Revision of Architecture Guides

v1:
	Introduction : Skeleton file of Build Process [WIP].
	Security Blueprint : Multiple markdowns appended into single markdown.
v2:
	Security Blueprint :
		4_Kernel.md - Fixed Internal Link.
		Annexes.md - Uniform markdown Title.

Bug-AGL: [SPEC-3633]

Signed-off-by: Shankho Boron Ghosh <shankhoghosh123@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I1ab478348a05464612d67f0e8a4570bda309022d
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/c/AGL/documentation/+/25586
Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>
Tested-by: Jan-Simon Moeller <jsmoeller@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9cc56459419f1225f5e9851825ad305424b3d6fb)
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.automotivelinux.org/gerrit/c/AGL/documentation/+/25602

1 files changed, 125 insertions, 0 deletions

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+---
+title: Application
+---
+
+**Application Hardening**: Best practices to apply to the build and release of
+user space applications, in order to reduce the number of attack surfaces used
+by potential attackers.
+
+The term of Application (App) has a very wide definition in **AGL**. Almost
+anything which is not in the core Operating System (OS) is an Application.
+Applications can be included in the base software package (image) or can be
+added at run-time.
+
+Application containment is achieved using the following protections:
+
+- Linux Native protection
+  - Mandatory Access Control (**MAC**)
+- AGL Platform protections
+  - Origin Tracking and Validation
+  - Application Privilege Management and Enforcement via Cynara
+  - Authenticated Transport via D-Bus
+
+## Application Types
+
+AGL provides a framework for applications to be written in different forms:
+
+- Web application: HTML5 + JavaScript
+- Qt application: in a QML file
+- Native application: in C
+
+While there is no harm in providing multiple types of applications, from a
+security perspective this does increase the attack surface for an intruder. The
+application framework (**AppFw**) consists of a number of utilities and daemons
+which provide context for the applications. Isolation is provided through
+**SMACK** labels.
+
+## Application Store
+
+Although the Tizen system has defined a [system of App signing and signing
+flow](https://wiki.tizen.org/Security/Tizen_3.X_Overview#Application_Singing_and_Certificates)
+to avoid the spread of unauthorized Apps that might contain malware. At this
+point, it is unclear how much of this flow AGL will adopt. However, judging from
+the experience, it is an essential topic. For example, the Google Play Store
+controls the authorization of Apps through signing, and still, there are [many
+accounts of Apps containing malware on the
+store](http://www.eweek.com/mobile/researchers-find-132-malware-infected-android-apps-on-google-play).
+
+Tizen defines 5 levels of certificates and signing at each level, including an
+author, testing distributor, public level store distributor, partner level store
+distributor, and platform level store distributor. AGL may define a different
+number of third parties, but at a minimum an author and store distributor should
+be defined.
+
+![App Signing Flow](images/App_signing_flow.png)
+
+Once the number of signatures has been established, verification of those
+signatures needs to be done at a minimum at installation time on the AGL device.
+It is important to ensure the robustness/integrity of the public key used for
+signature verification. If the public key is modified, then this compromised key
+can be used to verify an attacker's private key signature.
+
+Further to this, installation-time verification is limited. Attacks can happen
+to apps in-memory at runtime. Any modifications made after installation will be
+missed by installation-time verification. Integrity verification that runs
+during execution makes for a more complete security story.
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+## Acronyms and Abbreviations
+
+The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document.
+
+Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description
+------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------
+_3GPP_                    | **3**rd **G**eneration **P**artnership **P**roject
+_CASB_                    | **C**loud **A**ccess **S**ecurity **B**roker
+_DAST_                    | **D**ynamic **A**pplication **S**ecurity **T**esting
+_DPI_                     | **D**eep **P**acket **I**nspection
+_IDS_                     | **I**ntrusion **D**etection **S**ystems
+_IPS_                     | **I**ntrusion **P**revention **S**ystems
+_IPSec_                   | **I**nternet **P**rotocol **Sec**urity
+_LSM_                     | **L**inux **S**ecurity **M**odule
+_MITM_                    | **M**an **I**n **T**he **M**iddle
+_OSI_                     | **O**pen **S**ystems **I**nterconnection
+_SATS_                    | **S**tatic **A**pplication **S**ecurity **T**esting
+
+# Local
+
+Domain                     | Improvement
+-------------------------- | ------------------------------
+Application-Installation-1 | Talk about AppFw offline mode.
+
+## Installation
+
+Applications can be delivered and installed with the base image using a special
+offline-mode provided by the **AppFw**. Apps can also be installed at run time.
+
+During early release, default Apps are installed on the image at first boot.
+
+Domain                     | Object    | Recommendations
+-------------------------- | --------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Installation-1 | AppFw     | Provide offline-mode in order to install app with the base image.
+Application-Installation-2 | Integrity | Allow the installation of applications only if their integrity is good.
+
+# Local
+
+## Privilege Management
+
+Application privileges are managed by **Cynara** and the security manager in the
+**AppFw**. For more details, please refer to the **AppFw** documentation in
+Platform part.
+
+# App Signature
+
+Domain                  | Improvement
+----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------
+Application-Signature-1 | Add content (see secure build in Secure development part).
+
+
+# Services
+
+Domain                 | Improvement
+---------------------- | ------------
+Application-Services-1 | Add content (Which services?).
+Application-Services-2 | Add Binder.
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