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| -rw-r--r-- | security-blueprint/part-7/0_Abstract.md | 52 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md | 54 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security-blueprint/part-7/2-Wireless.md | 244 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security-blueprint/part-7/3-Cloud.md | 107 |
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diff --git a/security-blueprint/part-7/0_Abstract.md b/security-blueprint/part-7/0_Abstract.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..162aced --- /dev/null +++ b/security-blueprint/part-7/0_Abstract.md @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +# Part 7 - Connectivity + +## Abstract + +This part shows different Connectivity attacks on the car. + +<!-- todo --> + +Domain | Improvement +----------------------- | ----------------- +Connectivity-Abstract-1 | Improve abstract. + +<!-- endtodo --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Acronyms and Abbreviations + +The following table lists the terms utilized within this part of the document. + +Acronyms or Abbreviations | Description +------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +_ARP_ | **A**ddress **R**esolution **P**rotocol +_BLE_ | **B**luetooth **L**ow **E**nergy +_CAN_ | **C**ar **A**rea **N**etwork +_CCMP_ | **C**ounter-Mode/**C**BC-**M**ac **P**rotocol +_EDGE_ | **E**nhanced **D**ata **R**ates for **GSM** **E**volution - Evolution of **GPRS** +_GEA_ | **G**PRS **E**ncryption **A**lgorithm +_GPRS_ | **G**eneral **P**acket **R**adio **S**ervice (2,5G, 2G+) +_GSM_ | **G**lobal **S**ystem for **M**obile Communications (2G) +_HSPA_ | **H**igh **S**peed **P**acket **A**ccess (3G+) +_IMEI_ | **I**nternational **M**obile **E**quipment **I**dentity +_LIN_ | **L**ocal **I**nterconnect **N**etwork +_MOST_ | **M**edia **O**riented **S**ystem **T**ransport +_NFC_ | **N**ear **F**ield **C**ommunication +_OBD_ | **O**n-**B**oard **D**iagnostics +_PATS_ | **P**assive **A**nti-**T**heft **S**ystem +_PKE_ | **P**assive **K**eyless **E**ntry +_PSK_ | **P**hase-**S**hift **K**eying +_RDS_ | **R**adio **D**ata **S**ystem +_RFID_ | **R**adio **F**requency **I**dentification +_RKE_ | **R**emote **K**eyless **E**ntry +_SDR_ | **S**oftware **D**efined **R**adio +_SSP_ | **S**ecure **S**imple **P**airing +_TKIP_ | **T**emporal **K**ey **I**ntegrity **P**rotocol +_TPMS_ | **T**ire **P**ressure **M**onitoring **S**ystem +_UMTS_ | **U**niversal **M**obile **T**elecommunications **S**ystem (3G) +_USB_ | **U**niversal **S**erial **B**us +_WEP_ | **W**ired **E**quivalent **P**rivacy +_WPA_ | **W**ifi **P**rotected **A**ccess diff --git a/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md b/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..843a921 --- /dev/null +++ b/security-blueprint/part-7/1-BusAndConnectors.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# Bus + +We only speak about the **CAN** bus to take an example, because the different +attacks on bus like _FlewRay_, _ByteFlight_, _Most_ and _Lin_ use retro +engineering and the main argument to improve their security is to encrypt data +packets. We just describe them a bit: + +- **CAN**: Controller Area Network, developed in the early 1980s, is an + event-triggered controller network for serial communication with data rates + up to one MBit/s. **CAN** messages are classified over their respective + identifier. **CAN** controller broadcast their messages to all connected nodes + and all receiving nodes decide independently if they process the message. +- **FlewRay**: Is a deterministic and error-tolerant high-speed bus. With a data + rate up to 10 MBit/s. +- **ByteFlight**: Is used for safety-critical applications in motor vehicles + like air-bags. Byteflight runs at 10Mbps over 2 or 3 wires plastic optical + fibers. +- **Most**: Media Oriented System Transport, is used for transmitting audio, + video, voice, and control data via fiber optic cables. The speed is, for the + synchronous way, up to 24 MBit/s and asynchronous way up to 14 MBit/s. + **MOST** messages include always a clear sender and receiver address. +- **LIN**: Local Interconnect Network, is a single-wire subnet work for + low-cost, serial communication between smart sensors and actuators with + typical data rates up to 20 kBit/s. It is intended to be used from the year + 2001 on everywhere in a car, where the bandwidth and versatility of a **CAN** + network is not required. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Tech name | Recommendations +---------------------------------- | --------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Bus-1 | CAN | Implement hardware solution in order to prohibit sending unwanted signals. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +See [Security in Automotive Bus Systems](http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.92.728&rep=rep1&type=pdf) for more information. + +# Connectors + +For the connectors, we supposed that they were disabled by default. For example, +the **USB** must be disabled to avoid attacks like BadUSB. If not, configure the +Kernel to only enable the minimum require **USB** devices. The connectors used +to diagnose the car like **OBD-II** must be disabled outside garages. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Tech name | Recommendations +----------------------------------------- | --------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- +Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-1 | USB | Must be disabled. If not, only enable the minimum require USB devices. +Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-2 | USB | Confidential data exchanged with the ECU over USB must be secure. +Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-3 | USB | USB Boot on a ECU must be disable. +Connectivity-BusAndConnector-Connectors-4 | OBD-II | Must be disabled outside garages. + +<!-- endconfig --> diff --git a/security-blueprint/part-7/2-Wireless.md b/security-blueprint/part-7/2-Wireless.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a324673 --- /dev/null +++ b/security-blueprint/part-7/2-Wireless.md @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +# Wireless + +In this part, we talk about possible remote attacks on a car, according to the +different areas of possible attacks. For each communication channels, we +describe attacks and how to prevent them with some recommendations. The main +recommendation is to always follow the latest updates of these remote +communication channels. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +----------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ +Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Update | Always follow the latest updates of remote communication channels. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +We will see the following parts: + +- [Wifi](#wifi) + +- [Bluetooth](#bluetooth) + +- [Cellular](#cellular) + +- [Radio](#radio) + +- [NFC](#nfc) + +<!-- todo --> + +Domain | Improvement +----------------------- | ------------------------------------------- +Connectivity-Wireless-1 | Add communication channels (RFID, ZigBee?). + +<!-- endtodo --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +For existing automotive-specific means, we take examples of existing system +attacks from the _IOActive_ document ([A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf)) +and from the ETH document ([Relay Attacks on Passive Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf)). + +- [Telematics](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A40%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) + +- [Passive Anti-Theft System (PATS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A11%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C574%2C0%5D) + +- [Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A17%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) + +- [Remote Keyless Entry/Start (RKE)](https://www.ioactive.com/pdfs/IOActive_Remote_Attack_Surfaces.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A26%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2C60%2C720%2C0%5D) + +- [Passive Keyless Entry (PKE)](https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/332.pdf) + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Wifi + +### Attacks + +We can differentiate existing attacks on wifi in two categories: Those on +**WEP** and those on **WPA**. + +- **WEP** attacks: + + - **FMS**: (**F**luhrer, **M**antin and **S**hamir attack) is a "Stream cipher + attack on the widely used RC4 stream cipher. The attack allows an attacker + to recover the key in an RC4 encrypted stream from a large number of + messages in that stream." + - **KoreK**: "Allows the attacker to reduce the key space". + - **PTW**: (**P**yshkin **T**ews **W**einmann attack). + - **Chopchop**: Found by KoreK, "Weakness of the CRC32 checksum and the lack + of replay protection." + - **Fragmentation** + +- **WPA** attacks: + + - **Beck and Tews**: Exploit weakness in **TKIP**. "Allow the attacker to + decrypt **ARP** packets and to inject traffic into a network, even + allowing him to perform a **DoS** or an **ARP** poisoning". + - [KRACK](https://github.com/kristate/krackinfo): (K)ey (R)einstallation + (A)tta(ck) ([jira AGL SPEC-1017](https://jira.automotivelinux.org/browse/SPEC-1017)). + +### Recommendations + +- Do not use **WEP**, **PSK** and **TKIP**. + +- Use **WPA2** with **CCMP**. + +- Should protect data sniffing. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Tech name or object | Recommendations +---------------------------- | ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- +Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-1 | WEP, PSK, TKIP | Disabled +Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-2 | WPA2 and AES-CCMP | Used +Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-3 | WPA2 | Should protect data sniffing. +Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-4 | PSK | Changing regularly the password. +Connectivity-Wireless-Wifi-5 | Device | Upgraded easily in software or firmware to have the last security update. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +See [Wifi attacks WEP WPA](https://matthieu.io/dl/wifi-attacks-wep-wpa.pdf) +and [Breaking wep and wpa (Beck and Tews)](https://dl.aircrack-ng.org/breakingwepandwpa.pdf) +for more information. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Bluetooth + +### Attacks + +- **Bluesnarfing** attacks involve an attacker covertly gaining access to your + Bluetooth-enabled device for the purpose of retrieving information, including + addresses, calendar information or even the device's **I**nternational + **M**obile **E**quipment **I**dentity. With the **IMEI**, an attacker could + route your incoming calls to his cell phone. +- **Bluebugging** is a form of Bluetooth attack often caused by a lack of + awareness. Similar to bluesnarfing, bluebugging accesses and uses all phone + features but is limited by the transmitting power of class 2 Bluetooth radios, + normally capping its range at 10-15 meters. +- **Bluejacking** is the sending of unsolicited messages. +- **BLE**: **B**luetooth **L**ow **E**nergy [attacks](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf). +- **DoS**: Drain a device's battery or temporarily paralyze the phone. + +### Recommendations + +- Not allowing Bluetooth pairing attempts without the driver's first manually + placing the vehicle in pairing mode. +- Monitoring. +- Use **BLE** with caution. +- For v2.1 and later devices using **S**ecure **S**imple **P**airing (**SSP**), + avoid using the "Just Works" association model. The device must verify that + an authenticated link key was generated during pairing. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Tech name | Recommendations +--------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ +Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-1 | BLE | Use with caution. +Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-2 | Bluetooth | Monitoring +Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-3 | SSP | Avoid using the "Just Works" association model. +Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-4 | Visibility | Configured by default as undiscoverable. Except when needed. +Connectivity-Wireless-Bluetooth-5 | Anti-scanning | Used, inter alia, to slow down brute force attacks. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +See [Low energy and the automotive transformation](http://www.ti.com/lit/wp/sway008/sway008.pdf), +[Gattacking Bluetooth Smart Devices](http://gattack.io/whitepaper.pdf), +[Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive Attack Surfaces](http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf) +and [With Low Energy comes Low Security](https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot13/woot13-ryan.pdf) +for more information. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## Cellular + +### Attacks + +- **IMSI-Catcher**: Is a telephone eavesdropping device used for intercepting + mobile phone traffic and tracking location data of mobile phone users. + Essentially a "fake" mobile tower acting between the target mobile phone and + the service provider's real towers, it is considered a man-in-the-middle + (**MITM**) attack. + +- Lack of mutual authentication (**GPRS**/**EDGE**) and encryption with **GEA0**. + +- **Fall back** from **UMTS**/**HSPA** to **GPRS**/**EDGE** (Jamming against + **UMTS**/**HSPA**). + +- 4G **DoS** attack. + +### Recommendations + +- Check antenna legitimacy. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Tech name | Recommendations +-------------------------------- | --------- | -------------------------- +Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-1 | GPRS/EDGE | Avoid +Connectivity-Wireless-Cellular-2 | UMTS/HSPA | Protected against Jamming. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +See [A practical attack against GPRS/EDGE/UMTS/HSPA mobile data communications](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-dc-11/Perez-Pico/BlackHat_DC_2011_Perez-Pico_Mobile_Attacks-wp.pdf) +for more information. + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Radio + +### Attacks + +- Interception of data with low cost material (**SDR** with hijacked DVB-T/DAB + for example). + +### Recommendations + +- Use the **R**adio **D**ata **S**ystem (**RDS**) only to send signals for audio + output and meta concerning radio. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Tech name | Recommendations +----------------------------- | --------- | -------------------------------------------- +Connectivity-Wireless-Radio-1 | RDS | Only audio output and meta concerning radio. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +## NFC + +### Attacks + +- **MITM**: Relay and replay attack. + +### Recommendations + +- Should implements protection against relay and replay attacks (Tokens, etc...). +- Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles. +- NFC should be use encrypted link (secure channel). A standard key agreement + protocol like Diffie-Hellmann based on RSA or Elliptic Curves could be applied + to establish a shared secret between two devices. +- Automotive NFC device should be certified by NFC forum entity: The NFC Forum + Certification Mark shows that products meet global interoperability standards. +- NFC Modified Miller coding is preferred over NFC Manchester coding. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Tech name | Recommendations +--------------------------- | --------- | ------------------------------------------------------ +Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-1 | NFC | Protected against relay and replay attacks. +Connectivity-Wireless-NFC-2 | Device | Disable unneeded and unapproved services and profiles. + +<!-- endconfig --> diff --git a/security-blueprint/part-7/3-Cloud.md b/security-blueprint/part-7/3-Cloud.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d37ff4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security-blueprint/part-7/3-Cloud.md @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +# Cloud + +## Download + +- **authentication**: Authentication is the security process that validates the + claimed identity of a device, entity or person, relying on one or more + characteristics bound to that device, entity or person. + +- **Authorization**: Parses the network to allow access to some or all network +functionality by providing rules and allowing access or denying access based +on a subscriber's profile and services purchased. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +---------------------------- | ---------------- | ---------------------------------------- +Application-Cloud-Download-1 | authentication | Must implement authentication process. +Application-Cloud-Download-2 | Authorization | Must implement Authorization process. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Infrastructure + +- **Deep Packet Inspection**: **DPI** provides techniques to analyze the payload + of each packet, adding an extra layer of security. **DPI** can detect and + neutralize attacks that would be missed by other security mechanisms. + +- A **DoS** protection in order to avoid that the Infrastructure is no more + accessible for a period of time. + +- **Scanning tools** such as **SATS** and **DAST** assessments perform + vulnerability scans on the source code and data flows on web applications. + Many of these scanning tools run different security tests that stress + applications under certain attack scenarios to discover security issues. + +- **IDS & IPS**: **IDS** detect and log inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous + activity. **IDS** can be located in the telecommunications networks and/or + within the host server or computer. Telecommunications carriers build + intrusion detection capability in all network connections to routers and + servers, as well as offering it as a service to enterprise customers. Once + **IDS** systems have identified an attack, **IPS** ensures that malicious + packets are blocked before they cause any harm to backend systems and + networks. **IDS** typically functions via one or more of three systems: + + 1. Pattern matching. + 2. Anomaly detection. + 3. Protocol behavior. + +<!-- pagebreak --> + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +---------------------------------- | ------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- +Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-1 | Packet | Should implement a DPI. +Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-2 | DoS | Must implement a DoS protection. +Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-3 | Test | Should implement scanning tools like SATS and DAST. +Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-4 | Log | Should implement security tools (IDS and IPS). +Application-Cloud-Infrastructure-5 | App integrity | Applications must be signed by the code signing authority. + +<!-- endconfig --> + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +## Transport + +For data transport, it is necessary to **encrypt data end-to-end**. To prevent **MITM** attacks, +no third party should be able to interpret transported data. Another aspect +is the data anonymization in order to protect the leakage of private information +on the user or any other third party. + +The use of standards such as **IPSec** provides "_private and secure +communications over IP networks, through the use of cryptographic security +services, is a set of protocols using algorithms to transport secure data over +an IP network._". In addition, **IPSec** operates at the network layer of the +**OSI** model, contrary to previous standards that operate at the application +layer. This makes its application independent and means that users do not need +to configure each application to **IPSec** standards. + +**IPSec** provides the services below : + +- Confidentiality: A service that makes it impossible to interpret data if it is + not the recipient. It is the encryption function that provides this service by + transforming intelligible (unencrypted) data into unintelligible (encrypted) + data. +- Authentication: A service that ensures that a piece of data comes from where + it is supposed to come from. +- Integrity: A service that consists in ensuring that data has not been tampered + with accidentally or fraudulently. +- Replay Protection: A service that prevents attacks by re-sending a valid + intercepted packet to the network for the same authorization. + This service is provided by the presence of a sequence number. +- Key management: Mechanism for negotiating the length of encryption keys + between two **IPSec** elements and exchange of these keys. + +An additional means of protection would be to do the monitoring between users +and the cloud as a **CASB** will provide. + +<!-- config --> + +Domain | Object | Recommendations +----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- +Application-Cloud-Transport-1 | Integrity, confidentiality and legitimacy | Should implement IPSec standards. + +<!-- endconfig --> |