1 files changed, 265 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b4b50a06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "bn_local.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+typedef enum bnrand_flag_e {
+    NORMAL, TESTING, PRIVATE
+} BNRAND_FLAG;
+
+static int bnrand(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    int b, ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
+
+    if (bits == 0) {
+        if (top != BN_RAND_TOP_ANY || bottom != BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)
+            goto toosmall;
+        BN_zero(rnd);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0))
+        goto toosmall;
+
+    bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+    bit = (bits - 1) % 8;
+    mask = 0xff << (bit + 1);
+
+    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(bytes);
+    if (buf == NULL) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */
+    b = flag == NORMAL ? RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) : RAND_priv_bytes(buf, bytes);
+    if (b <= 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (flag == TESTING) {
+        /*
+         * generate patterns that are more likely to trigger BN library bugs
+         */
+        int i;
+        unsigned char c;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
+            if (RAND_bytes(&c, 1) <= 0)
+                goto err;
+            if (c >= 128 && i > 0)
+                buf[i] = buf[i - 1];
+            else if (c < 42)
+                buf[i] = 0;
+            else if (c < 84)
+                buf[i] = 255;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (top >= 0) {
+        if (top) {
+            if (bit == 0) {
+                buf[0] = 1;
+                buf[1] |= 0x80;
+            } else {
+                buf[0] |= (3 << (bit - 1));
+            }
+        } else {
+            buf[0] |= (1 << bit);
+        }
+    }
+    buf[0] &= ~mask;
+    if (bottom)                 /* set bottom bit if requested */
+        buf[bytes - 1] |= 1;
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(buf, bytes, rnd))
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bytes);
+    bn_check_top(rnd);
+    return ret;
+
+toosmall:
+    BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    return bnrand(NORMAL, rnd, bits, top, bottom);
+}
+
+int BN_bntest_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    return bnrand(TESTING, rnd, bits, top, bottom);
+}
+
+int BN_priv_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    return bnrand(PRIVATE, rnd, bits, top, bottom);
+}
+
+/* random number r:  0 <= r < range */
+static int bnrand_range(BNRAND_FLAG flag, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)
+{
+    int n;
+    int count = 100;
+
+    if (range->neg || BN_is_zero(range)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE, BN_R_INVALID_RANGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    n = BN_num_bits(range);     /* n > 0 */
+
+    /* BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 1) always holds */
+
+    if (n == 1)
+        BN_zero(r);
+    else if (!BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 2) && !BN_is_bit_set(range, n - 3)) {
+        /*
+         * range = 100..._2, so 3*range (= 11..._2) is exactly one bit longer
+         * than range
+         */
+        do {
+            if (!bnrand(flag, r, n + 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+                return 0;
+
+            /*
+             * If r < 3*range, use r := r MOD range (which is either r, r -
+             * range, or r - 2*range). Otherwise, iterate once more. Since
+             * 3*range = 11..._2, each iteration succeeds with probability >=
+             * .75.
+             */
+            if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0) {
+                if (!BN_sub(r, r, range))
+                    return 0;
+                if (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0)
+                    if (!BN_sub(r, r, range))
+                        return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!--count) {
+                BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+        }
+        while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+    } else {
+        do {
+            /* range = 11..._2  or  range = 101..._2 */
+            if (!bnrand(flag, r, n, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+                return 0;
+
+            if (!--count) {
+                BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND_RANGE, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        while (BN_cmp(r, range) >= 0);
+    }
+
+    bn_check_top(r);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)
+{
+    return bnrand_range(NORMAL, r, range);
+}
+
+int BN_priv_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)
+{
+    return bnrand_range(PRIVATE, r, range);
+}
+
+int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
+{
+    return BN_rand(rnd, bits, top, bottom);
+}
+
+int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *range)
+{
+    return BN_rand_range(r, range);
+}
+
+/*
+ * BN_generate_dsa_nonce generates a random number 0 <= out < range. Unlike
+ * BN_rand_range, it also includes the contents of |priv| and |message| in
+ * the generation so that an RNG failure isn't fatal as long as |priv|
+ * remains secret. This is intended for use in DSA and ECDSA where an RNG
+ * weakness leads directly to private key exposure unless this function is
+ * used.
+ */
+int BN_generate_dsa_nonce(BIGNUM *out, const BIGNUM *range,
+                          const BIGNUM *priv, const unsigned char *message,
+                          size_t message_len, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    SHA512_CTX sha;
+    /*
+     * We use 512 bits of random data per iteration to ensure that we have at
+     * least |range| bits of randomness.
+     */
+    unsigned char random_bytes[64];
+    unsigned char digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned done, todo;
+    /* We generate |range|+8 bytes of random output. */
+    const unsigned num_k_bytes = BN_num_bytes(range) + 8;
+    unsigned char private_bytes[96];
+    unsigned char *k_bytes;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    k_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(num_k_bytes);
+    if (k_bytes == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* We copy |priv| into a local buffer to avoid exposing its length. */
+    if (BN_bn2binpad(priv, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes)) < 0) {
+        /*
+         * No reasonable DSA or ECDSA key should have a private key this
+         * large and we don't handle this case in order to avoid leaking the
+         * length of the private key.
+         */
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_GENERATE_DSA_NONCE, BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    for (done = 0; done < num_k_bytes;) {
+        if (RAND_priv_bytes(random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)) != 1)
+            goto err;
+        SHA512_Init(&sha);
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, &done, sizeof(done));
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes));
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, message, message_len);
+        SHA512_Update(&sha, random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes));
+        SHA512_Final(digest, &sha);
+
+        todo = num_k_bytes - done;
+        if (todo > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+            todo = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+        memcpy(k_bytes + done, digest, todo);
+        done += todo;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(k_bytes, num_k_bytes, out))
+        goto err;
+    if (BN_mod(out, out, range, ctx) != 1)
+        goto err;
+    ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+    OPENSSL_free(k_bytes);
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(private_bytes, sizeof(private_bytes));
+    return ret;
+}