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-rw-r--r--roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c861
1 files changed, 861 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0eb21c8af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,861 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2006-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "rsa_local.h"
+
+/* RSA pkey context structure */
+
+typedef struct {
+ /* Key gen parameters */
+ int nbits;
+ BIGNUM *pub_exp;
+ int primes;
+ /* Keygen callback info */
+ int gentmp[2];
+ /* RSA padding mode */
+ int pad_mode;
+ /* message digest */
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ /* message digest for MGF1 */
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+ /* PSS salt length */
+ int saltlen;
+ /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
+ int min_saltlen;
+ /* Temp buffer */
+ unsigned char *tbuf;
+ /* OAEP label */
+ unsigned char *oaep_label;
+ size_t oaep_labellen;
+} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
+
+/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
+
+static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
+
+ if (rctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ rctx->nbits = 2048;
+ rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
+ if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+ rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+ else
+ rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+ rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
+ ctx->data = rctx;
+ ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
+ ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
+
+ if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
+ return 0;
+ sctx = src->data;
+ dctx = dst->data;
+ dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
+ if (sctx->pub_exp) {
+ dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
+ if (!dctx->pub_exp)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
+ dctx->md = sctx->md;
+ dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
+ if (sctx->oaep_label) {
+ OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
+ dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
+ if (!dctx->oaep_label)
+ return 0;
+ dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
+{
+ if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey))) == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_SETUP_TBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ if (rctx) {
+ BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx);
+ }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+ size_t tbslen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+
+ if (rctx->md) {
+ if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0,
+ tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = sltmp;
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
+ rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md));
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
+ sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+ ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+ tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = sltmp;
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
+ rctx->tbuf, tbs,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+ rctx->saltlen))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
+ sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ } else {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ *siglen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (rctx->md) {
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig,
+ rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ if (ret < 1)
+ return 0;
+ ret--;
+ if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+ RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER,
+ RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (rout)
+ memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ size_t sltmp;
+ ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md),
+ NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+ sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ ret = sltmp;
+ } else {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ *routlen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ size_t rslen;
+
+ if (rctx->md) {
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
+ sig, siglen, rsa);
+ if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ int ret;
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+ rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+ rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
+ rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
+ if (rslen == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
+ in, inlen,
+ rctx->oaep_label,
+ rctx->oaep_labellen,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
+ ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ *outlen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
+ return -1;
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf,
+ ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
+ ret, ret,
+ rctx->oaep_label,
+ rctx->oaep_labellen,
+ rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
+ rctx->pad_mode);
+ }
+ *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
+ ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
+{
+ int mdnid;
+
+ if (!md)
+ return 1;
+
+ mdnid = EVP_MD_type(md);
+
+ if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch(mdnid) {
+ /* List of all supported RSA digests */
+ case NID_sha1:
+ case NID_sha224:
+ case NID_sha256:
+ case NID_sha384:
+ case NID_sha512:
+ case NID_md5:
+ case NID_md5_sha1:
+ case NID_md2:
+ case NID_md4:
+ case NID_mdc2:
+ case NID_ripemd160:
+ case NID_sha3_224:
+ case NID_sha3_256:
+ case NID_sha3_384:
+ case NID_sha3_512:
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
+ if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
+ if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
+ return 0;
+ if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (!(ctx->operation &
+ (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
+ goto bad_pad;
+ if (!rctx->md)
+ rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+ } else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
+ goto bad_pad;
+ }
+ if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
+ goto bad_pad;
+ if (!rctx->md)
+ rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+ rctx->pad_mode = p1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ bad_pad:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+ RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+ return -2;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
+ *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
+ } else {
+ if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
+ return -2;
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
+ if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
+ && ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
+ && rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
+ || (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ rctx->saltlen = p1;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
+ if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ rctx->nbits = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
+ if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
+ rctx->pub_exp = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
+ if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ rctx->primes = p1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ else
+ rctx->md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
+ if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
+ if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
+ return 1;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rctx->md = p2;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
+ && rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
+ if (rctx->mgf1md)
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
+ else
+ *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
+ } else {
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
+ if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
+ return 1;
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rctx->mgf1md = p2;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
+ if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
+ rctx->oaep_label = p2;
+ rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
+ } else {
+ rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
+ rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
+ if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
+ return rctx->oaep_labellen;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
+#endif
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
+#endif
+ if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+ return 1;
+ /* fall through */
+ case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
+ RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return -2;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
+
+ }
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *type, const char *value)
+{
+ if (value == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
+ int pm;
+
+ if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ } else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) {
+ pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
+ } else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
+ pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ } else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ } else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
+ } else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
+ pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
+ } else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
+ pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+ } else {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
+ int saltlen;
+
+ if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+ else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ else
+ saltlen = atoi(value);
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
+ int nbits = atoi(value);
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
+ int ret;
+
+ BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
+ if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
+ return 0;
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ BN_free(pubexp);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
+ int nprimes = atoi(value);
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
+
+ if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
+ int saltlen = atoi(value);
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
+ unsigned char *lab;
+ long lablen;
+ int ret;
+
+ lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
+ if (!lab)
+ return 0;
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ OPENSSL_free(lab);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return -2;
+}
+
+/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
+static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+
+ if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+ return 1;
+ /* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
+ if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
+ return 1;
+ rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
+ rctx->saltlen == -2 ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
+ if (rsa->pss == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ BN_GENCB *pcb;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
+ rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
+ if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rsa = RSA_new();
+ if (rsa == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
+ pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
+ if (pcb == NULL) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
+ } else {
+ pcb = NULL;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
+ rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
+ BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
+ if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret > 0)
+ EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
+ else
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+ EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+ pkey_rsa_init,
+ pkey_rsa_copy,
+ pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_keygen,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_sign,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_verify,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_encrypt,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_decrypt,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+ pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
+};
+
+/*
+ * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
+ * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
+ */
+
+static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ RSA *rsa;
+ RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
+ int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
+ return 0;
+ rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ /* If no restrictions just return */
+ if (rsa->pss == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ /* Get and check parameters */
+ if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
+ max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
+ max_saltlen--;
+ if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_PSS_INIT, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
+ * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
+ */
+
+ rctx->md = md;
+ rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
+ rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
+ EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
+ pkey_rsa_init,
+ pkey_rsa_copy,
+ pkey_rsa_cleanup,
+
+ 0, 0,
+
+ 0,
+ pkey_rsa_keygen,
+
+ pkey_pss_init,
+ pkey_rsa_sign,
+
+ pkey_pss_init,
+ pkey_rsa_verify,
+
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ pkey_rsa_ctrl,
+ pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
+};