1 files changed, 0 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/meta-security/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch b/meta-security/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d7a868d2c..000000000
--- a/meta-security/recipes-security/libcap-ng/libcap-ng/CVE-2014-3215.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Pending
-
-diff --git a/docs/capng_lock.3 b/docs/capng_lock.3
-index 7683119..a070c1e 100644
---- a/docs/capng_lock.3
-+++ b/docs/capng_lock.3
-@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ int capng_lock(void);
- 
- .SH "DESCRIPTION"
- 
--capng_lock will take steps to prevent children of the current process to regain full privileges if the uid is 0. This should be called while possessing the CAP_SETPCAP capability in the kernel. This function will do the following if permitted by the kernel: Set the NOROOT option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the NOROOT_LOCKED option to on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, and set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS.
-+capng_lock will take steps to prevent children of the current process from gaining privileges by executing setuid programs.  This should be called while possessing the CAP_SETPCAP capability in the kernel.
- 
-+This function will do the following if permitted by the kernel:  If the kernel supports PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it will use it.  Otherwise it will set the NOROOT option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the NOROOT_LOCKED option to on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS, and set the PR_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED option on for PR_SET_SECUREBITS.  If both fail, it will return an error.
- 
- .SH "RETURN VALUE"
- 
--This returns 0 on success and a negative number on failure. -1 means a failure setting any of the PR_SET_SECUREBITS options.
-+This returns 0 on success and a negative number on failure. -1 means a failure to use PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and a failure setting any of the PR_SET_SECUREBITS options.
- 
- .SH "SEE ALSO"
- 
-diff --git a/src/cap-ng.c b/src/cap-ng.c
-index bd105ba..422f2bc 100644
---- a/src/cap-ng.c
-+++ b/src/cap-ng.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
-  * 2.6.24 kernel	XATTR_NAME_CAPS
-  * 2.6.25 kernel	PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAPABILITY_VERSION_2
-  * 2.6.26 kernel	PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECURE_*_LOCKED, VERSION_3
-+ * 3.5    kernel	PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
-  */
- 
- /* External syscall prototypes */
-@@ -122,6 +123,14 @@ extern int capget(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data);
- #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED   3  /* make bit-2 immutable */
- #endif
- 
-+/* prctl values that we use */
-+#ifndef PR_SET_SECUREBITS
-+#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS		28
-+#endif
-+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
-+#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS		38
-+#endif
-+
- // States: new, allocated, initted, updated, applied
- typedef enum { CAPNG_NEW, CAPNG_ERROR, CAPNG_ALLOCATED, CAPNG_INIT,
- 	CAPNG_UPDATED, CAPNG_APPLIED } capng_states_t;
-@@ -663,15 +672,22 @@ int capng_change_id(int uid, int gid, capng_flags_t flag)
- 
- int capng_lock(void)
- {
--#ifdef PR_SET_SECUREBITS
--	int rc = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
--			1 << SECURE_NOROOT |
--			1 << SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED |
--			1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
--			1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED, 0, 0, 0);
-+	int rc;
-+
-+	// On Linux 3.5 and up, we can directly prevent ourselves and
-+	// our descendents from gaining privileges.
-+	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == 0)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	// This kernel is too old or otherwise doesn't support
-+	// PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS.  Fall back to using securebits.
-+	rc = prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
-+		   1 << SECURE_NOROOT |
-+		   1 << SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED |
-+		   1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
-+		   1 << SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED, 0, 0, 0);
- 	if (rc)
- 		return -1;
--#endif
- 
- 	return 0;
- }