys in order -to alter the integrity of the boot. We should also prevent hardware modifications -in order to achieve this goal. We will expose below some examples of possible -configurations. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Acronyms and Abbreviations - -The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document. - -Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description -------------------------- | -------------------------------------- -_HSM_ | **H**ardware **S**ecurity **M**odule -_NVM_ | **N**on-**V**olatile **M**emory -_SHE_ | **S**ecure **H**ardware **E**xtensions - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Integrity - -The board must store hardcoded cryptographic keys in order to verify among others -the _integrity_ of the _bootloader_. Manufacturers can use **HSM** and **SHE** to -enhance the security of their board. - -<!-- section-config --> - -Domain | Object | Recommendations --------------------- | ---------- | ---------------------------------- -Hardware-Integrity-1 | Bootloader | Must control bootloader integrity. -Hardware-Integrity-2 | Board | Must use a HSM. -Hardware-Integrity-3 | RTC | Must not be alterable. - -<!-- end-section-config --> - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -<!-- pagebreak --> - -## Certificates - -<!-- section-config --> - -Domain | Object | Recommendations ----------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -Hardware-Certificate-1 | System | Shall allow storing dedicated certificates. -Hardware-Certificate-2 | ECU | The ECU must verify the certification authority hierarchy. -Hardware-Certificate-3 | System | Allow the modification of certificates only if the source can be authenticated by a certificate already stored or in the higher levels of the chain of trust. - -<!-- end-section-config --> - --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -## Memory - -<!-- section-config --> - -Domain | Object | Recommendations ------------------ | ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -Hardware-Memory-1 | ECU | The ECU shall never expose the unencrypted key in RAM when using cryptographic keys. -Hardware-Memory-2 | Bootloader | Internal NVM only -Hardware-Module-3 | - | HSM must be used to secure keys. - -<!-- end-section-config --> |