diff options
author | mudcam <v.nieutin@live.fr> | 2018-06-28 16:58:17 +0200 |
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committer | ronan [iot.bzh] <ronan.lemartret@iot.bzh> | 2018-07-02 09:24:07 +0200 |
commit | e16226588be32962c1019b86f73e61d3e9fbec2d (patch) | |
tree | 8768fdd5e7257fbb5c5fcdad27f7d3100a192d68 /security-blueprint/part-7 | |
parent | 217f394066ce97a13d385cf12bb6957da49ab7c7 (diff) |
Added content from the hidden chapter of the "old" security-blueprint.
Diffstat (limited to 'security-blueprint/part-7')
-rw-r--r-- | security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md | 14 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md b/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md index 0cdedc2..5ab9ab8 100644 --- a/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md +++ b/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md @@ -25,6 +25,20 @@ packets. We just describe them a bit: 2001 on everywhere in a car, where the bandwidth and versatility of a **CAN** network is not required. +On just about every vehicle, **ECU**s (**E**lectronic **C**ontrol **U**nits) +communicate over a CAN bus, which is a two-wire bus using hardware arbitration +for messages sent on the shared medium. This is essentially a *trusted* network +where all traffic is visible to all controllers and any controller can send any message. + +A malicious **ECU** on the CAN bus can easily inject messages destined for any +other device, including things like the instrument cluster and the head unit. +There are common ways for hardware to do USB to CAN and open source software to send +and receive messages. For example, there is a driver included in the Linux kernel +that can be used to send/receive CAN signals. A malicious device on the CAN bus can +cause a great number of harmful things to happen to the system, including: sending +bogus information to other devices, sending unintended commands to ECUs, +causing DOS (Denial Of Service) on the CAN bus, etc. + <!-- section-config --> Domain | Tech name | Recommendations |