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Diffstat (limited to 'docs/security-blueprint/part-4')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/security-blueprint/part-4/0_Abstract.md | 60 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/security-blueprint/part-4/1-General.md | 278 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/security-blueprint/part-4/2-Memory.md | 156 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/security-blueprint/part-4/3-Consoles.md | 78 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/security-blueprint/part-4/4-Debug.md | 208 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/security-blueprint/part-4/5-FileSystems.md | 60 |
6 files changed, 840 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/0_Abstract.md b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/0_Abstract.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01957e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/0_Abstract.md @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +# Part 4 - Kernel + +## Abstract + +**System Hardening:** Best practices associated with the configuration of an +embedded Linux based operating system. This section includes both hardening of +the kernel itself, as well as specific configurations and patches used to +protect against known vulnerabilities within the build and configuration of the +root filesystem. + +At the Kernel level, we must ensure that no console can be launched. It could be +used to change the behavior of the system or to have more information about it. +Another aspect is the protection of the memory used by the Kernel. + +The next sub-sections contain information on various kernel configuration +options to enhance the security in the kernel (3.10.17) and also for +applications compiled to take advantage of these security features. +Additionally, there are also configuration options that protect from known +vulnerable configuration options. Here's a high level summary of various kernel +configurations that shall be required for deployment. + +## Kernel Version + +The choice of kernel version for the AGL system is essential to its security. +Depending on the type of board and eventual production system, different kernel +versions are used. For example, one of the systems under study uses the +Linux kernel version 3.10, while another uses the Linux kernel version 4.4. +For the Linux kernel version 3.10.31, there are 25 known vulnerabilities. +These vulnerabilities would allow an attacker to gain privileges, +bypass access restrictions, allow memory to be corrupted, or cause denial of service. +In contrast, the Linux kernel version of 4.4 has many fewer known vulnerabilities. +For this reason, we would in general recommend the later kernel version as a basis +for the platform. + +Note that, although there are fewer known vulnerabilities in the most recent kernel +versions there may be many unknown vulnerabilities underlying. +A rule of thumb is to update the kernel as much as possible to avoid the problems +you do know, but you should not be complacent in the trust that you place in it. +A defense-in-depth approach would then apply. + +If there are constraints and dependencies in upgrading to a newer kernel version +(e.g. device drivers, board support providers) and you are forced to an older +Linux kernel version, there need to be additional provisions made to reduce +the risk of kernel exploits, which can include memory monitoring, watch-dog services, +and system call hooking. In this case, further defense-in-depth techniques +may be required to mitigate the risk of attacks to known vulnerabilities, +which can also include runtime integrity verification of components +that are vulnerable to tampering. + +## Kernel Build Configuration + +The kernel build configuration is extremely important for determining the level +of access to services and to reduce the breadth of the attack surface. +Linux contains a great and flexible number of capabilities and this is only controlled +through the build configuration. For example, the `CONFIG_MODULES` parameter +allows kernel modules to be loaded at runtime extending the capabilities of the kernel. +This capability needs to be either inhibited or controlled at runtime through +other configuration parameters. For example, `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y` ensures +that only signed modules are loaded. There is a very large number of kernel +configuration parameters, and these are discussed in detail in this section. diff --git a/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/1-General.md b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/1-General.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..54c7ea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/1-General.md @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +# General configuration + +## Mandatory Access Control + +Kernel should controls access with labels and policy. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +-------------------- | -------------- | -------------------------------------- +Kernel-General-MAC-1 | CONFIG_IP_NF_SECURITY | m +Kernel-General-MAC-2 | CONFIG_IP6_NF_SECURITY | m +Kernel-General-MAC-3 | CONFIG_EXT2_FS_SECURITY | y +Kernel-General-MAC-4 | CONFIG_EXT3_FS_SECURITY | y +Kernel-General-MAC-5 | CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY | y +Kernel-General-MAC-6 | CONFIG_SECURITY | y +Kernel-General-MAC-7 | CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK | y +Kernel-General-MAC-8 | CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR | y + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +Please also refer to the [**Mandatory Access Control** documentation in Platform](../part-5/1-MAC.html) part. +You can also find useful documentation and links on wikipedia about [**MAC**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control) +and about [**SMACK**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplified_Mandatory_Access_Control_Kernel). + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable kexec + +**Kexec** is a system call that enables you to load and boot into another kernel from the currently running kernel. This feature is not required in a production environment. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------- | -------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-kexec-1 | `CONFIG_KEXEC` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +<!-- section-note --> + +**kexec** can load arbitrary kernels but signing of new kernel can be enforced like it is can be enforced for new modules. + +<!-- end-section-note --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable kernel IP auto-configuration + +It is preferable to have an IP configuration performed using a user-space tool as these tend to have more validation. We do not want the network interface coming up until the system has come up properly. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +--------------------------- | --------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-IPAutoConf-1 | `CONFIG_IP_PNP` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable Sysctl syscall support + +Enabling this will result in code being included that is hard to maintain and not well tested. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-SysCtl_SysCall-1 | `CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable Legacy Linux Support + +There are some Kernel Configs which are present only to support legacy binaries. See also "Consoles" part in order to disabling support for legacy binary formats. The `uselib` system call, in particular, has no valid use in any `libc6` or `uclibc` system in recent times. This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.15 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------------- | --------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-LegacyLinux-1 | `CONFIG_USELIB` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable firmware auto-loading user mode helper + +The firmware auto loading helper, which is a utility executed by the kernel on `hotplug` events requiring firmware, can to be set `setuid`. As a result of this, the helper utility is an attractive target for attackers with control of physical ports on the device. Disabling this configuration that is supported in **Linux 3.9 and greater**. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +--------------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------- +Kernel-General-FirmHelper-1 | `CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +<!-- section-note --> + +It doesn't strictly need to be `setuid`, there is an option of shipping firmware builtin into kernel without initrd/filesystem. + +<!-- end-section-note --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Enable Kernel Panic on OOPS + +When fuzzing the kernel or attempting kernel exploits attackers are likely to trigger kernel OOPSes. Setting the behavior on OOPS to PANIC can impede their progress. + +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should only be enabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------------- | ---------------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-PanicOnOOPS-1 | `CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS` | `y` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Disable socket monitoring interface + +These monitors can be used to inspect shared file descriptors on Unix Domain sockets or traffic on 'localhost' which is otherwise assumed to be confidential. + +The `CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. + +The `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` configuration is supported in **Linux 3.3 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +-------------------------- | -------------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-SocketMon-1 | `CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG` | `n` +Kernel-General-SocketMon-2 | `CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable BPF JIT + +The BPF JIT can be used to create kernel-payloads from firewall table rules. + +This configuration for is supported in **Linux 3.16 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------ | ---------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-BPF_JIT-1 | `CONFIG_BPF_JIT` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Enable Enforced Module Signing + +The kernel should never allow an unprivileged user the ability to load specific kernel modules, +since that would provide a facility to unexpectedly extend the available attack surface. + +To protect against even privileged users, systems may need to either disable +module loading entirely, or provide signed modules +(e.g. `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE`, or dm-crypt with LoadPin), to keep from having +root load arbitrary kernel code via the module loader interface. + +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should only be enabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------------ | ------------------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-1 | `CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE` | `y` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +It is also possible to block the loading of modules after startup with "kernel.modules_disabled". + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Variable` name | `Value` +------------------------------ | ------------------------- | ------- +Kernel-General-ModuleSigning-2 | `kernel.modules_disabled` | `1` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Disable all USB, PCMCIA (and other `hotplug` bus) drivers that aren't needed + +To reduce the attack surface, the driver enumeration, probe, and operation happen in the kernel. The driver data is parsed by the kernel, so any logic bugs in these drivers can become kernel exploits. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | Object | _State_ +------------------------ | ------------------- | ---------- +Kernel-General-Drivers-1 | `USB` | _Disabled_ +Kernel-General-Drivers-2 | `PCMCIA` | _Disabled_ +Kernel-General-Drivers-3 | Other `hotplug` bus | _Disabled_ + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Position Independent Executables + +<!-- section-todo --> + +Domain | Improvement +-------------------------------- | ----------------------------- +Kernel-General-IndependentExec-1 | Kernel or/and platform part ? + +<!-- end-section-todo --> + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_ +-------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | -------- +Kernel-General-IndependentExec-1 | `-pie -fpic` | _Enable_ + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +Produce a position independent executable on targets which supports it. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Prevent Overwrite Attacks + +`-z,relro` linking option helps during program load, several ELF memory sections need to be written by the linker, but can be turned read-only before turning over control to the program. This prevents some Global Offset Table GOT overwrite attacks, or in the dtors section of the ELF binary. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_ +--------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | -------- +Kernel-General-OverwriteAttacks-1 | `-z,relro` | _Enable_ +Kernel-General-OverwriteAttacks-2 | `-z,now` | _Enable_ + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +During program load, all dynamic symbols are resolved, allowing for the complete GOT to be marked read-only (due to `-z relro` above). This prevents GOT overwrite attacks. For very large application, this can incur some performance loss during initial load while symbols are resolved, but this shouldn't be an issue for daemons. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Library linking + +<!-- section-todo --> + +Domain | Improvement +------------------------------- | --------------- +Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Keep this part? + +<!-- end-section-todo --> + +It is recommended that dynamic linking should generally not be allowed. This will avoid the user from replacing a library with malicious library. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +------------------------------- | --------------- | -------------------------------- +Kernel-General-LibraryLinking-1 | Dynamic linking | Should generally not be allowed. + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +<!-- section-note --> + +Linking everything statically doesn't change anything wrt security as binaries will live under same user:group as libraries and setuid executables ignore `LD_PRELOAD/LD_LIBRARY_PATH`. It also increases RSS footprint and creates problems with upgrading. + +<!-- end-section-note --> diff --git a/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/2-Memory.md b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/2-Memory.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7af446 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/2-Memory.md @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +# Memory + +## Restrict access to kernel memory + +The /dev/kmem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to kernel virtual memory. This can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would have direct access to kernel virtual memory. + +To disable the /dev/kmem file, which is very infrequently used by applications, the following kernel option should be set in the compile-time kernel configuration: + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------------ | ---------------- | ------- +Kernel-Memory-RestrictAccess-1 | `CONFIG_DEVKMEM` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +In case applications in userspace need /dev/kmem support, it should be available only for authenticated applications. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable access to a kernel core dump + +This kernel configuration disables access to a kernel core dump from user space. If enabled, it gives attackers a useful view into kernel memory. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------ | ------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Memory-CoreDump-1 | `CONFIG_PROC_KCORE` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable swap + +If not disabled, attackers can enable swap at runtime, add pressure to the memory subsystem and then scour the pages written to swap for useful information. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +-------------------- | ------------- | ------- +Kernel-Memory-Swap-1 | `CONFIG_SWAP` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +<!-- section-note --> + +- Enabling swap at runtime require `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`. +- Swap block device is usually under root:disk. +- Linux never swaps kernel pages. +- If swap disabling is not possible, swap encryption should be enabled. + +<!-- end-section-note --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Disable "Load All Symbols" + +There is a /proc/kallsyms file which exposes the kernel memory space address of many kernel symbols (functions, variables, etc...). This information is useful to attackers in identifying kernel versions/configurations and in preparing payloads for the exploits of kernel space. + +Both `KALLSYMS_ALL` and `KALLSYMS` shall be disabled; + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------------ | --------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Memory-LoadAllSymbols-1 | `CONFIG_KALLSYMS` | `n` +Kernel-Memory-LoadAllSymbols-2 | `CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Stack protection + +To prevent stack-smashing, similar to the stack protector used for ELF programs in user-space, the kernel can protect its internal stacks as well. + +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.11 and greater** and thus should only be enabled for such versions. + +This configuration also requires building the kernel with the **gcc compiler 4.2 or greater**. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +--------------------- | -------------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Memory-Stack-1 | `CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR` | `y` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +Other defenses include things like shadow stacks. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable access to /dev/mem + +The /dev/mem file in Linux systems is directly mapped to physical memory. This can be disastrous if an attacker gains root access, as the attacker would have direct access to physical memory through this convenient device file. It may not always be possible to disable such file, as some applications might need such support. In that case, then this device file should be available only for authenticated applications. + +This configuration is supported in **Linux 4.0 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------- | --------------- | ------- +Kernel-Memory-Access-1 | `CONFIG_DEVMEM` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Disable cross-memory attach + +Disable the process_vm_*v syscalls which allow one process to peek/poke the virtual memory of another. + +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.5 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------------ | --------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Memory-CrossMemAttach-1 | `CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Stack Smashing Attacks + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `compiler` and `linker` options | _State_ +----------------------------- | ------------------------------- | -------- +Kernel-Memory-StackSmashing-1 | `-fstack-protector-all` | _Enable_ + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack smashing attacks. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Detect Buffer Overflows + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `compiler` options and `config` name | `Value` +------------------------------- | ------------------------------------ | ------- +Kernel-Memory-BufferOverflows-1 | `-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE` | `2` +Kernel-Memory-BufferOverflows-2 | `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE` | `y` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +Helps detect some buffer overflow errors. diff --git a/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/3-Consoles.md b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/3-Consoles.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6cf80a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/3-Consoles.md @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +# Serial + +## Disable serial console + +The serial console should be disabled to prevent an attacker from accessing this powerful interface. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------ | ---------------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Consoles-Serial-1 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_8250` | `n` +Kernel-Consoles-Serial-2 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE` | `n` +Kernel-Consoles-Serial-3 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE` | `n` +Kernel-Consoles-Serial-4 | `CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE_CONSOLE` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Bake-in the kernel command-line + +The kernel command-line is used to control many aspects of the booting kernel, and is prone to tampering as they are passed in RAM with little to no reverse validation on these parameters. To prevent this type of attack, the kernel shall be configured to ignore commands line arguments, and use pre-configured (compile time) options instead. + +Set the kernel command line in the `CONFIG_CMDLINE KConfig` item and then pass no arguments from the bootloader. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +----------------------------- | ------------------------- | ----------------------------------- +Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-1 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL` | `y` +Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-2 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE` | `"insert kernel command line here"` +Kernel-Consoles-CommandLine-3 | `CONFIG_CMDLINE_OVERRIDE` | `y` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +It is recommended that any per-device settings (e.g: MAC addresses, serial numbers, etc.) be stored and accessed from read-only memory (or files), and that any such parameters be verified (signature checking) prior to their use. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable KGDB + +The Linux kernel supports KGDB over USB and console ports. These mechanisms are controlled by the `kgdbdbgp` and `kgdboc` kernel command-line parameters. It is important to ensure that no shipping product contains a kernel with KGDB compiled-in. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------- | ------------- | ------- +Kernel-Consoles-KDBG-1 | `CONFIG_KGDB` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable magic sysrq support + +On a few architectures, you can access a powerful debugger interface from the keyboard. The same powerful interface can be present on the serial console (responding to serial break) of Linux on other architectures. Disable to avoid potentially exposing this powerful backdoor. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +----------------------- | -------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Consoles-SysRQ-1 | `CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable support for binary formats other than ELF + +This will make possible to plug wrapper-driven binary formats into the kernel. It enables support for binary formats other than ELF. Providing the ability to use alternate interpreters would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------------ | -------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Consoles-BinaryFormat-1 | `CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> diff --git a/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/4-Debug.md b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/4-Debug.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cce5fc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/4-Debug.md @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +# Debug + +No debuggers shall be present on the file system. This includes, but is not limited to, the GNU Debugger client/server (commonly known in their short form names such as the `gdb` and `gdbserver` executable binaries respectively), the `LLDB` next generation debugger or the `TCF` (Target Communications Framework) agnostic framework. Including these binaries as part of the file system will facilitate an attacker's ability to reverse engineer and debug (either locally or remotely) any process that is currently executing on the device. + +## Kernel debug symbols + +Debug symbols should always be removed from production kernels as they provide a lot of information to attackers. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------- | ------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-Symbols-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +These kernel debug symbols are enabled by other config items in the kernel. Care should be taken to disable those also. If `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO` cannot be disabled, then enabling `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` is second best. + +<!-- section-note --> + +At least `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED` should be always enabled for developers to convert addresses in oops messages to line numbers. + +<!-- end-section-note --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable Kprobes + +Kprobes enables you to dynamically break into any kernel routine and collect debugging and performance information non-disruptively. You can trap at almost any kernel code address, specifying a handler routine to be invoked when the breakpoint is hit. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------- | ---------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-Kprobes-1 | `CONFIG_KPROBES` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable Tracing + +FTrace enables the kernel to trace every kernel function. Providing kernel trace functionality would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +---------------------- | --------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-Tracing-1 | `CONFIG_FTRACE` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable Profiling + +Profiling and OProfile enables profiling the whole system, include the kernel, kernel modules, libraries, and applications. Providing profiling functionality would assist an attacker in discovering attack vectors. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------ | ------------------ | ------- +Kernel-Debug-Profiling-1 | `CONFIG_OPROFILE` | `n` +Kernel-Debug-Profiling-2 | `CONFIG_PROFILING` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable OOPS print on BUG() + +The output from OOPS print can be helpful in Return Oriented Programming (ROP) when trying to determine the effectiveness of an exploit. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------ | ------------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-OOPSOnBUG-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable Kernel Debugging + +There are development-only branches of code in the kernel enabled by the `DEBUG_KERNEL` conf. This should be disabled to compile-out these branches. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------ | --------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-Dev-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL` | `n` +Kernel-Debug-Dev-2 | `CONFIG_EMBEDDED` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +In some kernel versions, disabling this requires also disabling `CONFIG_EMBEDDED`, and `CONFIG_EXPERT`. Disabling `CONFIG_EXPERT` makes it impossible to disable `COREDUMP`, `DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE`, `NAMESPACES`, `KALLSYMS` and `BUG`. In which case it is better to leave this enabled than enable the others. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Disable the kernel debug filesystem + +The kernel debug filesystem presents a lot of useful information and means of manipulation of the kernel to an attacker. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------- | ----------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-FileSystem-1 | `CONFIG_DEBUG_FS` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable BUG() support + +The kernel will display backtrace and register information for BUGs and WARNs in kernel space, making it easier for attackers to develop exploits. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------ | ------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-BUG-1 | `CONFIG_BUG` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Disable core dumps + +Core dumps provide a lot of debug information for hackers. So disabling core dumps are recommended in production builds. + +This configuration is supported in **Linux 3.7 and greater** and thus should only be disabled for such versions. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------ | ----------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-CoreDumps-1 | `CONFIG_COREDUMP` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Kernel Address Display Restriction + +When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for kernel vulnerabilities, they frequently need to know the location of internal kernel structures. By treating kernel addresses as sensitive information, those locations are not visible to regular local users. + +**/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict is set to "1"** to block the reporting of known kernel address leaks. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `File` name | `Value` +---------------------------- | -------------------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict` | `1` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +Additionally, various files and directories should be readable only by the root user: `/boot/vmlinuz*`, `/boot/System.map*`, `/sys/kernel/debug/`, `/proc/slabinfo` + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `File` or `Directorie` name | _State_ +---------------------------- | --------------------------- | ----------------------------- +Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-1 | `/boot/vmlinuz*` | _Readable Only for root user_ +Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-2 | `/boot/System.map*` | _Readable Only for root user_ +Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-3 | `/sys/kernel/debug/` | _Readable Only for root user_ +Kernel-Debug-AdressDisplay-4 | `/proc/slabinfo` | _Readable Only for root user_ + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## DMESG Restrictions + +When attackers try to develop "run anywhere" exploits for vulnerabilities, they frequently will use `dmesg` output. By treating `dmesg` output as sensitive information, this output is not available to the attacker. + +**/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict can be set to "1"** to treat dmesg output as sensitive. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `File` name | `Value` +-------------------- | --------------------------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-DMESG-1 | `/proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict` | `1` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +Enable the below compiler and linker options when building user-space applications to avoid stack smashing, buffer overflow attacks. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Disable /proc/config.gz + +It is extremely important to not expose the kernel configuration used on a production device to a potential attacker. With access to the kernel config, it could be possible for an attacker to build a custom kernel for the device that may disable critical security features. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +--------------------- | ----------------- | ------- +Kernel-Debug-Config-1 | `CONFIG_IKCONFIG` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> diff --git a/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/5-FileSystems.md b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/5-FileSystems.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78f2050 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/security-blueprint/part-4/5-FileSystems.md @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +# File System + +## Disable all file systems not needed + +To reduce the attack surface, file system data is parsed by the kernel, so any logic bugs in file system drivers can become kernel exploits. + +### Disable NFS file system + +NFS FileSystems are useful during development phases, but this can be a very helpful way for an attacker to get files when you are in production mode, so we must disable them. + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | `Value` +------------------------ | --------------- | ------- +Kernel-FileSystems-NFS-1 | `CONFIG_NFSD` | `n` +Kernel-FileSystems-NFS-2 | `CONFIG_NFS_FS` | `n` + +<!-- end-section-config --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Partition Mount Options + +There are several security restrictions that can be set on a filesystem when it is mounted. Some common security options include, but are not limited to: + +`nosuid` - Do not allow set-user-identifier or set-group-identifier bits to take effect. + +`nodev` - Do not interpret character or block special devices on the filesystem. + +`noexec` - Do not allow execution of any binaries on the mounted filesystem. + +`ro` - Mount filesystem as read-only. + +The following flags shall be used for mounting common filesystems: + +<!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Partition` | `Value` +-------------------------- | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-1 | `/boot` | `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`. +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-2 | `/var` & `/tmp` | In `/etc/fstab` or `vfstab`, add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`. +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-3 | _Non-root local_ | If type is `ext2` or `ext3` and mount point not '/', add `nodev`. +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-4 | _Removable storage_ | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`. +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-5 | _Temporary storage_ | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`. +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-6 | `/dev/shm` | Add `nosuid`, `nodev` and `noexec`. +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-7 | `/dev` | Add `nosuid` and `noexec`. + +<!-- end-section-config --> <!-- section-note --> + +If `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` is set, then the kernel will mount /dev and will not apply the `nosuid`, `noexec` options. Either disable `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` or add a remount with `noexec` and `nosuid` options to system startup. + +<!-- end-section-note --> <!-- section-config --> + +Domain | `Config` name | _State_ or `Value` +-------------------------- | ----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- +Kernel-FileSystems-Mount-1 | `CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT` | _Disabled_ or add remount with `noexec` and `nosuid` to system startup. + +<!-- end-section-config --> |