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+# BoringSSL API Conventions
+
+This document describes conventions for BoringSSL APIs. The [style
+guide](/STYLE.md) also includes guidelines, but this document is targeted at
+both API consumers and developers.
+
+
+## Documentation
+
+All supported public APIs are documented in the public header files, found in
+`include/openssl`. The API documentation is also available
+[online](https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/headers.html).
+
+Some headers lack documention comments. These are functions and structures from
+OpenSSL's legacy ASN.1, X.509, and PEM implementation. If possible, avoid using
+them. These are left largely unmodified from upstream and are retained only for
+compatibility with existing OpenSSL consumers.
+
+
+## Forward declarations
+
+Do not write `typedef struct foo_st FOO` or try otherwise to define BoringSSL's
+types. Including `openssl/base.h` (or `openssl/ossl_typ.h` for consumers who
+wish to be OpenSSL-compatible) will forward-declare each type without importing
+the rest of the library or invasive macros.
+
+
+## Error-handling
+
+Most functions in BoringSSL may fail, either due to allocation failures or input
+errors. Functions which return an `int` typically return one on success and zero
+on failure. Functions which return a pointer typically return `NULL` on failure.
+However, due to legacy constraints, some functions are more complex. Consult the
+API documentation before using a function.
+
+On error, most functions also push errors on the error queue, an `errno`-like
+mechanism. See the documentation for
+[err.h](https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/err.h.html)
+for more details.
+
+As with `errno`, callers must test the function's return value, not the error
+queue to determine whether an operation failed. Some codepaths may not interact
+with the error queue, and the error queue may have state from a previous failed
+operation.
+
+When ignoring a failed operation, it is recommended to call `ERR_clear_error` to
+avoid the state interacting with future operations. Failing to do so should not
+affect the actual behavior of any functions, but may result in errors from both
+operations being mixed in error logging. We hope to
+[improve](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/boringssl/issues/detail?id=38) this
+situation in the future.
+
+Where possible, avoid conditioning on specific reason codes and limit usage to
+logging. The reason codes are very specific and may change over time.
+
+
+## Memory allocation
+
+BoringSSL allocates memory via `OPENSSL_malloc`, found in `mem.h`. Use
+`OPENSSL_free`, found in the same header file, to release it. BoringSSL
+functions will fail gracefully on allocation error, but it is recommended to use
+a `malloc` implementation that `abort`s on failure.
+
+
+## Object initialization and cleanup
+
+BoringSSL defines a number of structs for use in its APIs. It is a C library,
+so the caller is responsible for ensuring these structs are properly
+initialized and released. Consult the documentation for a module for the
+proper use of its types. Some general conventions are listed below.
+
+
+### Heap-allocated types
+
+Some types, such as `RSA`, are heap-allocated. All instances will be allocated
+and returned from BoringSSL's APIs. It is an error to instantiate a heap-
+allocated type on the stack or embedded within another object.
+
+Heap-allocated types may have functioned named like `RSA_new` which allocates a
+fresh blank `RSA`. Other functions may also return newly-allocated instances.
+For example, `RSA_parse_public_key` is documented to return a newly-allocated
+`RSA` object.
+
+Heap-allocated objects must be released by the corresponding free function,
+named like `RSA_free`. Like C's `free` and C++'s `delete`, all free functions
+internally check for `NULL`. Consumers are not required to check for `NULL`
+before calling.
+
+A heap-allocated type may be reference-counted. In this case, a function named
+like `RSA_up_ref` will be available to take an additional reference count. The
+free function must be called to decrement the reference count. It will only
+release resources when the final reference is released. For OpenSSL
+compatibility, these functions return `int`, but callers may assume they always
+successfully return one because reference counts use saturating arithmetic.
+
+C++ consumers are recommended to use `bssl::UniquePtr` to manage heap-allocated
+objects. `bssl::UniquePtr<T>`, like other types, is forward-declared in
+`openssl/base.h`. Code that needs access to the free functions, such as code
+which destroys a `bssl::UniquePtr`, must include the corresponding module's
+header. (This matches `std::unique_ptr`'s relationship with forward
+declarations.)
+
+
+### Stack-allocated types
+
+Other types in BoringSSL are stack-allocated, such as `EVP_MD_CTX`. These
+types may be allocated on the stack or embedded within another object.
+However, they must still be initialized before use.
+
+Every stack-allocated object in BoringSSL has a *zero state*, analogous to
+initializing a pointer to `NULL`. In this state, the object may not be
+completely initialized, but it is safe to call cleanup functions. Entering the
+zero state cannot fail. (It is usually `memset(0)`.)
+
+The function to enter the zero state is named like `EVP_MD_CTX_init` or
+`CBB_zero` and will always return `void`. To release resources associated with
+the type, call the cleanup function, named like `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup`. The
+cleanup function must be called on all codepaths, regardless of success or
+failure. For example:
+
+    uint8_t md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    unsigned md_len;
+    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);  /* Enter the zero state. */
+    int ok = EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) &&
+             EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, "hello ", 6) &&
+             EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, "world", 5) &&
+             EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md, &md_len);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);  /* Release |ctx|. */
+
+Note that `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup` is called whether or not the `EVP_Digest*`
+operations succeeded. More complex C functions may use the `goto err` pattern:
+
+      int ret = 0;
+      EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+      if (!some_other_operation()) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      uint8_t md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+      unsigned md_len;
+      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, "hello ", 6) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, "world", 5) ||
+          !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md, &md_len) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      ret = 1;
+
+    err:
+      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+      return ret;
+
+Note that, because `ctx` is set to the zero state before any failures,
+`EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup` is safe to call even if the first operation fails before
+`EVP_DigestInit_ex`. However, it would be illegal to move the `EVP_MD_CTX_init`
+below the `some_other_operation` call.
+
+As a rule of thumb, enter the zero state of stack-allocated structs in the
+same place they are declared.
+
+C++ consumers are recommended to use the wrappers named like
+`bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX`, defined in the corresponding module's header. These
+wrappers are automatically initialized to the zero state and are automatically
+cleaned up.
+
+
+### Data-only types
+
+A few types, such as `SHA_CTX`, are data-only types and do not require cleanup.
+These are usually for low-level cryptographic operations. These types may be
+used freely without special cleanup conventions.
+
+
+## Thread safety
+
+BoringSSL is internally aware of the platform threading library and calls into
+it as needed. Consult the API documentation for the threading guarantees of
+particular objects. In general, stateless reference-counted objects like `RSA`
+or `EVP_PKEY` which represent keys may typically be used from multiple threads
+simultaneously, provided no thread mutates the key.