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-rw-r--r--roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c255
1 files changed, 255 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a3d0b7cef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int j;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+ /* pad out with 0xff data */
+ j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+ memset(p, 0xff, j);
+ p += j;
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ int num)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ p = from;
+
+ /*
+ * The format is
+ * 00 || 01 || PS || 00 || D
+ * PS - padding string, at least 8 bytes of FF
+ * D - data.
+ */
+
+ if (num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Accept inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. */
+ if (num == flen) {
+ if ((*p++) != 0x00) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ flen--;
+ }
+
+ if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 0x01)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* scan over padding data */
+ j = flen - 1; /* one for type. */
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (*p != 0xff) { /* should decrypt to 0xff */
+ if (*p == 0) {
+ p++;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ if (i == j) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 8) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
+ RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
+ j -= i;
+ if (j > tlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
+
+ return j;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)to;
+
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
+
+ /* pad out with non-zero random data */
+ j = tlen - 3 - flen;
+
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ if (*p == '\0')
+ do {
+ if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ } while (*p == '\0');
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ *(p++) = '\0';
+
+ memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
+ const unsigned char *from, int flen,
+ int num)
+{
+ int i;
+ /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
+ unsigned char *em = NULL;
+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
+
+ if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
+ * section 7.2.2.
+ */
+
+ if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
+ RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (em == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
+ * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
+ * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
+ * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
+ */
+ for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
+ flen -= 1 & mask;
+ from -= 1 & mask;
+ *--em = *from & mask;
+ }
+
+ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
+ good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
+
+ /* scan over padding data */
+ found_zero_byte = 0;
+ for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
+
+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
+ i, zero_index);
+ found_zero_byte |= equals0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
+ * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
+ * also fails.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
+ * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
+ */
+ msg_index = zero_index + 1;
+ mlen = num - msg_index;
+
+ /*
+ * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
+ */
+ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
+ * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
+ * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
+ * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
+ * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
+ * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
+ * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
+ * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
+ */
+ tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
+ num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
+ for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
+ mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
+ for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
+ em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
+ to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
+ err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
+
+ return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
+}