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authorAngelos Mouzakitis <a.mouzakitis@virtualopensystems.com>2023-10-10 14:33:42 +0000
committerAngelos Mouzakitis <a.mouzakitis@virtualopensystems.com>2023-10-10 14:33:42 +0000
commitaf1a266670d040d2f4083ff309d732d648afba2a (patch)
tree2fc46203448ddcc6f81546d379abfaeb323575e9 /roms/u-boot/lib/tpm-v1.c
parente02cda008591317b1625707ff8e115a4841aa889 (diff)
Add submodule dependency filesHEADmaster
Change-Id: Iaf8d18082d3991dec7c0ebbea540f092188eb4ec
Diffstat (limited to 'roms/u-boot/lib/tpm-v1.c')
-rw-r--r--roms/u-boot/lib/tpm-v1.c914
1 files changed, 914 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm-v1.c b/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm-v1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8dc144080
--- /dev/null
+++ b/roms/u-boot/lib/tpm-v1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,914 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ * Coypright (c) 2013 Guntermann & Drunck GmbH
+ */
+
+#define LOG_CATEGORY UCLASS_TPM
+
+#include <common.h>
+#include <dm.h>
+#include <log.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <u-boot/sha1.h>
+#include <tpm-common.h>
+#include <tpm-v1.h>
+#include "tpm-utils.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SHA1
+#error "TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS require SHA1 to be configured, too"
+#endif /* !CONFIG_SHA1 */
+
+struct session_data {
+ int valid;
+ u32 handle;
+ u8 nonce_even[DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ u8 nonce_odd[DIGEST_LENGTH];
+};
+
+static struct session_data oiap_session = {0, };
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */
+
+u32 tpm1_startup(struct udevice *dev, enum tpm_startup_type mode)
+{
+ const u8 command[12] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x99, 0x0, 0x0,
+ };
+ const size_t mode_offset = 10;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ mode_offset, mode))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_resume(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ return tpm1_startup(dev, TPM_ST_STATE);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_self_test_full(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ const u8 command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x50,
+ };
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_continue_self_test(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ const u8 command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x53,
+ };
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_clear_and_reenable(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ u32 ret;
+
+ log_info("TPM: Clear and re-enable\n");
+ ret = tpm1_force_clear(dev);
+ if (ret != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+ log_err("Can't initiate a force clear\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = tpm1_physical_enable(dev);
+ if (ret != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+ log_err("TPM: Can't set enabled state\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = tpm1_physical_set_deactivated(dev, 0);
+ if (ret != TPM_SUCCESS) {
+ log_err("TPM: Can't set deactivated state\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_nv_define_space(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, u32 perm, u32 size)
+{
+ const u8 command[101] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* parameter size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcc, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->... */
+ 0x0, 0x18, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->TPM_NV_INDEX */
+ /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */
+ 0x0, 0x3,
+ 0, 0, 0,
+ 0x1f,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ /* TPM_NV_DATA_PUBLIC->TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT */
+ 0x0, 0x3,
+ 0, 0, 0,
+ 0x1f,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ /* TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES->... */
+ 0x0, 0x17, /* ...->TPM_STRUCTURE_TAG */
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* ...->attributes */
+ /* End of TPM_NV_ATTRIBUTES */
+ 0, /* bReadSTClear */
+ 0, /* bWriteSTClear */
+ 0, /* bWriteDefine */
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, /* size */
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 12;
+ const size_t perm_offset = 70;
+ const size_t size_offset = 77;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index,
+ perm_offset, perm,
+ size_offset, size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_nv_set_locked(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ return tpm1_nv_define_space(dev, TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK, 0, 0);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_nv_read_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, u32 count)
+{
+ const u8 command[22] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcf,
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t length_offset = 18;
+ const size_t data_size_offset = 10;
+ const size_t data_offset = 14;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 data_size;
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index,
+ length_offset, count))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ data_size_offset, &data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (data_size > count)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ data_offset, data, data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_nv_write_value(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, const void *data,
+ u32 length)
+{
+ const u8 command[256] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xcd,
+ };
+ const size_t command_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t length_offset = 18;
+ const size_t data_offset = 22;
+ const size_t write_info_size = 12;
+ const u32 total_length =
+ TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + write_info_size + length;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sddds",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ command_size_offset, total_length,
+ index_offset, index,
+ length_offset, length,
+ data_offset, data, length))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_extend(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, const void *in_digest,
+ void *out_digest)
+{
+ const u8 command[34] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x22, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x14,
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t in_digest_offset = 14;
+ const size_t out_digest_offset = 10;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ u8 response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sds",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index,
+ in_digest_offset, in_digest,
+ PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ out_digest_offset, out_digest,
+ PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_pcr_read(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, void *data, size_t count)
+{
+ const u8 command[14] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x15,
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 10;
+ const size_t out_digest_offset = 10;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (count < PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ out_digest_offset, data, PCR_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_tsc_physical_presence(struct udevice *dev, u16 presence)
+{
+ const u8 command[12] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0,
+ };
+ const size_t presence_offset = 10;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sw",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ presence_offset, presence))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_finalise_physical_presence(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ const u8 command[12] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xc, 0x40, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x2, 0xa0,
+ };
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_read_pubek(struct udevice *dev, void *data, size_t count)
+{
+ const u8 command[30] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x1e, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x7c,
+ };
+ const size_t response_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t data_offset = 10;
+ const size_t header_and_checksum_size = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 20;
+ u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE + TPM_PUBEK_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 data_size;
+ u32 err;
+
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ response_size_offset, &data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (data_size < header_and_checksum_size)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ data_size -= header_and_checksum_size;
+ if (data_size > count)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ data_offset, data, data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_force_clear(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ const u8 command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x5d,
+ };
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_physical_enable(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ const u8 command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x6f,
+ };
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_physical_disable(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ const u8 command[10] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x70,
+ };
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_physical_set_deactivated(struct udevice *dev, u8 state)
+{
+ const u8 command[11] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xb, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x72,
+ };
+ const size_t state_offset = 10;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sb",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ state_offset, state))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_get_capability(struct udevice *dev, u32 cap_area, u32 sub_cap,
+ void *cap, size_t count)
+{
+ const u8 command[22] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* TPM_CAPABILITY_AREA */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* subcap size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, /* subcap value */
+ };
+ const size_t cap_area_offset = 10;
+ const size_t sub_cap_offset = 18;
+ const size_t cap_offset = 14;
+ const size_t cap_size_offset = 10;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 cap_size;
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ cap_area_offset, cap_area,
+ sub_cap_offset, sub_cap))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ cap_size_offset, &cap_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (cap_size > response_length || cap_size > count)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ cap_offset, cap, cap_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_get_permanent_flags(struct udevice *dev,
+ struct tpm_permanent_flags *pflags)
+{
+ const u8 command[22] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, /* subcap size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x1, 0x8, /* subcap value */
+ };
+ const size_t data_size_offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+ const size_t data_offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32);
+ u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+ u32 data_size;
+
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ data_size_offset, &data_size)) {
+ log_err("Cannot unpack data size\n");
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (data_size < sizeof(*pflags)) {
+ log_err("Data size too small\n");
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ data_offset, pflags, sizeof(*pflags))) {
+ log_err("Cannot unpack pflags\n");
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_get_permissions(struct udevice *dev, u32 index, u32 *perm)
+{
+ const u8 command[22] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x16, /* parameter size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x65, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x11,
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4,
+ };
+ const size_t index_offset = 18;
+ const size_t perm_offset = 60;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "d", 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ index_offset, index))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ perm_offset, perm))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES
+u32 tpm1_flush_specific(struct udevice *dev, u32 key_handle, u32 resource_type)
+{
+ const u8 command[18] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* key handle */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* resource type */
+ };
+ const size_t key_handle_offset = 10;
+ const size_t resource_type_offset = 14;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sdd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ key_handle_offset, key_handle,
+ resource_type_offset, resource_type))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_FLUSH_RESOURCES */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS
+
+/**
+ * Fill an authentication block in a request.
+ * This func can create the first as well as the second auth block (for
+ * double authorized commands).
+ *
+ * @param request pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data)
+ * @param request_len0 length of the request without auth data
+ * @param handles_len length of the handles area in request
+ * @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used
+ * @param request_auth pointer to the auth block of the request to be filled
+ * @param auth authentication data (HMAC key)
+ */
+static u32 create_request_auth(const void *request, size_t request_len0,
+ size_t handles_len,
+ struct session_data *auth_session,
+ void *request_auth, const void *auth)
+{
+ u8 hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1];
+ sha1_context hash_ctx;
+ const size_t command_code_offset = 6;
+ const size_t auth_nonce_odd_offset = 4;
+ const size_t auth_continue_offset = 24;
+ const size_t auth_auth_offset = 25;
+
+ if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, request + command_code_offset, 4);
+ if (request_len0 > TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len)
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx,
+ request + TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len,
+ request_len0 - TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - handles_len);
+ sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data);
+
+ sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd, DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data));
+ sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, auth_session->nonce_odd);
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(request_auth, TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH, "dsb",
+ 0, auth_session->handle,
+ auth_nonce_odd_offset, auth_session->nonce_odd,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_continue_offset, 1))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ss",
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_session->nonce_even,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 2 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ request_auth + auth_nonce_odd_offset,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH + 1))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data),
+ request_auth + auth_auth_offset);
+
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify an authentication block in a response.
+ * Since this func updates the nonce_even in the session data it has to be
+ * called when receiving a succesfull AUTH response.
+ * This func can verify the first as well as the second auth block (for
+ * double authorized commands).
+ *
+ * @param command_code command code of the request
+ * @param response pointer to the request (w/ uninitialised auth data)
+ * @param handles_len length of the handles area in response
+ * @param auth_session pointer to the (valid) auth session to be used
+ * @param response_auth pointer to the auth block of the response to be verified
+ * @param auth authentication data (HMAC key)
+ */
+static u32 verify_response_auth(u32 command_code, const void *response,
+ size_t response_len0, size_t handles_len,
+ struct session_data *auth_session,
+ const void *response_auth, const void *auth)
+{
+ u8 hmac_data[DIGEST_LENGTH * 3 + 1];
+ u8 computed_auth[DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ sha1_context hash_ctx;
+ const size_t return_code_offset = 6;
+ const size_t auth_continue_offset = 20;
+ const size_t auth_auth_offset = 21;
+ u8 auth_continue;
+
+ if (!auth_session || !auth_session->valid)
+ return TPM_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "d",
+ 0, command_code))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (response_len0 < TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ sha1_starts(&hash_ctx);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, response + return_code_offset, 4);
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx, hmac_data, 4);
+ if (response_len0 > TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len)
+ sha1_update(&hash_ctx,
+ response + TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + handles_len,
+ response_len0 - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - handles_len);
+ sha1_finish(&hash_ctx, hmac_data);
+
+ memcpy(auth_session->nonce_even, response_auth, DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ auth_continue = ((u8 *)response_auth)[auth_continue_offset];
+ if (pack_byte_string(hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data), "ssb",
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ response_auth,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 2 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_session->nonce_odd,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ 3 * DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ auth_continue))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ sha1_hmac(auth, DIGEST_LENGTH, hmac_data, sizeof(hmac_data),
+ computed_auth);
+
+ if (memcmp(computed_auth, response_auth + auth_auth_offset,
+ DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_AUTHFAIL;
+
+ return TPM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_terminate_auth_session(struct udevice *dev, u32 auth_handle)
+{
+ const u8 command[18] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xba, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* TPM_HANDLE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* TPM_RESOURCE_TYPE */
+ };
+ const size_t req_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ u8 request[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ req_handle_offset, auth_handle))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (oiap_session.valid && oiap_session.handle == auth_handle)
+ oiap_session.valid = 0;
+
+ return tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, request, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_end_oiap(struct udevice *dev)
+{
+ u32 err = TPM_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (oiap_session.valid)
+ err = tpm1_terminate_auth_session(dev, oiap_session.handle);
+ return err;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_oiap(struct udevice *dev, u32 *auth_handle)
+{
+ const u8 command[10] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ };
+ const size_t res_auth_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ const size_t res_nonce_even_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + 4;
+ u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (oiap_session.valid)
+ tpm1_terminate_auth_session(dev, oiap_session.handle);
+
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, command, response, &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "ds",
+ res_auth_handle_offset, &oiap_session.handle,
+ res_nonce_even_offset, &oiap_session.nonce_even,
+ (u32)DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ oiap_session.valid = 1;
+ if (auth_handle)
+ *auth_handle = oiap_session.handle;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_load_key2_oiap(struct udevice *dev, u32 parent_handle, const void *key,
+ size_t key_length, const void *parent_key_usage_auth,
+ u32 *key_handle)
+{
+ const u8 command[14] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parent handle */
+ };
+ const size_t req_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t req_parent_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ const size_t req_key_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH + 4;
+ const size_t res_handle_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ u8 request[sizeof(command) + TPM_KEY12_MAX_LENGTH +
+ TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH];
+ u8 response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (!oiap_session.valid) {
+ err = tpm1_oiap(dev, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdds",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ req_size_offset,
+ sizeof(command) + key_length
+ + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ req_parent_handle_offset, parent_handle,
+ req_key_offset, key, key_length
+ ))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command) + key_length, 4,
+ &oiap_session,
+ request + sizeof(command) + key_length,
+ parent_key_usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, request, response, &response_length);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL)
+ oiap_session.valid = 0;
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = verify_response_auth(0x00000041, response,
+ response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ 4, &oiap_session,
+ response + response_length -
+ TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ parent_key_usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (key_handle) {
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ res_handle_offset, key_handle))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 tpm1_get_pub_key_oiap(struct udevice *dev, u32 key_handle,
+ const void *usage_auth, void *pubkey,
+ size_t *pubkey_len)
+{
+ const u8 command[14] = {
+ 0x00, 0xc2, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* parameter size */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* key handle */
+ };
+ const size_t req_size_offset = 2;
+ const size_t req_key_handle_offset = TPM_REQUEST_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ const size_t res_pubkey_offset = TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ u8 request[sizeof(command) + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH];
+ u8 response[TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH + TPM_PUBKEY_MAX_LENGTH +
+ TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (!oiap_session.valid) {
+ err = tpm1_oiap(dev, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (pack_byte_string(request, sizeof(request), "sdd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ req_size_offset,
+ (u32)(sizeof(command)
+ + TPM_REQUEST_AUTH_LENGTH),
+ req_key_handle_offset, key_handle
+ ))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = create_request_auth(request, sizeof(command), 4, &oiap_session,
+ request + sizeof(command), usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, request, response, &response_length);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == TPM_AUTHFAIL)
+ oiap_session.valid = 0;
+ return err;
+ }
+ err = verify_response_auth(0x00000021, response,
+ response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ 0, &oiap_session,
+ response + response_length -
+ TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH,
+ usage_auth);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (pubkey) {
+ if ((response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH) > *pubkey_len)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ *pubkey_len = response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(pubkey, response + res_pubkey_offset,
+ response_length - TPM_RESPONSE_HEADER_LENGTH
+ - TPM_RESPONSE_AUTH_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TPM_LOAD_KEY_BY_SHA1
+u32 tpm1_find_key_sha1(struct udevice *dev, const u8 auth[20],
+ const u8 pubkey_digest[20], u32 *handle)
+{
+ u16 key_count;
+ u32 key_handles[10];
+ u8 buf[288];
+ u8 *ptr;
+ u32 err;
+ u8 digest[20];
+ size_t buf_len;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ /* fetch list of already loaded keys in the TPM */
+ err = tpm_get_capability(dev, TPM_CAP_HANDLE, TPM_RT_KEY, buf,
+ sizeof(buf));
+ if (err)
+ return -1;
+ key_count = get_unaligned_be16(buf);
+ ptr = buf + 2;
+ for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i, ptr += 4)
+ key_handles[i] = get_unaligned_be32(ptr);
+
+ /* now search a(/ the) key which we can access with the given auth */
+ for (i = 0; i < key_count; ++i) {
+ buf_len = sizeof(buf);
+ err = tpm_get_pub_key_oiap(key_handles[i], auth, buf, &buf_len);
+ if (err && err != TPM_AUTHFAIL)
+ return -1;
+ if (err)
+ continue;
+ sha1_csum(buf, buf_len, digest);
+ if (!memcmp(digest, pubkey_digest, 20)) {
+ *handle = key_handles[i];
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_LOAD_KEY_BY_SHA1 */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_TPM_AUTH_SESSIONS */
+
+u32 tpm1_get_random(struct udevice *dev, void *data, u32 count)
+{
+ const u8 command[14] = {
+ 0x0, 0xc1, /* TPM_TAG */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xe, /* parameter size */
+ 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x46, /* TPM_COMMAND_CODE */
+ };
+ const size_t length_offset = 10;
+ const size_t data_size_offset = 10;
+ const size_t data_offset = 14;
+ u8 buf[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE], response[COMMAND_BUFFER_SIZE];
+ size_t response_length = sizeof(response);
+ u32 data_size;
+ u8 *out = data;
+
+ while (count > 0) {
+ u32 this_bytes = min((size_t)count,
+ sizeof(response) - data_offset);
+ u32 err;
+
+ if (pack_byte_string(buf, sizeof(buf), "sd",
+ 0, command, sizeof(command),
+ length_offset, this_bytes))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ err = tpm_sendrecv_command(dev, buf, response,
+ &response_length);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "d",
+ data_size_offset, &data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (data_size > count)
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+ if (unpack_byte_string(response, response_length, "s",
+ data_offset, out, data_size))
+ return TPM_LIB_ERROR;
+
+ count -= data_size;
+ out += data_size;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}