diff options
| author |   Angelos Mouzakitis <a.mouzakitis@virtualopensystems.com> | 2023-10-10 14:33:42 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Angelos Mouzakitis <a.mouzakitis@virtualopensystems.com> | 2023-10-10 14:33:42 +0000 |
| commit | af1a266670d040d2f4083ff309d732d648afba2a (patch) | |
| tree | 2fc46203448ddcc6f81546d379abfaeb323575e9 /roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | |
| parent | e02cda008591317b1625707ff8e115a4841aa889 (diff) | |
Change-Id: Iaf8d18082d3991dec7c0ebbea540f092188eb4ec
Diffstat (limited to 'roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | 3842 |
1 files changed, 3842 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..64e392cfb --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -0,0 +1,3842 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include "../ssl_local.h" +#include "statem_local.h" +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <internal/cryptlib.h> + +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); + +static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); +static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); +static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, + WPACKET *pkt); + +/* + * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? + * + * Return values are: + * 1: Yes + * 0: No + */ +static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) +{ + /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ + if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION + && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) + || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? + * + * Return values are: + * 1: Yes + * 0: No + */ +static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) +{ + long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + /* + * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral + * ciphersuite or for SRP + */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK + | SSL_kSRP)) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the + * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The + * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) + */ +static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't + * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by + * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() + */ + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + /* + * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only + * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. + */ + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + if (s->hit) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { +#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION +# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message. +#endif + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; + /* + * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the + * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding + * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the + * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? + */ + if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } + } + break; + } + + /* No valid transition found */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the + * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The + * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) + */ +int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + int ske_expected; + + /* + * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version + * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) + goto err; + return 1; + } + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; + return 1; + } + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + /* + * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early + * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a + * HelloRetryRequest. + */ + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + if (s->hit) { + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; + return 1; + } + } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + return 1; + } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION + && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL + && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session + * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on + * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if + * the server is resuming. + */ + s->hit = 1; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; + return 1; + } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth + & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; + return 1; + } + } else { + ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); + /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ + if (ske_expected + || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) + && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; + return 1; + } + } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + && cert_req_allowed(s)) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; + return 1; + } + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + /* + * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if + * |ext.status_expected| is set + */ + if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; + return 1; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: + ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); + /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ + if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) + && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; + return 1; + } + goto err; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { + if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } + goto err; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; + return 1; + } + } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; + return 1; + } + break; + } + + err: + /* No valid transition found */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + BIO *rbio; + + /* + * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably + * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. + */ + s->init_num = 0; + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); + BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); + return 0; + } + SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the + * server. + */ +static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated + * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by + * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). + */ + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* + * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after + * we already sent close_notify + */ + if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { + /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; + else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + else + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + + /* Try to read from the server instead */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. + */ +WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what + * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until + * later + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_OK: + if (!s->renegotiate) { + /* + * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have + * received a message from the server. Better read it. + */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } + /* Renegotiation */ + /* fall thru */ + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { + /* + * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't + * actually selected a version yet. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* + * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what + * we will be sent + */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + /* + * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a + * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one + * because we did early data. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: + /* + * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is + * sent, but no verify packet is sent + */ + /* + * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH + * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We + * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's + * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + } + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; + } else { +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; +#else + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; +#endif + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; +#endif + + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } + + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: + /* + * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more + * convenient time. + */ + if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { + if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } +} + +/* + * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from + * the client to the server. + */ +WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No pre work to be done */ + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + s->shutdown = 0; + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (s->hit) { + /* + * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these + * messages unless we need to. + */ + st->use_timer = 0; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ + return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); + } +#endif + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + /* + * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not + * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press + * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. + */ + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING + || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + /* Fall through */ + + case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); + + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); + } + + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; +} + +/* + * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the + * client to the server. + */ +WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + s->init_num = 0; + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No post work to be done */ + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->max_early_data > 0) { + /* + * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change + * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead + * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { + if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + } + /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ + } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { + return WORK_MORE_A; + } + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ + s->first_packet = 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + /* + * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing + * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. + */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); + s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: + if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) + break; + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->max_early_data > 0) { + /* + * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change + * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead + * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. + */ + if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) + return WORK_ERROR; + break; + } + s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + s->session->compress_meth = 0; +#else + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + s->session->compress_meth = 0; + else + s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; +#endif + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (s->hit) { + /* + * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if + * no SCTP used. + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, + 0, NULL); + } +#endif + + dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { + /* + * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if + * no SCTP used. + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, + 0, NULL); + } +#endif + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_B; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + if (statem_flush(s) != 1) + return WORK_MORE_A; + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + break; + } + + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; +} + +/* + * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the + * client + * + * Valid return values are: + * 1: Success + * 0: Error + */ +int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); + return 0; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + else + *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; + *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + break; + + case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: + *confunc = NULL; + *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: + *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + break; + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: + *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; + *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; + break; +#endif + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + *confunc = tls_construct_finished; + *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; + break; + + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: + *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; + *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; + break; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are + * reading. Excludes the message header. + */ +size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; + + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + return s->max_cert_list; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: + return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + /* + * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In + * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured + * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs + */ + return s->max_cert_list; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: + if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + return 3; + return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; + } +} + +/* + * Process a message that the client has been received from the server. + */ +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); + + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: + return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: + return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: + return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: + return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); + + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: + return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); + } +} + +/* + * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message + * from the server + */ +WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); + } +} + +int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + unsigned char *p; + size_t sess_id_len; + int i, protverr; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; + unsigned char *session_id; + + /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ + protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); + if (protverr != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + protverr); + return 0; + } + + if (sess == NULL + || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) + || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE + && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + /* else use the pre-loaded session */ + + p = s->s3->client_random; + + /* + * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are + * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + size_t idx; + i = 1; + for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { + if (p[idx]) { + i = 0; + break; + } + } + } else { + i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); + } + + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), + DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /*- + * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from + * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version + * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also + * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can + * choke if we initially report a higher version then + * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This + * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it + * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports + * 1.0. + * + * Possible scenario with previous logic: + * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 + * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 + * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. + * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. + * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. + * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now + * know that is maximum server supports. + * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret + * containing version 1.0. + * + * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the + * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely + * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't + * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with + * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using + * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to + * the negotiated version. + * + * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the + * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. + */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Session ID */ + session_id = s->session->session_id; + if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { + if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { + sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); + s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; + session_id = s->tmp_session_id; + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE + && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else { + sess_id_len = 0; + } + } else { + assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); + sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; + if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { + s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; + memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); + } + } + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, + sess_id_len)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Ciphers supported */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* COMPRESSION */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (ssl_allow_compression(s) + && s->ctx->comp_methods + && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { + comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } +#endif + /* Add the NULL method */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* TLS extensions */ + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t cookie_len; + PACKET cookiepkt; + + if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); + if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + +static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + int i; + + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); + if (c == NULL) { + /* unknown cipher */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + /* + * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, + * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. + */ + if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); + i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); + if (i < 0) { + /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { + /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher + * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is + * set and use it for comparison. + */ + if (s->session->cipher != NULL) + s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; + if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different + * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. + */ + if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2) + != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); + return 0; + } + } else { + /* + * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same + * ciphersuite. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); + return 0; + } + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + PACKET session_id, extpkt; + size_t session_id_len; + const unsigned char *cipherchars; + int hrr = 0; + unsigned int compression; + unsigned int sversion; + unsigned int context; + RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + /* load the server random */ + if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION + && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { + s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; + hrr = 1; + if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Get the session-id. */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); + if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) + || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + /* TLS extensions */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { + PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); + } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + if (!hrr) { + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, + &extensions, NULL, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { + if (compression != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + + if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len + || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, + session_id_len) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); + goto err; + } + } + + if (hrr) { + if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); + } + + /* + * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions + * are appropriate for this version. + */ + context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; + if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); + goto err; + } + + s->hit = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of + * the message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + goto err; + } + + /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, + extensions, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else { + /* + * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared + * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. + * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. + * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) + * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application + * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether + * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session + * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we + * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake + * message to see if the server wants to resume. + */ + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION + && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { + const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + /* + * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for + * backwards compat reasons + */ + int master_key_length; + master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &master_key_length, + NULL, &pref_cipher, + s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) + && master_key_length > 0) { + s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); + } else { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (session_id_len != 0 + && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length + && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, + session_id_len) == 0) + s->hit = 1; + } + + if (s->hit) { + if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length + || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { + /* actually a client application bug */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* + * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server + * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. + * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, + * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be + * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. + */ + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + + s->session->ssl_version = s->version; + /* + * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can + * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an + * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be + * used for resumption. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; + /* session_id_len could be 0 */ + if (session_id_len > 0) + memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), + session_id_len); + } + } + + /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ + if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + /* + * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed + * version. + */ + s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; + s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; + + if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (compression != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + /* + * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session + * using compression. + */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto err; + } +#else + if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); + goto err; + } + if (compression == 0) + comp = NULL; + else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); + goto err; + } else { + comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); + } + + if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } else { + s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; + } +#endif + + if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { + unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; + char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; + size_t labellen; + + /* + * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if + * no SCTP used. + */ + memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, + sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); + + /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ + labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) + labellen += 1; + + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), + labelbuffer, + labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), + BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); + } +#endif + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise + * we're done with this message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, + PACKET *extpkt) +{ + RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; + + /* + * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and + * should not be used. + */ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); + s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + &extensions, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + extensions = NULL; + + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL +#endif + ) { + /* + * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next + * ClientHello will not change + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with + * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. + */ + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* + * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done + * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the + * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now + * for HRR messages. + */ + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + err: + OPENSSL_free(extensions); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int i; + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; + X509 *x = NULL; + const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + size_t chainidx, certidx; + unsigned int context = 0; + const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; + + if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) + || context != 0 + || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + certstart = certbytes; + x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); + if (x == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + PACKET extensions; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, + NULL, chainidx == 0) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + rawexts, x, chainidx, + PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + } + + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + x = NULL; + } + + i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); + /* + * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order + * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. + * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set + * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes + * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was + * reverted because at least one application *only* set + * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused + * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did + * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags + * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the + * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is + * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. + */ + if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto err; + } + ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ + if (i > 1) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); + goto err; + } + + s->session->peer_chain = sk; + /* + * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, + * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c + */ + x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); + sk = NULL; + + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); + + if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { + x = NULL; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + + if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { + x = NULL; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto err; + } + /* + * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 + * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate + * type. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { + x = NULL; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto err; + } + } + s->session->peer_type = certidx; + + X509_free(s->session->peer); + X509_up_ref(x); + s->session->peer = x; + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; + x = NULL; + + /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, + sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), + &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */; + goto err; + } + + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + + err: + X509_free(x); + sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); + return ret; +} + +static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + PACKET psk_identity_hint; + + /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in + * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of + * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK + * identity. + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, + &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */ + if ((s->srp_ctx.N = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), + (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.g = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), + (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.s = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), + (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.B = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), + (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); + return 0; + } + + if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* We must check if there is a certificate */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + + return 1; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; + EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; + + DH *dh = NULL; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; + + int check_bits = 0; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); + dh = DH_new(); + + if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ + p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); + g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), + NULL); + bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), + (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); + if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* test non-zero pubkey */ + if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); + goto err; + } + + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p = g = NULL; + + if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); + goto err; + } + + if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + bnpub_key = NULL; + + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; + + /* + * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with + * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + + return 1; + + err: + BN_free(p); + BN_free(g); + BN_free(bnpub_key); + DH_free(dh); + EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); + + return 0; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + PACKET encoded_pt; + unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; + + /* + * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH + * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and + * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + return 0; + } + /* + * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not + * server has sent an invalid curve. + */ + if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE + || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); + return 0; + } + + if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, + PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), + PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + return 0; + } + + /* + * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign + * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA + * and ECDSA. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + + return 1; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + long alg_k; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + PACKET save_param_start, signature; + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + save_param_start = *pkt; + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); + s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; +#endif + + if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { + if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + + /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (alg_k) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + + /* if it was signed, check the signature */ + if (pkey != NULL) { + PACKET params; + int maxsig; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + unsigned char *tbs; + size_t tbslen; + int rv; + + /* + * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference + * equals the length of the parameters. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, + PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - + PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + unsigned int sigalg; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto err; + } + if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", + md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (maxsig < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Check signature length + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { + /* wrong packet length */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (md_ctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), + PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); + if (tbslen == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), + PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); + OPENSSL_free(tbs); + if (rv <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + md_ctx = NULL; + } else { + /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) + && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { + /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ + if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_DATA); + } + /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + /* still data left over */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Clear certificate validity flags */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) + s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + PACKET reqctx, extensions; + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { + /* + * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 + * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so + * we just ignore it + */ + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + + /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); + s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; + s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; + OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); + s->pha_context = NULL; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || + !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &rawexts, NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } else { + PACKET ctypes; + + /* get the certificate types */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + PACKET sigalgs; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility + * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. + */ + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until + * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because + * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message + * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that + * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in + * client_cert_cb. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + unsigned int ticklen; + unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; + unsigned int sess_len; + RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; + PACKET nonce; + + PACKET_null_init(&nonce); + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) + : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty + * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never + * be 0 here in that instance + */ + if (ticklen == 0) + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + + /* + * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise + * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, + * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every + * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive + * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session + * cache. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + SSL_SESSION *new_sess; + + /* + * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new + * one + */ + if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 + && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that + * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the + * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails + */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + + /* + * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard - + * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok. + */ + s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); + + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); + s->session->ext.tick = NULL; + s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; + + s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; + s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; + s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + PACKET extpkt; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, + NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set + * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in + * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work + * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The + * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is + * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. + * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions + * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is + * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. + */ + /* + * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int + * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t + */ + if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, + s->session->session_id, &sess_len, + EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; + s->session->not_resumable = 0; + + /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); + size_t hashlen; + static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; + + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, + nonce_label, + sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, + PACKET_data(&nonce), + PACKET_remaining(&nonce), + s->session->master_key, + hashlen, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; + + OPENSSL_free(exts); + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: + OPENSSL_free(exts); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +/* + * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to + * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure + */ +int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t resplen; + unsigned int type; + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) + || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + return 0; + } + if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); + if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; + + return 1; +} + + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; +} + +/* + * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the + * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. + * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 + * on failure. + */ +int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s) +{ + /* + * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from + * the server + */ + if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* + * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and + * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status + * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise + */ + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing + && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { + int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); + + if (ret == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, + SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + return 0; + } + if (ret < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ + if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { + if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, + SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + +static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + int ret = 0; + /* + * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a + * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating + * strnlen. + */ + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; + size_t identitylen = 0; + unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; + char *tmpidentity = NULL; + size_t psklen = 0; + + if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); + goto err; + } + + memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); + + psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, + identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, + psk, sizeof(psk)); + + if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } else if (psklen == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + identitylen = strlen(identity); + if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); + tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); + if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); + s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk; + s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; + tmppsk = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); + s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; + tmpidentity = NULL; + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); + OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); + OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); + + return ret; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned char *encdata = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t enclen; + unsigned char *pms = NULL; + size_t pmslen = 0; + + if (s->session->peer == NULL) { + /* + * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (pms == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ + if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); + if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); + goto err; + } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + pctx = NULL; + + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ + if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; + s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + + return 0; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + DH *dh_clnt = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; + + skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); + if (ckey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); + + if (dh_clnt == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* send off the data */ + DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), + &keybytes)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + + return 1; + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + return 0; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; + size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); + if (ckey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* Generate encoding of client key */ + encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); + + if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + return ret; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + /* GOST key exchange message creation */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; + X509 *peer_cert; + size_t msglen; + unsigned int md_len; + unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; + EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; + int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; + unsigned char *pms = NULL; + size_t pmslen = 0; + + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) + dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; + + /* + * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it + */ + peer_cert = s->session->peer; + if (!peer_cert) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); + return 0; + } + + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + /* + * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key + * parameters match those of server certificate, use + * certificate key for key exchange + */ + + /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ + pmslen = 32; + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (pms == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 + /* Generate session key + * TODO(size_t): Convert this function + */ + || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + }; + /* + * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context + * data + */ + ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ukm_hash == NULL + || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); + ukm_hash = NULL; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ + /* + * Encapsulate it into sequence + */ + msglen = 255; + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) + || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; + s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + + return 1; + err: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); + return 0; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + unsigned char *abytes = NULL; + + if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), + &abytes)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); + + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +#else + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + unsigned long alg_k; + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + /* + * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so + * no need to do so here. + */ + if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) + && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) + goto err; + + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) + goto err; + } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); + s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); + s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; +#endif + return 0; +} + +int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *pms = NULL; + size_t pmslen = 0; + + pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; + pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + /* Check for SRP */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { + if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + return 1; + } +#endif + + if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ + pms = NULL; + pmslen = 0; + goto err; + } + pms = NULL; + pmslen = 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; + char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; + size_t labellen; + + /* + * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP + * used. + */ + memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, + sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); + + /* Don't include the terminating zero. */ + labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1; + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG) + labellen += 1; + + if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, + sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); + } +#endif + + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check + * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client + * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. + */ +static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) +{ + /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ + if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) + return 0; + /* + * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also + * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. + */ + if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && + !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) +{ + X509 *x509 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int i; + + if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { + /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ + if (s->cert->cert_cb) { + i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); + if (i < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return WORK_MORE_A; + } + if (i == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); + return WORK_ERROR; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + } + if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; + } + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + + /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ + wst = WORK_MORE_B; + } + + /* We need to get a client cert */ + if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { + /* + * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + * return(-1); We then get retied later + */ + i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); + if (i < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return WORK_MORE_B; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { + if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) + i = 0; + } else if (i == 1) { + i = 0; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); + } + + X509_free(x509); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) + i = 0; + if (i == 0) { + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } else { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + } + } + + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + + /* Shouldn't ever get here */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; +} + +int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->pha_context == NULL) { + /* no context available, add 0-length context */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, + (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL + : s->cert->key)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { + /* + * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent + * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) +{ + const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; + size_t idx; + long alg_k, alg_a; + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + /* we don't have a certificate */ + if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) + return 1; + + /* This is the passed certificate */ + clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); + + /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ + if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); + return 0; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { + if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) + return 1; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); + return 0; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + return 0; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t len, padding_len; + unsigned char *padding = NULL; + + len = s->ext.npn_len; + padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + memset(padding, 0, padding_len); + + return 1; +} +#endif + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + + /* + * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for + * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will + * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a + * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable + * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + SSL_renegotiate(s); + else + SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + PACKET extensions; + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, + NULL, 1) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + + err: + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + +int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) +{ + int i = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { + i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, + SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), + px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (i != 0) + return i; + } +#endif + if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) + i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); + return i; +} + +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + int i; + size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; + int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; + + /* Set disabled masks for this session */ + if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } + + if (sk == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH +# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 +# error Max cipher length too short +# endif + /* + * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround + * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we + * use TLS v1.2 + */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; + else +#endif + /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ + maxlen = 0xfffe; + + if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) + maxlen -= 2; + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) + maxlen -= 2; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); + /* Skip disabled ciphers */ + if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) + continue; + + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ + if (!maxverok) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)) + maxverok = 1; + } else { + if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver + && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + maxverok = 1; + } + } + + totlen += len; + } + + if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + + if (!maxverok) + ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); + + return 0; + } + + if (totlen != 0) { + if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { + 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { + static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { + 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 + }; + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + + s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; + return 1; +} |