diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 393 |
1 files changed, 393 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..29056a62a --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which + * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. - + * Geoff + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <time.h> +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include "rsa_local.h" + +static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, + BN_GENCB *cb); + +/* + * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static + * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here + * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application + * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't + * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD. + */ +int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) +{ + if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) + return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + + return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM, + e_value, cb); +} + +int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) +{ + /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */ + if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) { + return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, + e_value, cb); + } else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) { + /* + * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we + * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't + * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin + * subroutine... + */ + if (primes == 2) + return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + else + return 0; + } + + return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb); +} + +static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value, + BN_GENCB *cb) +{ + BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime; + int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0; + int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; + STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BN_ULONG bitst = 0; + unsigned long error = 0; + + if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { + ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } + + if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) { + ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); + goto err; + } + + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (r2 == NULL) + goto err; + + /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */ + quo = bits / primes; + rmd = bits % primes; + + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) + bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo; + + /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ + if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + + /* initialize multi-prime components */ + if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) { + rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; + prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2); + if (prime_infos == NULL) + goto err; + if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) { + /* could this happen? */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); + } + rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos; + + /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); + if (pinfo == NULL) + goto err; + (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); + } + } + + if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */ + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) { + adj = 0; + retries = 0; + + if (i == 0) { + prime = rsa->p; + } else if (i == 1) { + prime = rsa->q; + } else { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + prime = pinfo->r; + } + BN_set_flags(prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + for (;;) { + redo: + if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) + goto err; + /* + * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3... + * (those primes prior to this one) + */ + { + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + BIGNUM *prev_prime; + + if (j == 0) + prev_prime = rsa->p; + else if (j == 1) + prev_prime = rsa->q; + else + prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, + j - 2)->r; + + if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) { + goto redo; + } + } + } + if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + ERR_set_mark(); + BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { + /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ + break; + } + error = ERR_peek_last_error(); + if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN + && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { + /* GCD != 1 */ + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + } else { + goto err; + } + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + goto err; + } + + bitse += bitsr[i]; + + /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */ + if (i == 1) { + /* we get at least 2 primes */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } else if (i != 0) { + /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + /* i == 0, do nothing */ + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)) + goto err; + continue; + } + /* + * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected + * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than + * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime. + * + * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of + * the way factors are generated. + * + * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the + * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at + * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private + * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered + * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9. + */ + if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4)) + goto err; + bitst = BN_get_word(r2); + + if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) { + /* + * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to + * meet length requirement. + * + * Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length. + * + * This strategy has the following goals: + * + * 1. 1024-bit factors are efficient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key + * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key + */ + bitse -= bitsr[i]; + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + goto err; + if (primes > 4) { + if (bitst < 0x9) + adj++; + else + adj--; + } else if (retries == 4) { + /* + * re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used + * in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times + * is set to 4. + */ + i = -1; + bitse = 0; + continue; + } + retries++; + goto redo; + } + /* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */ + if (i > 1 && BN_copy(pinfo->pp, rsa->n) == NULL) + goto err; + if (BN_copy(rsa->n, r1) == NULL) + goto err; + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)) + goto err; + } + + if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) { + tmp = rsa->p; + rsa->p = rsa->q; + rsa->q = tmp; + } + + /* calculate d */ + + /* p - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + /* q - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + /* (p - 1)(q - 1) */ + if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) + goto err; + /* multi-prime */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + /* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */ + if (!BN_sub(pinfo->d, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, pinfo->d, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + { + BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new(); + + if (pr0 == NULL) + goto err; + + BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) { + BN_free(pr0); + goto err; /* d */ + } + /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */ + BN_free(pr0); + } + + { + BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); + + if (d == NULL) + goto err; + + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */ + if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx) + || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) { + BN_free(d); + goto err; + } + + /* calculate CRT exponents */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */ + if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) { + BN_free(d); + goto err; + } + } + + /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ + BN_free(d); + } + + { + BIGNUM *p = BN_new(); + + if (p == NULL) + goto err; + BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ + if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) { + BN_free(p); + goto err; + } + + /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) { + BN_free(p); + goto err; + } + } + + /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */ + BN_free(p); + } + + ok = 1; + err: + if (ok == -1) { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, ERR_LIB_BN); + ok = 0; + } + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + return ok; +} |