diff options
author | ToshikazuOhiwa <toshikazu_ohiwa@mail.toyota.co.jp> | 2020-03-30 09:24:26 +0900 |
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committer | ToshikazuOhiwa <toshikazu_ohiwa@mail.toyota.co.jp> | 2020-03-30 09:24:26 +0900 |
commit | 5b80bfd7bffd4c20d80b7c70a7130529e9a755dd (patch) | |
tree | b4bb18dcd1487dbf1ea8127e5671b7bb2eded033 /external/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch | |
parent | 706ad73eb02caf8532deaf5d38995bd258725cb8 (diff) |
agl-basesystem
Diffstat (limited to 'external/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | external/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch | 81 |
1 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/external/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch b/external/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b262dcac --- /dev/null +++ b/external/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can +result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. + +Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. + +CVE: CVE-2017-13077 +CVE: CVE-2017-13078 +CVE: CVE-2017-13079 +CVE: CVE-2017-13080 +CVE: CVE-2017-13081 +CVE: CVE-2017-13082 +CVE: CVE-2017-13086 +CVE: CVE-2017-13087 +CVE: CVE-2017-13088 + +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> + +From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce + +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. + +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) + } + + ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) + { + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; +@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); ++ else ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: + break; + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: +-- +2.7.4
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