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diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/README b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/README new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dd26cb047 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/README @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +BUILDING +======== + +See doc/build_this.rst for details about how to build the +documentation. + + +CONVENTIONS +=========== + +We use the following conventions: + +* Use four-space indentation where indentation levels are arbitrary. + Do not use tabs anywhere. Avoid trailing whitespace at the end of + lines or files. + +* Fill lines to 70 columns (the emacs default) where lines can be + wrapped. + +* For section headers, use === underlines for page titles, --- for + sections, ~~~ for subsections, and ### for sub-subsections. Make + underlines exactly as long as titles. Do not include trailing + punctuation in section headers. Do not capitalize section headers + (except for the first word) except in source files intended to + generate man pages. + +* For bullet lists, use * for top-level bullets and - for sub-bullets. + Do not indent bullet or enumerated lists relative to the surrounding + text. + +* Use italics (*word*) for words representing variables or parameters. + Use boldface (**word**) for command options, subcommands of programs + like kadmin, and krb5.conf/kdc.conf parameter names. Use literal + text (``text``) for examples and multi-component pathnames. For + command names, single-component filenames, and krb5.conf/kdc.conf + section names, use references (like :ref:`kadmin(1)`) if introducing + them, or just use them unadorned otherwise. + +* In man pages for commands with subcommands, make a subsection for + each subcommand. Start the subcommand with an indented synopsis, + then follow with non-indented text describing the subcommand and its + options. See kadmin_local.rst for an example. + +* In man page synopses, put a newline in the RST source before each + option. Put all parts of the synopsis at the same indentation + level. Ideally we would want a hanging indent to the width of the + command or subcommand name, but RST doesn't support that. Use + boldface for literal text in the synopsis, italics for variable + text, and unadorned text for syntax symbols (such as square brackets + to indicate optional parameters). If immediately following one kind + of inline markup with another or putting inline markup next to + punctuation, you may need to use "\ " as a dummy separator. + +* For directives that take a content block (e.g., note, error, and + warning), leave a blank line before the content block (after any + arguments or options that may be present). diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/_static/kerb.css_t b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/_static/kerb.css_t new file mode 100644 index 000000000..40569b908 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/_static/kerb.css_t @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* + * kerb.css + * ~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * Sphinx stylesheet -- modification to agogo theme. + * + */ +div.body { + padding-right: .5em; + text-align: left; + overflow-x: hidden; +} + +/* Page layout */ + +div.header, div.content, div.footer { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + padding-left: 1em; + padding-right: 1em; + max-width: 60em; +} + +div.header-wrapper { + background: white; + border-bottom: 3px solid #2e3436; + border-top: 13px solid #5d1509; +} + +/* Header */ + +div.header { + padding-top: 10px; + padding-bottom: 0px; +} + +div.header h1 { + font-family: "Georgia", "Times New Roman", serif, black; + font-weight: normal; +} + +div.header h1 a { + color: {{ theme_bgcolor }}; + font-size: 120%; + padding-top: 10px; +} + +div.header div.right a { + color: #fcaf3e; + letter-spacing: .1em; + text-transform: lowercase; + float: right; +} + +div.header div.rel { + font-family: "Georgia", "Times New Roman", serif, black; + font-weight: normal; + margin-bottom: 1.6em; +} + +/* Content */ + +div.document { + width: 80%; + float: left; + margin: 0; + background-color: white; + padding-top: 20px; + padding-bottom: 20px; +} + +div.document div.section h1 { + margin-bottom: 20px; + padding: 1px; + line-height: 130%; +} + +div.document div.section dl { + margin-top: 15px; + margin-bottom: 5px; + padding: 1px; + text-align: left; +} + +/* Sidebar */ + +div.sidebar { + float: right; + font-size: .9em; + width: 20%; + margin: 0; + padding: 0; + background-color: #F9F9F9; +} + +div.sidebar ul { + list-style-type: none; + margin-left: .5em; +} + +div.sidebar li.toctree-l1 a { + margin-left: .5em; +} + +div.sidebar li.toctree-l2 a { + margin-left: .5em; +} + +div.sidebar li.toctree-l3 a { + margin-left: .5em; +} + +div.sidebar li.toctree-l2.current a { + border-right: 2px solid #fcaf3e !important; +} + +div.sidebar li.toctree-l3.current a { + font-weight: bold; +} + +div.sidebar li.toctree-l4 a { + display: none; +} + +div.sidebar input[type=text] { + width: auto; +} + +/* Other body styles */ + +dt:target, .highlighted { + background-color: #c1c1c1; +} + +/* Code displays */ + +pre { + overflow: auto; + overflow-y: hidden; +} + +td.linenos pre { + padding: 5px 0px; + border: 0; + background-color: transparent; + color: #aaa; +} + +/* ordered lists */ + +ol.arabic { + list-style: decimal; +} + +ol.loweralpha { + list-style: lower-alpha; +} + +ol.upperalpha { + list-style: upper-alpha; +} + +ol.lowerroman { + list-style-type: lower-roman; +} + +ol.upperroman { + list-style-type: upper-roman; +} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/_templates/layout.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/_templates/layout.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6dc41cd1b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/_templates/layout.html @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +{% extends "!layout.html" %} +{% set rellinks = [('search', 'Enter search criteria', 'S', 'Search')] + + rellinks + + [('index', 'Full Table of Contents', 'C', 'Contents')] %} +{% set css_files = css_files + ["_static/kerb.css"] %} + +{# Add a "feedback" button to the rellinks #} +{%- macro feedback_rellinks() %} + {%- for rellink in rellinks|reverse %} + <a href="{{ pathto(rellink[0]) }}" title="{{ rellink[1]|striptags|e }}" + {{ accesskey(rellink[2]) }}>{{ rellink[3] }}</a>{{ reldelim2 }} + {%- endfor %} + <a href="mailto:krb5-bugs@mit.edu?subject=Documentation__{{ title }}">feedback</a> +{%- endmacro %} + +{% block footer %} + <div class="footer-wrapper"> + <div class="footer" > + <div class="right" ><i>Release: {{ release }}</i><br /> + {%- if show_copyright %} + {%- if hasdoc('copyright') %} + {% trans path=pathto('copyright'), copyright=copyright|e %}© <a href="{{ path }}">Copyright</a> {{ copyright }}.{% endtrans %} + {%- else %} + {% trans copyright=copyright|e %}© Copyright {{ copyright }}.{% endtrans %} + {%- endif %} + {%- endif %} + </div> + <div class="left"> + {{ feedback_rellinks() }} + </div> + </div> + </div> +{% endblock %} + +{% block header %} + <div class="header-wrapper"> + <div class="header"> + {% if logo %} + <p class="logo"> + {# Link logo to kerberos.org #} + <a href="http://kerberos.org"> <img class="logo" + src="{{ pathto('_static/' + logo, 1) }}" alt="Logo" /></a> + </p> + {% endif %} + {% block headertitle %} + <h1><a href="{{ pathto(master_doc) }}">{{ shorttitle|e }}</a></h1> + {% endblock %} + <div class="rel"> + {{ feedback_rellinks() }} + </div> + </div> + </div> +{% endblock %} + +{%- block sidebartoc %} + <h2>{{ _('On this page') }}</h2> + {{ toc }} + <br/> + <h2>{{ _('Table of contents') }}</h2> + {{ toctree(collapse=true, maxdepth=3, titles_only=true, + includehidden=false) }} + <br/> + <h4><a href="{{ pathto('index') }}">Full Table of Contents</a></h4> +{%- endblock %} + +{%- block sidebarsearch %} + <h4>{{ _('Search') }}</h4> + <form class="search" action="{{ pathto('search') }}" method="get"> + <input type="text" name="q" size="18" /> + <input type="submit" value="{{ _('Go') }}" /> + <input type="hidden" name="check_keywords" value="yes" /> + <input type="hidden" name="area" value="default" /> + </form> +{%- endblock %} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/about.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/about.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dfdc31fb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/about.rst @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +Contributing to the MIT Kerberos Documentation +============================================== + +We are looking for documentation writers and editors who could contribute +towards improving the MIT KC documentation content. If you are an experienced +Kerberos developer and/or administrator, please consider sharing your knowledge +and experience with the Kerberos Community. You can suggest your own topic or +write about any of the topics listed +`here <https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Documentation_Tasks>`__. + +If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions on the existing documents, +please send your feedback via email to krb5-bugs@mit.edu. The HTML version of +this documentation has a "FEEDBACK" link to the krb5-bugs@mit.edu email +address with a pre-constructed subject line. + + +Background +---------- + +Starting with release 1.11, the Kerberos documentation set is +unified in a central form. Man pages, HTML documentation, and PDF +documents are compiled from reStructuredText sources, and the application +developer documentation incorporates Doxygen markup from the source +tree. This project was undertaken along the outline described +`here <https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Kerberos_Documentation>`__. + +Previous versions of Kerberos 5 attempted to maintain separate documentation +in the texinfo format, with separate groff manual pages. Having the API +documentation disjoint from the source code implementing that API +resulted in the documentation becoming stale, and over time the documentation +ceased to match reality. With a fresh start and a source format that is +easier to use and maintain, reStructuredText-based documents should provide +an improved experience for the user. Consolidating all the documentation +formats into a single source document makes the documentation set easier +to maintain. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e8dc76524 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +Administration programs +======================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + kadmin_local.rst + kadmind.rst + kdb5_util.rst + kdb5_ldap_util.rst + krb5kdc.rst + kprop.rst + kpropd.rst + kproplog.rst + ktutil.rst + k5srvutil.rst + sserver.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/k5srvutil.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/k5srvutil.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..79502cf9e --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/k5srvutil.rst @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +.. _k5srvutil(1): + +k5srvutil +========= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**k5srvutil** *operation* +[**-i**] +[**-f** *filename*] +[**-e** *keysalts*] + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +k5srvutil allows an administrator to list keys currently in +a keytab, to obtain new keys for a principal currently in a keytab, +or to delete non-current keys from a keytab. + +*operation* must be one of the following: + +**list** + Lists the keys in a keytab, showing version number and principal + name. + +**change** + Uses the kadmin protocol to update the keys in the Kerberos + database to new randomly-generated keys, and updates the keys in + the keytab to match. If a key's version number doesn't match the + version number stored in the Kerberos server's database, then the + operation will fail. If the **-i** flag is given, k5srvutil will + prompt for confirmation before changing each key. If the **-k** + option is given, the old and new keys will be displayed. + Ordinarily, keys will be generated with the default encryption + types and key salts. This can be overridden with the **-e** + option. Old keys are retained in the keytab so that existing + tickets continue to work, but **delold** should be used after + such tickets expire, to prevent attacks against the old keys. + +**delold** + Deletes keys that are not the most recent version from the keytab. + This operation should be used some time after a change operation + to remove old keys, after existing tickets issued for the service + have expired. If the **-i** flag is given, then k5srvutil will + prompt for confirmation for each principal. + +**delete** + Deletes particular keys in the keytab, interactively prompting for + each key. + +In all cases, the default keytab is used unless this is overridden by +the **-f** option. + +k5srvutil uses the :ref:`kadmin(1)` program to edit the keytab in +place. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kadmin(1)`, :ref:`ktutil(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..150da1fad --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1012 @@ +.. _kadmin(1): + +kadmin +====== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +.. _kadmin_synopsis: + +**kadmin** +[**-O**\|\ **-N**] +[**-r** *realm*] +[**-p** *principal*] +[**-q** *query*] +[[**-c** *cache_name*]\|[**-k** [**-t** *keytab*]]\|\ **-n**] +[**-w** *password*] +[**-s** *admin_server*\ [:*port*]] +[command args...] + +**kadmin.local** +[**-r** *realm*] +[**-p** *principal*] +[**-q** *query*] +[**-d** *dbname*] +[**-e** *enc*:*salt* ...] +[**-m**] +[**-x** *db_args*] +[command args...] + +.. _kadmin_synopsis_end: + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kadmin and kadmin.local are command-line interfaces to the Kerberos V5 +administration system. They provide nearly identical functionalities; +the difference is that kadmin.local directly accesses the KDC +database, while kadmin performs operations using :ref:`kadmind(8)`. +Except as explicitly noted otherwise, this man page will use "kadmin" +to refer to both versions. kadmin provides for the maintenance of +Kerberos principals, password policies, and service key tables +(keytabs). + +The remote kadmin client uses Kerberos to authenticate to kadmind +using the service principal ``kadmin/ADMINHOST`` (where *ADMINHOST* is +the fully-qualified hostname of the admin server) or ``kadmin/admin``. +If the credentials cache contains a ticket for one of these +principals, and the **-c** credentials_cache option is specified, that +ticket is used to authenticate to kadmind. Otherwise, the **-p** and +**-k** options are used to specify the client Kerberos principal name +used to authenticate. Once kadmin has determined the principal name, +it requests a service ticket from the KDC, and uses that service +ticket to authenticate to kadmind. + +Since kadmin.local directly accesses the KDC database, it usually must +be run directly on the master KDC with sufficient permissions to read +the KDC database. If the KDC database uses the LDAP database module, +kadmin.local can be run on any host which can access the LDAP server. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +.. _kadmin_options: + +**-r** *realm* + Use *realm* as the default database realm. + +**-p** *principal* + Use *principal* to authenticate. Otherwise, kadmin will append + ``/admin`` to the primary principal name of the default ccache, + the value of the **USER** environment variable, or the username as + obtained with getpwuid, in order of preference. + +**-k** + Use a keytab to decrypt the KDC response instead of prompting for + a password. In this case, the default principal will be + ``host/hostname``. If there is no keytab specified with the + **-t** option, then the default keytab will be used. + +**-t** *keytab* + Use *keytab* to decrypt the KDC response. This can only be used + with the **-k** option. + +**-n** + Requests anonymous processing. Two types of anonymous principals + are supported. For fully anonymous Kerberos, configure PKINIT on + the KDC and configure **pkinit_anchors** in the client's + :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. Then use the **-n** option with a principal + of the form ``@REALM`` (an empty principal name followed by the + at-sign and a realm name). If permitted by the KDC, an anonymous + ticket will be returned. A second form of anonymous tickets is + supported; these realm-exposed tickets hide the identity of the + client but not the client's realm. For this mode, use ``kinit + -n`` with a normal principal name. If supported by the KDC, the + principal (but not realm) will be replaced by the anonymous + principal. As of release 1.8, the MIT Kerberos KDC only supports + fully anonymous operation. + +**-c** *credentials_cache* + Use *credentials_cache* as the credentials cache. The + cache should contain a service ticket for the ``kadmin/ADMINHOST`` + (where *ADMINHOST* is the fully-qualified hostname of the admin + server) or ``kadmin/admin`` service; it can be acquired with the + :ref:`kinit(1)` program. If this option is not specified, kadmin + requests a new service ticket from the KDC, and stores it in its + own temporary ccache. + +**-w** *password* + Use *password* instead of prompting for one. Use this option with + care, as it may expose the password to other users on the system + via the process list. + +**-q** *query* + Perform the specified query and then exit. + +**-d** *dbname* + Specifies the name of the KDC database. This option does not + apply to the LDAP database module. + +**-s** *admin_server*\ [:*port*] + Specifies the admin server which kadmin should contact. + +**-m** + If using kadmin.local, prompt for the database master password + instead of reading it from a stash file. + +**-e** "*enc*:*salt* ..." + Sets the keysalt list to be used for any new keys created. See + :ref:`Keysalt_lists` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a list of possible + values. + +**-O** + Force use of old AUTH_GSSAPI authentication flavor. + +**-N** + Prevent fallback to AUTH_GSSAPI authentication flavor. + +**-x** *db_args* + Specifies the database specific arguments. See the next section + for supported options. + +.. _kadmin_options_end: + +Starting with release 1.14, if any command-line arguments remain after +the options, they will be treated as a single query to be executed. +This mode of operation is intended for scripts and behaves differently +from the interactive mode in several respects: + +* Query arguments are split by the shell, not by kadmin. +* Informational and warning messages are suppressed. Error messages + and query output (e.g. for **get_principal**) will still be + displayed. +* Confirmation prompts are disabled (as if **-force** was given). + Password prompts will still be issued as required. +* The exit status will be non-zero if the query fails. + +The **-q** option does not carry these behavior differences; the query +will be processed as if it was entered interactively. The **-q** +option cannot be used in combination with a query in the remaining +arguments. + +.. _dboptions: + +DATABASE OPTIONS +---------------- + +Database options can be used to override database-specific defaults. +Supported options for the DB2 module are: + + **-x dbname=**\ \*filename* + Specifies the base filename of the DB2 database. + + **-x lockiter** + Make iteration operations hold the lock for the duration of + the entire operation, rather than temporarily releasing the + lock while handling each principal. This is the default + behavior, but this option exists to allow command line + override of a [dbmodules] setting. First introduced in + release 1.13. + + **-x unlockiter** + Make iteration operations unlock the database for each + principal, instead of holding the lock for the duration of the + entire operation. First introduced in release 1.13. + +Supported options for the LDAP module are: + + **-x host=**\ *ldapuri* + Specifies the LDAP server to connect to by a LDAP URI. + + **-x binddn=**\ *bind_dn* + Specifies the DN used to bind to the LDAP server. + + **-x bindpwd=**\ *password* + Specifies the password or SASL secret used to bind to the LDAP + server. Using this option may expose the password to other + users on the system via the process list; to avoid this, + instead stash the password using the **stashsrvpw** command of + :ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)`. + + **-x sasl_mech=**\ *mechanism* + Specifies the SASL mechanism used to bind to the LDAP server. + The bind DN is ignored if a SASL mechanism is used. New in + release 1.13. + + **-x sasl_authcid=**\ *name* + Specifies the authentication name used when binding to the + LDAP server with a SASL mechanism, if the mechanism requires + one. New in release 1.13. + + **-x sasl_authzid=**\ *name* + Specifies the authorization name used when binding to the LDAP + server with a SASL mechanism. New in release 1.13. + + **-x sasl_realm=**\ *realm* + Specifies the realm used when binding to the LDAP server with + a SASL mechanism, if the mechanism uses one. New in release + 1.13. + + **-x debug=**\ *level* + sets the OpenLDAP client library debug level. *level* is an + integer to be interpreted by the library. Debugging messages + are printed to standard error. New in release 1.12. + + +COMMANDS +-------- + +When using the remote client, available commands may be restricted +according to the privileges specified in the :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)` file +on the admin server. + +.. _add_principal: + +add_principal +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **add_principal** [*options*] *newprinc* + +Creates the principal *newprinc*, prompting twice for a password. If +no password policy is specified with the **-policy** option, and the +policy named ``default`` is assigned to the principal if it exists. +However, creating a policy named ``default`` will not automatically +assign this policy to previously existing principals. This policy +assignment can be suppressed with the **-clearpolicy** option. + +This command requires the **add** privilege. + +Aliases: **addprinc**, **ank** + +Options: + +**-expire** *expdate* + (:ref:`getdate` string) The expiration date of the principal. + +**-pwexpire** *pwexpdate* + (:ref:`getdate` string) The password expiration date. + +**-maxlife** *maxlife* + (:ref:`duration` or :ref:`getdate` string) The maximum ticket life + for the principal. + +**-maxrenewlife** *maxrenewlife* + (:ref:`duration` or :ref:`getdate` string) The maximum renewable + life of tickets for the principal. + +**-kvno** *kvno* + The initial key version number. + +**-policy** *policy* + The password policy used by this principal. If not specified, the + policy ``default`` is used if it exists (unless **-clearpolicy** + is specified). + +**-clearpolicy** + Prevents any policy from being assigned when **-policy** is not + specified. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_postdated** + **-allow_postdated** prohibits this principal from obtaining + postdated tickets. **+allow_postdated** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_forwardable** + **-allow_forwardable** prohibits this principal from obtaining + forwardable tickets. **+allow_forwardable** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_renewable** + **-allow_renewable** prohibits this principal from obtaining + renewable tickets. **+allow_renewable** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_proxiable** + **-allow_proxiable** prohibits this principal from obtaining + proxiable tickets. **+allow_proxiable** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_dup_skey** + **-allow_dup_skey** disables user-to-user authentication for this + principal by prohibiting others from obtaining a service ticket + encrypted in this principal's TGT session key. + **+allow_dup_skey** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **requires_preauth** + **+requires_preauth** requires this principal to preauthenticate + before being allowed to kinit. **-requires_preauth** clears this + flag. When **+requires_preauth** is set on a service principal, + the KDC will only issue service tickets for that service principal + if the client's initial authentication was performed using + preauthentication. + +{-\|+}\ **requires_hwauth** + **+requires_hwauth** requires this principal to preauthenticate + using a hardware device before being allowed to kinit. + **-requires_hwauth** clears this flag. When **+requires_hwauth** is + set on a service principal, the KDC will only issue service tickets + for that service principal if the client's initial authentication was + performed using a hardware device to preauthenticate. + +{-\|+}\ **ok_as_delegate** + **+ok_as_delegate** sets the **okay as delegate** flag on tickets + issued with this principal as the service. Clients may use this + flag as a hint that credentials should be delegated when + authenticating to the service. **-ok_as_delegate** clears this + flag. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_svr** + **-allow_svr** prohibits the issuance of service tickets for this + principal. In release 1.17 and later, user-to-user service + tickets are still allowed unless the **-allow_dup_skey** flag is + also set. **+allow_svr** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_tgs_req** + **-allow_tgs_req** specifies that a Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) + request for a service ticket for this principal is not permitted. + **+allow_tgs_req** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **allow_tix** + **-allow_tix** forbids the issuance of any tickets for this + principal. **+allow_tix** clears this flag. + +{-\|+}\ **needchange** + **+needchange** forces a password change on the next initial + authentication to this principal. **-needchange** clears this + flag. + +{-\|+}\ **password_changing_service** + **+password_changing_service** marks this principal as a password + change service principal. + +{-\|+}\ **ok_to_auth_as_delegate** + **+ok_to_auth_as_delegate** allows this principal to acquire + forwardable tickets to itself from arbitrary users, for use with + constrained delegation. + +{-\|+}\ **no_auth_data_required** + **+no_auth_data_required** prevents PAC or AD-SIGNEDPATH data from + being added to service tickets for the principal. + +{-\|+}\ **lockdown_keys** + **+lockdown_keys** prevents keys for this principal from leaving + the KDC via kadmind. The chpass and extract operations are denied + for a principal with this attribute. The chrand operation is + allowed, but will not return the new keys. The delete and rename + operations are also denied if this attribute is set, in order to + prevent a malicious administrator from replacing principals like + krbtgt/* or kadmin/* with new principals without the attribute. + This attribute can be set via the network protocol, but can only + be removed using kadmin.local. + +**-randkey** + Sets the key of the principal to a random value. + +**-nokey** + Causes the principal to be created with no key. New in release + 1.12. + +**-pw** *password* + Sets the password of the principal to the specified string and + does not prompt for a password. Note: using this option in a + shell script may expose the password to other users on the system + via the process list. + +**-e** *enc*:*salt*,... + Uses the specified keysalt list for setting the keys of the + principal. See :ref:`Keysalt_lists` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a + list of possible values. + +**-x** *db_princ_args* + Indicates database-specific options. The options for the LDAP + database module are: + + **-x dn=**\ *dn* + Specifies the LDAP object that will contain the Kerberos + principal being created. + + **-x linkdn=**\ *dn* + Specifies the LDAP object to which the newly created Kerberos + principal object will point. + + **-x containerdn=**\ *container_dn* + Specifies the container object under which the Kerberos + principal is to be created. + + **-x tktpolicy=**\ *policy* + Associates a ticket policy to the Kerberos principal. + + .. note:: + + - The **containerdn** and **linkdn** options cannot be + specified with the **dn** option. + - If the *dn* or *containerdn* options are not specified while + adding the principal, the principals are created under the + principal container configured in the realm or the realm + container. + - *dn* and *containerdn* should be within the subtrees or + principal container configured in the realm. + +Example:: + + kadmin: addprinc jennifer + WARNING: no policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; + defaulting to no policy. + Enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: + Re-enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: + Principal "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. + kadmin: + +.. _add_principal_end: + +.. _modify_principal: + +modify_principal +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **modify_principal** [*options*] *principal* + +Modifies the specified principal, changing the fields as specified. +The options to **add_principal** also apply to this command, except +for the **-randkey**, **-pw**, and **-e** options. In addition, the +option **-clearpolicy** will clear the current policy of a principal. + +This command requires the *modify* privilege. + +Alias: **modprinc** + +Options (in addition to the **addprinc** options): + +**-unlock** + Unlocks a locked principal (one which has received too many failed + authentication attempts without enough time between them according + to its password policy) so that it can successfully authenticate. + +.. _modify_principal_end: + +.. _rename_principal: + +rename_principal +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **rename_principal** [**-force**] *old_principal* *new_principal* + +Renames the specified *old_principal* to *new_principal*. This +command prompts for confirmation, unless the **-force** option is +given. + +This command requires the **add** and **delete** privileges. + +Alias: **renprinc** + +.. _rename_principal_end: + +.. _delete_principal: + +delete_principal +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **delete_principal** [**-force**] *principal* + +Deletes the specified *principal* from the database. This command +prompts for deletion, unless the **-force** option is given. + +This command requires the **delete** privilege. + +Alias: **delprinc** + +.. _delete_principal_end: + +.. _change_password: + +change_password +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **change_password** [*options*] *principal* + +Changes the password of *principal*. Prompts for a new password if +neither **-randkey** or **-pw** is specified. + +This command requires the **changepw** privilege, or that the +principal running the program is the same as the principal being +changed. + +Alias: **cpw** + +The following options are available: + +**-randkey** + Sets the key of the principal to a random value. + +**-pw** *password* + Set the password to the specified string. Using this option in a + script may expose the password to other users on the system via + the process list. + +**-e** *enc*:*salt*,... + Uses the specified keysalt list for setting the keys of the + principal. See :ref:`Keysalt_lists` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a + list of possible values. + +**-keepold** + Keeps the existing keys in the database. This flag is usually not + necessary except perhaps for ``krbtgt`` principals. + +Example:: + + kadmin: cpw systest + Enter password for principal systest@BLEEP.COM: + Re-enter password for principal systest@BLEEP.COM: + Password for systest@BLEEP.COM changed. + kadmin: + +.. _change_password_end: + +.. _purgekeys: + +purgekeys +~~~~~~~~~ + + **purgekeys** [**-all**\|\ **-keepkvno** *oldest_kvno_to_keep*] *principal* + +Purges previously retained old keys (e.g., from **change_password +-keepold**) from *principal*. If **-keepkvno** is specified, then +only purges keys with kvnos lower than *oldest_kvno_to_keep*. If +**-all** is specified, then all keys are purged. The **-all** option +is new in release 1.12. + +This command requires the **modify** privilege. + +.. _purgekeys_end: + +.. _get_principal: + +get_principal +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **get_principal** [**-terse**] *principal* + +Gets the attributes of principal. With the **-terse** option, outputs +fields as quoted tab-separated strings. + +This command requires the **inquire** privilege, or that the principal +running the the program to be the same as the one being listed. + +Alias: **getprinc** + +Examples:: + + kadmin: getprinc tlyu/admin + Principal: tlyu/admin@BLEEP.COM + Expiration date: [never] + Last password change: Mon Aug 12 14:16:47 EDT 1996 + Password expiration date: [none] + Maximum ticket life: 0 days 10:00:00 + Maximum renewable life: 7 days 00:00:00 + Last modified: Mon Aug 12 14:16:47 EDT 1996 (bjaspan/admin@BLEEP.COM) + Last successful authentication: [never] + Last failed authentication: [never] + Failed password attempts: 0 + Number of keys: 2 + Key: vno 1, des-cbc-crc + Key: vno 1, des-cbc-crc:v4 + Attributes: + Policy: [none] + + kadmin: getprinc -terse systest + systest@BLEEP.COM 3 86400 604800 1 + 785926535 753241234 785900000 + tlyu/admin@BLEEP.COM 786100034 0 0 + kadmin: + +.. _get_principal_end: + +.. _list_principals: + +list_principals +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **list_principals** [*expression*] + +Retrieves all or some principal names. *expression* is a shell-style +glob expression that can contain the wild-card characters ``?``, +``*``, and ``[]``. All principal names matching the expression are +printed. If no expression is provided, all principal names are +printed. If the expression does not contain an ``@`` character, an +``@`` character followed by the local realm is appended to the +expression. + +This command requires the **list** privilege. + +Alias: **listprincs**, **get_principals**, **get_princs** + +Example:: + + kadmin: listprincs test* + test3@SECURE-TEST.OV.COM + test2@SECURE-TEST.OV.COM + test1@SECURE-TEST.OV.COM + testuser@SECURE-TEST.OV.COM + kadmin: + +.. _list_principals_end: + +.. _get_strings: + +get_strings +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **get_strings** *principal* + +Displays string attributes on *principal*. + +This command requires the **inquire** privilege. + +Alias: **getstr** + +.. _get_strings_end: + +.. _set_string: + +set_string +~~~~~~~~~~ + + **set_string** *principal* *name* *value* + +Sets a string attribute on *principal*. String attributes are used to +supply per-principal configuration to the KDC and some KDC plugin +modules. The following string attribute names are recognized by the +KDC: + +**require_auth** + Specifies an authentication indicator which is required to + authenticate to the principal as a service. Multiple indicators + can be specified, separated by spaces; in this case any of the + specified indicators will be accepted. (New in release 1.14.) + +**session_enctypes** + Specifies the encryption types supported for session keys when the + principal is authenticated to as a server. See + :ref:`Encryption_types` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a list of the + accepted values. + +**otp** + Enables One Time Passwords (OTP) preauthentication for a client + *principal*. The *value* is a JSON string representing an array + of objects, each having optional ``type`` and ``username`` fields. + +**pkinit_cert_match** + Specifies a matching expression that defines the certificate + attributes required for the client certificate used by the + principal during PKINIT authentication. The matching expression + is in the same format as those used by the **pkinit_cert_match** + option in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. (New in release 1.16.) + +This command requires the **modify** privilege. + +Alias: **setstr** + +Example:: + + set_string host/foo.mit.edu session_enctypes aes128-cts + set_string user@FOO.COM otp "[{""type"":""hotp"",""username"":""al""}]" + +.. _set_string_end: + +.. _del_string: + +del_string +~~~~~~~~~~ + + **del_string** *principal* *key* + +Deletes a string attribute from *principal*. + +This command requires the **delete** privilege. + +Alias: **delstr** + +.. _del_string_end: + +.. _add_policy: + +add_policy +~~~~~~~~~~ + + **add_policy** [*options*] *policy* + +Adds a password policy named *policy* to the database. + +This command requires the **add** privilege. + +Alias: **addpol** + +The following options are available: + +**-maxlife** *time* + (:ref:`duration` or :ref:`getdate` string) Sets the maximum + lifetime of a password. + +**-minlife** *time* + (:ref:`duration` or :ref:`getdate` string) Sets the minimum + lifetime of a password. + +**-minlength** *length* + Sets the minimum length of a password. + +**-minclasses** *number* + Sets the minimum number of character classes required in a + password. The five character classes are lower case, upper case, + numbers, punctuation, and whitespace/unprintable characters. + +**-history** *number* + Sets the number of past keys kept for a principal. This option is + not supported with the LDAP KDC database module. + +.. _policy_maxfailure: + +**-maxfailure** *maxnumber* + Sets the number of authentication failures before the principal is + locked. Authentication failures are only tracked for principals + which require preauthentication. The counter of failed attempts + resets to 0 after a successful attempt to authenticate. A + *maxnumber* value of 0 (the default) disables lockout. + +.. _policy_failurecountinterval: + +**-failurecountinterval** *failuretime* + (:ref:`duration` or :ref:`getdate` string) Sets the allowable time + between authentication failures. If an authentication failure + happens after *failuretime* has elapsed since the previous + failure, the number of authentication failures is reset to 1. A + *failuretime* value of 0 (the default) means forever. + +.. _policy_lockoutduration: + +**-lockoutduration** *lockouttime* + (:ref:`duration` or :ref:`getdate` string) Sets the duration for + which the principal is locked from authenticating if too many + authentication failures occur without the specified failure count + interval elapsing. A duration of 0 (the default) means the + principal remains locked out until it is administratively unlocked + with ``modprinc -unlock``. + +**-allowedkeysalts** + Specifies the key/salt tuples supported for long-term keys when + setting or changing a principal's password/keys. See + :ref:`Keysalt_lists` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a list of the + accepted values, but note that key/salt tuples must be separated + with commas (',') only. To clear the allowed key/salt policy use + a value of '-'. + +Example:: + + kadmin: add_policy -maxlife "2 days" -minlength 5 guests + kadmin: + +.. _add_policy_end: + +.. _modify_policy: + +modify_policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **modify_policy** [*options*] *policy* + +Modifies the password policy named *policy*. Options are as described +for **add_policy**. + +This command requires the **modify** privilege. + +Alias: **modpol** + +.. _modify_policy_end: + +.. _delete_policy: + +delete_policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **delete_policy** [**-force**] *policy* + +Deletes the password policy named *policy*. Prompts for confirmation +before deletion. The command will fail if the policy is in use by any +principals. + +This command requires the **delete** privilege. + +Alias: **delpol** + +Example:: + + kadmin: del_policy guests + Are you sure you want to delete the policy "guests"? + (yes/no): yes + kadmin: + +.. _delete_policy_end: + +.. _get_policy: + +get_policy +~~~~~~~~~~ + + **get_policy** [ **-terse** ] *policy* + +Displays the values of the password policy named *policy*. With the +**-terse** flag, outputs the fields as quoted strings separated by +tabs. + +This command requires the **inquire** privilege. + +Alias: getpol + +Examples:: + + kadmin: get_policy admin + Policy: admin + Maximum password life: 180 days 00:00:00 + Minimum password life: 00:00:00 + Minimum password length: 6 + Minimum number of password character classes: 2 + Number of old keys kept: 5 + Reference count: 17 + + kadmin: get_policy -terse admin + admin 15552000 0 6 2 5 17 + kadmin: + +The "Reference count" is the number of principals using that policy. +With the LDAP KDC database module, the reference count field is not +meaningful. + +.. _get_policy_end: + +.. _list_policies: + +list_policies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **list_policies** [*expression*] + +Retrieves all or some policy names. *expression* is a shell-style +glob expression that can contain the wild-card characters ``?``, +``*``, and ``[]``. All policy names matching the expression are +printed. If no expression is provided, all existing policy names are +printed. + +This command requires the **list** privilege. + +Aliases: **listpols**, **get_policies**, **getpols**. + +Examples:: + + kadmin: listpols + test-pol + dict-only + once-a-min + test-pol-nopw + + kadmin: listpols t* + test-pol + test-pol-nopw + kadmin: + +.. _list_policies_end: + +.. _ktadd: + +ktadd +~~~~~ + + | **ktadd** [options] *principal* + | **ktadd** [options] **-glob** *princ-exp* + +Adds a *principal*, or all principals matching *princ-exp*, to a +keytab file. Each principal's keys are randomized in the process. +The rules for *princ-exp* are described in the **list_principals** +command. + +This command requires the **inquire** and **changepw** privileges. +With the **-glob** form, it also requires the **list** privilege. + +The options are: + +**-k[eytab]** *keytab* + Use *keytab* as the keytab file. Otherwise, the default keytab is + used. + +**-e** *enc*:*salt*,... + Uses the specified keysalt list for setting the new keys of the + principal. See :ref:`Keysalt_lists` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a + list of possible values. + +**-q** + Display less verbose information. + +**-norandkey** + Do not randomize the keys. The keys and their version numbers stay + unchanged. This option cannot be specified in combination with the + **-e** option. + +An entry for each of the principal's unique encryption types is added, +ignoring multiple keys with the same encryption type but different +salt types. + +Example:: + + kadmin: ktadd -k /tmp/foo-new-keytab host/foo.mit.edu + Entry for principal host/foo.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, + encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab + FILE:/tmp/foo-new-keytab + kadmin: + +.. _ktadd_end: + +.. _ktremove: + +ktremove +~~~~~~~~ + + **ktremove** [options] *principal* [*kvno* | *all* | *old*] + +Removes entries for the specified *principal* from a keytab. Requires +no permissions, since this does not require database access. + +If the string "all" is specified, all entries for that principal are +removed; if the string "old" is specified, all entries for that +principal except those with the highest kvno are removed. Otherwise, +the value specified is parsed as an integer, and all entries whose +kvno match that integer are removed. + +The options are: + +**-k[eytab]** *keytab* + Use *keytab* as the keytab file. Otherwise, the default keytab is + used. + +**-q** + Display less verbose information. + +Example:: + + kadmin: ktremove kadmin/admin all + Entry for principal kadmin/admin with kvno 3 removed from keytab + FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab + kadmin: + +.. _ktremove_end: + +lock +~~~~ + +Lock database exclusively. Use with extreme caution! This command +only works with the DB2 KDC database module. + +unlock +~~~~~~ + +Release the exclusive database lock. + +list_requests +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Lists available for kadmin requests. + +Aliases: **lr**, **?** + +quit +~~~~ + +Exit program. If the database was locked, the lock is released. + +Aliases: **exit**, **q** + + +HISTORY +------- + +The kadmin program was originally written by Tom Yu at MIT, as an +interface to the OpenVision Kerberos administration program. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kpasswd(1)`, :ref:`kadmind(8)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmind.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmind.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..03a0d6d95 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kadmind.rst @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +.. _kadmind(8): + +kadmind +======= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kadmind** +[**-x** *db_args*] +[**-r** *realm*] +[**-m**] +[**-nofork**] +[**-proponly**] +[**-port** *port-number*] +[**-P** *pid_file*] +[**-p** *kdb5_util_path*] +[**-K** *kprop_path*] +[**-k** *kprop_port*] +[**-F** *dump_file*] + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kadmind starts the Kerberos administration server. kadmind typically +runs on the master Kerberos server, which stores the KDC database. If +the KDC database uses the LDAP module, the administration server and +the KDC server need not run on the same machine. kadmind accepts +remote requests from programs such as :ref:`kadmin(1)` and +:ref:`kpasswd(1)` to administer the information in these database. + +kadmind requires a number of configuration files to be set up in order +for it to work: + +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)` + The KDC configuration file contains configuration information for + the KDC and admin servers. kadmind uses settings in this file to + locate the Kerberos database, and is also affected by the + **acl_file**, **dict_file**, **kadmind_port**, and iprop-related + settings. + +:ref:`kadm5.acl(5)` + kadmind's ACL (access control list) tells it which principals are + allowed to perform administration actions. The pathname to the + ACL file can be specified with the **acl_file** :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` + variable; by default, it is |kdcdir|\ ``/kadm5.acl``. + +After the server begins running, it puts itself in the background and +disassociates itself from its controlling terminal. + +kadmind can be configured for incremental database propagation. +Incremental propagation allows replica KDC servers to receive +principal and policy updates incrementally instead of receiving full +dumps of the database. This facility can be enabled in the +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)` file with the **iprop_enable** option. Incremental +propagation requires the principal ``kiprop/MASTER\@REALM`` (where +MASTER is the master KDC's canonical host name, and REALM the realm +name). In release 1.13, this principal is automatically created and +registered into the datebase. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-r** *realm* + specifies the realm that kadmind will serve; if it is not + specified, the default realm of the host is used. + +**-m** + causes the master database password to be fetched from the + keyboard (before the server puts itself in the background, if not + invoked with the **-nofork** option) rather than from a file on + disk. + +**-nofork** + causes the server to remain in the foreground and remain + associated to the terminal. + +**-proponly** + causes the server to only listen and respond to Kerberos replica + incremental propagation polling requests. This option can be used + to set up a hierarchical propagation topology where a replica KDC + provides incremental updates to other Kerberos replicas. + +**-port** *port-number* + specifies the port on which the administration server listens for + connections. The default port is determined by the + **kadmind_port** configuration variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +**-P** *pid_file* + specifies the file to which the PID of kadmind process should be + written after it starts up. This file can be used to identify + whether kadmind is still running and to allow init scripts to stop + the correct process. + +**-p** *kdb5_util_path* + specifies the path to the kdb5_util command to use when dumping the + KDB in response to full resync requests when iprop is enabled. + +**-K** *kprop_path* + specifies the path to the kprop command to use to send full dumps + to replicas in response to full resync requests. + +**-k** *kprop_port* + specifies the port by which the kprop process that is spawned by + kadmind connects to the replica kpropd, in order to transfer the + dump file during an iprop full resync request. + +**-F** *dump_file* + specifies the file path to be used for dumping the KDB in response + to full resync requests when iprop is enabled. + +**-x** *db_args* + specifies database-specific arguments. See :ref:`Database Options + <dboptions>` in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for supported arguments. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kpasswd(1)`, :ref:`kadmin(1)`, :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`, +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)`, :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..73a920f43 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst @@ -0,0 +1,449 @@ +.. _kdb5_ldap_util(8): + +kdb5_ldap_util +=============== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_synopsis: + +**kdb5_ldap_util** +[**-D** *user_dn* [**-w** *passwd*]] +[**-H** *ldapuri*] +**command** +[*command_options*] + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_synopsis_end: + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kdb5_ldap_util allows an administrator to manage realms, Kerberos +services and ticket policies. + + +COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS +-------------------- + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_options: + +**-r** *realm* + Specifies the realm to be operated on. + +**-D** *user_dn* + Specifies the Distinguished Name (DN) of the user who has + sufficient rights to perform the operation on the LDAP server. + +**-w** *passwd* + Specifies the password of *user_dn*. This option is not + recommended. + +**-H** *ldapuri* + Specifies the URI of the LDAP server. + +By default, kdb5_ldap_util operates on the default realm (as specified +in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`) and connects and authenticates to the LDAP +server in the same manner as :ref:kadmind(8)` would given the +parameters in :ref:`dbdefaults` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_options_end: + + +COMMANDS +-------- + +create +~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_create: + + **create** + [**-subtrees** *subtree_dn_list*] + [**-sscope** *search_scope*] + [**-containerref** *container_reference_dn*] + [**-k** *mkeytype*] + [**-kv** *mkeyVNO*] + [**-M** *mkeyname*] + [**-m|-P** *password*\|\ **-sf** *stashfilename*] + [**-s**] + [**-maxtktlife** *max_ticket_life*] + [**-maxrenewlife** *max_renewable_ticket_life*] + [*ticket_flags*] + +Creates realm in directory. Options: + +**-subtrees** *subtree_dn_list* + Specifies the list of subtrees containing the principals of a + realm. The list contains the DNs of the subtree objects separated + by colon (``:``). + +**-sscope** *search_scope* + Specifies the scope for searching the principals under the + subtree. The possible values are 1 or one (one level), 2 or sub + (subtrees). + +**-containerref** *container_reference_dn* + Specifies the DN of the container object in which the principals + of a realm will be created. If the container reference is not + configured for a realm, the principals will be created in the + realm container. + +**-k** *mkeytype* + Specifies the key type of the master key in the database. The + default is given by the **master_key_type** variable in + :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +**-kv** *mkeyVNO* + Specifies the version number of the master key in the database; + the default is 1. Note that 0 is not allowed. + +**-M** *mkeyname* + Specifies the principal name for the master key in the database. + If not specified, the name is determined by the + **master_key_name** variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +**-m** + Specifies that the master database password should be read from + the TTY rather than fetched from a file on the disk. + +**-P** *password* + Specifies the master database password. This option is not + recommended. + +**-sf** *stashfilename* + Specifies the stash file of the master database password. + +**-s** + Specifies that the stash file is to be created. + +**-maxtktlife** *max_ticket_life* + (:ref:`getdate` string) Specifies maximum ticket life for + principals in this realm. + +**-maxrenewlife** *max_renewable_ticket_life* + (:ref:`getdate` string) Specifies maximum renewable life of + tickets for principals in this realm. + +*ticket_flags* + Specifies global ticket flags for the realm. Allowable flags are + documented in the description of the **add_principal** command in + :ref:`kadmin(1)`. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu + -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU create -subtrees o=org -sscope SUB + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + Initializing database for realm 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU' + You will be prompted for the database Master Password. + It is important that you NOT FORGET this password. + Enter KDC database master key: + Re-enter KDC database master key to verify: + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_create_end: + +modify +~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_modify: + + **modify** + [**-subtrees** *subtree_dn_list*] + [**-sscope** *search_scope*] + [**-containerref** *container_reference_dn*] + [**-maxtktlife** *max_ticket_life*] + [**-maxrenewlife** *max_renewable_ticket_life*] + [*ticket_flags*] + +Modifies the attributes of a realm. Options: + +**-subtrees** *subtree_dn_list* + Specifies the list of subtrees containing the principals of a + realm. The list contains the DNs of the subtree objects separated + by colon (``:``). This list replaces the existing list. + +**-sscope** *search_scope* + Specifies the scope for searching the principals under the + subtrees. The possible values are 1 or one (one level), 2 or sub + (subtrees). + +**-containerref** *container_reference_dn* Specifies the DN of the + container object in which the principals of a realm will be + created. + +**-maxtktlife** *max_ticket_life* + (:ref:`getdate` string) Specifies maximum ticket life for + principals in this realm. + +**-maxrenewlife** *max_renewable_ticket_life* + (:ref:`getdate` string) Specifies maximum renewable life of + tickets for principals in this realm. + +*ticket_flags* + Specifies global ticket flags for the realm. Allowable flags are + documented in the description of the **add_principal** command in + :ref:`kadmin(1)`. + +Example:: + + shell% kdb5_ldap_util -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU -D cn=admin,o=org -H + ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu modify +requires_preauth + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + shell% + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_modify_end: + +view +~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_view: + + **view** + +Displays the attributes of a realm. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu + -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU view + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + Realm Name: ATHENA.MIT.EDU + Subtree: ou=users,o=org + Subtree: ou=servers,o=org + SearchScope: ONE + Maximum ticket life: 0 days 01:00:00 + Maximum renewable life: 0 days 10:00:00 + Ticket flags: DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE REQUIRES_PWCHANGE + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_view_end: + +destroy +~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy: + + **destroy** [**-f**] + +Destroys an existing realm. Options: + +**-f** + If specified, will not prompt the user for confirmation. + +Example:: + + shell% kdb5_ldap_util -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU -D cn=admin,o=org -H + ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu destroy + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + Deleting KDC database of 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU', are you sure? + (type 'yes' to confirm)? yes + OK, deleting database of 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU'... + shell% + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy_end: + +list +~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_list: + + **list** + +Lists the names of realms under the container. + +Example:: + + shell% kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H + ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu list + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + ATHENA.MIT.EDU + OPENLDAP.MIT.EDU + MEDIA-LAB.MIT.EDU + shell% + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_list_end: + +stashsrvpw +~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_stashsrvpw: + + **stashsrvpw** + [**-f** *filename*] + *name* + +Allows an administrator to store the password for service object in a +file so that KDC and Administration server can use it to authenticate +to the LDAP server. Options: + +**-f** *filename* + Specifies the complete path of the service password file. By + default, ``/usr/local/var/service_passwd`` is used. + +*name* + Specifies the name of the object whose password is to be stored. + If :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` or :ref:`kadmind(8)` are configured for + simple binding, this should be the distinguished name it will + use as given by the **ldap_kdc_dn** or **ldap_kadmind_dn** + variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. If the KDC or kadmind is + configured for SASL binding, this should be the authentication + name it will use as given by the **ldap_kdc_sasl_authcid** or + **ldap_kadmind_sasl_authcid** variable. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util stashsrvpw -f /home/andrew/conf_keyfile + cn=service-kdc,o=org + Password for "cn=service-kdc,o=org": + Re-enter password for "cn=service-kdc,o=org": + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_stashsrvpw_end: + +create_policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_create_policy: + + **create_policy** + [**-maxtktlife** *max_ticket_life*] + [**-maxrenewlife** *max_renewable_ticket_life*] + [*ticket_flags*] + *policy_name* + +Creates a ticket policy in the directory. Options: + +**-maxtktlife** *max_ticket_life* + (:ref:`getdate` string) Specifies maximum ticket life for + principals. + +**-maxrenewlife** *max_renewable_ticket_life* + (:ref:`getdate` string) Specifies maximum renewable life of + tickets for principals. + +*ticket_flags* + Specifies the ticket flags. If this option is not specified, by + default, no restriction will be set by the policy. Allowable + flags are documented in the description of the **add_principal** + command in :ref:`kadmin(1)`. + +*policy_name* + Specifies the name of the ticket policy. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu + -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU create_policy -maxtktlife "1 day" + -maxrenewlife "1 week" -allow_postdated +needchange + -allow_forwardable tktpolicy + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_create_policy_end: + +modify_policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_modify_policy: + + **modify_policy** + [**-maxtktlife** *max_ticket_life*] + [**-maxrenewlife** *max_renewable_ticket_life*] + [*ticket_flags*] + *policy_name* + +Modifies the attributes of a ticket policy. Options are same as for +**create_policy**. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H + ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU modify_policy + -maxtktlife "60 minutes" -maxrenewlife "10 hours" + +allow_postdated -requires_preauth tktpolicy + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_modify_policy_end: + +view_policy +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_view_policy: + + **view_policy** + *policy_name* + +Displays the attributes of the named ticket policy. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu + -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU view_policy tktpolicy + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + Ticket policy: tktpolicy + Maximum ticket life: 0 days 01:00:00 + Maximum renewable life: 0 days 10:00:00 + Ticket flags: DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE REQUIRES_PWCHANGE + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_view_policy_end: + +destroy_policy +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy_policy: + + **destroy_policy** + [**-force**] + *policy_name* + +Destroys an existing ticket policy. Options: + +**-force** + Forces the deletion of the policy object. If not specified, the + user will be prompted for confirmation before deleting the policy. + +*policy_name* + Specifies the name of the ticket policy. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu + -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU destroy_policy tktpolicy + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + This will delete the policy object 'tktpolicy', are you sure? + (type 'yes' to confirm)? yes + ** policy object 'tktpolicy' deleted. + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy_policy_end: + +list_policy +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_list_policy: + + **list_policy** + +Lists ticket policies. + +Example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util -D cn=admin,o=org -H ldaps://ldap-server1.mit.edu + -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU list_policy + Password for "cn=admin,o=org": + tktpolicy + tmppolicy + userpolicy + +.. _kdb5_ldap_util_list_policy_end: + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kadmin(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fee68261a --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@ +.. _kdb5_util(8): + +kdb5_util +========= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +.. _kdb5_util_synopsis: + +**kdb5_util** +[**-r** *realm*] +[**-d** *dbname*] +[**-k** *mkeytype*] +[**-kv** *mkeyVNO*] +[**-M** *mkeyname*] +[**-m**] +[**-sf** *stashfilename*] +[**-P** *password*] +[**-x** *db_args*] +*command* [*command_options*] + +.. _kdb5_util_synopsis_end: + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kdb5_util allows an administrator to perform maintenance procedures on +the KDC database. Databases can be created, destroyed, and dumped to +or loaded from ASCII files. kdb5_util can create a Kerberos master +key stash file or perform live rollover of the master key. + +When kdb5_util is run, it attempts to acquire the master key and open +the database. However, execution continues regardless of whether or +not kdb5_util successfully opens the database, because the database +may not exist yet or the stash file may be corrupt. + +Note that some KDC database modules may not support all kdb5_util +commands. + + +COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS +-------------------- + +.. _kdb5_util_options: + +**-r** *realm* + specifies the Kerberos realm of the database. + +**-d** *dbname* + specifies the name under which the principal database is stored; + by default the database is that listed in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. The + password policy database and lock files are also derived from this + value. + +**-k** *mkeytype* + specifies the key type of the master key in the database. The + default is given by the **master_key_type** variable in + :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +**-kv** *mkeyVNO* + Specifies the version number of the master key in the database; + the default is 1. Note that 0 is not allowed. + +**-M** *mkeyname* + principal name for the master key in the database. If not + specified, the name is determined by the **master_key_name** + variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +**-m** + specifies that the master database password should be read from + the keyboard rather than fetched from a file on disk. + +**-sf** *stash_file* + specifies the stash filename of the master database password. If + not specified, the filename is determined by the + **key_stash_file** variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +**-P** *password* + specifies the master database password. Using this option may + expose the password to other users on the system via the process + list. + +**-x** *db_args* + specifies database-specific options. See :ref:`kadmin(1)` for + supported options. + +.. _kdb5_util_options_end: + + +COMMANDS +-------- + +create +~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_util_create: + + **create** [**-s**] + +Creates a new database. If the **-s** option is specified, the stash +file is also created. This command fails if the database already +exists. If the command is successful, the database is opened just as +if it had already existed when the program was first run. + +.. _kdb5_util_create_end: + +destroy +~~~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_util_destroy: + + **destroy** [**-f**] + +Destroys the database, first overwriting the disk sectors and then +unlinking the files, after prompting the user for confirmation. With +the **-f** argument, does not prompt the user. + +.. _kdb5_util_destroy_end: + +stash +~~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_util_stash: + + **stash** [**-f** *keyfile*] + +Stores the master principal's keys in a stash file. The **-f** +argument can be used to override the *keyfile* specified in +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +.. _kdb5_util_stash_end: + +dump +~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_util_dump: + + **dump** [**-b7**\|\ **-ov**\|\ **-r13**\|\ **-r18**] + [**-verbose**] [**-mkey_convert**] [**-new_mkey_file** + *mkey_file*] [**-rev**] [**-recurse**] [*filename* + [*principals*...]] + +Dumps the current Kerberos and KADM5 database into an ASCII file. By +default, the database is dumped in current format, "kdb5_util +load_dump version 7". If filename is not specified, or is the string +"-", the dump is sent to standard output. Options: + +**-b7** + causes the dump to be in the Kerberos 5 Beta 7 format ("kdb5_util + load_dump version 4"). This was the dump format produced on + releases prior to 1.2.2. + +**-ov** + causes the dump to be in "ovsec_adm_export" format. + +**-r13** + causes the dump to be in the Kerberos 5 1.3 format ("kdb5_util + load_dump version 5"). This was the dump format produced on + releases prior to 1.8. + +**-r18** + causes the dump to be in the Kerberos 5 1.8 format ("kdb5_util + load_dump version 6"). This was the dump format produced on + releases prior to 1.11. + +**-verbose** + causes the name of each principal and policy to be printed as it + is dumped. + +**-mkey_convert** + prompts for a new master key. This new master key will be used to + re-encrypt principal key data in the dumpfile. The principal keys + themselves will not be changed. + +**-new_mkey_file** *mkey_file* + the filename of a stash file. The master key in this stash file + will be used to re-encrypt the key data in the dumpfile. The key + data in the database will not be changed. + +**-rev** + dumps in reverse order. This may recover principals that do not + dump normally, in cases where database corruption has occurred. + +**-recurse** + causes the dump to walk the database recursively (btree only). + This may recover principals that do not dump normally, in cases + where database corruption has occurred. In cases of such + corruption, this option will probably retrieve more principals + than the **-rev** option will. + + .. versionchanged:: 1.15 + Release 1.15 restored the functionality of the **-recurse** + option. + + .. versionchanged:: 1.5 + The **-recurse** option ceased working until release 1.15, + doing a normal dump instead of a recursive traversal. + +.. _kdb5_util_dump_end: + +load +~~~~ + +.. _kdb5_util_load: + + **load** [**-b7**\|\ **-ov**\|\ **-r13**\|\ **-r18**] [**-hash**] + [**-verbose**] [**-update**] *filename* + +Loads a database dump from the named file into the named database. If +no option is given to determine the format of the dump file, the +format is detected automatically and handled as appropriate. Unless +the **-update** option is given, **load** creates a new database +containing only the data in the dump file, overwriting the contents of +any previously existing database. Note that when using the LDAP KDC +database module, the **-update** flag is required. + +Options: + +**-b7** + requires the database to be in the Kerberos 5 Beta 7 format + ("kdb5_util load_dump version 4"). This was the dump format + produced on releases prior to 1.2.2. + +**-ov** + requires the database to be in "ovsec_adm_import" format. Must be + used with the **-update** option. + +**-r13** + requires the database to be in Kerberos 5 1.3 format ("kdb5_util + load_dump version 5"). This was the dump format produced on + releases prior to 1.8. + +**-r18** + requires the database to be in Kerberos 5 1.8 format ("kdb5_util + load_dump version 6"). This was the dump format produced on + releases prior to 1.11. + +**-hash** + stores the database in hash format, if using the DB2 database + type. If this option is not specified, the database will be + stored in btree format. This option is not recommended, as + databases stored in hash format are known to corrupt data and lose + principals. + +**-verbose** + causes the name of each principal and policy to be printed as it + is dumped. + +**-update** + records from the dump file are added to or updated in the existing + database. Otherwise, a new database is created containing only + what is in the dump file and the old one destroyed upon successful + completion. + +.. _kdb5_util_load_end: + +ark +~~~ + + **ark** [**-e** *enc*:*salt*,...] *principal* + +Adds new random keys to *principal* at the next available key version +number. Keys for the current highest key version number will be +preserved. The **-e** option specifies the list of encryption and +salt types to be used for the new keys. + +add_mkey +~~~~~~~~ + + **add_mkey** [**-e** *etype*] [**-s**] + +Adds a new master key to the master key principal, but does not mark +it as active. Existing master keys will remain. The **-e** option +specifies the encryption type of the new master key; see +:ref:`Encryption_types` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a list of possible +values. The **-s** option stashes the new master key in the stash +file, which will be created if it doesn't already exist. + +After a new master key is added, it should be propagated to replica +servers via a manual or periodic invocation of :ref:`kprop(8)`. Then, +the stash files on the replica servers should be updated with the +kdb5_util **stash** command. Once those steps are complete, the key +is ready to be marked active with the kdb5_util **use_mkey** command. + +use_mkey +~~~~~~~~ + + **use_mkey** *mkeyVNO* [*time*] + +Sets the activation time of the master key specified by *mkeyVNO*. +Once a master key becomes active, it will be used to encrypt newly +created principal keys. If no *time* argument is given, the current +time is used, causing the specified master key version to become +active immediately. The format for *time* is :ref:`getdate` string. + +After a new master key becomes active, the kdb5_util +**update_princ_encryption** command can be used to update all +principal keys to be encrypted in the new master key. + +list_mkeys +~~~~~~~~~~ + + **list_mkeys** + +List all master keys, from most recent to earliest, in the master key +principal. The output will show the kvno, enctype, and salt type for +each mkey, similar to the output of :ref:`kadmin(1)` **getprinc**. A +``*`` following an mkey denotes the currently active master key. + +purge_mkeys +~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **purge_mkeys** [**-f**] [**-n**] [**-v**] + +Delete master keys from the master key principal that are not used to +protect any principals. This command can be used to remove old master +keys all principal keys are protected by a newer master key. + +**-f** + does not prompt for confirmation. + +**-n** + performs a dry run, showing master keys that would be purged, but + not actually purging any keys. + +**-v** + gives more verbose output. + +update_princ_encryption +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **update_princ_encryption** [**-f**] [**-n**] [**-v**] + [*princ-pattern*] + +Update all principal records (or only those matching the +*princ-pattern* glob pattern) to re-encrypt the key data using the +active database master key, if they are encrypted using a different +version, and give a count at the end of the number of principals +updated. If the **-f** option is not given, ask for confirmation +before starting to make changes. The **-v** option causes each +principal processed to be listed, with an indication as to whether it +needed updating or not. The **-n** option performs a dry run, only +showing the actions which would have been taken. + +tabdump +~~~~~~~ + + **tabdump** [**-H**] [**-c**] [**-e**] [**-n**] [**-o** *outfile*] + *dumptype* + +Dump selected fields of the database in a tabular format suitable for +reporting (e.g., using traditional Unix text processing tools) or +importing into relational databases. The data format is tab-separated +(default), or optionally comma-separated (CSV), with a fixed number of +columns. The output begins with a header line containing field names, +unless suppression is requested using the **-H** option. + +The *dumptype* parameter specifies the name of an output table (see +below). + +Options: + +**-H** + suppress writing the field names in a header line + +**-c** + use comma separated values (CSV) format, with minimal quoting, + instead of the default tab-separated (unquoted, unescaped) format + +**-e** + write empty hexadecimal string fields as empty fields instead of + as "-1". + +**-n** + produce numeric output for fields that normally have symbolic + output, such as enctypes and flag names. Also requests output of + time stamps as decimal POSIX time_t values. + +**-o** *outfile* + write the dump to the specified output file instead of to standard + output + +Dump types: + +**keydata** + principal encryption key information, including actual key data + (which is still encrypted in the master key) + + **name** + principal name + **keyindex** + index of this key in the principal's key list + **kvno** + key version number + **enctype** + encryption type + **key** + key data as a hexadecimal string + **salttype** + salt type + **salt** + salt data as a hexadecimal string + +**keyinfo** + principal encryption key information (as in **keydata** above), + excluding actual key data + +**princ_flags** + principal boolean attributes. Flag names print as hexadecimal + numbers if the **-n** option is specified, and all flag positions + are printed regardless of whether or not they are set. If **-n** + is not specified, print all known flag names for each principal, + but only print hexadecimal flag names if the corresponding flag is + set. + + **name** + principal name + **flag** + flag name + **value** + boolean value (0 for clear, or 1 for set) + +**princ_lockout** + state information used for tracking repeated password failures + + **name** + principal name + **last_success** + time stamp of most recent successful authentication + **last_failed** + time stamp of most recent failed authentication + **fail_count** + count of failed attempts + +**princ_meta** + principal metadata + + **name** + principal name + **modby** + name of last principal to modify this principal + **modtime** + timestamp of last modification + **lastpwd** + timestamp of last password change + **policy** + policy object name + **mkvno** + key version number of the master key that encrypts this + principal's key data + **hist_kvno** + key version number of the history key that encrypts the key + history data for this principal + +**princ_stringattrs** + string attributes (key/value pairs) + + **name** + principal name + **key** + attribute name + **value** + attribute value + +**princ_tktpolicy** + per-principal ticket policy data, including maximum ticket + lifetimes + + **name** + principal name + **expiration** + principal expiration date + **pw_expiration** + password expiration date + **max_life** + maximum ticket lifetime + **max_renew_life** + maximum renewable ticket lifetime + +Examples:: + + $ kdb5_util tabdump -o keyinfo.txt keyinfo + $ cat keyinfo.txt + name keyindex kvno enctype salttype salt + foo@EXAMPLE.COM 0 1 aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 normal -1 + bar@EXAMPLE.COM 0 1 aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 normal -1 + bar@EXAMPLE.COM 1 1 des-cbc-crc normal -1 + $ sqlite3 + sqlite> .mode tabs + sqlite> .import keyinfo.txt keyinfo + sqlite> select * from keyinfo where enctype like 'des-cbc-%'; + bar@EXAMPLE.COM 1 1 des-cbc-crc normal -1 + sqlite> .quit + $ awk -F'\t' '$4 ~ /des-cbc-/ { print }' keyinfo.txt + bar@EXAMPLE.COM 1 1 des-cbc-crc normal -1 + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kadmin(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kprop.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kprop.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c2b6c7955 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kprop.rst @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +.. _kprop(8): + +kprop +===== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kprop** +[**-r** *realm*] +[**-f** *file*] +[**-d**] +[**-P** *port*] +[**-s** *keytab*] +*replica_host* + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kprop is used to securely propagate a Kerberos V5 database dump file +from the master Kerberos server to a replica Kerberos server, which is +specified by *replica_host*. The dump file must be created by +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)`. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-r** *realm* + Specifies the realm of the master server. + +**-f** *file* + Specifies the filename where the dumped principal database file is + to be found; by default the dumped database file is normally + |kdcdir|\ ``/replica_datatrans``. + +**-P** *port* + Specifies the port to use to contact the :ref:`kpropd(8)` server + on the remote host. + +**-d** + Prints debugging information. + +**-s** *keytab* + Specifies the location of the keytab file. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kpropd(8)`, :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`, :ref:`krb5kdc(8)`, +:ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kpropd.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kpropd.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7f7faa232 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kpropd.rst @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +.. _kpropd(8): + +kpropd +====== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kpropd** +[**-r** *realm*] +[**-A** *admin_server*] +[**-a** *acl_file*] +[**-f** *replica_dumpfile*] +[**-F** *principal_database*] +[**-p** *kdb5_util_prog*] +[**-P** *port*] +[**--pid-file**\ =\ *pid_file*] +[**-d**] +[**-t**] + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The *kpropd* command runs on the replica KDC server. It listens for +update requests made by the :ref:`kprop(8)` program. If incremental +propagation is enabled, it periodically requests incremental updates +from the master KDC. + +When the replica receives a kprop request from the master, kpropd +accepts the dumped KDC database and places it in a file, and then runs +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)` to load the dumped database into the active +database which is used by :ref:`krb5kdc(8)`. This allows the master +Kerberos server to use :ref:`kprop(8)` to propagate its database to +the replica servers. Upon a successful download of the KDC database +file, the replica Kerberos server will have an up-to-date KDC +database. + +Where incremental propagation is not used, kpropd is commonly invoked +out of inetd(8) as a nowait service. This is done by adding a line to +the ``/etc/inetd.conf`` file which looks like this:: + + kprop stream tcp nowait root /usr/local/sbin/kpropd kpropd + +kpropd can also run as a standalone daemon, backgrounding itself and +waiting for connections on port 754 (or the port specified with the +**-P** option if given). Standalone mode is required for incremental +propagation. Starting in release 1.11, kpropd automatically detects +whether it was run from inetd and runs in standalone mode if it is +not. Prior to release 1.11, the **-S** option is required to run +kpropd in standalone mode; this option is now accepted for backward +compatibility but does nothing. + +Incremental propagation may be enabled with the **iprop_enable** +variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. If incremental propagation is +enabled, the replica periodically polls the master KDC for updates, at +an interval determined by the **iprop_replica_poll** variable. If the +replica receives updates, kpropd updates its log file with any updates +from the master. :ref:`kproplog(8)` can be used to view a summary of +the update entry log on the replica KDC. If incremental propagation +is enabled, the principal ``kiprop/replicahostname@REALM`` (where +*replicahostname* is the name of the replica KDC host, and *REALM* is +the name of the Kerberos realm) must be present in the replica's +keytab file. + +:ref:`kproplog(8)` can be used to force full replication when iprop is +enabled. + + +OPTIONS +-------- + +**-r** *realm* + Specifies the realm of the master server. + +**-A** *admin_server* + Specifies the server to be contacted for incremental updates; by + default, the master admin server is contacted. + +**-f** *file* + Specifies the filename where the dumped principal database file is + to be stored; by default the dumped database file is |kdcdir|\ + ``/from_master``. + +**-p** + Allows the user to specify the pathname to the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` + program; by default the pathname used is |sbindir|\ + ``/kdb5_util``. + +**-d** + Turn on debug mode. In this mode, kpropd will not detach + itself from the current job and run in the background. Instead, + it will run in the foreground and print out debugging messages + during the database propagation. + +**-t** + In standalone mode without incremental propagation, exit after one + dump file is received. In incremental propagation mode, exit as + soon as the database is up to date, or if the master returns an + error. + +**-P** + Allow for an alternate port number for kpropd to listen on. This + is only useful in combination with the **-S** option. + +**-a** *acl_file* + Allows the user to specify the path to the kpropd.acl file; by + default the path used is |kdcdir|\ ``/kpropd.acl``. + +**--pid-file**\ =\ *pid_file* + In standalone mode, write the process ID of the daemon into + *pid_file*. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +kpropd uses the following environment variables: + +* **KRB5_CONFIG** +* **KRB5_KDC_PROFILE** + + +FILES +----- + +kpropd.acl + Access file for kpropd; the default location is + ``/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kpropd.acl``. Each entry is a line + containing the principal of a host from which the local machine + will allow Kerberos database propagation via :ref:`kprop(8)`. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kprop(8)`, :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`, :ref:`krb5kdc(8)`, +:ref:`kerberos(7)`, inetd(8) diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kproplog.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kproplog.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..44e706d73 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/kproplog.rst @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +.. _kproplog(8): + +kproplog +======== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kproplog** [**-h**] [**-e** *num*] [-v] +**kproplog** [-R] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The kproplog command displays the contents of the KDC database update +log to standard output. It can be used to keep track of incremental +updates to the principal database. The update log file contains the +update log maintained by the :ref:`kadmind(8)` process on the master +KDC server and the :ref:`kpropd(8)` process on the replica KDC +servers. When updates occur, they are logged to this file. +Subsequently any KDC replica configured for incremental updates will +request the current data from the master KDC and update their log file +with any updates returned. + +The kproplog command requires read access to the update log file. It +will display update entries only for the KDC it runs on. + +If no options are specified, kproplog displays a summary of the update +log. If invoked on the master, kproplog also displays all of the +update entries. If invoked on a replica KDC server, kproplog displays +only a summary of the updates, which includes the serial number of the +last update received and the associated time stamp of the last update. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-R** + Reset the update log. This forces full resynchronization. If + used on a replica then that replica will request a full resync. + If used on the master then all replicas will request full resyncs. + +**-h** + Display a summary of the update log. This information includes + the database version number, state of the database, the number of + updates in the log, the time stamp of the first and last update, + and the version number of the first and last update entry. + +**-e** *num* + Display the last *num* update entries in the log. This is useful + when debugging synchronization between KDC servers. + +**-v** + Display individual attributes per update. An example of the + output generated for one entry:: + + Update Entry + Update serial # : 4 + Update operation : Add + Update principal : test@EXAMPLE.COM + Update size : 424 + Update committed : True + Update time stamp : Fri Feb 20 23:37:42 2004 + Attributes changed : 6 + Principal + Key data + Password last changed + Modifying principal + Modification time + TL data + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kpropd(8)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/krb5kdc.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/krb5kdc.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..08d40cc0d --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/krb5kdc.rst @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +.. _krb5kdc(8): + +krb5kdc +======= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**krb5kdc** +[**-x** *db_args*] +[**-d** *dbname*] +[**-k** *keytype*] +[**-M** *mkeyname*] +[**-p** *portnum*] +[**-m**] +[**-r** *realm*] +[**-n**] +[**-w** *numworkers*] +[**-P** *pid_file*] +[**-T** *time_offset*] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +krb5kdc is the Kerberos version 5 Authentication Service and Key +Distribution Center (AS/KDC). + + +OPTIONS +------- + +The **-r** *realm* option specifies the realm for which the server +should provide service. This option may be specified multiple times +to serve multiple realms. If no **-r** option is given, the default +realm (as specified in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`) will be served. + +The **-d** *dbname* option specifies the name under which the +principal database can be found. This option does not apply to the +LDAP database. + +The **-k** *keytype* option specifies the key type of the master key +to be entered manually as a password when **-m** is given; the default +is ``des-cbc-crc``. + +The **-M** *mkeyname* option specifies the principal name for the +master key in the database (usually ``K/M`` in the KDC's realm). + +The **-m** option specifies that the master database password should +be fetched from the keyboard rather than from a stash file. + +The **-n** option specifies that the KDC does not put itself in the +background and does not disassociate itself from the terminal. + +The **-P** *pid_file* option tells the KDC to write its PID into +*pid_file* after it starts up. This can be used to identify whether +the KDC is still running and to allow init scripts to stop the correct +process. + +The **-p** *portnum* option specifies the default UDP and TCP port +numbers which the KDC should listen on for Kerberos version 5 +requests, as a comma-separated list. This value overrides the port +numbers specified in the :ref:`kdcdefaults` section of +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, but may be overridden by realm-specific values. +If no value is given from any source, the default port is 88. + +The **-w** *numworkers* option tells the KDC to fork *numworkers* +processes to listen to the KDC ports and process requests in parallel. +The top level KDC process (whose pid is recorded in the pid file if +the **-P** option is also given) acts as a supervisor. The supervisor +will relay SIGHUP signals to the worker subprocesses, and will +terminate the worker subprocess if the it is itself terminated or if +any other worker process exits. + +The **-x** *db_args* option specifies database-specific arguments. +See :ref:`Database Options <dboptions>` in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for +supported arguments. + +The **-T** *offset* option specifies a time offset, in seconds, which +the KDC will operate under. It is intended only for testing purposes. + +EXAMPLE +------- + +The KDC may service requests for multiple realms (maximum 32 realms). +The realms are listed on the command line. Per-realm options that can +be specified on the command line pertain for each realm that follows +it and are superseded by subsequent definitions of the same option. + +For example:: + + krb5kdc -p 2001 -r REALM1 -p 2002 -r REALM2 -r REALM3 + +specifies that the KDC listen on port 2001 for REALM1 and on port 2002 +for REALM2 and REALM3. Additionally, per-realm parameters may be +specified in the :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` file. The location of this file +may be specified by the **KRB5_KDC_PROFILE** environment variable. +Per-realm parameters specified in this file take precedence over +options specified on the command line. See the :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` +description for further details. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)`, :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`, +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/ktutil.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/ktutil.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0dbc08f60 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/ktutil.rst @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.. _ktutil(1): + +ktutil +====== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**ktutil** + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The ktutil command invokes a command interface from which an +administrator can read, write, or edit entries in a keytab or Kerberos +V4 srvtab file. + + +COMMANDS +-------- + +list +~~~~ + + **list** + +Displays the current keylist. + +Alias: **l** + +read_kt +~~~~~~~ + + **read_kt** *keytab* + +Read the Kerberos V5 keytab file *keytab* into the current keylist. + +Alias: **rkt** + +read_st +~~~~~~~ + + **read_st** *srvtab* + +Read the Kerberos V4 srvtab file *srvtab* into the current keylist. + +Alias: **rst** + +write_kt +~~~~~~~~ + + **write_kt** *keytab* + +Write the current keylist into the Kerberos V5 keytab file *keytab*. + +Alias: **wkt** + +write_st +~~~~~~~~ + + **write_st** *srvtab* + +Write the current keylist into the Kerberos V4 srvtab file *srvtab*. + +Alias: **wst** + +clear_list +~~~~~~~~~~ + + **clear_list** + +Clear the current keylist. + +Alias: **clear** + +delete_entry +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **delete_entry** *slot* + +Delete the entry in slot number *slot* from the current keylist. + +Alias: **delent** + +add_entry +~~~~~~~~~ + + **add_entry** {**-key**\|\ **-password**} **-p** *principal* + **-k** *kvno* [**-e** *enctype*] [**-f**\|\ **-s** *salt*] + +Add *principal* to keylist using key or password. If the **-f** flag +is specified, salt information will be fetched from the KDC; in this +case the **-e** flag may be omitted, or it may be supplied to force a +particular enctype. If the **-f** flag is not specified, the **-e** +flag must be specified, and the default salt will be used unless +overridden with the **-s** option. + +Alias: **addent** + +list_requests +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + + **list_requests** + +Displays a listing of available commands. + +Aliases: **lr**, **?** + +quit +~~~~ + + **quit** + +Quits ktutil. + +Aliases: **exit**, **q** + + +EXAMPLE +------- + + :: + + ktutil: add_entry -password -p alice@BLEEP.COM -k 1 -e + aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 + Password for alice@BLEEP.COM: + ktutil: add_entry -password -p alice@BLEEP.COM -k 1 -e + aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 + Password for alice@BLEEP.COM: + ktutil: write_kt keytab + ktutil: + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kadmin(1)`, :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/sserver.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/sserver.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a8dcf5d5b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/admin_commands/sserver.rst @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +.. _sserver(8): + +sserver +======= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**sserver** +[ **-p** *port* ] +[ **-S** *keytab* ] +[ *server_port* ] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +sserver and :ref:`sclient(1)` are a simple demonstration client/server +application. When sclient connects to sserver, it performs a Kerberos +authentication, and then sserver returns to sclient the Kerberos +principal which was used for the Kerberos authentication. It makes a +good test that Kerberos has been successfully installed on a machine. + +The service name used by sserver and sclient is sample. Hence, +sserver will require that there be a keytab entry for the service +``sample/hostname.domain.name@REALM.NAME``. This keytab is generated +using the :ref:`kadmin(1)` program. The keytab file is usually +installed as |keytab|. + +The **-S** option allows for a different keytab than the default. + +sserver is normally invoked out of inetd(8), using a line in +``/etc/inetd.conf`` that looks like this:: + + sample stream tcp nowait root /usr/local/sbin/sserver sserver + +Since ``sample`` is normally not a port defined in ``/etc/services``, +you will usually have to add a line to ``/etc/services`` which looks +like this:: + + sample 13135/tcp + +When using sclient, you will first have to have an entry in the +Kerberos database, by using :ref:`kadmin(1)`, and then you have to get +Kerberos tickets, by using :ref:`kinit(1)`. Also, if you are running +the sclient program on a different host than the sserver it will be +connecting to, be sure that both hosts have an entry in /etc/services +for the sample tcp port, and that the same port number is in both +files. + +When you run sclient you should see something like this:: + + sendauth succeeded, reply is: + reply len 32, contents: + You are nlgilman@JIMI.MIT.EDU + + +COMMON ERROR MESSAGES +--------------------- + +1) kinit returns the error:: + + kinit: Client not found in Kerberos database while getting + initial credentials + + This means that you didn't create an entry for your username in the + Kerberos database. + +2) sclient returns the error:: + + unknown service sample/tcp; check /etc/services + + This means that you don't have an entry in /etc/services for the + sample tcp port. + +3) sclient returns the error:: + + connect: Connection refused + + This probably means you didn't edit /etc/inetd.conf correctly, or + you didn't restart inetd after editing inetd.conf. + +4) sclient returns the error:: + + sclient: Server not found in Kerberos database while using + sendauth + + This means that the ``sample/hostname@LOCAL.REALM`` service was not + defined in the Kerberos database; it should be created using + :ref:`kadmin(1)`, and a keytab file needs to be generated to make + the key for that service principal available for sclient. + +5) sclient returns the error:: + + sendauth rejected, error reply is: + "No such file or directory" + + This probably means sserver couldn't find the keytab file. It was + probably not installed in the proper directory. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`sclient(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)`, services(5), inetd(8) diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/advanced/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/advanced/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..834f453c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/advanced/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +Advanced topics +=============== + + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + retiring-des.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/advanced/retiring-des.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/advanced/retiring-des.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ebac95f24 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/advanced/retiring-des.rst @@ -0,0 +1,417 @@ +.. _retiring-des: + +Retiring DES +======================= + +Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was originally implemented using +the Data Encryption Standard (DES) as a block cipher for encryption. +While it was considered secure at the time, advancements in computational +ability have rendered DES vulnerable to brute force attacks on its 56-bit +keyspace. As such, it is now considered insecure and should not be +used (:rfc:`6649`). + +History +------- + +DES was used in the original Kerberos implementation, and was the +only cryptosystem in krb5 1.0. Partial support for triple-DES (3DES) was +added in version 1.1, with full support following in version 1.2. +The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which supersedes DES, gained +partial support in version 1.3.0 of krb5 and full support in version 1.3.2. +However, deployments of krb5 using Kerberos databases created with older +versions of krb5 will not necessarily start using strong crypto for +ordinary operation without administrator intervention. + +Types of keys +------------- + +* The database master key: This key is not exposed to user requests, + but is used to encrypt other key material stored in the kerberos + database. The database master key is currently stored as ``K/M`` + by default. +* Password-derived keys: User principals frequently have keys + derived from a password. When a new password is set, the KDC + uses various string2key functions to generate keys in the database + for that principal. +* Keytab keys: Application server principals generally use random + keys which are not derived from a password. When the database + entry is created, the KDC generates random keys of various enctypes + to enter in the database, which are conveyed to the application server + and stored in a keytab. +* Session keys: These are short-term keys generated by the KDC while + processing client requests, with an enctype selected by the KDC. + +For details on the various enctypes and how enctypes are selected by the KDC +for session keys and client/server long-term keys, see :ref:`enctypes`. +When using the :ref:`kadmin(1)` interface to generate new long-term keys, +the **-e** argument can be used to force a particular set of enctypes, +overriding the KDC default values. + +.. note:: + + When the KDC is selecting a session key, it has no knowledge about the + kerberos installation on the server which will receive the service ticket, + only what keys are in the database for the service principal. + In order to allow uninterrupted operation to + clients while migrating away from DES, care must be taken to ensure that + kerberos installations on application server machines are configured to + support newer encryption types before keys of those new encryption types + are created in the Kerberos database for those server principals. + +Upgrade procedure +----------------- + +This procedure assumes that the KDC software has already been upgraded +to a modern version of krb5 that supports non-DES keys, so that the +only remaining task is to update the actual keys used to service requests. +The realm used for demonstrating this procedure, ZONE.MIT.EDU, +is an example of the worst-case scenario, where all keys in the realm +are DES. The realm was initially created with a very old version of krb5, +and **supported_enctypes** in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` was set to a value +appropriate when the KDC was installed, but was not updated as the KDC +was upgraded: + +:: + + [realms] + ZONE.MIT.EDU = { + [...] + master_key_type = des-cbc-crc + supported_enctypes = des-cbc-crc:normal des:normal des:v4 des:norealm des:onlyrealm des:afs3 + } + +This resulted in the keys for all principals in the realm being forced +to DES-only, unless specifically requested using :ref:`kadmin(1)`. + +Before starting the upgrade, all KDCs were running krb5 1.11, +and the database entries for some "high-value" principals were: + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q 'getprinc krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU' + [...] + Number of keys: 1 + Key: vno 1, des-cbc-crc:v4 + [...] + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q 'getprinc kadmin/admin' + [...] + Number of keys: 1 + Key: vno 15, des-cbc-crc + [...] + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q 'getprinc kadmin/changepw' + [...] + Number of keys: 1 + Key: vno 14, des-cbc-crc + [...] + +The ``krbtgt/REALM`` key appears to have never been changed since creation +(its kvno is 1), and all three database entries have only a des-cbc-crc key. + +The krbtgt key and KDC keys +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Perhaps the biggest single-step improvement in the security of the cell +is gained by strengthening the key of the ticket-granting service principal, +``krbtgt/REALM``---if this principal's key is compromised, so is the +entire realm. Since the server that will handle service tickets +for this principal is the KDC itself, it is easy to guarantee that it +will be configured to support any encryption types which might be +selected. However, the default KDC behavior when creating new keys is to +remove the old keys, which would invalidate all existing tickets issued +against that principal, rendering the TGTs cached by clients useless. +Instead, a new key can be created with the old key retained, so that +existing tickets will still function until their scheduled expiry +(see :ref:`changing_krbtgt_key`). + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# enctypes=aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal,\ + > aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal,des3-hmac-sha1:normal,des-cbc-crc:normal + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q "cpw -e ${enctypes} -randkey \ + > -keepold krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU" + Authenticating as principal root/admin@ZONE.MIT.EDU with password. + Key for "krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU@ZONE.MIT.EDU" randomized. + +.. note:: + + The new ``krbtgt@REALM`` key should be propagated to replica KDCs + immediately so that TGTs issued by the master KDC can be used to + issue service tickets on replica KDCs. Replica KDCs will refuse + requests using the new TGT kvno until the new krbtgt entry has + been propagated to them. + +It is necessary to explicitly specify the enctypes for the new database +entry, since **supported_enctypes** has not been changed. Leaving +**supported_enctypes** unchanged makes a potential rollback operation +easier, since all new keys of new enctypes are the result of explicit +administrator action and can be easily enumerated. +Upgrading the krbtgt key should have minimal user-visible disruption other +than that described in the note above, since only clients which list the +new enctypes as supported will use them, per the procedure +in :ref:`session_key_selection`. +Once the krbtgt key is updated, the session and ticket keys for user +TGTs will be strong keys, but subsequent requests +for service tickets will still get DES keys until the service principals +have new keys generated. Application service +remains uninterrupted due to the key-selection procedure on the KDC. + +After the change, the database entry is now: + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q 'getprinc krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU' + [...] + Number of keys: 5 + Key: vno 2, aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 + Key: vno 2, aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 + Key: vno 2, des3-cbc-sha1 + Key: vno 2, des-cbc-crc + Key: vno 1, des-cbc-crc:v4 + [...] + +Since the expected disruptions from rekeying the krbtgt principal are +minor, after a short testing period, it is +appropriate to rekey the other high-value principals, ``kadmin/admin@REALM`` +and ``kadmin/changepw@REALM``. These are the service principals used for +changing user passwords and updating application keytabs. The kadmin +and password-changing services are regular kerberized services, so the +session-key-selection algorithm described in :ref:`session_key_selection` +applies. It is particularly important to have strong session keys for +these services, since user passwords and new long-term keys are conveyed +over the encrypted channel. + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# enctypes=aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal,\ + > aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal,des3-hmac-sha1:normal + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q "cpw -e ${enctypes} -randkey \ + > kadmin/admin" + Authenticating as principal root/admin@ZONE.MIT.EDU with password. + Key for "kadmin/admin@ZONE.MIT.EDU" randomized. + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q "cpw -e ${enctypes} -randkey \ + > kadmin/changepw" + Authenticating as principal root/admin@ZONE.MIT.EDU with password. + Key for "kadmin/changepw@ZONE.MIT.EDU" randomized. + +It is not necessary to retain a single-DES key for these services, since +password changes are not part of normal daily workflow, and disruption +from a client failure is likely to be minimal. Furthermore, if a kerberos +client experiences failure changing a user password or keytab key, +this indicates that that client will become inoperative once services +are rekeyed to non-DES enctypes. Such problems can be detected early +at this stage, giving more time for corrective action. + +Adding strong keys to application servers +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Before switching the default enctypes for new keys over to strong enctypes, +it may be desired to test upgrading a handful of services with the +new configuration before flipping the switch for the defaults. This +still requires using the **-e** argument in :ref:`kadmin(1)` to get non-default +enctypes: + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# enctypes=aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal,\ + > aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal,des3-cbc-sha1:normal,des-cbc-crc:normal + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -p zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU -k -t \ + > /etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab -q "ktadd -e ${enctypes} \ + > -k /etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU" + Authenticating as principal zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU with keytab /etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 4, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 4, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 4, encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 4, encryption type des-cbc-crc added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab. + +Be sure to remove the old keys from the application keytab, per best +practice. + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# k5srvutil -f /etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab delold + Authenticating as principal zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU with keytab /etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal zephyr/zephyr@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3 removed from keytab WRFILE:/etc/zephyr/krb5.keytab. + +Adding strong keys by default +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Once the high-visibility services have been rekeyed, it is probably +appropriate to change :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` to generate keys with the new +encryption types by default. This enables server administrators to generate +new enctypes with the **change** subcommand of :ref:`k5srvutil(1)`, +and causes user password +changes to add new encryption types for their entries. It will probably +be necessary to implement administrative controls to cause all user +principal keys to be updated in a reasonable period of time, whether +by forcing password changes or a password synchronization service that +has access to the current password and can add the new keys. + +:: + + [realms] + ZONE.MIT.EDU = { + supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal des-cbc-crc:normal + +.. note:: + + The krb5kdc process must be restarted for these changes to take effect. + +At this point, all service administrators can update their services and the +servers behind them to take advantage of strong cryptography. +If necessary, the server's krb5 installation should be configured and/or +upgraded to a version supporting non-DES keys. See :ref:`enctypes` for +krb5 version and configuration settings. +Only when the service is configured to accept non-DES keys should +the key version number be incremented and new keys generated +(``k5srvutil change && k5srvutil delold``). + +:: + + root@dr-willy:~# k5srvutil change + Authenticating as principal host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU with keytab /etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type AES-128 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type Triple DES cbc mode with HMAC/sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type DES cbc mode with CRC-32 added to keytab WRFILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + root@dr-willy:~# klist -e -k -t /etc/krb5.keytab + Keytab name: WRFILE:/etc/krb5.keytab + KVNO Timestamp Principal + ---- ----------------- -------------------------------------------------------- + 2 10/10/12 17:03:59 host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU (DES cbc mode with CRC-32) + 3 12/12/12 15:31:19 host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU (AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC) + 3 12/12/12 15:31:19 host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU (AES-128 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC) + 3 12/12/12 15:31:19 host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU (Triple DES cbc mode with HMAC/sha1) + 3 12/12/12 15:31:19 host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU (DES cbc mode with CRC-32) + root@dr-willy:~# k5srvutil delold + Authenticating as principal host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU with keytab /etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/dr-willy.xvm.mit.edu@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 2 removed from keytab WRFILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + +When a single service principal is shared by multiple backend servers in +a load-balanced environment, it may be necessary to schedule downtime +or adjust the population in the load-balanced pool in order to propagate +the updated keytab to all hosts in the pool with minimal service interruption. + +Removing DES keys from usage +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This situation remains something of a testing or transitory state, +as new DES keys are still being generated, and will be used if requested +by a client. To make more progress removing DES from the realm, the KDC +should be configured to not generate such keys by default. + +.. note:: + + An attacker posing as a client can implement a brute force attack against + a DES key for any principal, if that key is in the current (highest-kvno) + key list. This attack is only possible if **allow_weak_crypto = true** + is enabled on the KDC. Setting the **+requires_preauth** flag on a + principal forces this attack to be an online attack, much slower than + the offline attack otherwise available to the attacker. However, setting + this flag on a service principal is not always advisable; see the entry in + :ref:`add_principal` for details. + +The following KDC configuration will not generate DES keys by default: + +:: + + [realms] + ZONE.MIT.EDU = { + supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal des3-cbc-sha1:normal des3-hmac-sha1:normal + +.. note:: + + As before, the KDC process must be restarted for this change to take + effect. It is best practice to update kdc.conf on all KDCs, not just the + master, to avoid unpleasant surprises should the master fail and a + replica need to be promoted. + +It is now appropriate to remove the legacy single-DES key from the +``krbtgt/REALM`` entry: + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q "cpw -randkey -keepold \ + > krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU" + Authenticating as principal host/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU with password. + Key for "krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU@ZONE.MIT.EDU" randomized. + +After the maximum ticket lifetime has passed, the old database entry +should be removed. + +:: + + [root@casio krb5kdc]# kadmin.local -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q 'purgekeys krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU' + Authenticating as principal root/admin@ZONE.MIT.EDU with password. + Old keys for principal "krbtgt/ZONE.MIT.EDU@ZONE.MIT.EDU" purged. + +After the KDC is restarted with the new **supported_enctypes**, +all user password changes and application keytab updates will not +generate DES keys by default. + +:: + + contents-vnder-pressvre:~> kpasswd zonetest@ZONE.MIT.EDU + Password for zonetest@ZONE.MIT.EDU: [enter old password] + Enter new password: [enter new password] + Enter it again: [enter new password] + Password changed. + contents-vnder-pressvre:~> kadmin -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -q 'getprinc zonetest' + [...] + Number of keys: 3 + Key: vno 9, aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 + Key: vno 9, aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 + Key: vno 9, des3-cbc-sha1 + [...] + + [kaduk@glossolalia ~]$ kadmin -p kaduk@ZONE.MIT.EDU -r ZONE.MIT.EDU -k \ + > -t kaduk-zone.keytab -q 'ktadd -k kaduk-zone.keytab kaduk@ZONE.MIT.EDU' + Authenticating as principal kaduk@ZONE.MIT.EDU with keytab kaduk-zone.keytab. + Entry for principal kaduk@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:kaduk-zone.keytab. + Entry for principal kaduk@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab WRFILE:kaduk-zone.keytab. + Entry for principal kaduk@ZONE.MIT.EDU with kvno 3, encryption type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab WRFILE:kaduk-zone.keytab. + +Once all principals have been re-keyed, DES support can be disabled on the +KDC (**allow_weak_crypto = false**), and client machines can remove +**allow_weak_crypto = true** from their :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` configuration +files, completing the migration. **allow_weak_crypto** takes precedence over +all places where DES enctypes could be explicitly configured. DES keys will +not be used, even if they are present, when **allow_weak_crypto = false**. + +Support for legacy services +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If there remain legacy services which do not support non-DES enctypes +(such as older versions of AFS), **allow_weak_crypto** must remain +enabled on the KDC. Client machines need not have this setting, +though---applications which require DES can use API calls to allow +weak crypto on a per-request basis, overriding the system krb5.conf. +However, having **allow_weak_crypto** set on the KDC means that any +principals which have a DES key in the database could still use those +keys. To minimize the use of DES in the realm and restrict it to just +legacy services which require DES, it is necessary to remove all other +DES keys. The realm has been configured such that at password and +keytab change, no DES keys will be generated by default. The task +then reduces to requiring user password changes and having server +administrators update their service keytabs. Administrative outreach +will be necessary, and if the desire to eliminate DES is sufficiently +strong, the KDC administrators may choose to randkey any principals +which have not been rekeyed after some timeout period, forcing the +user to contact the helpdesk for access. + +The Database Master Key +----------------------- + +This procedure does not alter ``K/M@REALM``, the key used to encrypt key +material in the Kerberos database. (This is the key stored in the stash file +on the KDC if stash files are used.) However, the security risk of +a single-DES key for ``K/M`` is minimal, given that access to material +encrypted in ``K/M`` (the Kerberos database) is generally tightly controlled. +If an attacker can gain access to the encrypted database, they likely +have access to the stash file as well, rendering the weak cryptography +broken by non-cryptographic means. As such, upgrading ``K/M`` to a stronger +encryption type is unlikely to be a high-priority task. + +Is is possible to upgrade the master key used for the database, if +desired. Using :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`'s **add_mkey**, **use_mkey**, and +**update_princ_encryption** commands, a new master key can be added +and activated for use on new key material, and the existing entries +converted to the new master key. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/appl_servers.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/appl_servers.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fee49f027 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/appl_servers.rst @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +Application servers +=================== + +If you need to install the Kerberos V5 programs on an application +server, please refer to the Kerberos V5 Installation Guide. Once you +have installed the software, you need to add that host to the Kerberos +database (see :ref:`add_mod_del_princs`), and generate a keytab for +that host, that contains the host's key. You also need to make sure +the host's clock is within your maximum clock skew of the KDCs. + + +Keytabs +------- + +A keytab is a host's copy of its own keylist, which is analogous to a +user's password. An application server that needs to authenticate +itself to the KDC has to have a keytab that contains its own principal +and key. Just as it is important for users to protect their +passwords, it is equally important for hosts to protect their keytabs. +You should always store keytab files on local disk, and make them +readable only by root, and you should never send a keytab file over a +network in the clear. Ideally, you should run the :ref:`kadmin(1)` +command to extract a keytab on the host on which the keytab is to +reside. + + +.. _add_princ_kt: + +Adding principals to keytabs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To generate a keytab, or to add a principal to an existing keytab, use +the **ktadd** command from kadmin. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _ktadd: + :end-before: _ktadd_end: + + +Examples +######## + +Here is a sample session, using configuration files that enable only +AES encryption:: + + kadmin: ktadd host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + Entry for principal host/daffodil.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab + Entry for principal host/daffodil.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab + kadmin: + + +Removing principals from keytabs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To remove a principal from an existing keytab, use the kadmin +**ktremove** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _ktremove: + :end-before: _ktremove_end: + + +Clock Skew +---------- + +A Kerberos application server host must keep its clock synchronized or +it will reject authentication requests from clients. Modern operating +systems typically provide a facility to maintain the correct time; +make sure it is enabled. This is especially important on virtual +machines, where clocks tend to drift more rapidly than normal machine +clocks. + +The default allowable clock skew is controlled by the **clockskew** +variable in :ref:`libdefaults`. + + +Getting DNS information correct +------------------------------- + +Several aspects of Kerberos rely on name service. When a hostname is +used to name a service, the Kerberos library canonicalizes the +hostname using forward and reverse name resolution. (The reverse name +resolution step can be turned off using the **rdns** variable in +:ref:`libdefaults`.) The result of this canonicalization must match +the principal entry in the host's keytab, or authentication will fail. + +Each host's canonical name must be the fully-qualified host name +(including the domain), and each host's IP address must +reverse-resolve to the canonical name. + +Configuration of hostnames varies by operating system. On the +application server itself, canonicalization will typically use the +``/etc/hosts`` file rather than the DNS. Ensure that the line for the +server's hostname is in the following form:: + + IP address fully-qualified hostname aliases + +Here is a sample ``/etc/hosts`` file:: + + # this is a comment + 127.0.0.1 localhost localhost.mit.edu + 10.0.0.6 daffodil.mit.edu daffodil trillium wake-robin + +The output of ``klist -k`` for this example host should look like:: + + viola# klist -k + Keytab name: /etc/krb5.keytab + KVNO Principal + ---- ------------------------------------------------------------ + 2 host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + +If you were to ssh to this host with a fresh credentials cache (ticket +file), and then :ref:`klist(1)`, the output should list a service +principal of ``host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU``. + + +.. _conf_firewall: + +Configuring your firewall to work with Kerberos V5 +-------------------------------------------------- + +If you need off-site users to be able to get Kerberos tickets in your +realm, they must be able to get to your KDC. This requires either +that you have a replica KDC outside your firewall, or that you +configure your firewall to allow UDP requests into at least one of +your KDCs, on whichever port the KDC is running. (The default is port +88; other ports may be specified in the KDC's :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` +file.) Similarly, if you need off-site users to be able to change +their passwords in your realm, they must be able to get to your +Kerberos admin server on the kpasswd port (which defaults to 464). If +you need off-site users to be able to administer your Kerberos realm, +they must be able to get to your Kerberos admin server on the +administrative port (which defaults to 749). + +If your on-site users inside your firewall will need to get to KDCs in +other realms, you will also need to configure your firewall to allow +outgoing TCP and UDP requests to port 88, and to port 464 to allow +password changes. If your on-site users inside your firewall will +need to get to Kerberos admin servers in other realms, you will also +need to allow outgoing TCP and UDP requests to port 749. + +If any of your KDCs are outside your firewall, you will need to allow +kprop requests to get through to the remote KDC. :ref:`kprop(8)` uses +the ``krb5_prop`` service on port 754 (tcp). + +The book *UNIX System Security*, by David Curry, is a good starting +point for learning to configure firewalls. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/auth_indicator.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/auth_indicator.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b13905e95 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/auth_indicator.rst @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +.. _auth_indicator: + +Authentication indicators +========================= + +As of release 1.14, the KDC can be configured to annotate tickets if +the client authenticated using a stronger preauthentication mechanism +such as :ref:`PKINIT <pkinit>` or :ref:`OTP <otp_preauth>`. These +annotations are called "authentication indicators." Service +principals can be configured to require particular authentication +indicators in order to authenticate to that service. An +authentication indicator value can be any string chosen by the KDC +administrator; there are no pre-set values. + +To use authentication indicators with PKINIT or OTP, first configure +the KDC to include an indicator when that preauthentication mechanism +is used. For PKINIT, use the **pkinit_indicator** variable in +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. For OTP, use the **indicator** variable in the +token type definition, or specify the indicators in the **otp** user +string as described in :ref:`otp_preauth`. + +To require an indicator to be present in order to authenticate to a +service principal, set the **require_auth** string attribute on the +principal to the indicator value to be required. If you wish to allow +one of several indicators to be accepted, you can specify multiple +indicator values separated by spaces. + +For example, a realm could be configured to set the authentication +indicator value "strong" when PKINIT is used to authenticate, using a +setting in the :ref:`kdc_realms` subsection:: + + pkinit_indicator = strong + +A service principal could be configured to require the "strong" +authentication indicator value:: + + $ kadmin setstr host/high.value.server require_auth strong + Password for user/admin@KRBTEST.COM: + +A user who authenticates with PKINIT would be able to obtain a ticket +for the service principal:: + + $ kinit -X X509_user_identity=FILE:/my/cert.pem,/my/key.pem user + $ kvno host/high.value.server + host/high.value.server@KRBTEST.COM: kvno = 1 + +but a user who authenticates with a password would not:: + + $ kinit user + Password for user@KRBTEST.COM: + $ kvno host/high.value.server + kvno: KDC policy rejects request while getting credentials for + host/high.value.server@KRBTEST.COM + +GSSAPI server applications can inspect authentication indicators +through the :ref:`auth-indicators <gssapi_authind_attr>` name +attribute. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/backup_host.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/backup_host.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..982a2d1fc --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/backup_host.rst @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +Backups of secure hosts +======================= + +When you back up a secure host, you should exclude the host's keytab +file from the backup. If someone obtained a copy of the keytab from a +backup, that person could make any host masquerade as the host whose +keytab was compromised. In many configurations, knowledge of the +host's keytab also allows root access to the host. This could be +particularly dangerous if the compromised keytab was from one of your +KDCs. If the machine has a disk crash and the keytab file is lost, it +is easy to generate another keytab file. (See :ref:`add_princ_kt`.) +If you are unable to exclude particular files from backups, you should +ensure that the backups are kept as secure as the host's root +password. + + +Backing up the Kerberos database +-------------------------------- + +As with any file, it is possible that your Kerberos database could +become corrupted. If this happens on one of the replica KDCs, you +might never notice, since the next automatic propagation of the +database would install a fresh copy. However, if it happens to the +master KDC, the corrupted database would be propagated to all of the +replicas during the next propagation. For this reason, MIT recommends +that you back up your Kerberos database regularly. Because the master +KDC is continuously dumping the database to a file in order to +propagate it to the replica KDCs, it is a simple matter to have a cron +job periodically copy the dump file to a secure machine elsewhere on +your network. (Of course, it is important to make the host where +these backups are stored as secure as your KDCs, and to encrypt its +transmission across your network.) Then if your database becomes +corrupted, you can load the most recent dump onto the master KDC. +(See :ref:`restore_from_dump`.) diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a04836ac7 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +Configuration Files +=================== + +Kerberos uses configuration files to allow administrators to specify +settings on a per-machine basis. :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` applies to all +applications using the Kerboros library, on clients and servers. +For KDC-specific applications, additional settings can be specified in +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)`; the two files are merged into a configuration profile +used by applications accessing the KDC database directly. :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)` +is also only used on the KDC, it controls permissions for modifying the +KDC database. + +Contents +-------- +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_conf + kdc_conf + kadm5_acl diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/kadm5_acl.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/kadm5_acl.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..290bf0e03 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/kadm5_acl.rst @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +.. _kadm5.acl(5): + +kadm5.acl +========= + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The Kerberos :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon uses an Access Control List +(ACL) file to manage access rights to the Kerberos database. +For operations that affect principals, the ACL file also controls +which principals can operate on which other principals. + +The default location of the Kerberos ACL file is +|kdcdir|\ ``/kadm5.acl`` unless this is overridden by the *acl_file* +variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + +SYNTAX +------ + +Empty lines and lines starting with the sharp sign (``#``) are +ignored. Lines containing ACL entries have the format:: + + principal permissions [target_principal [restrictions] ] + +.. note:: + + Line order in the ACL file is important. The first matching entry + will control access for an actor principal on a target principal. + +*principal* + (Partially or fully qualified Kerberos principal name.) Specifies + the principal whose permissions are to be set. + + Each component of the name may be wildcarded using the ``*`` + character. + +*permissions* + Specifies what operations may or may not be performed by a + *principal* matching a particular entry. This is a string of one or + more of the following list of characters or their upper-case + counterparts. If the character is *upper-case*, then the operation + is disallowed. If the character is *lower-case*, then the operation + is permitted. + + == ====================================================== + a [Dis]allows the addition of principals or policies + c [Dis]allows the changing of passwords for principals + d [Dis]allows the deletion of principals or policies + e [Dis]allows the extraction of principal keys + i [Dis]allows inquiries about principals or policies + l [Dis]allows the listing of all principals or policies + m [Dis]allows the modification of principals or policies + p [Dis]allows the propagation of the principal database (used in :ref:`incr_db_prop`) + s [Dis]allows the explicit setting of the key for a principal + x Short for admcilsp. All privileges (except ``e``) + \* Same as x. + == ====================================================== + +.. note:: + + The ``extract`` privilege is not included in the wildcard + privilege; it must be explicitly assigned. This privilege + allows the user to extract keys from the database, and must be + handled with great care to avoid disclosure of important keys + like those of the kadmin/* or krbtgt/* principals. The + **lockdown_keys** principal attribute can be used to prevent + key extraction from specific principals regardless of the + granted privilege. + +*target_principal* + (Optional. Partially or fully qualified Kerberos principal name.) + Specifies the principal on which *permissions* may be applied. + Each component of the name may be wildcarded using the ``*`` + character. + + *target_principal* can also include back-references to *principal*, + in which ``*number`` matches the corresponding wildcard in + *principal*. + +*restrictions* + (Optional) A string of flags. Allowed restrictions are: + + {+\|-}\ *flagname* + flag is forced to the indicated value. The permissible flags + are the same as those for the **default_principal_flags** + variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + + *-clearpolicy* + policy is forced to be empty. + + *-policy pol* + policy is forced to be *pol*. + + -{*expire, pwexpire, maxlife, maxrenewlife*} *time* + (:ref:`getdate` string) associated value will be forced to + MIN(*time*, requested value). + + The above flags act as restrictions on any add or modify operation + which is allowed due to that ACL line. + +.. warning:: + + If the kadmind ACL file is modified, the kadmind daemon needs to be + restarted for changes to take effect. + +EXAMPLE +------- + +Here is an example of a kadm5.acl file:: + + */admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU * # line 1 + joeadmin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU ADMCIL # line 2 + joeadmin/*@ATHENA.MIT.EDU i */root@ATHENA.MIT.EDU # line 3 + */root@ATHENA.MIT.EDU ci *1@ATHENA.MIT.EDU # line 4 + */root@ATHENA.MIT.EDU l * # line 5 + sms@ATHENA.MIT.EDU x * -maxlife 9h -postdateable # line 6 + +(line 1) Any principal in the ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` realm with an +``admin`` instance has all administrative privileges except extracting +keys. + +(lines 1-3) The user ``joeadmin`` has all permissions except +extracting keys with his ``admin`` instance, +``joeadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` (matches line 1). He has no +permissions at all with his null instance, ``joeadmin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` +(matches line 2). His ``root`` and other non-``admin``, non-null +instances (e.g., ``extra`` or ``dbadmin``) have inquire permissions +with any principal that has the instance ``root`` (matches line 3). + +(line 4) Any ``root`` principal in ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` can inquire +or change the password of their null instance, but not any other +null instance. (Here, ``*1`` denotes a back-reference to the +component matching the first wildcard in the actor principal.) + +(line 5) Any ``root`` principal in ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` can generate +the list of principals in the database, and the list of policies +in the database. This line is separate from line 4, because list +permission can only be granted globally, not to specific target +principals. + +(line 6) Finally, the Service Management System principal +``sms@ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` has all permissions except extracting keys, but +any principal that it creates or modifies will not be able to get +postdateable tickets or tickets with a life of longer than 9 hours. + +MODULE BEHAVIOR +--------------- + +The ACL file can coexist with other authorization modules in release +1.16 and later, as configured in the :ref:`kadm5_auth` section of +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. The ACL file will positively authorize +operations according to the rules above, but will never +authoritatively deny an operation, so other modules can authorize +operations in addition to those authorized by the ACL file. + +To operate without an ACL file, set the *acl_file* variable in +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)` to the empty string with ``acl_file = ""``. + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, :ref:`kadmind(8)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/kdc_conf.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/kdc_conf.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..72f002d4d --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/kdc_conf.rst @@ -0,0 +1,980 @@ +.. _kdc.conf(5): + +kdc.conf +======== + +The kdc.conf file supplements :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` for programs which +are typically only used on a KDC, such as the :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` and +:ref:`kadmind(8)` daemons and the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` program. +Relations documented here may also be specified in krb5.conf; for the +KDC programs mentioned, krb5.conf and kdc.conf will be merged into a +single configuration profile. + +Normally, the kdc.conf file is found in the KDC state directory, +|kdcdir|. You can override the default location by setting the +environment variable **KRB5_KDC_PROFILE**. + +Please note that you need to restart the KDC daemon for any configuration +changes to take effect. + +Structure +--------- + +The kdc.conf file is set up in the same format as the +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file. + + +Sections +-------- + +The kdc.conf file may contain the following sections: + +==================== ================================================= +:ref:`kdcdefaults` Default values for KDC behavior +:ref:`kdc_realms` Realm-specific database configuration and settings +:ref:`dbdefaults` Default database settings +:ref:`dbmodules` Per-database settings +:ref:`logging` Controls how Kerberos daemons perform logging +==================== ================================================= + + +.. _kdcdefaults: + +[kdcdefaults] +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Some relations in the [kdcdefaults] section specify default values for +realm variables, to be used if the [realms] subsection does not +contain a relation for the tag. See the :ref:`kdc_realms` section for +the definitions of these relations. + +* **host_based_services** +* **kdc_listen** +* **kdc_ports** +* **kdc_tcp_listen** +* **kdc_tcp_ports** +* **no_host_referral** +* **restrict_anonymous_to_tgt** + +The following [kdcdefaults] variables have no per-realm equivalent: + +**kdc_max_dgram_reply_size** + Specifies the maximum packet size that can be sent over UDP. The + default value is 4096 bytes. + +**kdc_tcp_listen_backlog** + (Integer.) Set the size of the listen queue length for the KDC + daemon. The value may be limited by OS settings. The default + value is 5. + +**spake_preauth_kdc_challenge** + (String.) Specifies the group for a SPAKE optimistic challenge. + See the **spake_preauth_groups** variable in :ref:`libdefaults` + for possible values. The default is not to issue an optimistic + challenge. (New in release 1.17.) + + +.. _kdc_realms: + +[realms] +~~~~~~~~ + +Each tag in the [realms] section is the name of a Kerberos realm. The +value of the tag is a subsection where the relations define KDC +parameters for that particular realm. The following example shows how +to define one parameter for the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm:: + + [realms] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + max_renewable_life = 7d 0h 0m 0s + } + +The following tags may be specified in a [realms] subsection: + +**acl_file** + (String.) Location of the access control list file that + :ref:`kadmind(8)` uses to determine which principals are allowed + which permissions on the Kerberos database. To operate without an + ACL file, set this relation to the empty string with ``acl_file = + ""``. The default value is |kdcdir|\ ``/kadm5.acl``. For more + information on Kerberos ACL file see :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)`. + +**database_module** + (String.) This relation indicates the name of the configuration + section under :ref:`dbmodules` for database-specific parameters + used by the loadable database library. The default value is the + realm name. If this configuration section does not exist, default + values will be used for all database parameters. + +**database_name** + (String, deprecated.) This relation specifies the location of the + Kerberos database for this realm, if the DB2 module is being used + and the :ref:`dbmodules` configuration section does not specify a + database name. The default value is |kdcdir|\ ``/principal``. + +**default_principal_expiration** + (:ref:`abstime` string.) Specifies the default expiration date of + principals created in this realm. The default value is 0, which + means no expiration date. + +**default_principal_flags** + (Flag string.) Specifies the default attributes of principals + created in this realm. The format for this string is a + comma-separated list of flags, with '+' before each flag that + should be enabled and '-' before each flag that should be + disabled. The **postdateable**, **forwardable**, **tgt-based**, + **renewable**, **proxiable**, **dup-skey**, **allow-tickets**, and + **service** flags default to enabled. + + There are a number of possible flags: + + **allow-tickets** + Enabling this flag means that the KDC will issue tickets for + this principal. Disabling this flag essentially deactivates + the principal within this realm. + + **dup-skey** + Enabling this flag allows the KDC to issue user-to-user + service tickets for this principal. + + **forwardable** + Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain forwardable + tickets. + + **hwauth** + If this flag is enabled, then the principal is required to + preauthenticate using a hardware device before receiving any + tickets. + + **no-auth-data-required** + Enabling this flag prevents PAC or AD-SIGNEDPATH data from + being added to service tickets for the principal. + + **ok-as-delegate** + If this flag is enabled, it hints the client that credentials + can and should be delegated when authenticating to the + service. + + **ok-to-auth-as-delegate** + Enabling this flag allows the principal to use S4USelf tickets. + + **postdateable** + Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain postdateable + tickets. + + **preauth** + If this flag is enabled on a client principal, then that + principal is required to preauthenticate to the KDC before + receiving any tickets. On a service principal, enabling this + flag means that service tickets for this principal will only + be issued to clients with a TGT that has the preauthenticated + bit set. + + **proxiable** + Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain proxy + tickets. + + **pwchange** + Enabling this flag forces a password change for this + principal. + + **pwservice** + If this flag is enabled, it marks this principal as a password + change service. This should only be used in special cases, + for example, if a user's password has expired, then the user + has to get tickets for that principal without going through + the normal password authentication in order to be able to + change the password. + + **renewable** + Enabling this flag allows the principal to obtain renewable + tickets. + + **service** + Enabling this flag allows the the KDC to issue service tickets + for this principal. In release 1.17 and later, user-to-user + service tickets are still allowed if the **dup-skey** flag is + set. + + **tgt-based** + Enabling this flag allows a principal to obtain tickets based + on a ticket-granting-ticket, rather than repeating the + authentication process that was used to obtain the TGT. + +**dict_file** + (String.) Location of the dictionary file containing strings that + are not allowed as passwords. The file should contain one string + per line, with no additional whitespace. If none is specified or + if there is no policy assigned to the principal, no dictionary + checks of passwords will be performed. + +**encrypted_challenge_indicator** + (String.) Specifies the authentication indicator value that the KDC + asserts into tickets obtained using FAST encrypted challenge + pre-authentication. New in 1.16. + +**host_based_services** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list.) Lists services which will + get host-based referral processing even if the server principal is + not marked as host-based by the client. + +**iprop_enable** + (Boolean value.) Specifies whether incremental database + propagation is enabled. The default value is false. + +**iprop_master_ulogsize** + (Integer.) Specifies the maximum number of log entries to be + retained for incremental propagation. The default value is 1000. + Prior to release 1.11, the maximum value was 2500. + +**iprop_replica_poll** + (Delta time string.) Specifies how often the replica KDC polls + for new updates from the master. The default value is ``2m`` + (that is, two minutes). New in release 1.17. + +**iprop_slave_poll** + (Delta time string.) The name for **iprop_replica_poll** prior to + release 1.17. Its value is used as a fallback if + **iprop_replica_poll** is not specified. + +**iprop_listen** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list.) Specifies the iprop RPC + listening addresses and/or ports for the :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon. + Each entry may be an interface address, a port number, or an + address and port number separated by a colon. If the address + contains colons, enclose it in square brackets. If no address is + specified, the wildcard address is used. If kadmind fails to bind + to any of the specified addresses, it will fail to start. The + default (when **iprop_enable** is true) is to bind to the wildcard + address at the port specified in **iprop_port**. New in release + 1.15. + +**iprop_port** + (Port number.) Specifies the port number to be used for + incremental propagation. When **iprop_enable** is true, this + relation is required in the replica KDC configuration file, and + this relation or **iprop_listen** is required in the master + configuration file, as there is no default port number. Port + numbers specified in **iprop_listen** entries will override this + port number for the :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon. + +**iprop_resync_timeout** + (Delta time string.) Specifies the amount of time to wait for a + full propagation to complete. This is optional in configuration + files, and is used by replica KDCs only. The default value is 5 + minutes (``5m``). New in release 1.11. + +**iprop_logfile** + (File name.) Specifies where the update log file for the realm + database is to be stored. The default is to use the + **database_name** entry from the realms section of the krb5 config + file, with ``.ulog`` appended. (NOTE: If **database_name** isn't + specified in the realms section, perhaps because the LDAP database + back end is being used, or the file name is specified in the + [dbmodules] section, then the hard-coded default for + **database_name** is used. Determination of the **iprop_logfile** + default value will not use values from the [dbmodules] section.) + +**kadmind_listen** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list.) Specifies the kadmin RPC + listening addresses and/or ports for the :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon. + Each entry may be an interface address, a port number, or an + address and port number separated by a colon. If the address + contains colons, enclose it in square brackets. If no address is + specified, the wildcard address is used. If kadmind fails to bind + to any of the specified addresses, it will fail to start. The + default is to bind to the wildcard address at the port specified + in **kadmind_port**, or the standard kadmin port (749). New in + release 1.15. + +**kadmind_port** + (Port number.) Specifies the port on which the :ref:`kadmind(8)` + daemon is to listen for this realm. Port numbers specified in + **kadmind_listen** entries will override this port number. The + assigned port for kadmind is 749, which is used by default. + +**key_stash_file** + (String.) Specifies the location where the master key has been + stored (via kdb5_util stash). The default is |kdcdir|\ + ``/.k5.REALM``, where *REALM* is the Kerberos realm. + +**kdc_listen** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list.) Specifies the UDP + listening addresses and/or ports for the :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemon. + Each entry may be an interface address, a port number, or an + address and port number separated by a colon. If the address + contains colons, enclose it in square brackets. If no address is + specified, the wildcard address is used. If no port is specified, + the standard port (88) is used. If the KDC daemon fails to bind + to any of the specified addresses, it will fail to start. The + default is to bind to the wildcard address on the standard port. + New in release 1.15. + +**kdc_ports** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list, deprecated.) Prior to + release 1.15, this relation lists the ports for the + :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemon to listen on for UDP requests. In + release 1.15 and later, it has the same meaning as **kdc_listen** + if that relation is not defined. + +**kdc_tcp_listen** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list.) Specifies the TCP + listening addresses and/or ports for the :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemon. + Each entry may be an interface address, a port number, or an + address and port number separated by a colon. If the address + contains colons, enclose it in square brackets. If no address is + specified, the wildcard address is used. If no port is specified, + the standard port (88) is used. To disable listening on TCP, set + this relation to the empty string with ``kdc_tcp_listen = ""``. + If the KDC daemon fails to bind to any of the specified addresses, + it will fail to start. The default is to bind to the wildcard + address on the standard port. New in release 1.15. + +**kdc_tcp_ports** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list, deprecated.) Prior to + release 1.15, this relation lists the ports for the + :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemon to listen on for UDP requests. In + release 1.15 and later, it has the same meaning as + **kdc_tcp_listen** if that relation is not defined. + +**kpasswd_listen** + (Comma-separated list.) Specifies the kpasswd listening addresses + and/or ports for the :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon. Each entry may be + an interface address, a port number, or an address and port number + separated by a colon. If the address contains colons, enclose it + in square brackets. If no address is specified, the wildcard + address is used. If kadmind fails to bind to any of the specified + addresses, it will fail to start. The default is to bind to the + wildcard address at the port specified in **kpasswd_port**, or the + standard kpasswd port (464). New in release 1.15. + +**kpasswd_port** + (Port number.) Specifies the port on which the :ref:`kadmind(8)` + daemon is to listen for password change requests for this realm. + Port numbers specified in **kpasswd_listen** entries will override + this port number. The assigned port for password change requests + is 464, which is used by default. + +**master_key_name** + (String.) Specifies the name of the principal associated with the + master key. The default is ``K/M``. + +**master_key_type** + (Key type string.) Specifies the master key's key type. The + default value for this is |defmkey|. For a list of all possible + values, see :ref:`Encryption_types`. + +**max_life** + (:ref:`duration` string.) Specifies the maximum time period for + which a ticket may be valid in this realm. The default value is + 24 hours. + +**max_renewable_life** + (:ref:`duration` string.) Specifies the maximum time period + during which a valid ticket may be renewed in this realm. + The default value is 0. + +**no_host_referral** + (Whitespace- or comma-separated list.) Lists services to block + from getting host-based referral processing, even if the client + marks the server principal as host-based or the service is also + listed in **host_based_services**. ``no_host_referral = *`` will + disable referral processing altogether. + +**des_crc_session_supported** + (Boolean value). If set to true, the KDC will assume that service + principals support des-cbc-crc for session key enctype negotiation + purposes. If **allow_weak_crypto** in :ref:`libdefaults` is + false, or if des-cbc-crc is not a permitted enctype, then this + variable has no effect. Defaults to true. New in release 1.11. + +**reject_bad_transit** + (Boolean value.) If set to true, the KDC will check the list of + transited realms for cross-realm tickets against the transit path + computed from the realm names and the capaths section of its + :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file; if the path in the ticket to be issued + contains any realms not in the computed path, the ticket will not + be issued, and an error will be returned to the client instead. + If this value is set to false, such tickets will be issued + anyways, and it will be left up to the application server to + validate the realm transit path. + + If the disable-transited-check flag is set in the incoming + request, this check is not performed at all. Having the + **reject_bad_transit** option will cause such ticket requests to + be rejected always. + + This transit path checking and config file option currently apply + only to TGS requests. + + The default value is true. + +**restrict_anonymous_to_tgt** + (Boolean value.) If set to true, the KDC will reject ticket + requests from anonymous principals to service principals other + than the realm's ticket-granting service. This option allows + anonymous PKINIT to be enabled for use as FAST armor tickets + without allowing anonymous authentication to services. The + default value is false. New in release 1.9. + +**spake_preauth_indicator** + (String.) Specifies an authentication indicator value that the + KDC asserts into tickets obtained using SPAKE pre-authentication. + The default is not to add any indicators. This option may be + specified multiple times. New in release 1.17. + +**supported_enctypes** + (List of *key*:*salt* strings.) Specifies the default key/salt + combinations of principals for this realm. Any principals created + through :ref:`kadmin(1)` will have keys of these types. The + default value for this tag is |defkeysalts|. For lists of + possible values, see :ref:`Keysalt_lists`. + + +.. _dbdefaults: + +[dbdefaults] +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The [dbdefaults] section specifies default values for some database +parameters, to be used if the [dbmodules] subsection does not contain +a relation for the tag. See the :ref:`dbmodules` section for the +definitions of these relations. + +* **ldap_kerberos_container_dn** +* **ldap_kdc_dn** +* **ldap_kdc_sasl_authcid** +* **ldap_kdc_sasl_authzid** +* **ldap_kdc_sasl_mech** +* **ldap_kdc_sasl_realm** +* **ldap_kadmind_dn** +* **ldap_kadmind_sasl_authcid** +* **ldap_kadmind_sasl_authzid** +* **ldap_kadmind_sasl_mech** +* **ldap_kadmind_sasl_realm** +* **ldap_service_password_file** +* **ldap_conns_per_server** + + +.. _dbmodules: + +[dbmodules] +~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The [dbmodules] section contains parameters used by the KDC database +library and database modules. Each tag in the [dbmodules] section is +the name of a Kerberos realm or a section name specified by a realm's +**database_module** parameter. The following example shows how to +define one database parameter for the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm:: + + [dbmodules] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + disable_last_success = true + } + +The following tags may be specified in a [dbmodules] subsection: + +**database_name** + This DB2-specific tag indicates the location of the database in + the filesystem. The default is |kdcdir|\ ``/principal``. + +**db_library** + This tag indicates the name of the loadable database module. The + value should be ``db2`` for the DB2 module, ``klmdb`` for the LMDB + module, or ``kldap`` for the LDAP module. + +**disable_last_success** + If set to ``true``, suppresses KDC updates to the "Last successful + authentication" field of principal entries requiring + preauthentication. Setting this flag may improve performance. + (Principal entries which do not require preauthentication never + update the "Last successful authentication" field.). First + introduced in release 1.9. + +**disable_lockout** + If set to ``true``, suppresses KDC updates to the "Last failed + authentication" and "Failed password attempts" fields of principal + entries requiring preauthentication. Setting this flag may + improve performance, but also disables account lockout. First + introduced in release 1.9. + +**ldap_conns_per_server** + This LDAP-specific tag indicates the number of connections to be + maintained per LDAP server. + +**ldap_kdc_dn** and **ldap_kadmind_dn** + These LDAP-specific tags indicate the default DN for binding to + the LDAP server. The :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemon uses + **ldap_kdc_dn**, while the :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon and other + administrative programs use **ldap_kadmind_dn**. The kadmind DN + must have the rights to read and write the Kerberos data in the + LDAP database. The KDC DN must have the same rights, unless + **disable_lockout** and **disable_last_success** are true, in + which case it only needs to have rights to read the Kerberos data. + These tags are ignored if a SASL mechanism is set with + **ldap_kdc_sasl_mech** or **ldap_kadmind_sasl_mech**. + +**ldap_kdc_sasl_mech** and **ldap_kadmind_sasl_mech** + These LDAP-specific tags specify the SASL mechanism (such as + ``EXTERNAL``) to use when binding to the LDAP server. New in + release 1.13. + +**ldap_kdc_sasl_authcid** and **ldap_kadmind_sasl_authcid** + These LDAP-specific tags specify the SASL authentication identity + to use when binding to the LDAP server. Not all SASL mechanisms + require an authentication identity. If the SASL mechanism + requires a secret (such as the password for ``DIGEST-MD5``), these + tags also determine the name within the + **ldap_service_password_file** where the secret is stashed. New + in release 1.13. + +**ldap_kdc_sasl_authzid** and **ldap_kadmind_sasl_authzid** + These LDAP-specific tags specify the SASL authorization identity + to use when binding to the LDAP server. In most circumstances + they do not need to be specified. New in release 1.13. + +**ldap_kdc_sasl_realm** and **ldap_kadmind_sasl_realm** + These LDAP-specific tags specify the SASL realm to use when + binding to the LDAP server. In most circumstances they do not + need to be set. New in release 1.13. + +**ldap_kerberos_container_dn** + This LDAP-specific tag indicates the DN of the container object + where the realm objects will be located. + +**ldap_servers** + This LDAP-specific tag indicates the list of LDAP servers that the + Kerberos servers can connect to. The list of LDAP servers is + whitespace-separated. The LDAP server is specified by a LDAP URI. + It is recommended to use ``ldapi:`` or ``ldaps:`` URLs to connect + to the LDAP server. + +**ldap_service_password_file** + This LDAP-specific tag indicates the file containing the stashed + passwords (created by ``kdb5_ldap_util stashsrvpw``) for the + **ldap_kdc_dn** and **ldap_kadmind_dn** objects, or for the + **ldap_kdc_sasl_authcid** or **ldap_kadmind_sasl_authcid** names + for SASL authentication. This file must be kept secure. + +**mapsize** + This LMDB-specific tag indicates the maximum size of the two + database environments in megabytes. The default value is 128. + Increase this value to address "Environment mapsize limit reached" + errors. New in release 1.17. + +**max_readers** + This LMDB-specific tag indicates the maximum number of concurrent + reading processes for the databases. The default value is 128. + New in release 1.17. + +**nosync** + This LMDB-specific tag can be set to improve the throughput of + kadmind and other administrative agents, at the expense of + durability (recent database changes may not survive a power outage + or other sudden reboot). It does not affect the throughput of the + KDC. The default value is false. New in release 1.17. + +**unlockiter** + If set to ``true``, this DB2-specific tag causes iteration + operations to release the database lock while processing each + principal. Setting this flag to ``true`` can prevent extended + blocking of KDC or kadmin operations when dumps of large databases + are in progress. First introduced in release 1.13. + +The following tag may be specified directly in the [dbmodules] +section to control where database modules are loaded from: + +**db_module_dir** + This tag controls where the plugin system looks for database + modules. The value should be an absolute path. + +.. _logging: + +[logging] +~~~~~~~~~ + +The [logging] section indicates how :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` and +:ref:`kadmind(8)` perform logging. It may contain the following +relations: + +**admin_server** + Specifies how :ref:`kadmind(8)` performs logging. + +**kdc** + Specifies how :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` performs logging. + +**default** + Specifies how either daemon performs logging in the absence of + relations specific to the daemon. + +**debug** + (Boolean value.) Specifies whether debugging messages are + included in log outputs other than SYSLOG. Debugging messages are + always included in the system log output because syslog performs + its own priority filtering. The default value is false. New in + release 1.15. + +Logging specifications may have the following forms: + +**FILE=**\ *filename* or **FILE:**\ *filename* + This value causes the daemon's logging messages to go to the + *filename*. If the ``=`` form is used, the file is overwritten. + If the ``:`` form is used, the file is appended to. + +**STDERR** + This value causes the daemon's logging messages to go to its + standard error stream. + +**CONSOLE** + This value causes the daemon's logging messages to go to the + console, if the system supports it. + +**DEVICE=**\ *<devicename>* + This causes the daemon's logging messages to go to the specified + device. + +**SYSLOG**\ [\ **:**\ *severity*\ [\ **:**\ *facility*\ ]] + This causes the daemon's logging messages to go to the system log. + + For backward compatibility, a severity argument may be specified, + and must be specified in order to specify a facility. This + argument will be ignored. + + The facility argument specifies the facility under which the + messages are logged. This may be any of the following facilities + supported by the syslog(3) call minus the LOG\_ prefix: **KERN**, + **USER**, **MAIL**, **DAEMON**, **AUTH**, **LPR**, **NEWS**, + **UUCP**, **CRON**, and **LOCAL0** through **LOCAL7**. If no + facility is specified, the default is **AUTH**. + +In the following example, the logging messages from the KDC will go to +the console and to the system log under the facility LOG_DAEMON, and +the logging messages from the administrative server will be appended +to the file ``/var/adm/kadmin.log`` and sent to the device +``/dev/tty04``. :: + + [logging] + kdc = CONSOLE + kdc = SYSLOG:INFO:DAEMON + admin_server = FILE:/var/adm/kadmin.log + admin_server = DEVICE=/dev/tty04 + +If no logging specification is given, the default is to use syslog. +To disable logging entirely, specify ``default = DEVICE=/dev/null``. + + +.. _otp: + +[otp] +~~~~~ + +Each subsection of [otp] is the name of an OTP token type. The tags +within the subsection define the configuration required to forward a +One Time Password request to a RADIUS server. + +For each token type, the following tags may be specified: + +**server** + This is the server to send the RADIUS request to. It can be a + hostname with optional port, an ip address with optional port, or + a Unix domain socket address. The default is + |kdcdir|\ ``/<name>.socket``. + +**secret** + This tag indicates a filename (which may be relative to |kdcdir|) + containing the secret used to encrypt the RADIUS packets. The + secret should appear in the first line of the file by itself; + leading and trailing whitespace on the line will be removed. If + the value of **server** is a Unix domain socket address, this tag + is optional, and an empty secret will be used if it is not + specified. Otherwise, this tag is required. + +**timeout** + An integer which specifies the time in seconds during which the + KDC should attempt to contact the RADIUS server. This tag is the + total time across all retries and should be less than the time + which an OTP value remains valid for. The default is 5 seconds. + +**retries** + This tag specifies the number of retries to make to the RADIUS + server. The default is 3 retries (4 tries). + +**strip_realm** + If this tag is ``true``, the principal without the realm will be + passed to the RADIUS server. Otherwise, the realm will be + included. The default value is ``true``. + +**indicator** + This tag specifies an authentication indicator to be included in + the ticket if this token type is used to authenticate. This + option may be specified multiple times. (New in release 1.14.) + +In the following example, requests are sent to a remote server via UDP:: + + [otp] + MyRemoteTokenType = { + server = radius.mydomain.com:1812 + secret = SEmfiajf42$ + timeout = 15 + retries = 5 + strip_realm = true + } + +An implicit default token type named ``DEFAULT`` is defined for when +the per-principal configuration does not specify a token type. Its +configuration is shown below. You may override this token type to +something applicable for your situation:: + + [otp] + DEFAULT = { + strip_realm = false + } + +PKINIT options +-------------- + +.. note:: + + The following are pkinit-specific options. These values may + be specified in [kdcdefaults] as global defaults, or within + a realm-specific subsection of [realms]. Also note that a + realm-specific value over-rides, does not add to, a generic + [kdcdefaults] specification. The search order is: + +1. realm-specific subsection of [realms]:: + + [realms] + EXAMPLE.COM = { + pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/example.com.crt + } + +2. generic value in the [kdcdefaults] section:: + + [kdcdefaults] + pkinit_anchors = DIR:/usr/local/generic_trusted_cas/ + +For information about the syntax of some of these options, see +:ref:`Specifying PKINIT identity information <pkinit_identity>` in +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. + +**pkinit_anchors** + Specifies the location of trusted anchor (root) certificates which + the KDC trusts to sign client certificates. This option is + required if pkinit is to be supported by the KDC. This option may + be specified multiple times. + +**pkinit_dh_min_bits** + Specifies the minimum number of bits the KDC is willing to accept + for a client's Diffie-Hellman key. The default is 2048. + +**pkinit_allow_upn** + Specifies that the KDC is willing to accept client certificates + with the Microsoft UserPrincipalName (UPN) Subject Alternative + Name (SAN). This means the KDC accepts the binding of the UPN in + the certificate to the Kerberos principal name. The default value + is false. + + Without this option, the KDC will only accept certificates with + the id-pkinit-san as defined in :rfc:`4556`. There is currently + no option to disable SAN checking in the KDC. + +**pkinit_eku_checking** + This option specifies what Extended Key Usage (EKU) values the KDC + is willing to accept in client certificates. The values + recognized in the kdc.conf file are: + + **kpClientAuth** + This is the default value and specifies that client + certificates must have the id-pkinit-KPClientAuth EKU as + defined in :rfc:`4556`. + + **scLogin** + If scLogin is specified, client certificates with the + Microsoft Smart Card Login EKU (id-ms-kp-sc-logon) will be + accepted. + + **none** + If none is specified, then client certificates will not be + checked to verify they have an acceptable EKU. The use of + this option is not recommended. + +**pkinit_identity** + Specifies the location of the KDC's X.509 identity information. + This option is required if pkinit is to be supported by the KDC. + +**pkinit_indicator** + Specifies an authentication indicator to include in the ticket if + pkinit is used to authenticate. This option may be specified + multiple times. (New in release 1.14.) + +**pkinit_pool** + Specifies the location of intermediate certificates which may be + used by the KDC to complete the trust chain between a client's + certificate and a trusted anchor. This option may be specified + multiple times. + +**pkinit_revoke** + Specifies the location of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) + information to be used by the KDC when verifying the validity of + client certificates. This option may be specified multiple times. + +**pkinit_require_crl_checking** + The default certificate verification process will always check the + available revocation information to see if a certificate has been + revoked. If a match is found for the certificate in a CRL, + verification fails. If the certificate being verified is not + listed in a CRL, or there is no CRL present for its issuing CA, + and **pkinit_require_crl_checking** is false, then verification + succeeds. + + However, if **pkinit_require_crl_checking** is true and there is + no CRL information available for the issuing CA, then verification + fails. + + **pkinit_require_crl_checking** should be set to true if the + policy is such that up-to-date CRLs must be present for every CA. + +**pkinit_require_freshness** + Specifies whether to require clients to include a freshness token + in PKINIT requests. The default value is false. (New in release + 1.17.) + +.. _Encryption_types: + +Encryption types +---------------- + +Any tag in the configuration files which requires a list of encryption +types can be set to some combination of the following strings. +Encryption types marked as "weak" are available for compatibility but +not recommended for use. + +==================================================== ========================================================= +des-cbc-crc DES cbc mode with CRC-32 (weak) +des-cbc-md4 DES cbc mode with RSA-MD4 (weak) +des-cbc-md5 DES cbc mode with RSA-MD5 (weak) +des-cbc-raw DES cbc mode raw (weak) +des3-cbc-raw Triple DES cbc mode raw (weak) +des3-cbc-sha1 des3-hmac-sha1 des3-cbc-sha1-kd Triple DES cbc mode with HMAC/sha1 +des-hmac-sha1 DES with HMAC/sha1 (weak) +aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes256-cts aes256-sha1 AES-256 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC +aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes128-cts aes128-sha1 AES-128 CTS mode with 96-bit SHA-1 HMAC +aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 aes256-sha2 AES-256 CTS mode with 192-bit SHA-384 HMAC +aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 aes128-sha2 AES-128 CTS mode with 128-bit SHA-256 HMAC +arcfour-hmac rc4-hmac arcfour-hmac-md5 RC4 with HMAC/MD5 +arcfour-hmac-exp rc4-hmac-exp arcfour-hmac-md5-exp Exportable RC4 with HMAC/MD5 (weak) +camellia256-cts-cmac camellia256-cts Camellia-256 CTS mode with CMAC +camellia128-cts-cmac camellia128-cts Camellia-128 CTS mode with CMAC +des The DES family: des-cbc-crc, des-cbc-md5, and des-cbc-md4 (weak) +des3 The triple DES family: des3-cbc-sha1 +aes The AES family: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96, aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96, aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192, and aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 +rc4 The RC4 family: arcfour-hmac +camellia The Camellia family: camellia256-cts-cmac and camellia128-cts-cmac +==================================================== ========================================================= + +The string **DEFAULT** can be used to refer to the default set of +types for the variable in question. Types or families can be removed +from the current list by prefixing them with a minus sign ("-"). +Types or families can be prefixed with a plus sign ("+") for symmetry; +it has the same meaning as just listing the type or family. For +example, "``DEFAULT -des``" would be the default set of encryption +types with DES types removed, and "``des3 DEFAULT``" would be the +default set of encryption types with triple DES types moved to the +front. + +While **aes128-cts** and **aes256-cts** are supported for all Kerberos +operations, they are not supported by very old versions of our GSSAPI +implementation (krb5-1.3.1 and earlier). Services running versions of +krb5 without AES support must not be given keys of these encryption +types in the KDC database. + +The **aes128-sha2** and **aes256-sha2** encryption types are new in +release 1.15. Services running versions of krb5 without support for +these newer encryption types must not be given keys of these +encryption types in the KDC database. + + +.. _Keysalt_lists: + +Keysalt lists +------------- + +Kerberos keys for users are usually derived from passwords. Kerberos +commands and configuration parameters that affect generation of keys +take lists of enctype-salttype ("keysalt") pairs, known as *keysalt +lists*. Each keysalt pair is an enctype name followed by a salttype +name, in the format *enc*:*salt*. Individual keysalt list members are +separated by comma (",") characters or space characters. For example:: + + kadmin -e aes256-cts:normal,aes128-cts:normal + +would start up kadmin so that by default it would generate +password-derived keys for the **aes256-cts** and **aes128-cts** +encryption types, using a **normal** salt. + +To ensure that people who happen to pick the same password do not have +the same key, Kerberos 5 incorporates more information into the key +using something called a salt. The supported salt types are as +follows: + +================= ============================================ +normal default for Kerberos Version 5 +v4 the only type used by Kerberos Version 4 (no salt) +norealm same as the default, without using realm information +onlyrealm uses only realm information as the salt +afs3 AFS version 3, only used for compatibility with Kerberos 4 in AFS +special generate a random salt +================= ============================================ + + +Sample kdc.conf File +-------------------- + +Here's an example of a kdc.conf file:: + + [kdcdefaults] + kdc_listen = 88 + kdc_tcp_listen = 88 + [realms] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + kadmind_port = 749 + max_life = 12h 0m 0s + max_renewable_life = 7d 0h 0m 0s + master_key_type = aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 + supported_enctypes = aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal + database_module = openldap_ldapconf + } + + [logging] + kdc = FILE:/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kdc.log + admin_server = FILE:/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/kadmin.log + + [dbdefaults] + ldap_kerberos_container_dn = cn=krbcontainer,dc=mit,dc=edu + + [dbmodules] + openldap_ldapconf = { + db_library = kldap + disable_last_success = true + ldap_kdc_dn = "cn=krbadmin,dc=mit,dc=edu" + # this object needs to have read rights on + # the realm container and principal subtrees + ldap_kadmind_dn = "cn=krbadmin,dc=mit,dc=edu" + # this object needs to have read and write rights on + # the realm container and principal subtrees + ldap_service_password_file = /etc/kerberos/service.keyfile + ldap_servers = ldaps://kerberos.mit.edu + ldap_conns_per_server = 5 + } + + +FILES +------ + +|kdcdir|\ ``/kdc.conf`` + + +SEE ALSO +--------- + +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)`, :ref:`krb5kdc(8)`, :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4adb084a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_files/krb5_conf.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1247 @@ +.. _krb5.conf(5): + +krb5.conf +========= + +The krb5.conf file contains Kerberos configuration information, +including the locations of KDCs and admin servers for the Kerberos +realms of interest, defaults for the current realm and for Kerberos +applications, and mappings of hostnames onto Kerberos realms. +Normally, you should install your krb5.conf file in the directory +``/etc``. You can override the default location by setting the +environment variable **KRB5_CONFIG**. Multiple colon-separated +filenames may be specified in **KRB5_CONFIG**; all files which are +present will be read. Starting in release 1.14, directory names can +also be specified in **KRB5_CONFIG**; all files within the directory +whose names consist solely of alphanumeric characters, dashes, or +underscores will be read. + + +Structure +--------- + +The krb5.conf file is set up in the style of a Windows INI file. +Lines beginning with '#' or ';' (possibly after initial whitespace) +are ignored as comments. Sections are headed by the section name, in +square brackets. Each section may contain zero or more relations, of +the form:: + + foo = bar + +or:: + + fubar = { + foo = bar + baz = quux + } + +Placing a '\*' after the closing bracket of a section name indicates +that the section is *final*, meaning that if the same section appears +within a later file specified in **KRB5_CONFIG**, it will be ignored. +A subsection can be marked as final by placing a '\*' after either the +tag name or the closing brace. + +The krb5.conf file can include other files using either of the +following directives at the beginning of a line:: + + include FILENAME + includedir DIRNAME + +*FILENAME* or *DIRNAME* should be an absolute path. The named file or +directory must exist and be readable. Including a directory includes +all files within the directory whose names consist solely of +alphanumeric characters, dashes, or underscores. Starting in release +1.15, files with names ending in ".conf" are also included, unless the +name begins with ".". Included profile files are syntactically +independent of their parents, so each included file must begin with a +section header. Starting in release 1.17, files are read in +alphanumeric order; in previous releases, they may be read in any +order. + +The krb5.conf file can specify that configuration should be obtained +from a loadable module, rather than the file itself, using the +following directive at the beginning of a line before any section +headers:: + + module MODULEPATH:RESIDUAL + +*MODULEPATH* may be relative to the library path of the krb5 +installation, or it may be an absolute path. *RESIDUAL* is provided +to the module at initialization time. If krb5.conf uses a module +directive, :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` should also use one if it exists. + + +Sections +-------- + +The krb5.conf file may contain the following sections: + +=================== ======================================================= +:ref:`libdefaults` Settings used by the Kerberos V5 library +:ref:`realms` Realm-specific contact information and settings +:ref:`domain_realm` Maps server hostnames to Kerberos realms +:ref:`capaths` Authentication paths for non-hierarchical cross-realm +:ref:`appdefaults` Settings used by some Kerberos V5 applications +:ref:`plugins` Controls plugin module registration +=================== ======================================================= + +Additionally, krb5.conf may include any of the relations described in +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, but it is not a recommended practice. + +.. _libdefaults: + +[libdefaults] +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The libdefaults section may contain any of the following relations: + +**allow_weak_crypto** + If this flag is set to false, then weak encryption types (as noted + in :ref:`Encryption_types` in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`) will be filtered + out of the lists **default_tgs_enctypes**, + **default_tkt_enctypes**, and **permitted_enctypes**. The default + value for this tag is false, which may cause authentication + failures in existing Kerberos infrastructures that do not support + strong crypto. Users in affected environments should set this tag + to true until their infrastructure adopts stronger ciphers. + +**ap_req_checksum_type** + An integer which specifies the type of AP-REQ checksum to use in + authenticators. This variable should be unset so the appropriate + checksum for the encryption key in use will be used. This can be + set if backward compatibility requires a specific checksum type. + See the **kdc_req_checksum_type** configuration option for the + possible values and their meanings. + +**canonicalize** + If this flag is set to true, initial ticket requests to the KDC + will request canonicalization of the client principal name, and + answers with different client principals than the requested + principal will be accepted. The default value is false. + +**ccache_type** + This parameter determines the format of credential cache types + created by :ref:`kinit(1)` or other programs. The default value + is 4, which represents the most current format. Smaller values + can be used for compatibility with very old implementations of + Kerberos which interact with credential caches on the same host. + +**clockskew** + Sets the maximum allowable amount of clockskew in seconds that the + library will tolerate before assuming that a Kerberos message is + invalid. The default value is 300 seconds, or five minutes. + + The clockskew setting is also used when evaluating ticket start + and expiration times. For example, tickets that have reached + their expiration time can still be used (and renewed if they are + renewable tickets) if they have been expired for a shorter + duration than the **clockskew** setting. + +**default_ccache_name** + This relation specifies the name of the default credential cache. + The default is |ccache|. This relation is subject to parameter + expansion (see below). New in release 1.11. + +**default_client_keytab_name** + This relation specifies the name of the default keytab for + obtaining client credentials. The default is |ckeytab|. This + relation is subject to parameter expansion (see below). + New in release 1.11. + +**default_keytab_name** + This relation specifies the default keytab name to be used by + application servers such as sshd. The default is |keytab|. This + relation is subject to parameter expansion (see below). + +**default_realm** + Identifies the default Kerberos realm for the client. Set its + value to your Kerberos realm. If this value is not set, then a + realm must be specified with every Kerberos principal when + invoking programs such as :ref:`kinit(1)`. + +**default_tgs_enctypes** + Identifies the supported list of session key encryption types that + the client should request when making a TGS-REQ, in order of + preference from highest to lowest. The list may be delimited with + commas or whitespace. See :ref:`Encryption_types` in + :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` for a list of the accepted values for this tag. + The default value is |defetypes|, but single-DES encryption types + will be implicitly removed from this list if the value of + **allow_weak_crypto** is false. + + Do not set this unless required for specific backward + compatibility purposes; stale values of this setting can prevent + clients from taking advantage of new stronger enctypes when the + libraries are upgraded. + +**default_tkt_enctypes** + Identifies the supported list of session key encryption types that + the client should request when making an AS-REQ, in order of + preference from highest to lowest. The format is the same as for + default_tgs_enctypes. The default value for this tag is + |defetypes|, but single-DES encryption types will be implicitly + removed from this list if the value of **allow_weak_crypto** is + false. + + Do not set this unless required for specific backward + compatibility purposes; stale values of this setting can prevent + clients from taking advantage of new stronger enctypes when the + libraries are upgraded. + +**dns_canonicalize_hostname** + Indicate whether name lookups will be used to canonicalize + hostnames for use in service principal names. Setting this flag + to false can improve security by reducing reliance on DNS, but + means that short hostnames will not be canonicalized to + fully-qualified hostnames. The default value is true. + +**dns_lookup_kdc** + Indicate whether DNS SRV records should be used to locate the KDCs + and other servers for a realm, if they are not listed in the + krb5.conf information for the realm. (Note that the admin_server + entry must be in the krb5.conf realm information in order to + contact kadmind, because the DNS implementation for kadmin is + incomplete.) + + Enabling this option does open up a type of denial-of-service + attack, if someone spoofs the DNS records and redirects you to + another server. However, it's no worse than a denial of service, + because that fake KDC will be unable to decode anything you send + it (besides the initial ticket request, which has no encrypted + data), and anything the fake KDC sends will not be trusted without + verification using some secret that it won't know. + +**dns_uri_lookup** + Indicate whether DNS URI records should be used to locate the KDCs + and other servers for a realm, if they are not listed in the + krb5.conf information for the realm. SRV records are used as a + fallback if no URI records were found. The default value is true. + New in release 1.15. + +**err_fmt** + This relation allows for custom error message formatting. If a + value is set, error messages will be formatted by substituting a + normal error message for %M and an error code for %C in the value. + +**extra_addresses** + This allows a computer to use multiple local addresses, in order + to allow Kerberos to work in a network that uses NATs while still + using address-restricted tickets. The addresses should be in a + comma-separated list. This option has no effect if + **noaddresses** is true. + +**forwardable** + If this flag is true, initial tickets will be forwardable by + default, if allowed by the KDC. The default value is false. + +**ignore_acceptor_hostname** + When accepting GSSAPI or krb5 security contexts for host-based + service principals, ignore any hostname passed by the calling + application, and allow clients to authenticate to any service + principal in the keytab matching the service name and realm name + (if given). This option can improve the administrative + flexibility of server applications on multihomed hosts, but could + compromise the security of virtual hosting environments. The + default value is false. New in release 1.10. + +**k5login_authoritative** + If this flag is true, principals must be listed in a local user's + k5login file to be granted login access, if a :ref:`.k5login(5)` + file exists. If this flag is false, a principal may still be + granted login access through other mechanisms even if a k5login + file exists but does not list the principal. The default value is + true. + +**k5login_directory** + If set, the library will look for a local user's k5login file + within the named directory, with a filename corresponding to the + local username. If not set, the library will look for k5login + files in the user's home directory, with the filename .k5login. + For security reasons, .k5login files must be owned by + the local user or by root. + +**kcm_mach_service** + On macOS only, determines the name of the bootstrap service used to + contact the KCM daemon for the KCM credential cache type. If the + value is ``-``, Mach RPC will not be used to contact the KCM + daemon. The default value is ``org.h5l.kcm``. + +**kcm_socket** + Determines the path to the Unix domain socket used to access the + KCM daemon for the KCM credential cache type. If the value is + ``-``, Unix domain sockets will not be used to contact the KCM + daemon. The default value is + ``/var/run/.heim_org.h5l.kcm-socket``. + +**kdc_default_options** + Default KDC options (Xored for multiple values) when requesting + initial tickets. By default it is set to 0x00000010 + (KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK). + +**kdc_timesync** + Accepted values for this relation are 1 or 0. If it is nonzero, + client machines will compute the difference between their time and + the time returned by the KDC in the timestamps in the tickets and + use this value to correct for an inaccurate system clock when + requesting service tickets or authenticating to services. This + corrective factor is only used by the Kerberos library; it is not + used to change the system clock. The default value is 1. + +**kdc_req_checksum_type** + An integer which specifies the type of checksum to use for the KDC + requests, for compatibility with very old KDC implementations. + This value is only used for DES keys; other keys use the preferred + checksum type for those keys. + + The possible values and their meanings are as follows. + + ======== =============================== + 1 CRC32 + 2 RSA MD4 + 3 RSA MD4 DES + 4 DES CBC + 7 RSA MD5 + 8 RSA MD5 DES + 9 NIST SHA + 12 HMAC SHA1 DES3 + -138 Microsoft MD5 HMAC checksum type + ======== =============================== + +**noaddresses** + If this flag is true, requests for initial tickets will not be + made with address restrictions set, allowing the tickets to be + used across NATs. The default value is true. + +**permitted_enctypes** + Identifies all encryption types that are permitted for use in + session key encryption. The default value for this tag is + |defetypes|, but single-DES encryption types will be implicitly + removed from this list if the value of **allow_weak_crypto** is + false. + +**plugin_base_dir** + If set, determines the base directory where krb5 plugins are + located. The default value is the ``krb5/plugins`` subdirectory + of the krb5 library directory. This relation is subject to + parameter expansion (see below) in release 1.17 and later. + +**preferred_preauth_types** + This allows you to set the preferred preauthentication types which + the client will attempt before others which may be advertised by a + KDC. The default value for this setting is "17, 16, 15, 14", + which forces libkrb5 to attempt to use PKINIT if it is supported. + +**proxiable** + If this flag is true, initial tickets will be proxiable by + default, if allowed by the KDC. The default value is false. + +**rdns** + If this flag is true, reverse name lookup will be used in addition + to forward name lookup to canonicalizing hostnames for use in + service principal names. If **dns_canonicalize_hostname** is set + to false, this flag has no effect. The default value is true. + +**realm_try_domains** + Indicate whether a host's domain components should be used to + determine the Kerberos realm of the host. The value of this + variable is an integer: -1 means not to search, 0 means to try the + host's domain itself, 1 means to also try the domain's immediate + parent, and so forth. The library's usual mechanism for locating + Kerberos realms is used to determine whether a domain is a valid + realm, which may involve consulting DNS if **dns_lookup_kdc** is + set. The default is not to search domain components. + +**renew_lifetime** + (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the default renewable lifetime + for initial ticket requests. The default value is 0. + +**safe_checksum_type** + An integer which specifies the type of checksum to use for the + KRB-SAFE requests. By default it is set to 8 (RSA MD5 DES). For + compatibility with applications linked against DCE version 1.1 or + earlier Kerberos libraries, use a value of 3 to use the RSA MD4 + DES instead. This field is ignored when its value is incompatible + with the session key type. See the **kdc_req_checksum_type** + configuration option for the possible values and their meanings. + +**spake_preauth_groups** + A whitespace or comma-separated list of words which specifies the + groups allowed for SPAKE preauthentication. The possible values + are: + + ============ ================================ + edwards25519 Edwards25519 curve (:rfc:`7748`) + P-256 NIST P-256 curve (:rfc:`5480`) + P-384 NIST P-384 curve (:rfc:`5480`) + P-521 NIST P-521 curve (:rfc:`5480`) + ============ ================================ + + The default value for the client is ``edwards25519``. The default + value for the KDC is empty. New in release 1.17. + +**ticket_lifetime** + (:ref:`duration` string.) Sets the default lifetime for initial + ticket requests. The default value is 1 day. + +**udp_preference_limit** + When sending a message to the KDC, the library will try using TCP + before UDP if the size of the message is above + **udp_preference_limit**. If the message is smaller than + **udp_preference_limit**, then UDP will be tried before TCP. + Regardless of the size, both protocols will be tried if the first + attempt fails. + +**verify_ap_req_nofail** + If this flag is true, then an attempt to verify initial + credentials will fail if the client machine does not have a + keytab. The default value is false. + +.. _realms: + +[realms] +~~~~~~~~ + +Each tag in the [realms] section of the file is the name of a Kerberos +realm. The value of the tag is a subsection with relations that +define the properties of that particular realm. For each realm, the +following tags may be specified in the realm's subsection: + +**admin_server** + Identifies the host where the administration server is running. + Typically, this is the master Kerberos server. This tag must be + given a value in order to communicate with the :ref:`kadmind(8)` + server for the realm. + +**auth_to_local** + This tag allows you to set a general rule for mapping principal + names to local user names. It will be used if there is not an + explicit mapping for the principal name that is being + translated. The possible values are: + + **RULE:**\ *exp* + The local name will be formulated from *exp*. + + The format for *exp* is **[**\ *n*\ **:**\ *string*\ **](**\ + *regexp*\ **)s/**\ *pattern*\ **/**\ *replacement*\ **/g**. + The integer *n* indicates how many components the target + principal should have. If this matches, then a string will be + formed from *string*, substituting the realm of the principal + for ``$0`` and the *n*'th component of the principal for + ``$n`` (e.g., if the principal was ``johndoe/admin`` then + ``[2:$2$1foo]`` would result in the string + ``adminjohndoefoo``). If this string matches *regexp*, then + the ``s//[g]`` substitution command will be run over the + string. The optional **g** will cause the substitution to be + global over the *string*, instead of replacing only the first + match in the *string*. + + **DEFAULT** + The principal name will be used as the local user name. If + the principal has more than one component or is not in the + default realm, this rule is not applicable and the conversion + will fail. + + For example:: + + [realms] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + auth_to_local = RULE:[2:$1](johndoe)s/^.*$/guest/ + auth_to_local = RULE:[2:$1;$2](^.*;admin$)s/;admin$// + auth_to_local = RULE:[2:$2](^.*;root)s/^.*$/root/ + auth_to_local = DEFAULT + } + + would result in any principal without ``root`` or ``admin`` as the + second component to be translated with the default rule. A + principal with a second component of ``admin`` will become its + first component. ``root`` will be used as the local name for any + principal with a second component of ``root``. The exception to + these two rules are any principals ``johndoe/*``, which will + always get the local name ``guest``. + +**auth_to_local_names** + This subsection allows you to set explicit mappings from principal + names to local user names. The tag is the mapping name, and the + value is the corresponding local user name. + +**default_domain** + This tag specifies the domain used to expand hostnames when + translating Kerberos 4 service principals to Kerberos 5 principals + (for example, when converting ``rcmd.hostname`` to + ``host/hostname.domain``). + +**disable_encrypted_timestamp** + If this flag is true, the client will not perform encrypted + timestamp preauthentication if requested by the KDC. Setting this + flag can help to prevent dictionary attacks by active attackers, + if the realm's KDCs support SPAKE preauthentication or if initial + authentication always uses another mechanism or always uses FAST. + This flag persists across client referrals during initial + authentication. This flag does not prevent the KDC from offering + encrypted timestamp. New in release 1.17. + +**http_anchors** + When KDCs and kpasswd servers are accessed through HTTPS proxies, this tag + can be used to specify the location of the CA certificate which should be + trusted to issue the certificate for a proxy server. If left unspecified, + the system-wide default set of CA certificates is used. + + The syntax for values is similar to that of values for the + **pkinit_anchors** tag: + + **FILE:** *filename* + + *filename* is assumed to be the name of an OpenSSL-style ca-bundle file. + + **DIR:** *dirname* + + *dirname* is assumed to be an directory which contains CA certificates. + All files in the directory will be examined; if they contain certificates + (in PEM format), they will be used. + + **ENV:** *envvar* + + *envvar* specifies the name of an environment variable which has been set + to a value conforming to one of the previous values. For example, + ``ENV:X509_PROXY_CA``, where environment variable ``X509_PROXY_CA`` has + been set to ``FILE:/tmp/my_proxy.pem``. + +**kdc** + The name or address of a host running a KDC for that realm. An + optional port number, separated from the hostname by a colon, may + be included. If the name or address contains colons (for example, + if it is an IPv6 address), enclose it in square brackets to + distinguish the colon from a port separator. For your computer to + be able to communicate with the KDC for each realm, this tag must + be given a value in each realm subsection in the configuration + file, or there must be DNS SRV records specifying the KDCs. + +**kpasswd_server** + Points to the server where all the password changes are performed. + If there is no such entry, DNS will be queried (unless forbidden + by **dns_lookup_kdc**). Finally, port 464 on the **admin_server** + host will be tried. + +**master_kdc** + Identifies the master KDC(s). Currently, this tag is used in only + one case: If an attempt to get credentials fails because of an + invalid password, the client software will attempt to contact the + master KDC, in case the user's password has just been changed, and + the updated database has not been propagated to the replica + servers yet. + +**v4_instance_convert** + This subsection allows the administrator to configure exceptions + to the **default_domain** mapping rule. It contains V4 instances + (the tag name) which should be translated to some specific + hostname (the tag value) as the second component in a Kerberos V5 + principal name. + +**v4_realm** + This relation is used by the krb524 library routines when + converting a V5 principal name to a V4 principal name. It is used + when the V4 realm name and the V5 realm name are not the same, but + still share the same principal names and passwords. The tag value + is the Kerberos V4 realm name. + + +.. _domain_realm: + +[domain_realm] +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The [domain_realm] section provides a translation from a domain name +or hostname to a Kerberos realm name. The tag name can be a host name +or domain name, where domain names are indicated by a prefix of a +period (``.``). The value of the relation is the Kerberos realm name +for that particular host or domain. A host name relation implicitly +provides the corresponding domain name relation, unless an explicit domain +name relation is provided. The Kerberos realm may be +identified either in the realms_ section or using DNS SRV records. +Host names and domain names should be in lower case. For example:: + + [domain_realm] + crash.mit.edu = TEST.ATHENA.MIT.EDU + .dev.mit.edu = TEST.ATHENA.MIT.EDU + mit.edu = ATHENA.MIT.EDU + +maps the host with the name ``crash.mit.edu`` into the +``TEST.ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` realm. The second entry maps all hosts under the +domain ``dev.mit.edu`` into the ``TEST.ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` realm, but not +the host with the name ``dev.mit.edu``. That host is matched +by the third entry, which maps the host ``mit.edu`` and all hosts +under the domain ``mit.edu`` that do not match a preceding rule +into the realm ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU``. + +If no translation entry applies to a hostname used for a service +principal for a service ticket request, the library will try to get a +referral to the appropriate realm from the client realm's KDC. If +that does not succeed, the host's realm is considered to be the +hostname's domain portion converted to uppercase, unless the +**realm_try_domains** setting in [libdefaults] causes a different +parent domain to be used. + + +.. _capaths: + +[capaths] +~~~~~~~~~ + +In order to perform direct (non-hierarchical) cross-realm +authentication, configuration is needed to determine the +authentication paths between realms. + +A client will use this section to find the authentication path between +its realm and the realm of the server. The server will use this +section to verify the authentication path used by the client, by +checking the transited field of the received ticket. + +There is a tag for each participating client realm, and each tag has +subtags for each of the server realms. The value of the subtags is an +intermediate realm which may participate in the cross-realm +authentication. The subtags may be repeated if there is more then one +intermediate realm. A value of "." means that the two realms share +keys directly, and no intermediate realms should be allowed to +participate. + +Only those entries which will be needed on the client or the server +need to be present. A client needs a tag for its local realm with +subtags for all the realms of servers it will need to authenticate to. +A server needs a tag for each realm of the clients it will serve, with +a subtag of the server realm. + +For example, ``ANL.GOV``, ``PNL.GOV``, and ``NERSC.GOV`` all wish to +use the ``ES.NET`` realm as an intermediate realm. ANL has a sub +realm of ``TEST.ANL.GOV`` which will authenticate with ``NERSC.GOV`` +but not ``PNL.GOV``. The [capaths] section for ``ANL.GOV`` systems +would look like this:: + + [capaths] + ANL.GOV = { + TEST.ANL.GOV = . + PNL.GOV = ES.NET + NERSC.GOV = ES.NET + ES.NET = . + } + TEST.ANL.GOV = { + ANL.GOV = . + } + PNL.GOV = { + ANL.GOV = ES.NET + } + NERSC.GOV = { + ANL.GOV = ES.NET + } + ES.NET = { + ANL.GOV = . + } + +The [capaths] section of the configuration file used on ``NERSC.GOV`` +systems would look like this:: + + [capaths] + NERSC.GOV = { + ANL.GOV = ES.NET + TEST.ANL.GOV = ES.NET + TEST.ANL.GOV = ANL.GOV + PNL.GOV = ES.NET + ES.NET = . + } + ANL.GOV = { + NERSC.GOV = ES.NET + } + PNL.GOV = { + NERSC.GOV = ES.NET + } + ES.NET = { + NERSC.GOV = . + } + TEST.ANL.GOV = { + NERSC.GOV = ANL.GOV + NERSC.GOV = ES.NET + } + +When a subtag is used more than once within a tag, clients will use +the order of values to determine the path. The order of values is not +important to servers. + + +.. _appdefaults: + +[appdefaults] +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Each tag in the [appdefaults] section names a Kerberos V5 application +or an option that is used by some Kerberos V5 application[s]. The +value of the tag defines the default behaviors for that application. + +For example:: + + [appdefaults] + telnet = { + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + option1 = false + } + } + telnet = { + option1 = true + option2 = true + } + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + option2 = false + } + option2 = true + +The above four ways of specifying the value of an option are shown in +order of decreasing precedence. In this example, if telnet is running +in the realm EXAMPLE.COM, it should, by default, have option1 and +option2 set to true. However, a telnet program in the realm +``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` should have ``option1`` set to false and +``option2`` set to true. Any other programs in ATHENA.MIT.EDU should +have ``option2`` set to false by default. Any programs running in +other realms should have ``option2`` set to true. + +The list of specifiable options for each application may be found in +that application's man pages. The application defaults specified here +are overridden by those specified in the realms_ section. + + +.. _plugins: + +[plugins] +~~~~~~~~~ + + * pwqual_ interface + * kadm5_hook_ interface + * clpreauth_ and kdcpreauth_ interfaces + +Tags in the [plugins] section can be used to register dynamic plugin +modules and to turn modules on and off. Not every krb5 pluggable +interface uses the [plugins] section; the ones that do are documented +here. + +New in release 1.9. + +Each pluggable interface corresponds to a subsection of [plugins]. +All subsections support the same tags: + +**disable** + This tag may have multiple values. If there are values for this + tag, then the named modules will be disabled for the pluggable + interface. + +**enable_only** + This tag may have multiple values. If there are values for this + tag, then only the named modules will be enabled for the pluggable + interface. + +**module** + This tag may have multiple values. Each value is a string of the + form ``modulename:pathname``, which causes the shared object + located at *pathname* to be registered as a dynamic module named + *modulename* for the pluggable interface. If *pathname* is not an + absolute path, it will be treated as relative to the + **plugin_base_dir** value from :ref:`libdefaults`. + +For pluggable interfaces where module order matters, modules +registered with a **module** tag normally come first, in the order +they are registered, followed by built-in modules in the order they +are documented below. If **enable_only** tags are used, then the +order of those tags overrides the normal module order. + +The following subsections are currently supported within the [plugins] +section: + +.. _ccselect: + +ccselect interface +################## + +The ccselect subsection controls modules for credential cache +selection within a cache collection. In addition to any registered +dynamic modules, the following built-in modules exist (and may be +disabled with the disable tag): + +**k5identity** + Uses a .k5identity file in the user's home directory to select a + client principal + +**realm** + Uses the service realm to guess an appropriate cache from the + collection + +**hostname** + If the service principal is host-based, uses the service hostname + to guess an appropriate cache from the collection + +.. _pwqual: + +pwqual interface +################ + +The pwqual subsection controls modules for the password quality +interface, which is used to reject weak passwords when passwords are +changed. The following built-in modules exist for this interface: + +**dict** + Checks against the realm dictionary file + +**empty** + Rejects empty passwords + +**hesiod** + Checks against user information stored in Hesiod (only if Kerberos + was built with Hesiod support) + +**princ** + Checks against components of the principal name + +.. _kadm5_hook: + +kadm5_hook interface +#################### + +The kadm5_hook interface provides plugins with information on +principal creation, modification, password changes and deletion. This +interface can be used to write a plugin to synchronize MIT Kerberos +with another database such as Active Directory. No plugins are built +in for this interface. + +.. _kadm5_auth: + +kadm5_auth interface +#################### + +The kadm5_auth section (introduced in release 1.16) controls modules +for the kadmin authorization interface, which determines whether a +client principal is allowed to perform a kadmin operation. The +following built-in modules exist for this interface: + +**acl** + This module reads the :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)` file, and authorizes + operations which are allowed according to the rules in the file. + +**self** + This module authorizes self-service operations including password + changes, creation of new random keys, fetching the client's + principal record or string attributes, and fetching the policy + record associated with the client principal. + +.. _clpreauth: + +.. _kdcpreauth: + +clpreauth and kdcpreauth interfaces +################################### + +The clpreauth and kdcpreauth interfaces allow plugin modules to +provide client and KDC preauthentication mechanisms. The following +built-in modules exist for these interfaces: + +**pkinit** + This module implements the PKINIT preauthentication mechanism. + +**encrypted_challenge** + This module implements the encrypted challenge FAST factor. + +**encrypted_timestamp** + This module implements the encrypted timestamp mechanism. + +.. _hostrealm: + +hostrealm interface +################### + +The hostrealm section (introduced in release 1.12) controls modules +for the host-to-realm interface, which affects the local mapping of +hostnames to realm names and the choice of default realm. The following +built-in modules exist for this interface: + +**profile** + This module consults the [domain_realm] section of the profile for + authoritative host-to-realm mappings, and the **default_realm** + variable for the default realm. + +**dns** + This module looks for DNS records for fallback host-to-realm + mappings and the default realm. It only operates if the + **dns_lookup_realm** variable is set to true. + +**domain** + This module applies heuristics for fallback host-to-realm + mappings. It implements the **realm_try_domains** variable, and + uses the uppercased parent domain of the hostname if that does not + produce a result. + +.. _localauth: + +localauth interface +################### + +The localauth section (introduced in release 1.12) controls modules +for the local authorization interface, which affects the relationship +between Kerberos principals and local system accounts. The following +built-in modules exist for this interface: + +**default** + This module implements the **DEFAULT** type for **auth_to_local** + values. + +**rule** + This module implements the **RULE** type for **auth_to_local** + values. + +**names** + This module looks for an **auth_to_local_names** mapping for the + principal name. + +**auth_to_local** + This module processes **auth_to_local** values in the default + realm's section, and applies the default method if no + **auth_to_local** values exist. + +**k5login** + This module authorizes a principal to a local account according to + the account's :ref:`.k5login(5)` file. + +**an2ln** + This module authorizes a principal to a local account if the + principal name maps to the local account name. + +.. _certauth: + +certauth interface +################## + +The certauth section (introduced in release 1.16) controls modules for +the certificate authorization interface, which determines whether a +certificate is allowed to preauthenticate a user via PKINIT. The +following built-in modules exist for this interface: + +**pkinit_san** + This module authorizes the certificate if it contains a PKINIT + Subject Alternative Name for the requested client principal, or a + Microsoft UPN SAN matching the principal if **pkinit_allow_upn** + is set to true for the realm. + +**pkinit_eku** + This module rejects the certificate if it does not contain an + Extended Key Usage attribute consistent with the + **pkinit_eku_checking** value for the realm. + +**dbmatch** + This module authorizes or rejects the certificate according to + whether it matches the **pkinit_cert_match** string attribute on + the client principal, if that attribute is present. + + +PKINIT options +-------------- + +.. note:: + + The following are PKINIT-specific options. These values may + be specified in [libdefaults] as global defaults, or within + a realm-specific subsection of [libdefaults], or may be + specified as realm-specific values in the [realms] section. + A realm-specific value overrides, not adds to, a generic + [libdefaults] specification. The search order is: + +1. realm-specific subsection of [libdefaults]:: + + [libdefaults] + EXAMPLE.COM = { + pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/example.com.crt + } + +2. realm-specific value in the [realms] section:: + + [realms] + OTHERREALM.ORG = { + pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/otherrealm.org.crt + } + +3. generic value in the [libdefaults] section:: + + [libdefaults] + pkinit_anchors = DIR:/usr/local/generic_trusted_cas/ + + +.. _pkinit_identity: + +Specifying PKINIT identity information +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The syntax for specifying Public Key identity, trust, and revocation +information for PKINIT is as follows: + +**FILE:**\ *filename*\ [**,**\ *keyfilename*] + This option has context-specific behavior. + + In **pkinit_identity** or **pkinit_identities**, *filename* + specifies the name of a PEM-format file containing the user's + certificate. If *keyfilename* is not specified, the user's + private key is expected to be in *filename* as well. Otherwise, + *keyfilename* is the name of the file containing the private key. + + In **pkinit_anchors** or **pkinit_pool**, *filename* is assumed to + be the name of an OpenSSL-style ca-bundle file. + +**DIR:**\ *dirname* + This option has context-specific behavior. + + In **pkinit_identity** or **pkinit_identities**, *dirname* + specifies a directory with files named ``*.crt`` and ``*.key`` + where the first part of the file name is the same for matching + pairs of certificate and private key files. When a file with a + name ending with ``.crt`` is found, a matching file ending with + ``.key`` is assumed to contain the private key. If no such file + is found, then the certificate in the ``.crt`` is not used. + + In **pkinit_anchors** or **pkinit_pool**, *dirname* is assumed to + be an OpenSSL-style hashed CA directory where each CA cert is + stored in a file named ``hash-of-ca-cert.#``. This infrastructure + is encouraged, but all files in the directory will be examined and + if they contain certificates (in PEM format), they will be used. + + In **pkinit_revoke**, *dirname* is assumed to be an OpenSSL-style + hashed CA directory where each revocation list is stored in a file + named ``hash-of-ca-cert.r#``. This infrastructure is encouraged, + but all files in the directory will be examined and if they + contain a revocation list (in PEM format), they will be used. + +**PKCS12:**\ *filename* + *filename* is the name of a PKCS #12 format file, containing the + user's certificate and private key. + +**PKCS11:**\ [**module_name=**]\ *modname*\ [**:slotid=**\ *slot-id*][**:token=**\ *token-label*][**:certid=**\ *cert-id*][**:certlabel=**\ *cert-label*] + All keyword/values are optional. *modname* specifies the location + of a library implementing PKCS #11. If a value is encountered + with no keyword, it is assumed to be the *modname*. If no + module-name is specified, the default is ``opensc-pkcs11.so``. + ``slotid=`` and/or ``token=`` may be specified to force the use of + a particular smard card reader or token if there is more than one + available. ``certid=`` and/or ``certlabel=`` may be specified to + force the selection of a particular certificate on the device. + See the **pkinit_cert_match** configuration option for more ways + to select a particular certificate to use for PKINIT. + +**ENV:**\ *envvar* + *envvar* specifies the name of an environment variable which has + been set to a value conforming to one of the previous values. For + example, ``ENV:X509_PROXY``, where environment variable + ``X509_PROXY`` has been set to ``FILE:/tmp/my_proxy.pem``. + + +PKINIT krb5.conf options +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +**pkinit_anchors** + Specifies the location of trusted anchor (root) certificates which + the client trusts to sign KDC certificates. This option may be + specified multiple times. These values from the config file are + not used if the user specifies X509_anchors on the command line. + +**pkinit_cert_match** + Specifies matching rules that the client certificate must match + before it is used to attempt PKINIT authentication. If a user has + multiple certificates available (on a smart card, or via other + media), there must be exactly one certificate chosen before + attempting PKINIT authentication. This option may be specified + multiple times. All the available certificates are checked + against each rule in order until there is a match of exactly one + certificate. + + The Subject and Issuer comparison strings are the :rfc:`2253` + string representations from the certificate Subject DN and Issuer + DN values. + + The syntax of the matching rules is: + + [*relation-operator*\ ]\ *component-rule* ... + + where: + + *relation-operator* + can be either ``&&``, meaning all component rules must match, + or ``||``, meaning only one component rule must match. The + default is ``&&``. + + *component-rule* + can be one of the following. Note that there is no + punctuation or whitespace between component rules. + + | **<SUBJECT>**\ *regular-expression* + | **<ISSUER>**\ *regular-expression* + | **<SAN>**\ *regular-expression* + | **<EKU>**\ *extended-key-usage-list* + | **<KU>**\ *key-usage-list* + + *extended-key-usage-list* is a comma-separated list of + required Extended Key Usage values. All values in the list + must be present in the certificate. Extended Key Usage values + can be: + + * pkinit + * msScLogin + * clientAuth + * emailProtection + + *key-usage-list* is a comma-separated list of required Key + Usage values. All values in the list must be present in the + certificate. Key Usage values can be: + + * digitalSignature + * keyEncipherment + + Examples:: + + pkinit_cert_match = ||<SUBJECT>.*DoE.*<SAN>.*@EXAMPLE.COM + pkinit_cert_match = &&<EKU>msScLogin,clientAuth<ISSUER>.*DoE.* + pkinit_cert_match = <EKU>msScLogin,clientAuth<KU>digitalSignature + +**pkinit_eku_checking** + This option specifies what Extended Key Usage value the KDC + certificate presented to the client must contain. (Note that if + the KDC certificate has the pkinit SubjectAlternativeName encoded + as the Kerberos TGS name, EKU checking is not necessary since the + issuing CA has certified this as a KDC certificate.) The values + recognized in the krb5.conf file are: + + **kpKDC** + This is the default value and specifies that the KDC must have + the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU as defined in :rfc:`4556`. + + **kpServerAuth** + If **kpServerAuth** is specified, a KDC certificate with the + id-kp-serverAuth EKU will be accepted. This key usage value + is used in most commercially issued server certificates. + + **none** + If **none** is specified, then the KDC certificate will not be + checked to verify it has an acceptable EKU. The use of this + option is not recommended. + +**pkinit_dh_min_bits** + Specifies the size of the Diffie-Hellman key the client will + attempt to use. The acceptable values are 1024, 2048, and 4096. + The default is 2048. + +**pkinit_identities** + Specifies the location(s) to be used to find the user's X.509 + identity information. If this option is specified multiple times, + the first valid value is used; this can be used to specify an + environment variable (with **ENV:**\ *envvar*) followed by a + default value. Note that these values are not used if the user + specifies **X509_user_identity** on the command line. + +**pkinit_kdc_hostname** + The presense of this option indicates that the client is willing + to accept a KDC certificate with a dNSName SAN (Subject + Alternative Name) rather than requiring the id-pkinit-san as + defined in :rfc:`4556`. This option may be specified multiple + times. Its value should contain the acceptable hostname for the + KDC (as contained in its certificate). + +**pkinit_pool** + Specifies the location of intermediate certificates which may be + used by the client to complete the trust chain between a KDC + certificate and a trusted anchor. This option may be specified + multiple times. + +**pkinit_require_crl_checking** + The default certificate verification process will always check the + available revocation information to see if a certificate has been + revoked. If a match is found for the certificate in a CRL, + verification fails. If the certificate being verified is not + listed in a CRL, or there is no CRL present for its issuing CA, + and **pkinit_require_crl_checking** is false, then verification + succeeds. + + However, if **pkinit_require_crl_checking** is true and there is + no CRL information available for the issuing CA, then verification + fails. + + **pkinit_require_crl_checking** should be set to true if the + policy is such that up-to-date CRLs must be present for every CA. + +**pkinit_revoke** + Specifies the location of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) + information to be used by the client when verifying the validity + of the KDC certificate presented. This option may be specified + multiple times. + + +.. _parameter_expansion: + +Parameter expansion +------------------- + +Starting with release 1.11, several variables, such as +**default_keytab_name**, allow parameters to be expanded. +Valid parameters are: + + ================= =================================================== + %{TEMP} Temporary directory + %{uid} Unix real UID or Windows SID + %{euid} Unix effective user ID or Windows SID + %{USERID} Same as %{uid} + %{null} Empty string + %{LIBDIR} Installation library directory + %{BINDIR} Installation binary directory + %{SBINDIR} Installation admin binary directory + %{username} (Unix) Username of effective user ID + %{APPDATA} (Windows) Roaming application data for current user + %{COMMON_APPDATA} (Windows) Application data for all users + %{LOCAL_APPDATA} (Windows) Local application data for current user + %{SYSTEM} (Windows) Windows system folder + %{WINDOWS} (Windows) Windows folder + %{USERCONFIG} (Windows) Per-user MIT krb5 config file directory + %{COMMONCONFIG} (Windows) Common MIT krb5 config file directory + ================= =================================================== + +Sample krb5.conf file +--------------------- + +Here is an example of a generic krb5.conf file:: + + [libdefaults] + default_realm = ATHENA.MIT.EDU + dns_lookup_kdc = true + dns_lookup_realm = false + + [realms] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + kdc = kerberos.mit.edu + kdc = kerberos-1.mit.edu + kdc = kerberos-2.mit.edu + admin_server = kerberos.mit.edu + master_kdc = kerberos.mit.edu + } + EXAMPLE.COM = { + kdc = kerberos.example.com + kdc = kerberos-1.example.com + admin_server = kerberos.example.com + } + + [domain_realm] + mit.edu = ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + [capaths] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + EXAMPLE.COM = . + } + EXAMPLE.COM = { + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = . + } + +FILES +----- + +|krb5conf| + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +syslog(3) diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_ldap.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_ldap.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..13d3769f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/conf_ldap.rst @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +.. _conf_ldap: + +Configuring Kerberos with OpenLDAP back-end +=========================================== + + + 1. Make sure the LDAP server is using local authentication + (``ldapi://``) or TLS (``ldaps``). See + https://www.openldap.org/doc/admin24/tls.html for instructions on + configuring TLS support in OpenLDAP. + + 2. Add the Kerberos schema file to the LDAP Server using the OpenLDAP + LDIF file from the krb5 source directory + (``src/plugins/kdb/ldap/libkdb_ldap/kerberos.openldap.ldif``). + The following example uses local authentication:: + + ldapadd -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f /path/to/kerberos.openldap.ldif + + 3. Choose DNs for the :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` and :ref:`kadmind(8)` servers + to bind to the LDAP server, and create them if necessary. Specify + these DNs with the **ldap_kdc_dn** and **ldap_kadmind_dn** + directives in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. The kadmind DN will also be + used for administrative commands such as :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`. + + Alternatively, you may configure krb5kdc and kadmind to use SASL + authentication to access the LDAP server; see the :ref:`dbmodules` + relations **ldap_kdc_sasl_mech** and similar. + + 4. Specify a location for the LDAP service password file by setting + **ldap_service_password_file**. Use ``kdb5_ldap_util stashsrvpw`` + to stash passwords for the KDC and kadmind DNs chosen above. For + example:: + + kdb5_ldap_util stashsrvpw -f /path/to/service.keyfile cn=krbadmin,dc=example,dc=com + + Skip this step if you are using SASL authentication and the + mechanism does not require a password. + + 5. Choose a DN for the global Kerberos container entry (but do not + create the entry at this time). Specify this DN with the + **ldap_kerberos_container_dn** directive in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. + Realm container entries will be created underneath this DN. + Principal entries may exist either underneath the realm container + (the default) or in separate trees referenced from the realm + container. + + 6. Configure the LDAP server ACLs to enable the KDC and kadmin server + DNs to read and write the Kerberos data. If + **disable_last_success** and **disable_lockout** are both set to + true in the :ref:`dbmodules` subsection for the realm, then the + KDC DN only requires read access to the Kerberos data. + + Sample access control information:: + + access to dn.base="" + by * read + + access to dn.base="cn=Subschema" + by * read + + # Provide access to the realm container. + access to dn.subtree= "cn=EXAMPLE.COM,cn=krbcontainer,dc=example,dc=com" + by dn.exact="cn=kdc-service,dc=example,dc=com" write + by dn.exact="cn=adm-service,dc=example,dc=com" write + by * none + + # Provide access to principals, if not underneath the realm container. + access to dn.subtree= "ou=users,dc=example,dc=com" + by dn.exact="cn=kdc-service,dc=example,dc=com" write + by dn.exact="cn=adm-service,dc=example,dc=com" write + by * none + + access to * + by * read + + If the locations of the container and principals or the DNs of the + service objects for a realm are changed then this information + should be updated. + + 7. In :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, make sure the following relations are set + in the :ref:`dbmodules` subsection for the realm:: + + db_library (set to ``kldap``) + ldap_kerberos_container_dn + ldap_kdc_dn + ldap_kadmind_dn + ldap_service_password_file + ldap_servers + + 8. Create the realm using :ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` (see + :ref:`ldap_create_realm`):: + + kdb5_ldap_util create -subtrees ou=users,dc=example,dc=com -s + + Use the **-subtrees** option if the principals are to exist in a + separate subtree from the realm container. Before executing the + command, make sure that the subtree mentioned above + ``(ou=users,dc=example,dc=com)`` exists. If the principals will + exist underneath the realm container, omit the **-subtrees** option + and do not worry about creating the principal subtree. + + For more information, refer to the section :ref:`ops_on_ldap`. + + The realm object is created under the + **ldap_kerberos_container_dn** specified in the configuration + file. This operation will also create the Kerberos container, if + not present already. This container can be used to store + information related to multiple realms. + + 9. Add an ``eq`` index for ``krbPrincipalName`` to speed up principal + lookup operations. See + https://www.openldap.org/doc/admin24/tuning.html#Indexes for + details. + +With the LDAP back end it is possible to provide aliases for principal +entries. Currently we provide no administrative utilities for +creating aliases, so it must be done by direct manipulation of the +LDAP entries. + +An entry with aliases contains multiple values of the +*krbPrincipalName* attribute. Since LDAP attribute values are not +ordered, it is necessary to specify which principal name is canonical, +by using the *krbCanonicalName* attribute. Therefore, to create +aliases for an entry, first set the *krbCanonicalName* attribute of +the entry to the canonical principal name (which should be identical +to the pre-existing *krbPrincipalName* value), and then add additional +*krbPrincipalName* attributes for the aliases. + +Principal aliases are only returned by the KDC when the client +requests canonicalization. Canonicalization is normally requested for +service principals; for client principals, an explicit flag is often +required (e.g., ``kinit -C``) and canonicalization is only performed +for initial ticket requests. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/database.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/database.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d0be455f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/database.rst @@ -0,0 +1,893 @@ +Database administration +======================= + +A Kerberos database contains all of a realm's Kerberos principals, +their passwords, and other administrative information about each +principal. For the most part, you will use the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` +program to manipulate the Kerberos database as a whole, and the +:ref:`kadmin(1)` program to make changes to the entries in the +database. (One notable exception is that users will use the +:ref:`kpasswd(1)` program to change their own passwords.) The kadmin +program has its own command-line interface, to which you type the +database administrating commands. + +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)` provides a means to create, delete, load, or dump +a Kerberos database. It also contains commands to roll over the +database master key, and to stash a copy of the key so that the +:ref:`kadmind(8)` and :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemons can use the database +without manual input. + +:ref:`kadmin(1)` provides for the maintenance of Kerberos principals, +password policies, and service key tables (keytabs). Normally it +operates as a network client using Kerberos authentication to +communicate with :ref:`kadmind(8)`, but there is also a variant, named +kadmin.local, which directly accesses the Kerberos database on the +local filesystem (or through LDAP). kadmin.local is necessary to set +up enough of the database to be able to use the remote version. + +kadmin can authenticate to the admin server using the service +principal ``kadmin/HOST`` (where *HOST* is the hostname of the admin +server) or ``kadmin/admin``. If the credentials cache contains a +ticket for either service principal and the **-c** ccache option is +specified, that ticket is used to authenticate to KADM5. Otherwise, +the **-p** and **-k** options are used to specify the client Kerberos +principal name used to authenticate. Once kadmin has determined the +principal name, it requests a ``kadmin/admin`` Kerberos service ticket +from the KDC, and uses that service ticket to authenticate to KADM5. + +See :ref:`kadmin(1)` for the available kadmin and kadmin.local +commands and options. + + +kadmin options +-------------- + +You can invoke :ref:`kadmin(1)` or kadmin.local with any of the +following options: + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: kadmin_synopsis: + :end-before: kadmin_synopsis_end: + +**OPTIONS** + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _kadmin_options: + :end-before: _kadmin_options_end: + + +Date Format +----------- + +For the supported date-time formats see :ref:`getdate` section +in :ref:`datetime`. + + +Principals +---------- + +Each entry in the Kerberos database contains a Kerberos principal and +the attributes and policies associated with that principal. + + +.. _add_mod_del_princs: + +Adding, modifying and deleting principals +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To add a principal to the database, use the :ref:`kadmin(1)` +**add_principal** command. + +To modify attributes of a principal, use the kadmin +**modify_principal** command. + +To delete a principal, use the kadmin **delete_principal** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _add_principal: + :end-before: _add_principal_end: + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _modify_principal: + :end-before: _modify_principal_end: + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _delete_principal: + :end-before: _delete_principal_end: + + +Examples +######## + +If you want to create a principal which is contained by a LDAP object, +all you need to do is:: + + kadmin: addprinc -x dn=cn=jennifer,dc=example,dc=com jennifer + WARNING: no policy specified for "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; + defaulting to no policy. + Enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password. + Re-enter password for principal jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <=Type it again. + Principal "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. + kadmin: + +If you want to create a principal under a specific LDAP container and +link to an existing LDAP object, all you need to do is:: + + kadmin: addprinc -x containerdn=dc=example,dc=com -x linkdn=cn=david,dc=example,dc=com david + WARNING: no policy specified for "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; + defaulting to no policy. + Enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password. + Re-enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <=Type it again. + Principal "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. + kadmin: + +If you want to associate a ticket policy to a principal, all you need +to do is:: + + kadmin: modprinc -x tktpolicy=userpolicy david + Principal "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" modified. + kadmin: + +If, on the other hand, you want to set up an account that expires on +January 1, 2000, that uses a policy called "stduser", with a temporary +password (which you want the user to change immediately), you would +type the following:: + + kadmin: addprinc david -expire "1/1/2000 12:01am EST" -policy stduser +needchange + Enter password for principal david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type the password. + Re-enter password for principal + david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type it again. + Principal "david@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. + kadmin: + +If you want to delete a principal:: + + kadmin: delprinc jennifer + Are you sure you want to delete the principal + "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"? (yes/no): yes + Principal "jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" deleted. + Make sure that you have removed this principal from + all ACLs before reusing. + kadmin: + + +Retrieving information about a principal +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To retrieve a listing of the attributes and/or policies associated +with a principal, use the :ref:`kadmin(1)` **get_principal** command. + +To generate a listing of principals, use the kadmin +**list_principals** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _get_principal: + :end-before: _get_principal_end: + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _list_principals: + :end-before: _list_principals_end: + + +Changing passwords +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To change a principal's password use the :ref:`kadmin(1)` +**change_password** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _change_password: + :end-before: _change_password_end: + +.. note:: + + Password changes through kadmin are subject to the same + password policies as would apply to password changes through + :ref:`kpasswd(1)`. + + +.. _policies: + +Policies +-------- + +A policy is a set of rules governing passwords. Policies can dictate +minimum and maximum password lifetimes, minimum number of characters +and character classes a password must contain, and the number of old +passwords kept in the database. + + +Adding, modifying and deleting policies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To add a new policy, use the :ref:`kadmin(1)` **add_policy** command. + +To modify attributes of a principal, use the kadmin **modify_policy** +command. + +To delete a policy, use the kadmin **delete_policy** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _add_policy: + :end-before: _add_policy_end: + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _modify_policy: + :end-before: _modify_policy_end: + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _delete_policy: + :end-before: _delete_policy_end: + +.. note:: + + You must cancel the policy from *all* principals before + deleting it. The *delete_policy* command will fail if the policy + is in use by any principals. + + +Retrieving policies +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To retrieve a policy, use the :ref:`kadmin(1)` **get_policy** command. + +You can retrieve the list of policies with the kadmin +**list_policies** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _get_policy: + :end-before: _get_policy_end: + +.. include:: admin_commands/kadmin_local.rst + :start-after: _list_policies: + :end-before: _list_policies_end: + + +Policies and principals +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Policies can be applied to principals as they are created by using +the **-policy** flag to :ref:`add_principal`. Existing principals can +be modified by using the **-policy** or **-clearpolicy** flag to +:ref:`modify_principal`. + + +Updating the history key +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If a policy specifies a number of old keys kept of two or more, the +stored old keys are encrypted in a history key, which is found in the +key data of the ``kadmin/history`` principal. + +Currently there is no support for proper rollover of the history key, +but you can change the history key (for example, to use a better +encryption type) at the cost of invalidating currently stored old +keys. To change the history key, run:: + + kadmin: change_password -randkey kadmin/history + +This command will fail if you specify the **-keepold** flag. Only one +new history key will be created, even if you specify multiple key/salt +combinations. + +In the future, we plan to migrate towards encrypting old keys in the +master key instead of the history key, and implementing proper +rollover support for stored old keys. + + +.. _privileges: + +Privileges +---------- + +Administrative privileges for the Kerberos database are stored in the +file :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)`. + +.. note:: + + A common use of an admin instance is so you can grant + separate permissions (such as administrator access to the + Kerberos database) to a separate Kerberos principal. For + example, the user ``joeadmin`` might have a principal for + his administrative use, called ``joeadmin/admin``. This + way, ``joeadmin`` would obtain ``joeadmin/admin`` tickets + only when he actually needs to use those permissions. + + +.. _db_operations: + +Operations on the Kerberos database +----------------------------------- + +The :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` command is the primary tool for administrating +the Kerberos database. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_util_synopsis: + :end-before: _kdb5_util_synopsis_end: + +**OPTIONS** + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_util_options: + :end-before: _kdb5_util_options_end: + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + +Dumping a Kerberos database to a file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To dump a Kerberos database into a file, use the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` +**dump** command on one of the KDCs. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_util_dump: + :end-before: _kdb5_util_dump_end: + + +Examples +######## + +:: + + shell% kdb5_util dump dumpfile + shell% + + shell% kbd5_util dump -verbose dumpfile + kadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + kadmin/history@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + kadmin/changepw@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + shell% + +If you specify which principals to dump, you must use the full +principal, as in the following example:: + + shell% kdb5_util dump -verbose dumpfile K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU kadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + kadmin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + shell% + +Otherwise, the principals will not match those in the database and +will not be dumped:: + + shell% kdb5_util dump -verbose dumpfile K/M kadmin/admin + shell% + +If you do not specify a dump file, kdb5_util will dump the database to +the standard output. + + +.. _restore_from_dump: + +Restoring a Kerberos database from a dump file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +To restore a Kerberos database dump from a file, use the +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)` **load** command on one of the KDCs. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_util_load: + :end-before: _kdb5_util_load_end: + + +Examples +######## + +To dump a single principal and later load it, updating the database: + +:: + + shell% kdb5_util dump dumpfile principal@REALM + shell% + + shell% kdb5_util load -update dumpfile + shell% + + +.. note:: + + If the database file exists, and the *-update* flag was not + given, *kdb5_util* will overwrite the existing database. + +Using kdb5_util to upgrade a master KDC from krb5 1.1.x: + +:: + + shell% kdb5_util dump old-kdb-dump + shell% kdb5_util dump -ov old-kdb-dump.ov + [Create a new KDC installation, using the old stash file/master password] + shell% kdb5_util load old-kdb-dump + shell% kdb5_util load -update old-kdb-dump.ov + +The use of old-kdb-dump.ov for an extra dump and load is necessary +to preserve per-principal policy information, which is not included in +the default dump format of krb5 1.1.x. + +.. note:: + + Using kdb5_util to dump and reload the principal database is + only necessary when upgrading from versions of krb5 prior + to 1.2.0---newer versions will use the existing database as-is. + + +.. _create_stash: + +Creating a stash file +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +A stash file allows a KDC to authenticate itself to the database +utilities, such as :ref:`kadmind(8)`, :ref:`krb5kdc(8)`, and +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)`. + +To create a stash file, use the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` **stash** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_util_stash: + :end-before: _kdb5_util_stash_end: + + +Example +####### + + shell% kdb5_util stash + kdb5_util: Cannot find/read stored master key while reading master key + kdb5_util: Warning: proceeding without master key + Enter KDC database master key: <= Type the KDC database master password. + shell% + +If you do not specify a stash file, kdb5_util will stash the key in +the file specified in your :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` file. + + +Creating and destroying a Kerberos database +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If you need to create a new Kerberos database, use the +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)` **create** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_util_create: + :end-before: _kdb5_util_create_end: + +If you need to destroy the current Kerberos database, use the +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)` **destroy** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_util_destroy: + :end-before: _kdb5_util_destroy_end: + + +Examples +######## + +:: + + shell% kdb5_util -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU create -s + Loading random data + Initializing database '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal' for realm 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU', + master key name 'K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU' + You will be prompted for the database Master Password. + It is important that you NOT FORGET this password. + Enter KDC database master key: <= Type the master password. + Re-enter KDC database master key to verify: <= Type it again. + shell% + + shell% kdb5_util -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU destroy + Deleting KDC database stored in '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal', are you sure? + (type 'yes' to confirm)? <= yes + OK, deleting database '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal'... + ** Database '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal' destroyed. + shell% + + +Updating the master key +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Starting with release 1.7, :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` allows the master key +to be changed using a rollover process, with minimal loss of +availability. To roll over the master key, follow these steps: + +#. On the master KDC, run ``kdb5_util list_mkeys`` to view the current + master key version number (KVNO). If you have never rolled over + the master key before, this will likely be version 1:: + + $ kdb5_util list_mkeys + Master keys for Principal: K/M@KRBTEST.COM + KVNO: 1, Enctype: des-cbc-crc, Active on: Wed Dec 31 19:00:00 EST 1969 * + +#. On the master KDC, run ``kdb5_util use_mkey 1`` to ensure that a + master key activation list is present in the database. This step + is unnecessary in release 1.11.4 or later, or if the database was + initially created with release 1.7 or later. + +#. On the master KDC, run ``kdb5_util add_mkey -s`` to create a new + master key and write it to the stash file. Enter a secure password + when prompted. If this is the first time you are changing the + master key, the new key will have version 2. The new master key + will not be used until you make it active. + +#. Propagate the database to all replica KDCs, either manually or by + waiting until the next scheduled propagation. If you do not have + any replica KDCs, you can skip this and the next step. + +#. On each replica KDC, run ``kdb5_util list_mkeys`` to verify that + the new master key is present, and then ``kdb5_util stash`` to + write the new master key to the replica KDC's stash file. + +#. On the master KDC, run ``kdb5_util use_mkey 2`` to begin using the + new master key. Replace ``2`` with the version of the new master + key, as appropriate. You can optionally specify a date for the new + master key to become active; by default, it will become active + immediately. Prior to release 1.12, :ref:`kadmind(8)` must be + restarted for this change to take full effect. + +#. On the master KDC, run ``kdb5_util update_princ_encryption``. This + command will iterate over the database and re-encrypt all keys in + the new master key. If the database is large and uses DB2, the + master KDC will become unavailable while this command runs, but + clients should fail over to replica KDCs (if any are present) + during this time period. In release 1.13 and later, you can + instead run ``kdb5_util -x unlockiter update_princ_encryption`` to + use unlocked iteration; this variant will take longer, but will + keep the database available to the KDC and kadmind while it runs. + +#. Wait until the above changes have propagated to all replica KDCs + and until all running KDC and kadmind processes have serviced + requests using updated principal entries. + +#. On the master KDC, run ``kdb5_util purge_mkeys`` to clean up the + old master key. + + +.. _ops_on_ldap: + +Operations on the LDAP database +------------------------------- + +The :ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` is the primary tool for administrating +the Kerberos LDAP database. It allows an administrator to manage +realms, Kerberos services (KDC and Admin Server) and ticket policies. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_synopsis: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_synopsis_end: + +**OPTIONS** + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_options: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_options_end: + + +.. _ldap_create_realm: + +Creating a Kerberos realm +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If you need to create a new realm, use the :ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` +**create** command as follows. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_create: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_create_end: + + +.. _ldap_mod_realm: + +Modifying a Kerberos realm +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If you need to modify a realm, use the :ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` +**modify** command as follows. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_modify: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_modify_end: + + +Destroying a Kerberos realm +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If you need to destroy a Kerberos realm, use the +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **destroy** command as follows. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy_end: + + +Retrieving information about a Kerberos realm +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If you need to display the attributes of a realm, use the +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **view** command as follows. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_view: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_view_end: + + +Listing available Kerberos realms +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If you need to display the list of the realms, use the +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **list** command as follows. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_list: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_list_end: + + +.. _stash_ldap: + +Stashing service object's password +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +The :ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **stashsrvpw** command allows an +administrator to store the password of service object in a file. The +KDC and Administration server uses this password to authenticate to +the LDAP server. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_stashsrvpw: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_stashsrvpw_end: + + +Ticket Policy operations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Creating a Ticket Policy +######################## + +To create a new ticket policy in directory , use the +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **create_policy** command. Ticket policy +objects are created under the realm container. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_create_policy: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_create_policy_end: + + +Modifying a Ticket Policy +######################### + +To modify a ticket policy in directory, use the +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **modify_policy** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_modify_policy: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_modify_policy_end: + + +Retrieving Information About a Ticket Policy +############################################ + +To display the attributes of a ticket policy, use the +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **view_policy** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_view_policy: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_view_policy_end: + + +Destroying a Ticket Policy +########################## + +To destroy an existing ticket policy, use the :ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` +**destroy_policy** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy_policy: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_destroy_policy_end: + + +Listing available Ticket Policies +################################# + +To list the name of ticket policies in a realm, use the +:ref:`kdb5_ldap_util(8)` **list_policy** command. + +.. include:: admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util.rst + :start-after: _kdb5_ldap_util_list_policy: + :end-before: _kdb5_ldap_util_list_policy_end: + + +.. _xrealm_authn: + +Cross-realm authentication +-------------------------- + +In order for a KDC in one realm to authenticate Kerberos users in a +different realm, it must share a key with the KDC in the other realm. +In both databases, there must be krbtgt service principals for both realms. +For example, if you need to do cross-realm authentication between the realms +``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` and ``EXAMPLE.COM``, you would need to add the +principals ``krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` and +``krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM`` to both databases. +These principals must all have the same passwords, key version +numbers, and encryption types; this may require explicitly setting +the key version number with the **-kvno** option. + +In the ATHENA.MIT.EDU and EXAMPLE.COM cross-realm case, the administrators +would run the following commands on the KDCs in both realms:: + + shell%: kadmin.local -e "aes256-cts:normal" + kadmin: addprinc -requires_preauth krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM + Enter password for principal krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM: + Re-enter password for principal krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@EXAMPLE.COM: + kadmin: addprinc -requires_preauth krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + Enter password for principal krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: + Enter password for principal krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: + kadmin: + +.. note:: + + Even if most principals in a realm are generally created + with the **requires_preauth** flag enabled, this flag is not + desirable on cross-realm authentication keys because doing + so makes it impossible to disable preauthentication on a + service-by-service basis. Disabling it as in the example + above is recommended. + +.. note:: + + It is very important that these principals have good + passwords. MIT recommends that TGT principal passwords be + at least 26 characters of random ASCII text. + + +.. _changing_krbtgt_key: + +Changing the krbtgt key +----------------------- + +A Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is a service ticket for the +principal ``krbtgt/REALM``. The key for this principal is created +when the Kerberos database is initialized and need not be changed. +However, it will only have the encryption types supported by the KDC +at the time of the initial database creation. To allow use of newer +encryption types for the TGT, this key has to be changed. + +Changing this key using the normal :ref:`kadmin(1)` +**change_password** command would invalidate any previously issued +TGTs. Therefore, when changing this key, normally one should use the +**-keepold** flag to change_password to retain the previous key in the +database as well as the new key. For example:: + + kadmin: change_password -randkey -keepold krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + +.. warning:: + + After issuing this command, the old key is still valid + and is still vulnerable to (for instance) brute force + attacks. To completely retire an old key or encryption + type, run the kadmin **purgekeys** command to delete keys + with older kvnos, ideally first making sure that all + tickets issued with the old keys have expired. + +Only the first krbtgt key of the newest key version is used to encrypt +ticket-granting tickets. However, the set of encryption types present +in the krbtgt keys is used by default to determine the session key +types supported by the krbtgt service (see +:ref:`session_key_selection`). Because non-MIT Kerberos clients +sometimes send a limited set of encryption types when making AS +requests, it can be important to for the krbtgt service to support +multiple encryption types. This can be accomplished by giving the +krbtgt principal multiple keys, which is usually as simple as not +specifying any **-e** option when changing the krbtgt key, or by +setting the **session_enctypes** string attribute on the krbtgt +principal (see :ref:`set_string`). + +Due to a bug in releases 1.8 through 1.13, renewed and forwarded +tickets may not work if the original ticket was obtained prior to a +krbtgt key change and the modified ticket is obtained afterwards. +Upgrading the KDC to release 1.14 or later will correct this bug. + + +.. _incr_db_prop: + +Incremental database propagation +-------------------------------- + +Overview +~~~~~~~~ + +At some very large sites, dumping and transmitting the database can +take more time than is desirable for changes to propagate from the +master KDC to the replica KDCs. The incremental propagation support +added in the 1.7 release is intended to address this. + +With incremental propagation enabled, all programs on the master KDC +that change the database also write information about the changes to +an "update log" file, maintained as a circular buffer of a certain +size. A process on each replica KDC connects to a service on the +master KDC (currently implemented in the :ref:`kadmind(8)` server) and +periodically requests the changes that have been made since the last +check. By default, this check is done every two minutes. + +Incremental propagation uses the following entries in the per-realm +data in the KDC config file (See :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`): + +====================== =============== =========================================== +iprop_enable *boolean* If *true*, then incremental propagation is enabled, and (as noted below) normal kprop propagation is disabled. The default is *false*. +iprop_master_ulogsize *integer* Indicates the number of entries that should be retained in the update log. The default is 1000; the maximum number is 2500. +iprop_replica_poll *time interval* Indicates how often the replica should poll the master KDC for changes to the database. The default is two minutes. +iprop_port *integer* Specifies the port number to be used for incremental propagation. This is required in both master and replica configuration files. +iprop_resync_timeout *integer* Specifies the number of seconds to wait for a full propagation to complete. This is optional on replica configurations. Defaults to 300 seconds (5 minutes). +iprop_logfile *file name* Specifies where the update log file for the realm database is to be stored. The default is to use the *database_name* entry from the realms section of the config file :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, with *.ulog* appended. (NOTE: If database_name isn't specified in the realms section, perhaps because the LDAP database back end is being used, or the file name is specified in the *dbmodules* section, then the hard-coded default for *database_name* is used. Determination of the *iprop_logfile* default value will not use values from the *dbmodules* section.) +====================== =============== =========================================== + +Both master and replica sides must have a principal named +``kiprop/hostname`` (where *hostname* is the lowercase, +fully-qualified, canonical name for the host) registered in the +Kerberos database, and have keys for that principal stored in the +default keytab file (|keytab|). In release 1.13, the +``kiprop/hostname`` principal is created automatically for the master +KDC, but it must still be created for replica KDCs. + +On the master KDC side, the ``kiprop/hostname`` principal must be +listed in the kadmind ACL file :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)`, and given the +**p** privilege (see :ref:`privileges`). + +On the replica KDC side, :ref:`kpropd(8)` should be run. When +incremental propagation is enabled, it will connect to the kadmind on +the master KDC and start requesting updates. + +The normal kprop mechanism is disabled by the incremental propagation +support. However, if the replica has been unable to fetch changes +from the master KDC for too long (network problems, perhaps), the log +on the master may wrap around and overwrite some of the updates that +the replica has not yet retrieved. In this case, the replica will +instruct the master KDC to dump the current database out to a file and +invoke a one-time kprop propagation, with special options to also +convey the point in the update log at which the replica should resume +fetching incremental updates. Thus, all the keytab and ACL setup +previously described for kprop propagation is still needed. + +If an environment has a large number of replicas, it may be desirable +to arrange them in a hierarchy instead of having the master serve +updates to every replica. To do this, run ``kadmind -proponly`` on +each intermediate replica, and ``kpropd -A upstreamhostname`` on +downstream replicas to direct each one to the appropriate upstream +replica. + +There are several known restrictions in the current implementation: + +- The incremental update protocol does not transport changes to policy + objects. Any policy changes on the master will result in full + resyncs to all replicas. +- The replica's KDB module must support locking; it cannot be using the + LDAP KDB module. +- The master and replica must be able to initiate TCP connections in + both directions, without an intervening NAT. + + +Sun/MIT incremental propagation differences +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Sun donated the original code for supporting incremental database +propagation to MIT. Some changes have been made in the MIT source +tree that will be visible to administrators. (These notes are based +on Sun's patches. Changes to Sun's implementation since then may not +be reflected here.) + +The Sun config file support looks for ``sunw_dbprop_enable``, +``sunw_dbprop_master_ulogsize``, and ``sunw_dbprop_slave_poll``. + +The incremental propagation service is implemented as an ONC RPC +service. In the Sun implementation, the service is registered with +rpcbind (also known as portmapper) and the client looks up the port +number to contact. In the MIT implementation, where interaction with +some modern versions of rpcbind doesn't always work well, the port +number must be specified in the config file on both the master and +replica sides. + +The Sun implementation hard-codes pathnames in ``/var/krb5`` for the +update log and the per-replica kprop dump files. In the MIT +implementation, the pathname for the update log is specified in the +config file, and the per-replica dump files are stored in +|kdcdir|\ ``/replica_datatrans_hostname``. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/dbtypes.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/dbtypes.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..02f79ac9d --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/dbtypes.rst @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +Database types +============== + +A Kerberos database can be implemented with one of three built-in +database providers, called KDB modules. Software which incorporates +the MIT krb5 KDC may also provide its own KDB module. The following +subsections describe the three built-in KDB modules and the +configuration specific to them. + +The database type can be configured with the **db_library** variable +in the :ref:`dbmodules` subsection for the realm. For example:: + + [dbmodules] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + db_library = db2 + } + +If the ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` realm subsection contains a +**database_module** setting, then the subsection within +``[dbmodules]`` should use that name instead of ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU``. + +To transition from one database type to another, stop the +:ref:`kadmind(8)` service, use ``kdb5_util dump`` to create a dump +file, change the **db_library** value and set any appropriate +configuration for the new database type, and use ``kdb5_util load`` to +create and populate the new database. If the new database type is +LDAP, create the new database using ``kdb5_ldap_util`` and populate it +from the dump file using ``kdb5_util load -update``. Then restart the +:ref:`krb5kdc(8)` and :ref:`kadmind(8)` services. + + +Berkeley database module (db2) +------------------------------ + +The default KDB module is ``db2``, which uses a version of the +Berkeley DB library. It creates four files based on the database +pathname. If the pathname ends with ``principal`` then the four files +are: + +* ``principal``, containing principal entry data +* ``principal.ok``, a lock file for the principal database +* ``principal.kadm5``, containing policy object data +* ``principal.kadm5.lock``, a lock file for the policy database + +For large databases, the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` **dump** command (perhaps +invoked by :ref:`kprop(8)` or by :ref:`kadmind(8)` for incremental +propagation) may cause :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` to stop for a noticeable +period of time while it iterates over the database. This delay can be +avoided by disabling account lockout features so that the KDC does not +perform database writes (see :ref:`disable_lockout`). Alternatively, +a slower form of iteration can be enabled by setting the +**unlockiter** variable to ``true``. For example:: + + [dbmodules] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + db_library = db2 + unlockiter = true + } + +In rare cases, a power failure or other unclean system shutdown may +cause inconsistencies in the internal pointers within a database file, +such that ``kdb5_util dump`` cannot retrieve all principal entries in +the database. In this situation, it may be possible to retrieve all +of the principal data by running ``kdb5_util dump -recurse`` to +iterate over the database using the tree pointers instead of the +iteration pointers. Running ``kdb5_util dump -rev`` to iterate over +the database backwards may also retrieve some of the data which is not +retrieved by a normal dump operation. + + +Lightning Memory-Mapped Database module (klmdb) +----------------------------------------------- + +The klmdb module was added in release 1.17. It uses the LMDB library, +and may offer better performance and reliability than the db2 module. +It creates four files based on the database pathname. If the pathname +ends with ``principal``, then the four files are: + +* ``principal.mdb``, containing policy object data and most principal + entry data +* ``principal.mdb-lock``, a lock file for the primary database +* ``principal.lockout.mdb``, containing the account lockout attributes + (last successful authentication time, last failed authentication + time, and number of failed attempts) for each principal entry +* ``principal.lockout.mdb-lock``, a lock file for the lockout database + +Separating out the lockout attributes ensures that the KDC will never +block on an administrative operation such as a database dump or load. +It also allows the KDC to operate without write access to the primary +database. If both account lockout features are disabled (see +:ref:`disable_lockout`), the lockout database files will be created +but will not subsequently be opened, and the account lockout +attributes will always have zero values. + +Because LMDB creates a memory map to the database files, it requires a +configured memory map size which also determines the maximum size of +the database. This size is applied equally to the two databases, so +twice the configured size will be consumed in the process address +space; this is primarily a limitation on 32-bit platforms. The +default value of 128 megabytes should be sufficient for several +hundred thousand principal entries. If the limit is reached, kadmin +operations will fail and the error message "Environment mapsize limit +reached" will appear in the kadmind log file. In this case, the +**mapsize** variable can be used to increase the map size. The +following example sets the map size to 512 megabytes:: + + [dbmodules] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + db_library = klmdb + mapsize = 512 + } + +LMDB has a configurable maximum number of readers. The default value +of 128 should be sufficient for most deployments. If you are going to +use a large number of KDC worker processes, it may be necessary to set +the **max_readers** variable to a larger number. + +By default, LMDB synchronizes database files to disk after each write +transaction to ensure durability in the case of an unclean system +shutdown. The klmdb module always turns synchronization off for the +lockout database to ensure reasonable KDC performance, but leaves it +on for the primary database. If high throughput for administrative +operations (including password changes) is required, the **nosync** +variable can be set to "true" to disable synchronization for the +primary database. + +The klmdb module does not support explicit locking with the +:ref:`kadmin(1)` **lock** command. + + +LDAP module (kldap) +------------------- + +The kldap module stores principal and policy data using an LDAP +server. To use it you must configure an LDAP server to use the +Kerberos schema. See :ref:`conf_ldap` for details. + +Because :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` is single-threaded, latency in LDAP database +accesses may limit KDC operation throughput. If the LDAP server is +located on the same server host as the KDC and accessed through an +``ldapi://`` URL, latency should be minimal. If this is not possible, +consider starting multiple KDC worker processes with the +:ref:`krb5kdc(8)` **-w** option to enable concurrent processing of KDC +requests. + +The kldap module does not support explicit locking with the +:ref:`kadmin(1)` **lock** command. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/dictionary.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/dictionary.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a5c578687 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/dictionary.rst @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +.. _dictionary: + +Addressing dictionary attack risks +================================== + +Kerberos initial authentication is normally secured using the client +principal's long-term key, which for users is generally derived from a +password. Using a pasword-derived long-term key carries the risk of a +dictionary attack, where an attacker tries a sequence of possible +passwords, possibly requiring much less effort than would be required +to try all possible values of the key. Even if :ref:`password policy +objects <policies>` are used to force users not to pick trivial +passwords, dictionary attacks can sometimes be successful against a +significant fraction of the users in a realm. Dictionary attacks are +not a concern for principals using random keys. + +A dictionary attack may be online or offline. An online dictionary +attack is performed by trying each password in a separate request to +the KDC, and is therefore visible to the KDC and also limited in speed +by the KDC's processing power and the network capacity between the +client and the KDC. Online dictionary attacks can be mitigated using +:ref:`account lockout <lockout>`. This measure is not totally +satisfactory, as it makes it easy for an attacker to deny access to a +client principal. + +An offline dictionary attack is performed by obtaining a ciphertext +generated using the password-derived key, and trying each password +against the ciphertext. This category of attack is invisible to the +KDC and can be performed much faster than an online attack. The +attack will generally take much longer with more recent encryption +types (particularly the ones based on AES), because those encryption +types use a much more expensive string-to-key function. However, the +best defense is to deny the attacker access to a useful ciphertext. +The required defensive measures depend on the attacker's level of +network access. + +An off-path attacker has no access to packets sent between legitimate +users and the KDC. An off-path attacker could gain access to an +attackable ciphertext either by making an AS request for a client +principal which does not have the **+requires_preauth** flag, or by +making a TGS request (after authenticating as a different user) for a +server principal which does not have the **-allow_svr** flag. To +address off-path attackers, a KDC administrator should set those flags +on principals with password-derived keys:: + + kadmin: add_principal +requires_preauth -allow_svr princname + +An attacker with passive network access (one who can monitor packets +sent between legitimate users and the KDC, but cannot change them or +insert their own packets) can gain access to an attackable ciphertext +by observing an authentication by a user using the most common form of +preauthentication, encrypted timestamp. Any of the following methods +can prevent dictionary attacks by attackers with passive network +access: + +* Enabling :ref:`SPAKE preauthentication <spake>` (added in release + 1.17) on the KDC, and ensuring that all clients are able to support + it. + +* Using an :ref:`HTTPS proxy <https>` for communication with the KDC, + if the attacker cannot monitor communication between the proxy + server and the KDC. + +* Using FAST, protecting the initial authentication with either a + random key (such as a host key) or with :ref:`anonymous PKINIT + <anonymous_pkinit>`. + +An attacker with active network access (one who can inject or modify +packets sent between legitimate users and the KDC) can try to fool the +client software into sending an attackable ciphertext using an +encryption type and salt string of the attacker's choosing. Any of the +following methods can prevent dictionary attacks by active attackers: + +* Enabling SPAKE preauthentication and setting the + **disable_encrypted_timestamp** variable to ``true`` in the + :ref:`realms` subsection of the client configuration. + +* Using an HTTPS proxy as described above, configured in the client's + krb5.conf realm configuration. If :ref:`KDC discovery + <kdc_discovery>` is used to locate a proxy server, an active + attacker may be able to use DNS spoofing to cause the client to use + a different HTTPS server or to not use HTTPS. + +* Using FAST as described above. + +If :ref:`PKINIT <pkinit>` or :ref:`OTP <otp_preauth>` are used for +initial authentication, the principal's long-term keys are not used +and dictionary attacks are usually not a concern. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/enctypes.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/enctypes.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3cdfc92cf --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/enctypes.rst @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +.. _enctypes: + +Encryption types +================ + +Kerberos can use a variety of cipher algorithms to protect data. A +Kerberos **encryption type** (also known as an **enctype**) is a +specific combination of a cipher algorithm with an integrity algorithm +to provide both confidentiality and integrity to data. + + +Enctypes in requests +-------------------- + +Clients make two types of requests (KDC-REQ) to the KDC: AS-REQs and +TGS-REQs. The client uses the AS-REQ to obtain initial tickets +(typically a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT)), and uses the TGS-REQ to +obtain service tickets. + +The KDC uses three different keys when issuing a ticket to a client: + +* The long-term key of the service: the KDC uses this to encrypt the + actual service ticket. The KDC only uses the first long-term key in + the most recent kvno for this purpose. + +* The session key: the KDC randomly chooses this key and places one + copy inside the ticket and the other copy inside the encrypted part + of the reply. + +* The reply-encrypting key: the KDC uses this to encrypt the reply it + sends to the client. For AS replies, this is a long-term key of the + client principal. For TGS replies, this is either the session key of the + authenticating ticket, or a subsession key. + +Each of these keys is of a specific enctype. + +Each request type allows the client to submit a list of enctypes that +it is willing to accept. For the AS-REQ, this list affects both the +session key selection and the reply-encrypting key selection. For the +TGS-REQ, this list only affects the session key selection. + + +.. _session_key_selection: + +Session key selection +--------------------- + +The KDC chooses the session key enctype by taking the intersection of +its **permitted_enctypes** list, the list of long-term keys for the +most recent kvno of the service, and the client's requested list of +enctypes. If **allow_weak_crypto** is true, all services are assumed +to support des-cbc-crc. + +Starting in krb5-1.11, **des_crc_session_supported** in +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)` allows additional control over whether the KDC +issues des-cbc-crc session keys. + +Also starting in krb5-1.11, it is possible to set a string attribute +on a service principal to control what session key enctypes the KDC +may issue for service tickets for that principal. See +:ref:`set_string` in :ref:`kadmin(1)` for details. + + +Choosing enctypes for a service +------------------------------- + +Generally, a service should have a key of the strongest +enctype that both it and the KDC support. If the KDC is running a +release earlier than krb5-1.11, it is also useful to generate an +additional key for each enctype that the service can support. The KDC +will only use the first key in the list of long-term keys for encrypting +the service ticket, but the additional long-term keys indicate the +other enctypes that the service supports. + +As noted above, starting with release krb5-1.11, there are additional +configuration settings that control session key enctype selection +independently of the set of long-term keys that the KDC has stored for +a service principal. + + +Configuration variables +----------------------- + +The following ``[libdefaults]`` settings in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` will +affect how enctypes are chosen. + +**allow_weak_crypto** + defaults to *false* starting with krb5-1.8. When *false*, removes + single-DES enctypes (and other weak enctypes) from + **permitted_enctypes**, **default_tkt_enctypes**, and + **default_tgs_enctypes**. Do not set this to *true* unless the + use of weak enctypes is an acceptable risk for your environment + and the weak enctypes are required for backward compatibility. + +**permitted_enctypes** + controls the set of enctypes that a service will accept as session + keys. + +**default_tkt_enctypes** + controls the default set of enctypes that the Kerberos client + library requests when making an AS-REQ. Do not set this unless + required for specific backward compatibility purposes; stale + values of this setting can prevent clients from taking advantage + of new stronger enctypes when the libraries are upgraded. + +**default_tgs_enctypes** + controls the default set of enctypes that the Kerberos client + library requests when making a TGS-REQ. Do not set this unless + required for specific backward compatibility purposes; stale + values of this setting can prevent clients from taking advantage + of new stronger enctypes when the libraries are upgraded. + +The following per-realm setting in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` affects the +generation of long-term keys. + +**supported_enctypes** + controls the default set of enctype-salttype pairs that :ref:`kadmind(8)` + will use for generating long-term keys, either randomly or from + passwords + + +Enctype compatibility +--------------------- + +See :ref:`Encryption_types` for additional information about enctypes. + +========================== ===== ======== ======= +enctype weak? krb5 Windows +========================== ===== ======== ======= +des-cbc-crc weak all >=2000 +des-cbc-md4 weak all ? +des-cbc-md5 weak all >=2000 +des3-cbc-sha1 >=1.1 none +arcfour-hmac >=1.3 >=2000 +arcfour-hmac-exp weak >=1.3 >=2000 +aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 >=1.3 >=Vista +aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 >=1.3 >=Vista +aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 >=1.15 none +aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 >=1.15 none +camellia128-cts-cmac >=1.9 none +camellia256-cts-cmac >=1.9 none +========================== ===== ======== ======= + +krb5 releases 1.8 and later disable the single-DES enctypes by +default. Microsoft Windows releases Windows 7 and later disable +single-DES enctypes by default. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/env_variables.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/env_variables.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a2d15bea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/env_variables.rst @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Environment variables +===================== + +This content has moved to :ref:`kerberos(7)`. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/host_config.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/host_config.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d94766257 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/host_config.rst @@ -0,0 +1,233 @@ +Host configuration +================== + +All hosts running Kerberos software, whether they are clients, +application servers, or KDCs, can be configured using +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. Here we describe some of the behavior changes +you might want to make. + + +Default realm +------------- + +In the :ref:`libdefaults` section, the **default_realm** realm +relation sets the default Kerberos realm. For example:: + + [libdefaults] + default_realm = ATHENA.MIT.EDU + +The default realm affects Kerberos behavior in the following ways: + +* When a principal name is parsed from text, the default realm is used + if no ``@REALM`` component is specified. + +* The default realm affects login authorization as described below. + +* For programs which operate on a Kerberos database, the default realm + is used to determine which database to operate on, unless the **-r** + parameter is given to specify a realm. + +* A server program may use the default realm when looking up its key + in a :ref:`keytab file <keytab_file>`, if its realm is not + determined by :ref:`domain_realm` configuration or by the server + program itself. + +* If :ref:`kinit(1)` is passed the **-n** flag, it requests anonymous + tickets from the default realm. + +In some situations, these uses of the default realm might conflict. +For example, it might be desirable for principal name parsing to use +one realm by default, but for login authorization to use a second +realm. In this situation, the first realm can be configured as the +default realm, and **auth_to_local** relations can be used as +described below to use the second realm for login authorization. + + +.. _login_authorization: + +Login authorization +------------------- + +If a host runs a Kerberos-enabled login service such as OpenSSH with +GSSAPIAuthentication enabled, login authorization rules determine +whether a Kerberos principal is allowed to access a local account. + +By default, a Kerberos principal is allowed access to an account if +its realm matches the default realm and its name matches the account +name. (For historical reasons, access is also granted by default if +the name has two components and the second component matches the +default realm; for instance, ``alice/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` +is granted access to the ``alice`` account if ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` is +the default realm.) + +The simplest way to control local access is using :ref:`.k5login(5)` +files. To use these, place a ``.k5login`` file in the home directory +of each account listing the principal names which should have login +access to that account. If it is not desirable to use ``.k5login`` +files located in account home directories, the **k5login_directory** +relation in the :ref:`libdefaults` section can specify a directory +containing one file per account uname. + +By default, if a ``.k5login`` file is present, it controls +authorization both positively and negatively--any principal name +contained in the file is granted access and any other principal name +is denied access, even if it would have had access if the ``.k5login`` +file didn't exist. The **k5login_authoritative** relation in the +:ref:`libdefaults` section can be set to false to make ``.k5login`` +files provide positive authorization only. + +The **auth_to_local** relation in the :ref:`realms` section for the +default realm can specify pattern-matching rules to control login +authorization. For example, the following configuration allows access +to principals from a different realm than the default realm:: + + [realms] + DEFAULT.REALM = { + # Allow access to principals from OTHER.REALM. + # + # [1:$1@$0] matches single-component principal names and creates + # a selection string containing the principal name and realm. + # + # (.*@OTHER\.REALM) matches against the selection string, so that + # only principals in OTHER.REALM are matched. + # + # s/@OTHER\.REALM$// removes the realm name, leaving behind the + # principal name as the acount name. + auth_to_local = RULE:[1:$1@$0](.*@OTHER\.REALM)s/@OTHER\.REALM$// + + # Also allow principals from the default realm. Omit this line + # to only allow access to principals in OTHER.REALM. + auth_to_local = DEFAULT + } + +The **auth_to_local_names** subsection of the :ref:`realms` section +for the default realm can specify explicit mappings from principal +names to local accounts. The key used in this subsection is the +principal name without realm, so it is only safe to use in a Kerberos +environment with a single realm or a tightly controlled set of realms. +An example use of **auth_to_local_names** might be:: + + [realms] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + auth_to_local_names = { + # Careful, these match principals in any realm! + host/example.com = hostaccount + fred = localfred + } + } + +Local authorization behavior can also be modified using plugin +modules; see :ref:`hostrealm_plugin` for details. + + +.. _plugin_config: + +Plugin module configuration +--------------------------- + +Many aspects of Kerberos behavior, such as client preauthentication +and KDC service location, can be modified through the use of plugin +modules. For most of these behaviors, you can use the :ref:`plugins` +section of krb5.conf to register third-party modules, and to switch +off registered or built-in modules. + +A plugin module takes the form of a Unix shared object +(``modname.so``) or Windows DLL (``modname.dll``). If you have +installed a third-party plugin module and want to register it, you do +so using the **module** relation in the appropriate subsection of the +[plugins] section. The value for **module** must give the module name +and the path to the module, separated by a colon. The module name +will often be the same as the shared object's name, but in unusual +cases (such as a shared object which implements multiple modules for +the same interface) it might not be. For example, to register a +client preauthentication module named ``mypreauth`` installed at +``/path/to/mypreauth.so``, you could write:: + + [plugins] + clpreauth = { + module = mypreauth:/path/to/mypreauth.so + } + +Many of the pluggable behaviors in MIT krb5 contain built-in modules +which can be switched off. You can disable a built-in module (or one +you have registered) using the **disable** directive in the +appropriate subsection of the [plugins] section. For example, to +disable the use of .k5identity files to select credential caches, you +could write:: + + [plugins] + ccselect = { + disable = k5identity + } + +If you want to disable multiple modules, specify the **disable** +directive multiple times, giving one module to disable each time. + +Alternatively, you can explicitly specify which modules you want to be +enabled for that behavior using the **enable_only** directive. For +example, to make :ref:`kadmind(8)` check password quality using only a +module you have registered, and no other mechanism, you could write:: + + [plugins] + pwqual = { + module = mymodule:/path/to/mymodule.so + enable_only = mymodule + } + +Again, if you want to specify multiple modules, specify the +**enable_only** directive multiple times, giving one module to enable +each time. + +Some Kerberos interfaces use different mechanisms to register plugin +modules. + + +KDC location modules +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +For historical reasons, modules to control how KDC servers are located +are registered simply by placing the shared object or DLL into the +"libkrb5" subdirectory of the krb5 plugin directory, which defaults to +|libdir|\ ``/krb5/plugins``. For example, Samba's winbind krb5 +locator plugin would be registered by placing its shared object in +|libdir|\ ``/krb5/plugins/libkrb5/winbind_krb5_locator.so``. + + +.. _gssapi_plugin_config: + +GSSAPI mechanism modules +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +GSSAPI mechanism modules are registered using the file +``/etc/gss/mech`` or configuration files in the ``/etc/gss/mech.d/`` +directory. Only files with a ``.conf`` suffix will be read from the +``/etc/gss/mech.d/`` directory. Each line in these files has the +form:: + + name oid pathname [options] <type> + +Only the name, oid, and pathname are required. *name* is the +mechanism name, which may be used for debugging or logging purposes. +*oid* is the object identifier of the GSSAPI mechanism to be +registered. *pathname* is a path to the module shared object or DLL. +*options* (if present) are options provided to the plugin module, +surrounded in square brackets. *type* (if present) can be used to +indicate a special type of module. Currently the only special module +type is "interposer", for a module designed to intercept calls to +other mechanisms. + + +.. _profile_plugin_config: + +Configuration profile modules +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +A configuration profile module replaces the information source for +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` itself. To use a profile module, begin krb5.conf +with the line:: + + module PATHNAME:STRING + +where *PATHNAME* is a path to the module shared object or DLL, and +*STRING* is a string to provide to the module. The module will then +take over, and the rest of krb5.conf will be ignored. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/https.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/https.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b4e68b2b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/https.rst @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +.. _https: + +HTTPS proxy configuration +========================= + +In addition to being able to use UDP or TCP to communicate directly +with a KDC as is outlined in RFC4120, and with kpasswd services in a +similar fashion, the client libraries can attempt to use an HTTPS +proxy server to communicate with a KDC or kpasswd service, using the +protocol outlined in [MS-KKDCP]. + +Communicating with a KDC through an HTTPS proxy allows clients to +contact servers when network firewalls might otherwise prevent them +from doing so. The use of TLS also encrypts all traffic between the +clients and the KDC, preventing observers from conducting password +dictionary attacks or from observing the client and server principals +being authenticated, at additional computational cost to both clients +and servers. + +An HTTPS proxy server is provided as a feature in some versions of +Microsoft Windows Server, and a WSGI implementation named `kdcproxy` +is available in the python package index. + + +Configuring the clients +----------------------- + +To use an HTTPS proxy, a client host must trust the CA which issued +that proxy's SSL certificate. If that CA's certificate is not in the +system-wide default set of trusted certificates, configure the +following relation in the client host's :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file in +the appropriate :ref:`realms` subsection:: + + http_anchors = FILE:/etc/krb5/cacert.pem + +Adjust the pathname to match the path of the file which contains a +copy of the CA's certificate. The `http_anchors` option is documented +more fully in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. + +Configure the client to access the KDC and kpasswd service by +specifying their locations in its :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file in the form +of HTTPS URLs for the proxy server:: + + kdc = https://server.fqdn/KdcProxy + kpasswd_server = https://server.fqdn/KdcProxy + +If the proxy and client are properly configured, client commands such +as ``kinit``, ``kvno``, and ``kpasswd`` should all function normally. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d87b003ae --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +For administrators +================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + install.rst + conf_files/index.rst + realm_config.rst + database.rst + dbtypes.rst + lockout.rst + conf_ldap.rst + appl_servers.rst + host_config.rst + backup_host.rst + pkinit.rst + otp.rst + spake.rst + dictionary.rst + princ_dns.rst + enctypes.rst + https.rst + auth_indicator.rst + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + admin_commands/index.rst + ../mitK5defaults.rst + env_variables.rst + troubleshoot.rst + advanced/index.rst + various_envs.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a79bda952 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install.rst @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +Installation guide +================== + +Contents +-------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 2 + + install_kdc.rst + install_clients.rst + install_appl_srv.rst + + +Additional references +--------------------- + +#. Debian: `Setting up MIT Kerberos 5 + <http://techpubs.spinlocksolutions.com/dklar/kerberos.html>`_ +#. Solaris: `Configuring the Kerberos Service + <http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/E19253-01/816-4557/6maosrjv2/index.html>`_ diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_appl_srv.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_appl_srv.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6bae7248f --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_appl_srv.rst @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +UNIX Application Servers +======================== + +An application server is a host that provides one or more services +over the network. Application servers can be "secure" or "insecure." +A "secure" host is set up to require authentication from every client +connecting to it. An "insecure" host will still provide Kerberos +authentication, but will also allow unauthenticated clients to +connect. + +If you have Kerberos V5 installed on all of your client machines, MIT +recommends that you make your hosts secure, to take advantage of the +security that Kerberos authentication affords. However, if you have +some clients that do not have Kerberos V5 installed, you can run an +insecure server, and still take advantage of Kerberos V5's single +sign-on capability. + + +.. _keytab_file: + +The keytab file +--------------- + +All Kerberos server machines need a keytab file to authenticate to the +KDC. By default on UNIX-like systems this file is named |keytab|. +The keytab file is an local copy of the host's key. The keytab file +is a potential point of entry for a break-in, and if compromised, +would allow unrestricted access to its host. The keytab file should +be readable only by root, and should exist only on the machine's local +disk. The file should not be part of any backup of the machine, +unless access to the backup data is secured as tightly as access to +the machine's root password. + +In order to generate a keytab for a host, the host must have a +principal in the Kerberos database. The procedure for adding hosts to +the database is described fully in :ref:`add_mod_del_princs`. (See +:ref:`replica_host_key` for a brief description.) The keytab is +generated by running :ref:`kadmin(1)` and issuing the :ref:`ktadd` +command. + +For example, to generate a keytab file to allow the host +``trillium.mit.edu`` to authenticate for the services host, ftp, and +pop, the administrator ``joeadmin`` would issue the command (on +``trillium.mit.edu``):: + + trillium% kadmin + kadmin5: ktadd host/trillium.mit.edu ftp/trillium.mit.edu + pop/trillium.mit.edu + kadmin: Entry for principal host/trillium.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU with + kvno 3, encryption type DES-CBC-CRC added to keytab + FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + kadmin: Entry for principal ftp/trillium.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU with + kvno 3, encryption type DES-CBC-CRC added to keytab + FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + kadmin: Entry for principal pop/trillium.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU with + kvno 3, encryption type DES-CBC-CRC added to keytab + FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + kadmin5: quit + trillium% + +If you generate the keytab file on another host, you need to get a +copy of the keytab file onto the destination host (``trillium``, in +the above example) without sending it unencrypted over the network. + + +Some advice about secure hosts +------------------------------ + +Kerberos V5 can protect your host from certain types of break-ins, but +it is possible to install Kerberos V5 and still leave your host +vulnerable to attack. Obviously an installation guide is not the +place to try to include an exhaustive list of countermeasures for +every possible attack, but it is worth noting some of the larger holes +and how to close them. + +We recommend that backups of secure machines exclude the keytab file +(|keytab|). If this is not possible, the backups should at least be +done locally, rather than over a network, and the backup tapes should +be physically secured. + +The keytab file and any programs run by root, including the Kerberos +V5 binaries, should be kept on local disk. The keytab file should be +readable only by root. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_clients.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_clients.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f2c87d072 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_clients.rst @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +Installing and configuring UNIX client machines +=============================================== + +The Kerberized client programs include :ref:`kinit(1)`, +:ref:`klist(1)`, :ref:`kdestroy(1)`, and :ref:`kpasswd(1)`. All of +these programs are in the directory |bindir|. + +You can often integrate Kerberos with the login system on client +machines, typically through the use of PAM. The details vary by +operating system, and should be covered in your operating system's +documentation. If you do this, you will need to make sure your users +know to use their Kerberos passwords when they log in. + +You will also need to educate your users to use the ticket management +programs kinit, klist, and kdestroy. If you do not have Kerberos +password changing integrated into the native password program (again, +typically through PAM), you will need to educate users to use kpasswd +in place of its non-Kerberos counterparts passwd. + + +Client machine configuration files +---------------------------------- + +Each machine running Kerberos should have a :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file. +At a minimum, it should define a **default_realm** setting in +:ref:`libdefaults`. If you are not using DNS SRV records +(:ref:`kdc_hostnames`) or URI records (:ref:`kdc_discovery`), it must +also contain a :ref:`realms` section containing information for your +realm's KDCs. + +Consider setting **rdns** to false in order to reduce your dependence +on precisely correct DNS information for service hostnames. Turning +this flag off means that service hostnames will be canonicalized +through forward name resolution (which adds your domain name to +unqualified hostnames, and resolves CNAME records in DNS), but not +through reverse address lookup. The default value of this flag is +true for historical reasons only. + +If you anticipate users frequently logging into remote hosts +(e.g., using ssh) using forwardable credentials, consider setting +**forwardable** to true so that users obtain forwardable tickets by +default. Otherwise users will need to use ``kinit -f`` to get +forwardable tickets. + +Consider adjusting the **ticket_lifetime** setting to match the likely +length of sessions for your users. For instance, if most of your +users will be logging in for an eight-hour workday, you could set the +default to ten hours so that tickets obtained in the morning expire +shortly after the end of the workday. Users can still manually +request longer tickets when necessary, up to the maximum allowed by +each user's principal record on the KDC. + +If a client host may access services in different realms, it may be +useful to define a :ref:`domain_realm` mapping so that clients know +which hosts belong to which realms. However, if your clients and KDC +are running release 1.7 or later, it is also reasonable to leave this +section out on client machines and just define it in the KDC's +krb5.conf. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_kdc.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_kdc.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5d1e70ede --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/install_kdc.rst @@ -0,0 +1,534 @@ +Installing KDCs +=============== + +When setting up Kerberos in a production environment, it is best to +have multiple replica KDCs alongside with a master KDC to ensure the +continued availability of the Kerberized services. Each KDC contains +a copy of the Kerberos database. The master KDC contains the writable +copy of the realm database, which it replicates to the replica KDCs at +regular intervals. All database changes (such as password changes) +are made on the master KDC. Replica KDCs provide Kerberos +ticket-granting services, but not database administration, when the +master KDC is unavailable. MIT recommends that you install all of +your KDCs to be able to function as either the master or one of the +replicas. This will enable you to easily switch your master KDC with +one of the replicas if necessary (see :ref:`switch_master_replica`). +This installation procedure is based on that recommendation. + +.. warning:: + + - The Kerberos system relies on the availability of correct time + information. Ensure that the master and all replica KDCs have + properly synchronized clocks. + + - It is best to install and run KDCs on secured and dedicated + hardware with limited access. If your KDC is also a file + server, FTP server, Web server, or even just a client machine, + someone who obtained root access through a security hole in any + of those areas could potentially gain access to the Kerberos + database. + + +Install and configure the master KDC +------------------------------------ + +Install Kerberos either from the OS-provided packages or from the +source (See :ref:`do_build`). + +.. note:: + + For the purpose of this document we will use the following + names:: + + kerberos.mit.edu - master KDC + kerberos-1.mit.edu - replica KDC + ATHENA.MIT.EDU - realm name + .k5.ATHENA.MIT.EDU - stash file + admin/admin - admin principal + + See :ref:`mitK5defaults` for the default names and locations + of the relevant to this topic files. Adjust the names and + paths to your system environment. + + +Edit KDC configuration files +---------------------------- + +Modify the configuration files, :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` and +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, to reflect the correct information (such as +domain-realm mappings and Kerberos servers names) for your realm. +(See :ref:`mitK5defaults` for the recommended default locations for +these files). + +Most of the tags in the configuration have default values that will +work well for most sites. There are some tags in the +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file whose values must be specified, and this +section will explain those. + +If the locations for these configuration files differs from the +default ones, set **KRB5_CONFIG** and **KRB5_KDC_PROFILE** environment +variables to point to the krb5.conf and kdc.conf respectively. For +example:: + + export KRB5_CONFIG=/yourdir/krb5.conf + export KRB5_KDC_PROFILE=/yourdir/kdc.conf + + +krb5.conf +~~~~~~~~~ + +If you are not using DNS TXT records (see :ref:`mapping_hostnames`), +you must specify the **default_realm** in the :ref:`libdefaults` +section. If you are not using DNS URI or SRV records (see +:ref:`kdc_hostnames` and :ref:`kdc_discovery`), you must include the +**kdc** tag for each *realm* in the :ref:`realms` section. To +communicate with the kadmin server in each realm, the **admin_server** +tag must be set in the +:ref:`realms` section. + +An example krb5.conf file:: + + [libdefaults] + default_realm = ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + [realms] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + kdc = kerberos.mit.edu + kdc = kerberos-1.mit.edu + admin_server = kerberos.mit.edu + } + + +kdc.conf +~~~~~~~~ + +The kdc.conf file can be used to control the listening ports of the +KDC and kadmind, as well as realm-specific defaults, the database type +and location, and logging. + +An example kdc.conf file:: + + [kdcdefaults] + kdc_listen = 88 + kdc_tcp_listen = 88 + + [realms] + ATHENA.MIT.EDU = { + kadmind_port = 749 + max_life = 12h 0m 0s + max_renewable_life = 7d 0h 0m 0s + master_key_type = aes256-cts + supported_enctypes = aes256-cts:normal aes128-cts:normal + # If the default location does not suit your setup, + # explicitly configure the following values: + # database_name = /var/krb5kdc/principal + # key_stash_file = /var/krb5kdc/.k5.ATHENA.MIT.EDU + # acl_file = /var/krb5kdc/kadm5.acl + } + + [logging] + # By default, the KDC and kadmind will log output using + # syslog. You can instead send log output to files like this: + kdc = FILE:/var/log/krb5kdc.log + admin_server = FILE:/var/log/kadmin.log + default = FILE:/var/log/krb5lib.log + +Replace ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` and ``kerberos.mit.edu`` with the name of +your Kerberos realm and server respectively. + +.. note:: + + You have to have write permission on the target directories + (these directories must exist) used by **database_name**, + **key_stash_file**, and **acl_file**. + + +.. _create_db: + +Create the KDC database +----------------------- + +You will use the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` command on the master KDC to +create the Kerberos database and the optional :ref:`stash_definition`. + +.. note:: + + If you choose not to install a stash file, the KDC will + prompt you for the master key each time it starts up. This + means that the KDC will not be able to start automatically, + such as after a system reboot. + +:ref:`kdb5_util(8)` will prompt you for the master password for the +Kerberos database. This password can be any string. A good password +is one you can remember, but that no one else can guess. Examples of +bad passwords are words that can be found in a dictionary, any common +or popular name, especially a famous person (or cartoon character), +your username in any form (e.g., forward, backward, repeated twice, +etc.), and any of the sample passwords that appear in this manual. +One example of a password which might be good if it did not appear in +this manual is "MITiys4K5!", which represents the sentence "MIT is +your source for Kerberos 5!" (It's the first letter of each word, +substituting the numeral "4" for the word "for", and includes the +punctuation mark at the end.) + +The following is an example of how to create a Kerberos database and +stash file on the master KDC, using the :ref:`kdb5_util(8)` command. +Replace ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` with the name of your Kerberos realm:: + + shell% kdb5_util create -r ATHENA.MIT.EDU -s + + Initializing database '/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal' for realm 'ATHENA.MIT.EDU', + master key name 'K/M@ATHENA.MIT.EDU' + You will be prompted for the database Master Password. + It is important that you NOT FORGET this password. + Enter KDC database master key: <= Type the master password. + Re-enter KDC database master key to verify: <= Type it again. + shell% + +This will create five files in |kdcdir| (or at the locations specified +in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`): + +* two Kerberos database files, ``principal``, and ``principal.ok`` +* the Kerberos administrative database file, ``principal.kadm5`` +* the administrative database lock file, ``principal.kadm5.lock`` +* the stash file, in this example ``.k5.ATHENA.MIT.EDU``. If you do + not want a stash file, run the above command without the **-s** + option. + +For more information on administrating Kerberos database see +:ref:`db_operations`. + + +.. _admin_acl: + +Add administrators to the ACL file +---------------------------------- + +Next, you need create an Access Control List (ACL) file and put the +Kerberos principal of at least one of the administrators into it. +This file is used by the :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon to control which +principals may view and make privileged modifications to the Kerberos +database files. The ACL filename is determined by the **acl_file** +variable in :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`; the default is |kdcdir|\ +``/kadm5.acl``. + +For more information on Kerberos ACL file see :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)`. + +.. _addadmin_kdb: + +Add administrators to the Kerberos database +------------------------------------------- + +Next you need to add administrative principals (i.e., principals who +are allowed to administer Kerberos database) to the Kerberos database. +You *must* add at least one principal now to allow communication +between the Kerberos administration daemon kadmind and the kadmin +program over the network for further administration. To do this, use +the kadmin.local utility on the master KDC. kadmin.local is designed +to be run on the master KDC host without using Kerberos authentication +to an admin server; instead, it must have read and write access to the +Kerberos database on the local filesystem. + +The administrative principals you create should be the ones you added +to the ACL file (see :ref:`admin_acl`). + +In the following example, the administrative principal ``admin/admin`` +is created:: + + shell% kadmin.local + + kadmin.local: addprinc admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + WARNING: no policy specified for "admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; + assigning "default". + Enter password for principal admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Enter a password. + Re-enter password for principal admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <= Type it again. + Principal "admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. + kadmin.local: + +.. _start_kdc_daemons: + +Start the Kerberos daemons on the master KDC +-------------------------------------------- + +At this point, you are ready to start the Kerberos KDC +(:ref:`krb5kdc(8)`) and administrative daemons on the Master KDC. To +do so, type:: + + shell% krb5kdc + shell% kadmind + +Each server daemon will fork and run in the background. + +.. note:: + + Assuming you want these daemons to start up automatically at + boot time, you can add them to the KDC's ``/etc/rc`` or + ``/etc/inittab`` file. You need to have a + :ref:`stash_definition` in order to do this. + +You can verify that they started properly by checking for their +startup messages in the logging locations you defined in +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` (see :ref:`logging`). For example:: + + shell% tail /var/log/krb5kdc.log + Dec 02 12:35:47 beeblebrox krb5kdc[3187](info): commencing operation + shell% tail /var/log/kadmin.log + Dec 02 12:35:52 beeblebrox kadmind[3189](info): starting + +Any errors the daemons encounter while starting will also be listed in +the logging output. + +As an additional verification, check if :ref:`kinit(1)` succeeds +against the principals that you have created on the previous step +(:ref:`addadmin_kdb`). Run:: + + shell% kinit admin/admin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + +Install the replica KDCs +------------------------ + +You are now ready to start configuring the replica KDCs. + +.. note:: + + Assuming you are setting the KDCs up so that you can easily + switch the master KDC with one of the replicas, you should + perform each of these steps on the master KDC as well as the + replica KDCs, unless these instructions specify otherwise. + + +.. _replica_host_key: + +Create host keytabs for replica KDCs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Each KDC needs a ``host`` key in the Kerberos database. These keys +are used for mutual authentication when propagating the database dump +file from the master KDC to the secondary KDC servers. + +On the master KDC, connect to administrative interface and create the +host principal for each of the KDCs' ``host`` services. For example, +if the master KDC were called ``kerberos.mit.edu``, and you had a +replica KDC named ``kerberos-1.mit.edu``, you would type the +following:: + + shell% kadmin + kadmin: addprinc -randkey host/kerberos.mit.edu + NOTICE: no policy specified for "host/kerberos.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; assigning "default" + Principal "host/kerberos.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. + + kadmin: addprinc -randkey host/kerberos-1.mit.edu + NOTICE: no policy specified for "host/kerberos-1.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU"; assigning "default" + Principal "host/kerberos-1.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU" created. + +It is not strictly necessary to have the master KDC server in the +Kerberos database, but it can be handy if you want to be able to swap +the master KDC with one of the replicas. + +Next, extract ``host`` random keys for all participating KDCs and +store them in each host's default keytab file. Ideally, you should +extract each keytab locally on its own KDC. If this is not feasible, +you should use an encrypted session to send them across the network. +To extract a keytab directly on a replica KDC called +``kerberos-1.mit.edu``, you would execute the following command:: + + kadmin: ktadd host/kerberos-1.mit.edu + Entry for principal host/kerberos-1.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption + type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/kerberos-1.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption + type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/kerberos-1.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption + type des3-cbc-sha1 added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/kerberos-1.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption + type arcfour-hmac added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + +If you are instead extracting a keytab for the replica KDC called +``kerberos-1.mit.edu`` on the master KDC, you should use a dedicated +temporary keytab file for that machine's keytab:: + + kadmin: ktadd -k /tmp/kerberos-1.keytab host/kerberos-1.mit.edu + Entry for principal host/kerberos-1.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption + type aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + Entry for principal host/kerberos-1.mit.edu with kvno 2, encryption + type aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 added to keytab FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab. + +The file ``/tmp/kerberos-1.keytab`` can then be installed as +``/etc/krb5.keytab`` on the host ``kerberos-1.mit.edu``. + + +Configure replica KDCs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Database propagation copies the contents of the master's database, but +does not propagate configuration files, stash files, or the kadm5 ACL +file. The following files must be copied by hand to each replica (see +:ref:`mitK5defaults` for the default locations for these files): + +* krb5.conf +* kdc.conf +* kadm5.acl +* master key stash file + +Move the copied files into their appropriate directories, exactly as +on the master KDC. kadm5.acl is only needed to allow a replica to +swap with the master KDC. + +The database is propagated from the master KDC to the replica KDCs via +the :ref:`kpropd(8)` daemon. You must explicitly specify the +principals which are allowed to provide Kerberos dump updates on the +replica machine with a new database. Create a file named kpropd.acl +in the KDC state directory containing the ``host`` principals for each +of the KDCs:: + + host/kerberos.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + host/kerberos-1.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + +.. note:: + + If you expect that the master and replica KDCs will be + switched at some point of time, list the host principals + from all participating KDC servers in kpropd.acl files on + all of the KDCs. Otherwise, you only need to list the + master KDC's host principal in the kpropd.acl files of the + replica KDCs. + +Then, add the following line to ``/etc/inetd.conf`` on each KDC +(adjust the path to kpropd):: + + krb5_prop stream tcp nowait root /usr/local/sbin/kpropd kpropd + +You also need to add the following line to ``/etc/services`` on each +KDC, if it is not already present (assuming that the default port is +used):: + + krb5_prop 754/tcp # Kerberos replica propagation + +Restart inetd daemon. + +Alternatively, start :ref:`kpropd(8)` as a stand-alone daemon. This is +required when incremental propagation is enabled. + +Now that the replica KDC is able to accept database propagation, +you’ll need to propagate the database from the master server. + +NOTE: Do not start the replica KDC yet; you still do not have a copy +of the master's database. + + +.. _kprop_to_replicas: + +Propagate the database to each replica KDC +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +First, create a dump file of the database on the master KDC, as +follows:: + + shell% kdb5_util dump /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/replica_datatrans + +Then, manually propagate the database to each replica KDC, as in the +following example:: + + shell% kprop -f /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/replica_datatrans kerberos-1.mit.edu + + Database propagation to kerberos-1.mit.edu: SUCCEEDED + +You will need a script to dump and propagate the database. The +following is an example of a Bourne shell script that will do this. + +.. note:: + + Remember that you need to replace ``/usr/local/var/krb5kdc`` + with the name of the KDC state directory. + +:: + + #!/bin/sh + + kdclist = "kerberos-1.mit.edu kerberos-2.mit.edu" + + kdb5_util dump /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/replica_datatrans + + for kdc in $kdclist + do + kprop -f /usr/local/var/krb5kdc/replica_datatrans $kdc + done + +You will need to set up a cron job to run this script at the intervals +you decided on earlier (see :ref:`db_prop`). + +Now that the replica KDC has a copy of the Kerberos database, you can +start the krb5kdc daemon:: + + shell% krb5kdc + +As with the master KDC, you will probably want to add this command to +the KDCs' ``/etc/rc`` or ``/etc/inittab`` files, so they will start +the krb5kdc daemon automatically at boot time. + + +Propagation failed? +################### + +You may encounter the following error messages. For a more detailed +discussion on possible causes and solutions click on the error link +to be redirected to :ref:`troubleshoot` section. + +.. include:: ./troubleshoot.rst + :start-after: _prop_failed_start: + :end-before: _prop_failed_end: + + +Add Kerberos principals to the database +--------------------------------------- + +Once your KDCs are set up and running, you are ready to use +:ref:`kadmin(1)` to load principals for your users, hosts, and other +services into the Kerberos database. This procedure is described +fully in :ref:`add_mod_del_princs`. + +You may occasionally want to use one of your replica KDCs as the +master. This might happen if you are upgrading the master KDC, or if +your master KDC has a disk crash. See the following section for the +instructions. + + +.. _switch_master_replica: + +Switching master and replica KDCs +--------------------------------- + +You may occasionally want to use one of your replica KDCs as the +master. This might happen if you are upgrading the master KDC, or if +your master KDC has a disk crash. + +Assuming you have configured all of your KDCs to be able to function +as either the master KDC or a replica KDC (as this document +recommends), all you need to do to make the changeover is: + +If the master KDC is still running, do the following on the *old* +master KDC: + +#. Kill the kadmind process. +#. Disable the cron job that propagates the database. +#. Run your database propagation script manually, to ensure that the + replicas all have the latest copy of the database (see + :ref:`kprop_to_replicas`). + +On the *new* master KDC: + +#. Start the :ref:`kadmind(8)` daemon (see :ref:`start_kdc_daemons`). +#. Set up the cron job to propagate the database (see + :ref:`kprop_to_replicas`). +#. Switch the CNAMEs of the old and new master KDCs. If you can't do + this, you'll need to change the :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file on every + client machine in your Kerberos realm. + + +Incremental database propagation +-------------------------------- + +If you expect your Kerberos database to become large, you may wish to +set up incremental propagation to replica KDCs. See +:ref:`incr_db_prop` for details. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/lockout.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/lockout.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..97d9b1e08 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/lockout.rst @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +.. _lockout: + +Account lockout +=============== + +As of release 1.8, the KDC can be configured to lock out principals +after a number of failed authentication attempts within a period of +time. Account lockout can make it more difficult to attack a +principal's password by brute force, but also makes it easy for an +attacker to deny access to a principal. + + +Configuring account lockout +--------------------------- + +Account lockout only works for principals with the +**+requires_preauth** flag set. Without this flag, the KDC cannot +know whether or not a client successfully decrypted the ticket it +issued. It is also important to set the **-allow_svr** flag on a +principal to protect its password from an off-line dictionary attack +through a TGS request. You can set these flags on a principal with +:ref:`kadmin(1)` as follows:: + + kadmin: modprinc +requires_preauth -allow_svr PRINCNAME + +Account lockout parameters are configured via :ref:`policy objects +<policies>`. There may be an existing policy associated with user +principals (such as the "default" policy), or you may need to create a +new one and associate it with each user principal. + +The policy parameters related to account lockout are: + +* :ref:`maxfailure <policy_maxfailure>`: the number of failed attempts + before the principal is locked out +* :ref:`failurecountinterval <policy_failurecountinterval>`: the + allowable interval between failed attempts +* :ref:`lockoutduration <policy_lockoutduration>`: the amount of time + a principal is locked out for + +Here is an example of setting these parameters on a new policy and +associating it with a principal:: + + kadmin: addpol -maxfailure 10 -failurecountinterval 180 + -lockoutduration 60 lockout_policy + kadmin: modprinc -policy lockout_policy PRINCNAME + + +Testing account lockout +----------------------- + +To test that account lockout is working, try authenticating as the +principal (hopefully not one that might be in use) multiple times with +the wrong password. For instance, if **maxfailure** is set to 2, you +might see:: + + $ kinit user + Password for user@KRBTEST.COM: + kinit: Password incorrect while getting initial credentials + $ kinit user + Password for user@KRBTEST.COM: + kinit: Password incorrect while getting initial credentials + $ kinit user + kinit: Client's credentials have been revoked while getting initial credentials + + +Account lockout principal state +------------------------------- + +A principal entry keeps three pieces of state related to account +lockout: + +* The time of last successful authentication +* The time of last failed authentication +* A counter of failed attempts + +The time of last successful authentication is not actually needed for +the account lockout system to function, but may be of administrative +interest. These fields can be observed with the **getprinc** kadmin +command. For example:: + + kadmin: getprinc user + Principal: user@KRBTEST.COM + ... + Last successful authentication: [never] + Last failed authentication: Mon Dec 03 12:30:33 EST 2012 + Failed password attempts: 2 + ... + +A principal which has been locked out can be administratively unlocked +with the **-unlock** option to the **modprinc** kadmin command:: + + kadmin: modprinc -unlock PRINCNAME + +This command will reset the number of failed attempts to 0. + + +KDC replication and account lockout +----------------------------------- + +The account lockout state of a principal is not replicated by either +traditional :ref:`kprop(8)` or incremental propagation. Because of +this, the number of attempts an attacker can make within a time period +is multiplied by the number of KDCs. For instance, if the +**maxfailure** parameter on a policy is 10 and there are four KDCs in +the environment (a master and three replicas), an attacker could make +as many as 40 attempts before the principal is locked out on all four +KDCs. + +An administrative unlock is propagated from the master to the replica +KDCs during the next propagation. Propagation of an administrative +unlock will cause the counter of failed attempts on each replica to +reset to 1 on the next failure. + +If a KDC environment uses a replication strategy other than kprop or +incremental propagation, such as the LDAP KDB module with multi-master +LDAP replication, then account lockout state may be replicated between +KDCs and the concerns of this section may not apply. + + +.. _disable_lockout: + +KDC performance and account lockout +----------------------------------- + +In order to fully track account lockout state, the KDC must write to +the the database on each successful and failed authentication. +Writing to the database is generally more expensive than reading from +it, so these writes may have a significant impact on KDC performance. +As of release 1.9, it is possible to turn off account lockout state +tracking in order to improve performance, by setting the +**disable_last_success** and **disable_lockout** variables in the +database module subsection of :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`. For example:: + + [dbmodules] + DB = { + disable_last_success = true + disable_lockout = true + } + +Of the two variables, setting **disable_last_success** will usually +have the largest positive impact on performance, and will still allow +account lockout policies to operate. However, it will make it +impossible to observe the last successful authentication time with +kadmin. + + +KDC setup and account lockout +----------------------------- + +To update the account lockout state on principals, the KDC must be +able to write to the principal database. For the DB2 module, no +special setup is required. For the LDAP module, the KDC DN must be +granted write access to the principal objects. If the KDC DN has only +read access, account lockout will not function. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/otp.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/otp.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..29dc520f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/otp.rst @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +.. _otp_preauth: + +OTP Preauthentication +===================== + +OTP is a preauthentication mechanism for Kerberos 5 which uses One +Time Passwords (OTP) to authenticate the client to the KDC. The OTP +is passed to the KDC over an encrypted FAST channel in clear-text. +The KDC uses the password along with per-user configuration to proxy +the request to a third-party RADIUS system. This enables +out-of-the-box compatibility with a large number of already widely +deployed proprietary systems. + +Additionally, our implementation of the OTP system allows for the +passing of RADIUS requests over a UNIX domain stream socket. This +permits the use of a local companion daemon which can handle the +details of authentication. + + +Defining token types +-------------------- + +Token types are defined in either :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` or +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)` according to the following format:: + + [otp] + <name> = { + server = <host:port or filename> (default: see below) + secret = <filename> + timeout = <integer> (default: 5 [seconds]) + retries = <integer> (default: 3) + strip_realm = <boolean> (default: true) + indicator = <string> (default: none) + } + +If the server field begins with '/', it will be interpreted as a UNIX +socket. Otherwise, it is assumed to be in the format host:port. When +a UNIX domain socket is specified, the secret field is optional and an +empty secret is used by default. If the server field is not +specified, it defaults to |kdcrundir|\ ``/<name>.socket``. + +When forwarding the request over RADIUS, by default the principal is +used in the User-Name attribute of the RADIUS packet. The strip_realm +parameter controls whether the principal is forwarded with or without +the realm portion. + +If an indicator field is present, tickets issued using this token type +will be annotated with the specified authentication indicator (see +:ref:`auth_indicator`). This key may be specified multiple times to +add multiple indicators. + + +The default token type +---------------------- + +A default token type is used internally when no token type is specified for a +given user. It is defined as follows:: + + [otp] + DEFAULT = { + strip_realm = false + } + +The administrator may override the internal ``DEFAULT`` token type +simply by defining a configuration with the same name. + + +Token instance configuration +---------------------------- + +To enable OTP for a client principal, the administrator must define +the **otp** string attribute for that principal. (See +:ref:`set_string`.) The **otp** user string is a JSON string of the +format: + +.. code-block:: xml + + [{ + "type": <string>, + "username": <string>, + "indicators": [<string>, ...] + }, ...] + +This is an array of token objects. Both fields of token objects are +optional. The **type** field names the token type of this token; if +not specified, it defaults to ``DEFAULT``. The **username** field +specifies the value to be sent in the User-Name RADIUS attribute. If +not specified, the principal name is sent, with or without realm as +defined in the token type. The **indicators** field specifies a list +of authentication indicators to annotate tickets with, overriding any +indicators specified in the token type. + +For ease of configuration, an empty array (``[]``) is treated as +equivalent to one DEFAULT token (``[{}]``). + + +Other considerations +-------------------- + +#. FAST is required for OTP to work. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/pkinit.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/pkinit.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bec4fc800 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/pkinit.rst @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +.. _pkinit: + +PKINIT configuration +==================== + +PKINIT is a preauthentication mechanism for Kerberos 5 which uses +X.509 certificates to authenticate the KDC to clients and vice versa. +PKINIT can also be used to enable anonymity support, allowing clients +to communicate securely with the KDC or with application servers +without authenticating as a particular client principal. + + +Creating certificates +--------------------- + +PKINIT requires an X.509 certificate for the KDC and one for each +client principal which will authenticate using PKINIT. For anonymous +PKINIT, a KDC certificate is required, but client certificates are +not. A commercially issued server certificate can be used for the KDC +certificate, but generally cannot be used for client certificates. + +The instruction in this section describe how to establish a +certificate authority and create standard PKINIT certificates. Skip +this section if you are using a commercially issued server certificate +as the KDC certificate for anonymous PKINIT, or if you are configuring +a client to use an Active Directory KDC. + + +Generating a certificate authority certificate +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +You can establish a new certificate authority (CA) for use with a +PKINIT deployment with the commands:: + + openssl genrsa -out cakey.pem 2048 + openssl req -key cakey.pem -new -x509 -out cacert.pem -days 3650 + +The second command will ask for the values of several certificate +fields. These fields can be set to any values. You can adjust the +expiration time of the CA certificate by changing the number after +``-days``. Since the CA certificate must be deployed to client +machines each time it changes, it should normally have an expiration +time far in the future; however, expiration times after 2037 may cause +interoperability issues in rare circumstances. + +The result of these commands will be two files, cakey.pem and +cacert.pem. cakey.pem will contain a 2048-bit RSA private key, which +must be carefully protected. cacert.pem will contain the CA +certificate, which must be placed in the filesytems of the KDC and +each client host. cakey.pem will be required to create KDC and client +certificates. + + +Generating a KDC certificate +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +A KDC certificate for use with PKINIT is required to have some unusual +fields, which makes generating them with OpenSSL somewhat complicated. +First, you will need a file containing the following:: + + [kdc_cert] + basicConstraints=CA:FALSE + keyUsage=nonRepudiation,digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement + extendedKeyUsage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5 + subjectKeyIdentifier=hash + authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer + issuerAltName=issuer:copy + subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:kdc_princ_name + + [kdc_princ_name] + realm=EXP:0,GeneralString:${ENV::REALM} + principal_name=EXP:1,SEQUENCE:kdc_principal_seq + + [kdc_principal_seq] + name_type=EXP:0,INTEGER:1 + name_string=EXP:1,SEQUENCE:kdc_principals + + [kdc_principals] + princ1=GeneralString:krbtgt + princ2=GeneralString:${ENV::REALM} + +If the above contents are placed in extensions.kdc, you can generate +and sign a KDC certificate with the following commands:: + + openssl genrsa -out kdckey.pem 2048 + openssl req -new -out kdc.req -key kdckey.pem + env REALM=YOUR_REALMNAME openssl x509 -req -in kdc.req \ + -CAkey cakey.pem -CA cacert.pem -out kdc.pem -days 365 \ + -extfile extensions.kdc -extensions kdc_cert -CAcreateserial + rm kdc.req + +The second command will ask for the values of certificate fields, +which can be set to any values. In the third command, substitute your +KDC's realm name for YOUR_REALMNAME. You can adjust the certificate's +expiration date by changing the number after ``-days``. Remember to +create a new KDC certificate before the old one expires. + +The result of this operation will be in two files, kdckey.pem and +kdc.pem. Both files must be placed in the KDC's filesystem. +kdckey.pem, which contains the KDC's private key, must be carefully +protected. + +If you examine the KDC certificate with ``openssl x509 -in kdc.pem +-text -noout``, OpenSSL will not know how to display the KDC principal +name in the Subject Alternative Name extension, so it will appear as +``othername:<unsupported>``. This is normal and does not mean +anything is wrong with the KDC certificate. + + +Generating client certificates +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +PKINIT client certificates also must have some unusual certificate +fields. To generate a client certificate with OpenSSL for a +single-component principal name, you will need an extensions file +(different from the KDC extensions file above) containing:: + + [client_cert] + basicConstraints=CA:FALSE + keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment,keyAgreement + extendedKeyUsage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4 + subjectKeyIdentifier=hash + authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer + issuerAltName=issuer:copy + subjectAltName=otherName:1.3.6.1.5.2.2;SEQUENCE:princ_name + + [princ_name] + realm=EXP:0,GeneralString:${ENV::REALM} + principal_name=EXP:1,SEQUENCE:principal_seq + + [principal_seq] + name_type=EXP:0,INTEGER:1 + name_string=EXP:1,SEQUENCE:principals + + [principals] + princ1=GeneralString:${ENV::CLIENT} + +If the above contents are placed in extensions.client, you can +generate and sign a client certificate with the following commands:: + + openssl genrsa -out clientkey.pem 2048 + openssl req -new -key clientkey.pem -out client.req + env REALM=YOUR_REALMNAME CLIENT=YOUR_PRINCNAME openssl x509 \ + -CAkey cakey.pem -CA cacert.pem -req -in client.req \ + -extensions client_cert -extfile extensions.client \ + -days 365 -out client.pem + rm client.req + +Normally, the first two commands should be run on the client host, and +the resulting client.req file transferred to the certificate authority +host for the third command. As in the previous steps, the second +command will ask for the values of certificate fields, which can be +set to any values. In the third command, substitute your realm's name +for YOUR_REALMNAME and the client's principal name (without realm) for +YOUR_PRINCNAME. You can adjust the certificate's expiration date by +changing the number after ``-days``. + +The result of this operation will be two files, clientkey.pem and +client.pem. Both files must be present on the client's host; +clientkey.pem, which contains the client's private key, must be +protected from access by others. + +As in the KDC certificate, OpenSSL will display the client principal +name as ``othername:<unsupported>`` in the Subject Alternative Name +extension of a PKINIT client certificate. + +If the client principal name contains more than one component +(e.g. ``host/example.com@REALM``), the ``[principals]`` section of +``extensions.client`` must be altered to contain multiple entries. +(Simply setting ``CLIENT`` to ``host/example.com`` would generate a +certificate for ``host\/example.com@REALM`` which would not match the +multi-component principal name.) For a two-component principal, the +section should read:: + + [principals] + princ1=GeneralString:${ENV::CLIENT1} + princ2=GeneralString:${ENV::CLIENT2} + +The environment variables ``CLIENT1`` and ``CLIENT2`` must then be set +to the first and second components when running ``openssl x509``. + + +Configuring the KDC +------------------- + +The KDC must have filesystem access to the KDC certificate (kdc.pem) +and the KDC private key (kdckey.pem). Configure the following +relation in the KDC's :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` file, either in the +:ref:`kdcdefaults` section or in a :ref:`kdc_realms` subsection (with +appropriate pathnames):: + + pkinit_identity = FILE:/var/lib/krb5kdc/kdc.pem,/var/lib/krb5kdc/kdckey.pem + +If any clients will authenticate using regular (as opposed to +anonymous) PKINIT, the KDC must also have filesystem access to the CA +certificate (cacert.pem), and the following configuration (with the +appropriate pathname):: + + pkinit_anchors = FILE:/var/lib/krb5kdc/cacert.pem + +Because of the larger size of requests and responses using PKINIT, you +may also need to allow TCP access to the KDC:: + + kdc_tcp_listen = 88 + +Restart the :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemon to pick up the configuration +changes. + +The principal entry for each PKINIT-using client must be configured to +require preauthentication. Ensure this with the command:: + + kadmin -q 'modprinc +requires_preauth YOUR_PRINCNAME' + +Starting with release 1.12, it is possible to remove the long-term +keys of a principal entry, which can save some space in the database +and help to clarify some PKINIT-related error conditions by not asking +for a password:: + + kadmin -q 'purgekeys -all YOUR_PRINCNAME' + +These principal options can also be specified at principal creation +time as follows:: + + kadmin -q 'add_principal +requires_preauth -nokey YOUR_PRINCNAME' + +By default, the KDC requires PKINIT client certificates to have the +standard Extended Key Usage and Subject Alternative Name attributes +for PKINIT. Starting in release 1.16, it is possible to authorize +client certificates based on the subject or other criteria instead of +the standard PKINIT Subject Alternative Name, by setting the +**pkinit_cert_match** string attribute on each client principal entry. +For example:: + + kadmin set_string user@REALM pkinit_cert_match "<SUBJECT>CN=user@REALM$" + +The **pkinit_cert_match** string attribute follows the syntax used by +the :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` **pkinit_cert_match** relation. To allow the +use of non-PKINIT client certificates, it will also be necessary to +disable key usage checking using the **pkinit_eku_checking** relation; +for example:: + + [kdcdefaults] + pkinit_eku_checking = none + + + +Configuring the clients +----------------------- + +Client hosts must be configured to trust the issuing authority for the +KDC certificate. For a newly established certificate authority, the +client host must have filesystem access to the CA certificate +(cacert.pem) and the following relation in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` in the +appropriate :ref:`realms` subsection (with appropriate pathnames):: + + pkinit_anchors = FILE:/etc/krb5/cacert.pem + +If the KDC certificate is a commercially issued server certificate, +the issuing certificate is most likely included in a system directory. +You can specify it by filename as above, or specify the whole +directory like so:: + + pkinit_anchors = DIR:/etc/ssl/certs + +A commercially issued server certificate will usually not have the +standard PKINIT principal name or Extended Key Usage extensions, so +the following additional configuration is required:: + + pkinit_eku_checking = kpServerAuth + pkinit_kdc_hostname = hostname.of.kdc.certificate + +Multiple **pkinit_kdc_hostname** relations can be configured to +recognize multiple KDC certificates. If the KDC is an Active +Directory domain controller, setting **pkinit_kdc_hostname** is +necessary, but it should not be necessary to set +**pkinit_eku_checking**. + +To perform regular (as opposed to anonymous) PKINIT authentication, a +client host must have filesystem access to a client certificate +(client.pem), and the corresponding private key (clientkey.pem). +Configure the following relations in the client host's +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` file in the appropriate :ref:`realms` subsection +(with appropriate pathnames):: + + pkinit_identities = FILE:/etc/krb5/client.pem,/etc/krb5/clientkey.pem + +If the KDC and client are properly configured, it should now be +possible to run ``kinit username`` without entering a password. + + +.. _anonymous_pkinit: + +Anonymous PKINIT +---------------- + +Anonymity support in Kerberos allows a client to obtain a ticket +without authenticating as any particular principal. Such a ticket can +be used as a FAST armor ticket, or to securely communicate with an +application server anonymously. + +To configure anonymity support, you must generate or otherwise procure +a KDC certificate and configure the KDC host, but you do not need to +generate any client certificates. On the KDC, you must set the +**pkinit_identity** variable to provide the KDC certificate, but do +not need to set the **pkinit_anchors** variable or store the issuing +certificate if you won't have any client certificates to verify. On +client hosts, you must set the **pkinit_anchors** variable (and +possibly **pkinit_kdc_hostname** and **pkinit_eku_checking**) in order +to trust the issuing authority for the KDC certificate, but do not +need to set the **pkinit_identities** variable. + +Anonymity support is not enabled by default. To enable it, you must +create the principal ``WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS`` using the command:: + + kadmin -q 'addprinc -randkey WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS' + +Some Kerberos deployments include application servers which lack +proper access control, and grant some level of access to any user who +can authenticate. In such an environment, enabling anonymity support +on the KDC would present a security issue. If you need to enable +anonymity support for TGTs (for use as FAST armor tickets) without +enabling anonymous authentication to application servers, you can set +the variable **restrict_anonymous_to_tgt** to ``true`` in the +appropriate :ref:`kdc_realms` subsection of the KDC's +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)` file. + +To obtain anonymous credentials on a client, run ``kinit -n``, or +``kinit -n @REALMNAME`` to specify a realm. The resulting tickets +will have the client name ``WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS@WELLKNOWN:ANONYMOUS``. + + +Freshness tokens +---------------- + +Freshness tokens can ensure that the client has recently had access to +its certificate private key. If freshness tokens are not required by +the KDC, a client program with temporary possession of the private key +can compose requests for future timestamps and use them later. + +In release 1.17 and later, freshness tokens are supported by the +client and are sent by the KDC when the client indicates support for +them. Because not all clients support freshness tokens yet, they are +not required by default. To check if freshness tokens are supported +by a realm's clients, look in the KDC logs for the lines:: + + PKINIT: freshness token received from <client principal> + PKINIT: no freshness token received from <client principal> + +To require freshness tokens for all clients in a realm (except for +clients authenticating anonymously), set the +**pkinit_require_freshness** variable to ``true`` in the appropriate +:ref:`kdc_realms` subsection of the KDC's :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` file. To +test that this option is in effect, run ``kinit -X disable_freshness`` +and verify that authentication is unsuccessful. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/princ_dns.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/princ_dns.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e1d823f27 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/princ_dns.rst @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +Principal names and DNS +======================= + +Kerberos clients can do DNS lookups to canonicalize service principal +names. This can cause difficulties when setting up Kerberos +application servers, especially when the client's name for the service +is different from what the service thinks its name is. + + +Service principal names +----------------------- + +A frequently used kind of principal name is the host-based service +principal name. This kind of principal name has two components: a +service name and a hostname. For example, ``imap/imap.example.com`` +is the principal name of the "imap" service on the host +"imap.example.com". Other possible service names for the first +component include "host" (remote login services such as ssh), "HTTP", +and "nfs" (Network File System). + +Service administrators often publish well-known hostname aliases that +they would prefer users to use instead of the canonical name of the +service host. This gives service administrators more flexibility in +deploying services. For example, a shell login server might be named +"long-vanity-hostname.example.com", but users will naturally prefer to +type something like "login.example.com". Hostname aliases also allow +for administrators to set up load balancing for some sorts of services +based on rotating ``CNAME`` records in DNS. + + +Service principal canonicalization +---------------------------------- + +MIT Kerberos clients currently always do forward resolution (looking +up the IPv4 and possibly IPv6 addresses using ``getaddrinfo()``) of +the hostname part of a host-based service principal to canonicalize +the hostname. They obtain the "canonical" name of the host when doing +so. By default, MIT Kerberos clients will also then do reverse DNS +resolution (looking up the hostname associated with the IPv4 or IPv6 +address using ``getnameinfo()``) of the hostname. Using the +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` setting:: + + [libdefaults] + rdns = false + +will disable reverse DNS lookup on clients. The default setting is +"true". + +Operating system bugs may prevent a setting of ``rdns = false`` from +disabling reverse DNS lookup. Some versions of GNU libc have a bug in +``getaddrinfo()`` that cause them to look up ``PTR`` records even when +not required. MIT Kerberos releases krb5-1.10.2 and newer have a +workaround for this problem, as does the krb5-1.9.x series as of +release krb5-1.9.4. + + +Reverse DNS mismatches +---------------------- + +Sometimes, an enterprise will have control over its forward DNS but +not its reverse DNS. The reverse DNS is sometimes under the control +of the Internet service provider of the enterprise, and the enterprise +may not have much influence in setting up reverse DNS records for its +address space. If there are difficulties with getting forward and +reverse DNS to match, it is best to set ``rdns = false`` on client +machines. + + +Overriding application behavior +------------------------------- + +Applications can choose to use a default hostname component in their +service principal name when accepting authentication, which avoids +some sorts of hostname mismatches. Because not all relevant +applications do this yet, using the :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` setting:: + + [libdefaults] + ignore_acceptor_hostname = true + +will allow the Kerberos library to override the application's choice +of service principal hostname and will allow a server program to +accept incoming authentications using any key in its keytab that +matches the service name and realm name (if given). This setting +defaults to "false" and is available in releases krb5-1.10 and later. + + +Provisioning keytabs +-------------------- + +One service principal entry that should be in the keytab is a +principal whose hostname component is the canonical hostname that +``getaddrinfo()`` reports for all known aliases for the host. If the +reverse DNS information does not match this canonical hostname, an +additional service principal entry should be in the keytab for this +different hostname. + + +Specific application advice +--------------------------- + +Secure shell (ssh) +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Setting ``GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck = no`` in the configuration file +of modern versions of the openssh daemon will allow the daemon to try +any key in its keytab when accepting a connection, rather than looking +for the keytab entry that matches the host's own idea of its name +(typically the name that ``gethostname()`` returns). This requires +krb5-1.10 or later. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/realm_config.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/realm_config.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..23245caf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/realm_config.rst @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +Realm configuration decisions +============================= + +Before installing Kerberos V5, it is necessary to consider the +following issues: + +* The name of your Kerberos realm (or the name of each realm, if you + need more than one). +* How you will assign your hostnames to Kerberos realms. +* Which ports your KDC and and kadmind services will use, if they will + not be using the default ports. +* How many replica KDCs you need and where they should be located. +* The hostnames of your master and replica KDCs. +* How frequently you will propagate the database from the master KDC + to the replica KDCs. + + +Realm name +---------- + +Although your Kerberos realm can be any ASCII string, convention is to +make it the same as your domain name, in upper-case letters. + +For example, hosts in the domain ``example.com`` would be in the +Kerberos realm:: + + EXAMPLE.COM + +If you need multiple Kerberos realms, MIT recommends that you use +descriptive names which end with your domain name, such as:: + + BOSTON.EXAMPLE.COM + HOUSTON.EXAMPLE.COM + + +.. _mapping_hostnames: + +Mapping hostnames onto Kerberos realms +-------------------------------------- + +Mapping hostnames onto Kerberos realms is done in one of three ways. + +The first mechanism works through a set of rules in the +:ref:`domain_realm` section of :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. You can specify +mappings for an entire domain or on a per-hostname basis. Typically +you would do this by specifying the mappings for a given domain or +subdomain and listing the exceptions. + +The second mechanism is to use KDC host-based service referrals. With +this method, the KDC's krb5.conf has a full [domain_realm] mapping for +hosts, but the clients do not, or have mappings for only a subset of +the hosts they might contact. When a client needs to contact a server +host for which it has no mapping, it will ask the client realm's KDC +for the service ticket, and will receive a referral to the appropriate +service realm. + +To use referrals, clients must be running MIT krb5 1.6 or later, and +the KDC must be running MIT krb5 1.7 or later. The +**host_based_services** and **no_host_referral** variables in the +:ref:`kdc_realms` section of :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` can be used to +fine-tune referral behavior on the KDC. + +It is also possible for clients to use DNS TXT records, if +**dns_lookup_realm** is enabled in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. Such lookups +are disabled by default because DNS is an insecure protocol and security +holes could result if DNS records are spoofed. If enabled, the client +will try to look up a TXT record formed by prepending the prefix +``_kerberos`` to the hostname in question. If that record is not +found, the client will attempt a lookup by prepending ``_kerberos`` to the +host's domain name, then its parent domain, up to the top-level domain. +For the hostname ``boston.engineering.example.com``, the names looked up +would be:: + + _kerberos.boston.engineering.example.com + _kerberos.engineering.example.com + _kerberos.example.com + _kerberos.com + +The value of the first TXT record found is taken as the realm name. + +Even if you do not choose to use this mechanism within your site, +you may wish to set it up anyway, for use when interacting with other sites. + + +Ports for the KDC and admin services +------------------------------------ + +The default ports used by Kerberos are port 88 for the KDC and port +749 for the admin server. You can, however, choose to run on other +ports, as long as they are specified in each host's +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` files or in DNS SRV records, and the +:ref:`kdc.conf(5)` file on each KDC. For a more thorough treatment of +port numbers used by the Kerberos V5 programs, refer to the +:ref:`conf_firewall`. + + +Replica KDCs +------------ + +Replica KDCs provide an additional source of Kerberos ticket-granting +services in the event of inaccessibility of the master KDC. The +number of replica KDCs you need and the decision of where to place them, +both physically and logically, depends on the specifics of your +network. + +Kerberos authentication requires that each client be able to contact a +KDC. Therefore, you need to anticipate any likely reason a KDC might +be unavailable and have a replica KDC to take up the slack. + +Some considerations include: + +* Have at least one replica KDC as a backup, for when the master KDC + is down, is being upgraded, or is otherwise unavailable. +* If your network is split such that a network outage is likely to + cause a network partition (some segment or segments of the network + to become cut off or isolated from other segments), have a replica + KDC accessible to each segment. +* If possible, have at least one replica KDC in a different building + from the master, in case of power outages, fires, or other localized + disasters. + + +.. _kdc_hostnames: + +Hostnames for KDCs +------------------ + +MIT recommends that your KDCs have a predefined set of CNAME records +(DNS hostname aliases), such as ``kerberos`` for the master KDC and +``kerberos-1``, ``kerberos-2``, ... for the replica KDCs. This way, +if you need to swap a machine, you only need to change a DNS entry, +rather than having to change hostnames. + +As of MIT krb5 1.4, clients can locate a realm's KDCs through DNS +using SRV records (:rfc:`2782`), assuming the Kerberos realm name is +also a DNS domain name. These records indicate the hostname and port +number to contact for that service, optionally with weighting and +prioritization. The domain name used in the SRV record name is the +realm name. Several different Kerberos-related service names are +used: + +_kerberos._udp + This is for contacting any KDC by UDP. This entry will be used + the most often. Normally you should list port 88 on each of your + KDCs. +_kerberos._tcp + This is for contacting any KDC by TCP. The MIT KDC by default + will not listen on any TCP ports, so unless you've changed the + configuration or you're running another KDC implementation, you + should leave this unspecified. If you do enable TCP support, + normally you should use port 88. +_kerberos-master._udp + This entry should refer to those KDCs, if any, that will + immediately see password changes to the Kerberos database. If a + user is logging in and the password appears to be incorrect, the + client will retry with the master KDC before failing with an + "incorrect password" error given. + + If you have only one KDC, or for whatever reason there is no + accessible KDC that would get database changes faster than the + others, you do not need to define this entry. +_kerberos-adm._tcp + This should list port 749 on your master KDC. Support for it is + not complete at this time, but it will eventually be used by the + :ref:`kadmin(1)` program and related utilities. For now, you will + also need the **admin_server** variable in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. +_kpasswd._udp + This should list port 464 on your master KDC. It is used when a + user changes her password. If this entry is not defined but a + _kerberos-adm._tcp entry is defined, the client will use the + _kerberos-adm._tcp entry with the port number changed to 749. + +The DNS SRV specification requires that the hostnames listed be the +canonical names, not aliases. So, for example, you might include the +following records in your (BIND-style) zone file:: + + $ORIGIN foobar.com. + _kerberos TXT "FOOBAR.COM" + kerberos CNAME daisy + kerberos-1 CNAME use-the-force-luke + kerberos-2 CNAME bunny-rabbit + _kerberos._udp SRV 0 0 88 daisy + SRV 0 0 88 use-the-force-luke + SRV 0 0 88 bunny-rabbit + _kerberos-master._udp SRV 0 0 88 daisy + _kerberos-adm._tcp SRV 0 0 749 daisy + _kpasswd._udp SRV 0 0 464 daisy + +Clients can also be configured with the explicit location of services +using the **kdc**, **master_kdc**, **admin_server**, and +**kpasswd_server** variables in the :ref:`realms` section of +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. Even if some clients will be configured with +explicit server locations, providing SRV records will still benefit +unconfigured clients, and be useful for other sites. + + +.. _kdc_discovery: + +KDC Discovery +------------- + +As of MIT krb5 1.15, clients can also locate KDCs in DNS through URI +records (:rfc:`7553`). Limitations with the SRV record format may +result in extra DNS queries in situations where a client must failover +to other transport types, or find a master server. The URI record can +convey more information about a realm's KDCs with a single query. + +The client performs a query for the following URI records: + +* ``_kerberos.REALM`` for finding KDCs. +* ``_kerberos-adm.REALM`` for finding kadmin services. +* ``_kpasswd.REALM`` for finding password services. + +The URI record includes a priority, weight, and a URI string that +consists of case-insensitive colon separated fields, in the form +``scheme:[flags]:transport:residual``. + +* *scheme* defines the registered URI type. It should always be + ``krb5srv``. +* *flags* contains zero or more flag characters. Currently the only + valid flag is ``m``, which indicates that the record is for a master + server. +* *transport* defines the transport type of the residual URL or + address. Accepted values are ``tcp``, ``udp``, or ``kkdcp`` for the + MS-KKDCP type. +* *residual* contains the hostname, IP address, or URL to be + contacted using the specified transport, with an optional port + extension. The MS-KKDCP transport type uses a HTTPS URL, and can + include a port and/or path extension. + +An example of URI records in a zone file:: + + _kerberos.EXAMPLE.COM URI 10 1 krb5srv:m:tcp:kdc1.example.com + URI 20 1 krb5srv:m:udp:kdc2.example.com:89 + URI 40 1 krb5srv::udp:10.10.0.23 + URI 30 1 krb5srv::kkdcp:https://proxy:89/auth + +URI lookups are enabled by default, and can be disabled by setting +**dns_uri_lookup** in the :ref:`libdefaults` section of +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` to False. When enabled, URI lookups take +precedence over SRV lookups, falling back to SRV lookups if no URI +records are found. + + +.. _db_prop: + +Database propagation +-------------------- + +The Kerberos database resides on the master KDC, and must be +propagated regularly (usually by a cron job) to the replica KDCs. In +deciding how frequently the propagation should happen, you will need +to balance the amount of time the propagation takes against the +maximum reasonable amount of time a user should have to wait for a +password change to take effect. + +If the propagation time is longer than this maximum reasonable time +(e.g., you have a particularly large database, you have a lot of +replicas, or you experience frequent network delays), you may wish to +cut down on your propagation delay by performing the propagation in +parallel. To do this, have the master KDC propagate the database to +one set of replicas, and then have each of these replicas propagate +the database to additional replicas. + +See also :ref:`incr_db_prop` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/spake.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/spake.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8b9f4710c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/spake.rst @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +.. _spake: + +SPAKE Preauthentication +======================= + +SPAKE preauthentication (added in release 1.17) uses public key +cryptography techniques to protect against :ref:`password dictionary +attacks <dictionary>`. Unlike :ref:`PKINIT <pkinit>`, it does not +require any additional infrastructure such as certificates; it simply +needs to be turned on. Using SPAKE preauthentication may modestly +increase the CPU and network load on the KDC. + +SPAKE preauthentication can use one of four elliptic curve groups for +its password-authenticated key exchange. The recommended group is +``edwards25519``; three NIST curves (``P-256``, ``P-384``, and +``P-521``) are also supported. + +By default, SPAKE with the ``edwards25519`` group is enabled on +clients, but the KDC does not offer SPAKE by default. To turn it on, +set the **spake_preauth_groups** variable in :ref:`libdefaults` to a +list of allowed groups. This variable affects both the client and the +KDC. Simply setting it to ``edwards25519`` is recommended:: + + [libdefaults] + spake_preauth_groups = edwards25519 + +Set the **+requires_preauth** and **-allow_svr** flags on client +principal entries, as you would for any preauthentication mechanism:: + + kadmin: modprinc +requires_preauth -allow_srv PRINCNAME + +Clients which do not implement SPAKE preauthentication will fall back +to encrypted timestamp. + +An active attacker can force a fallback to encrypted timestamp by +modifying the initial KDC response, defeating the protection against +dictionary attacks. To prevent this fallback on clients which do +implement SPAKE preauthentication, set the +**disable_encrypted_timestamp** variable to ``true`` in the +:ref:`realms` subsection for realms whose KDCs offer SPAKE +preauthentication. + +By default, SPAKE preauthentication requires an extra network round +trip to the KDC during initial authentication. If most of the clients +in a realm support SPAKE, this extra round trip can be eliminated +using an optimistic challenge, by setting the +**spake_preauth_kdc_challenge** variable in :ref:`kdcdefaults` to a +single group name:: + + [kdcdefaults] + spake_preauth_kdc_challenge = edwards25519 + +Using optimistic challenge will cause the KDC to do extra work for +initial authentication requests that do not result in SPAKE +preauthentication, but will save work when SPAKE preauthentication is +used. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/troubleshoot.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/troubleshoot.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6a0c7f89b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/troubleshoot.rst @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +.. _troubleshoot: + +Troubleshooting +=============== + +.. _trace_logging: + +Trace logging +------------- + +Most programs using MIT krb5 1.9 or later can be made to provide +information about internal krb5 library operations using trace +logging. To enable this, set the **KRB5_TRACE** environment variable +to a filename before running the program. On many operating systems, +the filename ``/dev/stdout`` can be used to send trace logging output +to standard output. + +Some programs do not honor **KRB5_TRACE**, either because they use +secure library contexts (this generally applies to setuid programs and +parts of the login system) or because they take direct control of the +trace logging system using the API. + +Here is a short example showing trace logging output for an invocation +of the :ref:`kvno(1)` command:: + + shell% env KRB5_TRACE=/dev/stdout kvno krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM + [9138] 1332348778.823276: Getting credentials user@KRBTEST.COM -> + krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM@KRBTEST.COM using ccache + FILE:/me/krb5/build/testdir/ccache + [9138] 1332348778.823381: Retrieving user@KRBTEST.COM -> + krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM@KRBTEST.COM from + FILE:/me/krb5/build/testdir/ccache with result: 0/Unknown code 0 + krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM@KRBTEST.COM: kvno = 1 + + +List of errors +-------------- + +Frequently seen errors +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +#. :ref:`init_creds_ETYPE_NOSUPP` + +#. :ref:`cert_chain_ETYPE_NOSUPP` + +#. :ref:`err_cert_chain_cert_expired` + + +Errors seen by admins +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. _prop_failed_start: + +#. :ref:`kprop_no_route` + +#. :ref:`kprop_con_refused` + +#. :ref:`kprop_sendauth_exchange` + +.. _prop_failed_end: + +----- + +.. _init_creds_etype_nosupp: + +KDC has no support for encryption type while getting initial credentials +........................................................................ + +.. _cert_chain_etype_nosupp: + + +credential verification failed: KDC has no support for encryption type +...................................................................... + +This most commonly happens when trying to use a principal with only +DES keys, in a release (MIT krb5 1.7 or later) which disables DES by +default. DES encryption is considered weak due to its inadequate key +size. If you cannot migrate away from its use, you can re-enable DES +by adding ``allow_weak_crypto = true`` to the :ref:`libdefaults` +section of :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. + + +.. _err_cert_chain_cert_expired: + +Cannot create cert chain: certificate has expired +................................................. + +This error message indicates that PKINIT authentication failed because +the client certificate, KDC certificate, or one of the certificates in +the signing chain above them has expired. + +If the KDC certificate has expired, this message appears in the KDC +log file, and the client will receive a "Preauthentication failed" +error. (Prior to release 1.11, the KDC log file message erroneously +appears as "Out of memory". Prior to release 1.12, the client will +receive a "Generic error".) + +If the client or a signing certificate has expired, this message may +appear in trace_logging_ output from :ref:`kinit(1)` or, starting in +release 1.12, as an error message from kinit or another program which +gets initial tickets. The error message is more likely to appear +properly on the client if the principal entry has no long-term keys. + +.. _kprop_no_route: + +kprop: No route to host while connecting to server +.................................................. + +Make sure that the hostname of the replica KDC (as given to kprop) is +correct, and that any firewalls between the master and the replica +allow a connection on port 754. + +.. _kprop_con_refused: + +kprop: Connection refused while connecting to server +.................................................... + +If the replica KDC is intended to run kpropd out of inetd, make sure +that inetd is configured to accept krb5_prop connections. inetd may +need to be restarted or sent a SIGHUP to recognize the new +configuration. If the replica is intended to run kpropd in standalone +mode, make sure that it is running. + +.. _kprop_sendauth_exchange: + +kprop: Server rejected authentication (during sendauth exchange) while authenticating to server +............................................................................................... + +Make sure that: + +#. The time is synchronized between the master and replica KDCs. +#. The master stash file was copied from the master to the expected + location on the replica. +#. The replica has a keytab file in the default location containing a + ``host`` principal for the replica's hostname. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/various_envs.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/various_envs.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c32ac05f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/admin/various_envs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +Various links +============= + +Whitepapers +----------- + +#. http://kerberos.org/software/whitepapers.html + + +Tutorials +--------- + +#. Fulvio Ricciardi <http://www.kerberos.org/software/tutorial.html>_ + + +Troubleshooting +--------------- + +#. http://www.ncsa.illinois.edu/UserInfo/Resources/Software/kerberos/troubleshooting.html + +#. http://nfsv4.bullopensource.org/doc/kerberosnfs/krbnfs_howto_v3.pdf + +#. http://sysdoc.doors.ch/HP/T1417-90005.pdf + +#. http://www.shrubbery.net/solaris9ab/SUNWaadm/SYSADV6/p27.html + +#. http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/E19253-01/816-4557/trouble-1/index.html + +#. http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb463167.aspx#EBAA + +#. https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libpam-heimdal/+bug/86528 + +#. http://h71000.www7.hp.com/doc/83final/ba548_90007/ch06s05.html diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/gssapi.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/gssapi.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f574b608b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/gssapi.rst @@ -0,0 +1,641 @@ +Developing with GSSAPI +====================== + +The GSSAPI (Generic Security Services API) allows applications to +communicate securely using Kerberos 5 or other security mechanisms. +We recommend using the GSSAPI (or a higher-level framework which +encompasses GSSAPI, such as SASL) for secure network communication +over using the libkrb5 API directly. + +GSSAPIv2 is specified in :rfc:`2743` and :rfc:`2744`. Also see +:rfc:`7546` for a description of how to use the GSSAPI in a client or +server program. + +This documentation will describe how various ways of using the +GSSAPI will behave with the krb5 mechanism as implemented in MIT krb5, +as well as krb5-specific extensions to the GSSAPI. + + +Name types +---------- + +A GSSAPI application can name a local or remote entity by calling +gss_import_name_, specifying a name type and a value. The following +name types are supported by the krb5 mechanism: + +* **GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE**: The value should be a string of the + form ``service`` or ``service@hostname``. This is the most common + way to name target services when initiating a security context, and + is the most likely name type to work across multiple mechanisms. + +* **GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME**: The value should be a principal name + string. This name type only works with the krb5 mechanism, and is + defined in the ``<gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>`` header. + +* **GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME** or **GSS_C_NULL_OID**: The value is treated + as an unparsed principal name string, as above. These name types + may work with mechanisms other than krb5, but will have different + interpretations in those mechanisms. **GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME** is + intended to be used with a local username, which will parse into a + single-component principal in the default realm. + +* **GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS**: The value is ignored. The anonymous + principal is used, allowing a client to authenticate to a server + without asserting a particular identity (which may or may not be + allowed by a particular server or Kerberos realm). + +* **GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME**: The value is uid_t object. On + Unix-like systems, the username of the uid is looked up in the + system user database and the resulting username is parsed as a + principal name. + +* **GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME**: As above, but the value is a decimal + string representation of the uid. + +* **GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME**: The value must be the result of a + gss_export_name_ call. + +* **GSS_KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_NAME**: The value should be a krb5 + enterprise name string (see :rfc:`6806` section 5), in the form + ``user@suffix``. This name type is used to convey alias names, and + is defined in the ``<gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>`` header. (New in + release 1.17.) + + +Initiator credentials +--------------------- + +A GSSAPI client application uses gss_init_sec_context_ to establish a +security context. The *initiator_cred_handle* parameter determines +what tickets are used to establish the connection. An application can +either pass **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** to use the default client +credential, or it can use gss_acquire_cred_ beforehand to acquire an +initiator credential. The call to gss_acquire_cred_ may include a +*desired_name* parameter, or it may pass **GSS_C_NO_NAME** if it does +not have a specific name preference. + +If the desired name for a krb5 initiator credential is a host-based +name, it is converted to a principal name of the form +``service/hostname`` in the local realm, where *hostname* is the local +hostname if not specified. The hostname will be canonicalized using +forward name resolution, and possibly also using reverse name +resolution depending on the value of the **rdns** variable in +:ref:`libdefaults`. + +If a desired name is specified in the call to gss_acquire_cred_, the +krb5 mechanism will attempt to find existing tickets for that client +principal name in the default credential cache or collection. If the +default cache type does not support a collection, and the default +cache contains credentials for a different principal than the desired +name, a **GSS_S_CRED_UNAVAIL** error will be returned with a minor +code indicating a mismatch. + +If no existing tickets are available for the desired name, but the +name has an entry in the default client :ref:`keytab_definition`, the +krb5 mechanism will acquire initial tickets for the name using the +default client keytab. + +If no desired name is specified, credential acquisition will be +deferred until the credential is used in a call to +gss_init_sec_context_ or gss_inquire_cred_. If the call is to +gss_init_sec_context_, the target name will be used to choose a client +principal name using the credential cache selection facility. (This +facility might, for instance, try to choose existing tickets for a +client principal in the same realm as the target service). If there +are no existing tickets for the chosen principal, but it is present in +the default client keytab, the krb5 mechanism will acquire initial +tickets using the keytab. + +If the target name cannot be used to select a client principal +(because the credentials are used in a call to gss_inquire_cred_), or +if the credential cache selection facility cannot choose a principal +for it, the default credential cache will be selected if it exists and +contains tickets. + +If the default credential cache does not exist, but the default client +keytab does, the krb5 mechanism will try to acquire initial tickets +for the first principal in the default client keytab. + +If the krb5 mechanism acquires initial tickets using the default +client keytab, the resulting tickets will be stored in the default +cache or collection, and will be refreshed by future calls to +gss_acquire_cred_ as they approach their expire time. + + +Acceptor names +-------------- + +A GSSAPI server application uses gss_accept_sec_context_ to establish +a security context based on tokens provided by the client. The +*acceptor_cred_handle* parameter determines what +:ref:`keytab_definition` entries may be authenticated to by the +client, if the krb5 mechanism is used. + +The simplest choice is to pass **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** as the acceptor +credential. In this case, clients may authenticate to any service +principal in the default keytab (typically |keytab|, or the value of +the **KRB5_KTNAME** environment variable). This is the recommended +approach if the server application has no specific requirements to the +contrary. + +A server may acquire an acceptor credential with gss_acquire_cred_ and +a *cred_usage* of **GSS_C_ACCEPT** or **GSS_C_BOTH**. If the +*desired_name* parameter is **GSS_C_NO_NAME**, then clients will be +allowed to authenticate to any service principal in the default +keytab, just as if no acceptor credential was supplied. + +If a server wishes to specify a *desired_name* to gss_acquire_cred_, +the most common choice is a host-based name. If the host-based +*desired_name* contains just a *service*, then clients will be allowed +to authenticate to any host-based service principal (that is, a +principal of the form ``service/hostname@REALM``) for the named +service, regardless of hostname or realm, as long as it is present in +the default keytab. If the input name contains both a *service* and a +*hostname*, clients will be allowed to authenticate to any host-based +principal for the named service and hostname, regardless of realm. + +.. note:: + + If a *hostname* is specified, it will be canonicalized + using forward name resolution, and possibly also using + reverse name resolution depending on the value of the + **rdns** variable in :ref:`libdefaults`. + +.. note:: + + If the **ignore_acceptor_hostname** variable in + :ref:`libdefaults` is enabled, then *hostname* will be + ignored even if one is specified in the input name. + +.. note:: + + In MIT krb5 versions prior to 1.10, and in Heimdal's + implementation of the krb5 mechanism, an input name with + just a *service* is treated like an input name of + ``service@localhostname``, where *localhostname* is the + string returned by gethostname(). + +If the *desired_name* is a krb5 principal name or a local system name +type which is mapped to a krb5 principal name, clients will only be +allowed to authenticate to that principal in the default keytab. + + +Name Attributes +--------------- + +In release 1.8 or later, the gss_inquire_name_ and +gss_get_name_attribute_ functions, specified in :rfc:`6680`, can be +used to retrieve name attributes from the *src_name* returned by +gss_accept_sec_context_. The following attributes are defined when +the krb5 mechanism is used: + +.. _gssapi_authind_attr: + +* "auth-indicators" attribute: + +This attribute will be included in the gss_inquire_name_ output if the +ticket contains :ref:`authentication indicators <auth_indicator>`. +One indicator is returned per invocation of gss_get_name_attribute_, +so multiple invocations may be necessary to retrieve all of the +indicators from the ticket. (New in release 1.15.) + + +Importing and exporting credentials +----------------------------------- + +The following GSSAPI extensions can be used to import and export +credentials (declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``):: + + OM_uint32 gss_export_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_buffer_t token); + + OM_uint32 gss_import_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_buffer_t token, + gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle); + +The first function serializes a GSSAPI credential handle into a +buffer; the second unseralizes a buffer into a GSSAPI credential +handle. Serializing a credential does not destroy it. If any of the +mechanisms used in *cred_handle* do not support serialization, +gss_export_cred will return **GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE**. As with other +GSSAPI serialization functions, these extensions are only intended to +work with a matching implementation on the other side; they do not +serialize credentials in a standardized format. + +A serialized credential may contain secret information such as ticket +session keys. The serialization format does not protect this +information from eavesdropping or tampering. The calling application +must take care to protect the serialized credential when communicating +it over an insecure channel or to an untrusted party. + +A krb5 GSSAPI credential may contain references to a credential cache, +a client keytab, an acceptor keytab, and a replay cache. These +resources are normally serialized as references to their external +locations (such as the filename of the credential cache). Because of +this, a serialized krb5 credential can only be imported by a process +with similar privileges to the exporter. A serialized credential +should not be trusted if it originates from a source with lower +privileges than the importer, as it may contain references to external +credential cache, keytab, or replay cache resources not accessible to +the originator. + +An exception to the above rule applies when a krb5 GSSAPI credential +refers to a memory credential cache, as is normally the case for +delegated credentials received by gss_accept_sec_context_. In this +case, the contents of the credential cache are serialized, so that the +resulting token may be imported even if the original memory credential +cache no longer exists. + + +Constrained delegation (S4U) +---------------------------- + +The Microsoft S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy Kerberos protocol extensions +allow an intermediate service to acquire credentials from a client to +a target service without requiring the client to delegate a +ticket-granting ticket, if the KDC is configured to allow it. + +To perform a constrained delegation operation, the intermediate +service must submit to the KDC an "evidence ticket" from the client to +the intermediate service with the forwardable bit set. An evidence +ticket can be acquired when the client authenticates to the +intermediate service with Kerberos, or with an S4U2Self request if the +KDC allows it. The MIT krb5 GSSAPI library represents an evidence +ticket using a "proxy credential", which is a special kind of +gss_cred_id_t object whose underlying credential cache contains the +evidence ticket and a krbtgt ticket for the intermediate service. + +To acquire a proxy credential during client authentication, the +service should first create an acceptor credential using the +**GSS_C_BOTH** usage. The application should then pass this +credential as the *acceptor_cred_handle* to gss_accept_sec_context_, +and also pass a *delegated_cred_handle* output parameter to receive a +proxy credential containing the evidence ticket. The output value of +*delegated_cred_handle* may be a delegated ticket-granting ticket if +the client sent one, or a proxy credential if the client authenticated +with a forwardable service ticket, or **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** if +neither is the case. + +To acquire a proxy credential using an S4U2Self request, the service +can use the following GSSAPI extension:: + + OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t icred, + gss_name_t desired_name, + OM_uint32 time_req, + gss_OID_set desired_mechs, + gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage, + gss_cred_id_t *output_cred, + gss_OID_set *actual_mechs, + OM_uint32 *time_rec); + +The parameters to this function are similar to those of +gss_acquire_cred_, except that *icred* is used to make an S4U2Self +request to the KDC for a ticket from *desired_name* to the +intermediate service. Both *icred* and *desired_name* are required +for this function; passing **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** or +**GSS_C_NO_NAME** will cause the call to fail. *icred* must contain a +krbtgt ticket for the intermediate service. If the KDC returns a +forwardable ticket, the result of this operation is a proxy +credential; if it is not forwardable, the result is a regular +credential for *desired_name*. + +A recent KDC will usually allow any service to acquire a ticket from a +client to itself with an S4U2Self request, but the ticket will only be +forwardable if the service has a specific privilege. In the MIT krb5 +KDC, this privilege is determined by the **ok_to_auth_as_delegate** +bit on the intermediate service's principal entry, which can be +configured with :ref:`kadmin(1)`. + +Once the intermediate service has a proxy credential, it can simply +pass it to gss_init_sec_context_ as the *initiator_cred_handle* +parameter, and the desired service as the *target_name* parameter. +The GSSAPI library will present the krbtgt ticket and evidence ticket +in the proxy credential to the KDC in an S4U2Proxy request; if the +intermediate service has the appropriate permissions, the KDC will +issue a ticket from the client to the target service. The GSSAPI +library will then use this ticket to authenticate to the target +service. + +If an application needs to find out whether a credential it holds is a +proxy credential and the name of the intermediate service, it can +query the credential with the **GSS_KRB5_GET_CRED_IMPERSONATOR** OID +(new in release 1.16, declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>``) using +the gss_inquire_cred_by_oid extension (declared in +``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``):: + + OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle, + gss_OID desired_object, + gss_buffer_set_t *data_set); + +If the call succeeds and *cred_handle* is a proxy credential, +*data_set* will be set to a single-element buffer set containing the +unparsed principal name of the intermediate service. If *cred_handle* +is not a proxy credential, *data_set* will be set to an empty buffer +set. If the library does not support the query, +gss_inquire_cred_by_oid will return **GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE**. + + +AEAD message wrapping +--------------------- + +The following GSSAPI extensions (declared in +``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``) can be used to wrap and unwrap messages +with additional "associated data" which is integrity-checked but is +not included in the output buffer:: + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, + gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer, + gss_buffer_t input_payload_buffer, + int *conf_state, + gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer); + + OM_uint32 gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer, + gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer, + gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer, + int *conf_state, + gss_qop_t *qop_state); + +Wrap tokens created with gss_wrap_aead will successfully unwrap only +if the same *input_assoc_buffer* contents are presented to +gss_unwrap_aead. + + +IOV message wrapping +-------------------- + +The following extensions (declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``) can +be used for in-place encryption, fine-grained control over wrap token +layout, and for constructing wrap tokens compatible with Microsoft DCE +RPC:: + + typedef struct gss_iov_buffer_desc_struct { + OM_uint32 type; + gss_buffer_desc buffer; + } gss_iov_buffer_desc, *gss_iov_buffer_t; + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req, + int *conf_state, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count); + + OM_uint32 gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count); + + OM_uint32 gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + int conf_req_flag, + gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, + int iov_count); + + OM_uint32 gss_release_iov_buffer(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, + int iov_count); + +The caller of gss_wrap_iov provides an array of gss_iov_buffer_desc +structures, each containing a type and a gss_buffer_desc structure. +Valid types include: + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA**: A data buffer to be included in the + token, and to be encrypted or decrypted in-place if the token is + confidentiality-protected. + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER**: The GSSAPI wrap token header and + underlying cryptographic header. + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER**: The cryptographic trailer, if one is + required. + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING**: Padding to be combined with the data + during encryption and decryption. (The implementation may choose to + place padding in the trailer buffer, in which case it will set the + padding buffer length to 0.) + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM**: For unwrapping only, a buffer + containing a complete wrap token in standard format to be unwrapped. + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY**: A buffer to be included in the + token's integrity protection checksum, but not to be encrypted or + included in the token itself. + +For gss_wrap_iov, the IOV list should contain one HEADER buffer, +followed by zero or more SIGN_ONLY buffers, followed by one or more +DATA buffers, followed by a TRAILER buffer. The memory pointed to by +the buffers is not required to be contiguous or in any particular +order. If *conf_req_flag* is true, DATA buffers will be encrypted +in-place, while SIGN_ONLY buffers will not be modified. + +The type of an output buffer may be combined with +**GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE** to request that gss_wrap_iov allocate +the buffer contents. If gss_wrap_iov allocates a buffer, it sets the +**GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATED** flag on the buffer type. +gss_release_iov_buffer can be used to release all allocated buffers +within an iov list and unset their allocated flags. Here is an +example of how gss_wrap_iov can be used with allocation requested +(*ctx* is assumed to be a previously established gss_ctx_id_t):: + + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[4]; + char str[] = "message"; + + iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE; + iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA; + iov[1].buffer.value = str; + iov[1].buffer.length = strlen(str); + iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE; + iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE; + + major = gss_wrap_iov(&minor, ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, NULL, + iov, 4); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + handle_error(major, minor); + + /* Transmit or otherwise use resulting buffers. */ + + (void)gss_release_iov_buffer(&minor, iov, 4); + +If the caller does not choose to request buffer allocation by +gss_wrap_iov, it should first call gss_wrap_iov_length to query the +lengths of the HEADER, PADDING, and TRAILER buffers. DATA buffers +must be provided in the iov list so that padding length can be +computed correctly, but the output buffers need not be initialized. +Here is an example of using gss_wrap_iov_length and gss_wrap_iov:: + + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[4]; + char str[1024] = "message", *ptr; + + iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER; + iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA; + iov[1].buffer.value = str; + iov[1].buffer.length = strlen(str); + + iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING; + iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER; + + major = gss_wrap_iov_length(&minor, ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, + NULL, iov, 4); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + handle_error(major, minor); + if (strlen(str) + iov[0].buffer.length + iov[2].buffer.length + + iov[3].buffer.length > sizeof(str)) + handle_out_of_space_error(); + ptr = str + strlen(str); + iov[0].buffer.value = ptr; + ptr += iov[0].buffer.length; + iov[2].buffer.value = ptr; + ptr += iov[2].buffer.length; + iov[3].buffer.value = ptr; + + major = gss_wrap_iov(&minor, ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, NULL, + iov, 4); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + handle_error(major, minor); + +If the context was established using the **GSS_C_DCE_STYLE** flag +(described in :rfc:`4757`), wrap tokens compatible with Microsoft DCE +RPC can be constructed. In this case, the IOV list must include a +SIGN_ONLY buffer, a DATA buffer, a second SIGN_ONLY buffer, and a +HEADER buffer in that order (the order of the buffer contents remains +arbitrary). The application must pad the DATA buffer to a multiple of +16 bytes as no padding or trailer buffer is used. + +gss_unwrap_iov may be called with an IOV list just like one which +would be provided to gss_wrap_iov. DATA buffers will be decrypted +in-place if they were encrypted, and SIGN_ONLY buffers will not be +modified. + +Alternatively, gss_unwrap_iov may be called with a single STREAM +buffer, zero or more SIGN_ONLY buffers, and a single DATA buffer. The +STREAM buffer is interpreted as a complete wrap token. The STREAM +buffer will be modified in-place to decrypt its contents. The DATA +buffer will be initialized to point to the decrypted data within the +STREAM buffer, unless it has the **GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE** flag +set, in which case it will be initialized with a copy of the decrypted +data. Here is an example (*token* and *token_len* are assumed to be a +pre-existing pointer and length for a modifiable region of data):: + + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2]; + + iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM; + iov[0].buffer.value = token; + iov[0].buffer.length = token_len; + iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA; + major = gss_unwrap_iov(&minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, iov, 2); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + handle_error(major, minor); + + /* Decrypted data is in iov[1].buffer, pointing to a subregion of + * token. */ + +.. _gssapi_mic_token: + +IOV MIC tokens +-------------- + +The following extensions (declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``) can +be used in release 1.12 or later to construct and verify MIC tokens +using an IOV list:: + + OM_uint32 gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, + int iov_count); + + OM_uint32 gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t qop_req, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, + iov_count); + + OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, + gss_qop_t *qop_state, + gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, + int iov_count); + +The caller of gss_get_mic_iov provides an array of gss_iov_buffer_desc +structures, each containing a type and a gss_buffer_desc structure. +Valid types include: + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA** and **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY**: The + corresponding buffer for each of these types will be signed for the + MIC token, in the order provided. + +* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_MIC_TOKEN**: The GSSAPI MIC token. + +The type of the MIC_TOKEN buffer may be combined with +**GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE** to request that gss_get_mic_iov +allocate the buffer contents. If gss_get_mic_iov allocates the +buffer, it sets the **GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATED** flag on the buffer +type. gss_release_iov_buffer can be used to release all allocated +buffers within an iov list and unset their allocated flags. Here is +an example of how gss_get_mic_iov can be used with allocation +requested (*ctx* is assumed to be a previously established +gss_ctx_id_t):: + + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[3]; + + iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA; + iov[0].buffer.value = "sign1"; + iov[0].buffer.length = 5; + iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY; + iov[1].buffer.value = "sign2"; + iov[1].buffer.length = 5; + iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_MIC_TOKEN | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE; + + major = gss_get_mic_iov(&minor, ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, iov, 3); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + handle_error(major, minor); + + /* Transmit or otherwise use iov[2].buffer. */ + + (void)gss_release_iov_buffer(&minor, iov, 3); + +If the caller does not choose to request buffer allocation by +gss_get_mic_iov, it should first call gss_get_mic_iov_length to query +the length of the MIC_TOKEN buffer. Here is an example of using +gss_get_mic_iov_length and gss_get_mic_iov:: + + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2]; + char data[1024]; + + iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_MIC_TOKEN; + iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA; + iov[1].buffer.value = "message"; + iov[1].buffer.length = 7; + + major = gss_get_mic_iov_length(&minor, ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, iov, 2); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + handle_error(major, minor); + if (iov[0].buffer.length > sizeof(data)) + handle_out_of_space_error(); + iov[0].buffer.value = data; + + major = gss_get_mic_iov(&minor, ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, iov, 2); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + handle_error(major, minor); + + +.. _gss_accept_sec_context: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.1 +.. _gss_acquire_cred: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.2 +.. _gss_export_name: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.13 +.. _gss_get_name_attribute: https://tools.ietf.org/html/6680.html#section-7.5 +.. _gss_import_name: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.16 +.. _gss_init_sec_context: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.19 +.. _gss_inquire_name: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6680.txt#section-7.4 +.. _gss_inquire_cred: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.21 diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/h5l_mit_apidiff.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/h5l_mit_apidiff.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0ea5e32ef --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/h5l_mit_apidiff.rst @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +Differences between Heimdal and MIT Kerberos API +================================================ + +.. tabularcolumns:: |l|l| + +.. table:: + + ======================================== ================================================= + :c:func:`krb5_auth_con_getaddrs()` H5l: If either of the pointers to local_addr + and remote_addr is not NULL, it is freed + first and then reallocated before being + populated with the content of corresponding + address from authentication context. + :c:func:`krb5_auth_con_setaddrs()` H5l: If either address is NULL, the previous + address remains in place + :c:func:`krb5_auth_con_setports()` H5l: Not implemented as of version 1.3.3 + :c:func:`krb5_auth_con_setrecvsubkey()` H5l: If either port is NULL, the previous + port remains in place + :c:func:`krb5_auth_con_setsendsubkey()` H5l: Not implemented as of version 1.3.3 + :c:func:`krb5_cc_set_config()` MIT: Before version 1.10 it was assumed that + the last argument *data* is ALWAYS non-zero. + :c:func:`krb5_cccol_last_change_time()` H5l takes 3 arguments: krb5_context context, + const char \*type, krb5_timestamp \*change_time + MIT takes two arguments: krb5_context context, + krb5_timestamp \*change_time + :c:func:`krb5_set_default_realm()` H5l: Caches the computed default realm context + field. If the second argument is NULL, + it tries to retrieve it from libdefaults or DNS. + MIT: Computes the default realm each time + if it wasn't explicitly set in the context + ======================================== ================================================= diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..961bb1e9e --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +For application developers +========================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + gssapi.rst + y2038.rst + h5l_mit_apidiff.rst + init_creds.rst + princ_handle.rst + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + refs/index.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/init_creds.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/init_creds.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5c3c0a87c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/init_creds.rst @@ -0,0 +1,304 @@ +Initial credentials +=================== + +Software that performs tasks such as logging users into a computer +when they type their Kerberos password needs to get initial +credentials (usually ticket granting tickets) from Kerberos. Such +software shares some behavior with the :ref:`kinit(1)` program. + +Whenever a program grants access to a resource (such as a local login +session on a desktop computer) based on a user successfully getting +initial Kerberos credentials, it must verify those credentials against +a secure shared secret (e.g., a host keytab) to ensure that the user +credentials actually originate from a legitimate KDC. Failure to +perform this verification is a critical vulnerability, because a +malicious user can execute the "Zanarotti attack": the user constructs +a fake response that appears to come from the legitimate KDC, but +whose contents come from an attacker-controlled KDC. + +Some applications read a Kerberos password over the network (ideally +over a secure channel), which they then verify against the KDC. While +this technique may be the only practical way to integrate Kerberos +into some existing legacy systems, its use is contrary to the original +design goals of Kerberos. + +The function :c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_password` will get initial +credentials for a client using a password. An application that needs +to verify the credentials can call :c:func:`krb5_verify_init_creds`. +Here is an example of code to obtain and verify TGT credentials, given +strings *princname* and *password* for the client principal name and +password:: + + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_principal client_princ = NULL; + + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + ret = krb5_parse_name(context, princname, &client_princ); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(context, &creds, client_princ, + password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + cleanup: + krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + return ret; + +Options for get_init_creds +-------------------------- + +The function :c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_password` takes an options +parameter (which can be a null pointer). Use the function +:c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc` to allocate an options +structure, and :c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free` to free it. For +example:: + + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt = NULL; + krb5_creds creds; + + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opt); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life(opt, 24 * 60 * 60); + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(context, &creds, client_princ, + password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, opt); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + + cleanup: + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opt); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + return ret; + +Getting anonymous credentials +----------------------------- + +As of release 1.8, it is possible to obtain fully anonymous or +partially anonymous (realm-exposed) credentials, if the KDC supports +it. The MIT KDC supports issuing fully anonymous credentials as of +release 1.8 if configured appropriately (see :ref:`anonymous_pkinit`), +but does not support issuing realm-exposed anonymous credentials at +this time. + +To obtain fully anonymous credentials, call +:c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous` on the options +structure to set the anonymous flag, and specify a client principal +with the KDC's realm and a single empty data component (the principal +obtained by parsing ``@``\ *realmname*). Authentication will take +place using anonymous PKINIT; if successful, the client principal of +the resulting tickets will be +``WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS@WELLKNOWN:ANONYMOUS``. Here is an example:: + + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous(opt, 1); + ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &client_princ, strlen(myrealm), + myrealm, "", (char *)NULL); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(context, &creds, client_princ, + password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, opt); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + +To obtain realm-exposed anonymous credentials, set the anonymous flag +on the options structure as above, but specify a normal client +principal in order to prove membership in the realm. Authentication +will take place as it normally does; if successful, the client +principal of the resulting tickets will be ``WELLKNOWN/ANONYMOUS@``\ +*realmname*. + +User interaction +---------------- + +Authenticating a user usually requires the entry of secret +information, such as a password. A password can be supplied directly +to :c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_password` via the *password* +parameter, or the application can supply prompter and/or responder +callbacks instead. If callbacks are used, the user can also be +queried for other secret information such as a PIN, informed of +impending password expiration, or prompted to change a password which +has expired. + +Prompter callback +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +A prompter callback can be specified via the *prompter* and *data* +parameters to :c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_password`. The prompter +will be invoked each time the krb5 library has a question to ask or +information to present. When the prompter callback is invoked, the +*banner* argument (if not null) is intended to be displayed to the +user, and the questions to be answered are specified in the *prompts* +array. Each prompt contains a text question in the *prompt* field, a +*hidden* bit to indicate whether the answer should be hidden from +display, and a storage area for the answer in the *reply* field. The +callback should fill in each question's ``reply->data`` with the +answer, up to a maximum number of ``reply->length`` bytes, and then +reset ``reply->length`` to the length of the answer. + +A prompter callback can call :c:func:`krb5_get_prompt_types` to get an +array of type constants corresponding to the prompts, to get +programmatic information about the semantic meaning of the questions. +:c:func:`krb5_get_prompt_types` may return a null pointer if no prompt +type information is available. + +Text-based applications can use a built-in text prompter +implementation by supplying :c:func:`krb5_prompter_posix` as the +*prompter* parameter and a null pointer as the *data* parameter. For +example:: + + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(context, &creds, client_princ, + NULL, krb5_prompter_posix, NULL, 0, + NULL, NULL); + +Responder callback +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +A responder callback can be specified through the init_creds options +using the :c:func:`krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_responder` function. +Responder callbacks can present a more sophisticated user interface +for authentication secrets. The responder callback is usually invoked +only once per authentication, with a list of questions produced by all +of the allowed preauthentication mechanisms. + +When the responder callback is invoked, the *rctx* argument can be +accessed to obtain the list of questions and to answer them. The +:c:func:`krb5_responder_list_questions` function retrieves an array of +question types. For each question type, the +:c:func:`krb5_responder_get_challenge` function retrieves additional +information about the question, if applicable, and the +:c:func:`krb5_responder_set_answer` function sets the answer. + +Responder question types, challenges, and answers are UTF-8 strings. +The question type is a well-known string; the meaning of the challenge +and answer depend on the question type. If an application does not +understand a question type, it cannot interpret the challenge or +provide an answer. Failing to answer a question typically results in +the prompter callback being used as a fallback. + +Password question +################# + +The :c:macro:`KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PASSWORD` (or ``"password"``) +question type requests the user's password. This question does not +have a challenge, and the response is simply the password string. + +One-time password question +########################## + +The :c:macro:`KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_OTP` (or ``"otp"``) question +type requests a choice among one-time password tokens and the PIN and +value for the chosen token. The challenge and answer are JSON-encoded +strings, but an application can use convenience functions to avoid +doing any JSON processing itself. + +The :c:func:`krb5_responder_otp_get_challenge` function decodes the +challenge into a krb5_responder_otp_challenge structure. The +:c:func:`krb5_responder_otp_set_answer` function selects one of the +token information elements from the challenge and supplies the value +and pin for that token. + +PKINIT password or PIN question +############################### + +The :c:macro:`KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PKINIT` (or ``"pkinit"``) question +type requests PINs for hardware devices and/or passwords for encrypted +credentials which are stored on disk, potentially also supplying +information about the state of the hardware devices. The challenge and +answer are JSON-encoded strings, but an application can use convenience +functions to avoid doing any JSON processing itself. + +The :c:func:`krb5_responder_pkinit_get_challenge` function decodes the +challenges into a krb5_responder_pkinit_challenge structure. The +:c:func:`krb5_responder_pkinit_set_answer` function can be used to +supply the PIN or password for a particular client credential, and can +be called multiple times. + +Example +####### + +Here is an example of using a responder callback:: + + static krb5_error_code + my_responder(krb5_context context, void *data, + krb5_responder_context rctx) + { + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_responder_otp_challenge *chl; + + if (krb5_responder_get_challenge(context, rctx, + KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PASSWORD)) { + ret = krb5_responder_set_answer(context, rctx, + KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PASSWORD, + "open sesame"); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + ret = krb5_responder_otp_get_challenge(context, rctx, &chl); + if (ret == 0 && chl != NULL) { + ret = krb5_responder_otp_set_answer(context, rctx, 0, "1234", + NULL); + krb5_responder_otp_challenge_free(context, rctx, chl); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + return 0; + } + + static krb5_error_code + get_creds(krb5_context context, krb5_principal client_princ) + { + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt = NULL; + krb5_creds creds; + + memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds)); + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc(context, &opt); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_responder(context, opt, my_responder, + NULL); + if (ret) + goto cleanup; + ret = krb5_get_init_creds_password(context, &creds, client_princ, + NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, opt); + + cleanup: + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free(context, opt); + krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &creds); + return ret; + } + +Verifying initial credentials +----------------------------- + +Use the function :c:func:`krb5_verify_init_creds` to verify initial +credentials. It takes an options structure (which can be a null +pointer). Use :c:func:`krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init` to initialize +the caller-allocated options structure, and +:c:func:`krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail` to set the +"nofail" option. For example:: + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt vopt; + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(&vopt); + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail(&vopt, 1); + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds(context, &creds, NULL, NULL, NULL, &vopt); + +The confusingly named "nofail" option, when set, means that the +verification must actually succeed in order for +:c:func:`krb5_verify_init_creds` to indicate success. The default +state of this option (cleared) means that if there is no key material +available to verify the user credentials, the verification will +succeed anyway. (The default can be changed by a configuration file +setting.) + +This accommodates a use case where a large number of unkeyed shared +desktop workstations need to allow users to log in using Kerberos. +The security risks from this practice are mitigated by the absence of +valuable state on the shared workstations---any valuable resources +that the users would access reside on networked servers. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/princ_handle.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/princ_handle.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..455f00a4b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/princ_handle.rst @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +Principal manipulation and parsing +================================== + +Kerberos principal structure + +.. + +:c:type:`krb5_principal_data` + +:c:type:`krb5_principal` + +.. + +Create and free principal + +.. + +:c:func:`krb5_build_principal()` + +:c:func:`krb5_build_principal_alloc_va()` + +:c:func:`krb5_build_principal_ext()` + +:c:func:`krb5_copy_principal()` + +:c:func:`krb5_free_principal()` + +:c:func:`krb5_cc_get_principal()` + +.. + +Comparing + +.. + +:c:func:`krb5_principal_compare()` + +:c:func:`krb5_principal_compare_flags()` + +:c:func:`krb5_principal_compare_any_realm()` + +:c:func:`krb5_sname_match()` + +:c:func:`krb5_sname_to_principal()` + +.. + + +Parsing: + +.. + +:c:func:`krb5_parse_name()` + +:c:func:`krb5_parse_name_flags()` + +:c:func:`krb5_unparse_name()` + +:c:func:`krb5_unparse_name_flags()` + +.. + +Utilities: + +.. + +:c:func:`krb5_is_config_principal()` + +:c:func:`krb5_kuserok()` + +:c:func:`krb5_set_password()` + +:c:func:`krb5_set_password_using_ccache()` + +:c:func:`krb5_set_principal_realm()` + +:c:func:`krb5_realm_compare()` + +.. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f8a5aa5e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/api/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ +krb5 API +======== + + +Frequently used public interfaces +---------------------------------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_build_principal.rst + krb5_build_principal_alloc_va.rst + krb5_build_principal_ext.rst + krb5_cc_close.rst + krb5_cc_default.rst + krb5_cc_default_name.rst + krb5_cc_destroy.rst + krb5_cc_dup.rst + krb5_cc_get_name.rst + krb5_cc_get_principal.rst + krb5_cc_get_type.rst + krb5_cc_initialize.rst + krb5_cc_new_unique.rst + krb5_cc_resolve.rst + krb5_change_password.rst + krb5_chpw_message.rst + krb5_expand_hostname.rst + krb5_free_context.rst + krb5_free_error_message.rst + krb5_free_principal.rst + krb5_fwd_tgt_creds.rst + krb5_get_default_realm.rst + krb5_get_error_message.rst + krb5_get_host_realm.rst + krb5_get_credentials.rst + krb5_get_fallback_host_realm.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_keytab.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_alloc.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_free.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_get_fast_flags.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_address_list.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_anonymous.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_canonicalize.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_change_password_prompt.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_etype_list.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_expire_callback.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_fast_ccache.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_fast_ccache_name.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_fast_flags.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_in_ccache.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_out_ccache.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_pa.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_pac_request.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_preauth_list.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_proxiable.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_responder.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_salt.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_tkt_life.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_password.rst + krb5_get_profile.rst + krb5_get_prompt_types.rst + krb5_get_renewed_creds.rst + krb5_get_validated_creds.rst + krb5_init_context.rst + krb5_init_secure_context.rst + krb5_is_config_principal.rst + krb5_is_thread_safe.rst + krb5_kt_close.rst + krb5_kt_client_default.rst + krb5_kt_default.rst + krb5_kt_default_name.rst + krb5_kt_dup.rst + krb5_kt_get_name.rst + krb5_kt_get_type.rst + krb5_kt_resolve.rst + krb5_kuserok.rst + krb5_parse_name.rst + krb5_parse_name_flags.rst + krb5_principal_compare.rst + krb5_principal_compare_any_realm.rst + krb5_principal_compare_flags.rst + krb5_prompter_posix.rst + krb5_realm_compare.rst + krb5_responder_get_challenge.rst + krb5_responder_list_questions.rst + krb5_responder_set_answer.rst + krb5_responder_otp_get_challenge.rst + krb5_responder_otp_set_answer.rst + krb5_responder_otp_challenge_free.rst + krb5_responder_pkinit_get_challenge.rst + krb5_responder_pkinit_set_answer.rst + krb5_responder_pkinit_challenge_free.rst + krb5_set_default_realm.rst + krb5_set_password.rst + krb5_set_password_using_ccache.rst + krb5_set_principal_realm.rst + krb5_set_trace_callback.rst + krb5_set_trace_filename.rst + krb5_sname_match.rst + krb5_sname_to_principal.rst + krb5_unparse_name.rst + krb5_unparse_name_ext.rst + krb5_unparse_name_flags.rst + krb5_unparse_name_flags_ext.rst + krb5_us_timeofday.rst + krb5_verify_authdata_kdc_issued.rst + +Rarely used public interfaces +-------------------------------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_425_conv_principal.rst + krb5_524_conv_principal.rst + krb5_address_compare.rst + krb5_address_order.rst + krb5_address_search.rst + krb5_allow_weak_crypto.rst + krb5_aname_to_localname.rst + krb5_anonymous_principal.rst + krb5_anonymous_realm.rst + krb5_appdefault_boolean.rst + krb5_appdefault_string.rst + krb5_auth_con_free.rst + krb5_auth_con_genaddrs.rst + krb5_auth_con_get_checksum_func.rst + krb5_auth_con_getaddrs.rst + krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator.rst + krb5_auth_con_getflags.rst + krb5_auth_con_getkey.rst + krb5_auth_con_getkey_k.rst + krb5_auth_con_getlocalseqnumber.rst + krb5_auth_con_getrcache.rst + krb5_auth_con_getrecvsubkey.rst + krb5_auth_con_getrecvsubkey_k.rst + krb5_auth_con_getremoteseqnumber.rst + krb5_auth_con_getsendsubkey.rst + krb5_auth_con_getsendsubkey_k.rst + krb5_auth_con_init.rst + krb5_auth_con_set_checksum_func.rst + krb5_auth_con_set_req_cksumtype.rst + krb5_auth_con_setaddrs.rst + krb5_auth_con_setflags.rst + krb5_auth_con_setports.rst + krb5_auth_con_setrcache.rst + krb5_auth_con_setrecvsubkey.rst + krb5_auth_con_setrecvsubkey_k.rst + krb5_auth_con_setsendsubkey.rst + krb5_auth_con_setsendsubkey_k.rst + krb5_auth_con_setuseruserkey.rst + krb5_cc_cache_match.rst + krb5_cc_copy_creds.rst + krb5_cc_end_seq_get.rst + krb5_cc_get_config.rst + krb5_cc_get_flags.rst + krb5_cc_get_full_name.rst + krb5_cc_last_change_time.rst + krb5_cc_lock.rst + krb5_cc_move.rst + krb5_cc_next_cred.rst + krb5_cc_remove_cred.rst + krb5_cc_retrieve_cred.rst + krb5_cc_select.rst + krb5_cc_set_config.rst + krb5_cc_set_default_name.rst + krb5_cc_set_flags.rst + krb5_cc_start_seq_get.rst + krb5_cc_store_cred.rst + krb5_cc_support_switch.rst + krb5_cc_switch.rst + krb5_cc_unlock.rst + krb5_cccol_cursor_free.rst + krb5_cccol_cursor_new.rst + krb5_cccol_cursor_next.rst + krb5_cccol_have_content.rst + krb5_cccol_last_change_time.rst + krb5_cccol_lock.rst + krb5_cccol_unlock.rst + krb5_clear_error_message.rst + krb5_check_clockskew.rst + krb5_copy_addresses.rst + krb5_copy_authdata.rst + krb5_copy_authenticator.rst + krb5_copy_checksum.rst + krb5_copy_context.rst + krb5_copy_creds.rst + krb5_copy_data.rst + krb5_copy_error_message.rst + krb5_copy_keyblock.rst + krb5_copy_keyblock_contents.rst + krb5_copy_principal.rst + krb5_copy_ticket.rst + krb5_find_authdata.rst + krb5_free_addresses.rst + krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part.rst + krb5_free_authdata.rst + krb5_free_authenticator.rst + krb5_free_cred_contents.rst + krb5_free_creds.rst + krb5_free_data.rst + krb5_free_data_contents.rst + krb5_free_default_realm.rst + krb5_free_enctypes.rst + krb5_free_error.rst + krb5_free_host_realm.rst + krb5_free_keyblock.rst + krb5_free_keyblock_contents.rst + krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents.rst + krb5_free_string.rst + krb5_free_ticket.rst + krb5_free_unparsed_name.rst + krb5_get_etype_info.rst + krb5_get_permitted_enctypes.rst + krb5_get_server_rcache.rst + krb5_get_time_offsets.rst + krb5_init_context_profile.rst + krb5_init_creds_free.rst + krb5_init_creds_get.rst + krb5_init_creds_get_creds.rst + krb5_init_creds_get_error.rst + krb5_init_creds_get_times.rst + krb5_init_creds_init.rst + krb5_init_creds_set_keytab.rst + krb5_init_creds_set_password.rst + krb5_init_creds_set_service.rst + krb5_init_creds_step.rst + krb5_init_keyblock.rst + krb5_is_referral_realm.rst + krb5_kt_add_entry.rst + krb5_kt_end_seq_get.rst + krb5_kt_get_entry.rst + krb5_kt_have_content.rst + krb5_kt_next_entry.rst + krb5_kt_read_service_key.rst + krb5_kt_remove_entry.rst + krb5_kt_start_seq_get.rst + krb5_make_authdata_kdc_issued.rst + krb5_merge_authdata.rst + krb5_mk_1cred.rst + krb5_mk_error.rst + krb5_mk_ncred.rst + krb5_mk_priv.rst + krb5_mk_rep.rst + krb5_mk_rep_dce.rst + krb5_mk_req.rst + krb5_mk_req_extended.rst + krb5_mk_safe.rst + krb5_os_localaddr.rst + krb5_pac_add_buffer.rst + krb5_pac_free.rst + krb5_pac_get_buffer.rst + krb5_pac_get_types.rst + krb5_pac_init.rst + krb5_pac_parse.rst + krb5_pac_sign.rst + krb5_pac_sign_ext.rst + krb5_pac_verify.rst + krb5_pac_verify_ext.rst + krb5_prepend_error_message.rst + krb5_principal2salt.rst + krb5_rd_cred.rst + krb5_rd_error.rst + krb5_rd_priv.rst + krb5_rd_rep.rst + krb5_rd_rep_dce.rst + krb5_rd_req.rst + krb5_rd_safe.rst + krb5_read_password.rst + krb5_salttype_to_string.rst + krb5_server_decrypt_ticket_keytab.rst + krb5_set_default_tgs_enctypes.rst + krb5_set_error_message.rst + krb5_set_kdc_recv_hook.rst + krb5_set_kdc_send_hook.rst + krb5_set_real_time.rst + krb5_string_to_cksumtype.rst + krb5_string_to_deltat.rst + krb5_string_to_enctype.rst + krb5_string_to_salttype.rst + krb5_string_to_timestamp.rst + krb5_timeofday.rst + krb5_timestamp_to_sfstring.rst + krb5_timestamp_to_string.rst + krb5_tkt_creds_free.rst + krb5_tkt_creds_get.rst + krb5_tkt_creds_get_creds.rst + krb5_tkt_creds_get_times.rst + krb5_tkt_creds_init.rst + krb5_tkt_creds_step.rst + krb5_verify_init_creds.rst + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init.rst + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail.rst + krb5_vprepend_error_message.rst + krb5_vset_error_message.rst + krb5_vwrap_error_message.rst + krb5_wrap_error_message.rst + + +Public interfaces that should not be called directly +------------------------------------------------------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_c_block_size.rst + krb5_c_checksum_length.rst + krb5_c_crypto_length.rst + krb5_c_crypto_length_iov.rst + krb5_c_decrypt.rst + krb5_c_decrypt_iov.rst + krb5_c_derive_prfplus.rst + krb5_c_encrypt.rst + krb5_c_encrypt_iov.rst + krb5_c_encrypt_length.rst + krb5_c_enctype_compare.rst + krb5_c_free_state.rst + krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple.rst + krb5_c_init_state.rst + krb5_c_is_coll_proof_cksum.rst + krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum.rst + krb5_c_keyed_checksum_types.rst + krb5_c_keylengths.rst + krb5_c_make_checksum.rst + krb5_c_make_checksum_iov.rst + krb5_c_make_random_key.rst + krb5_c_padding_length.rst + krb5_c_prf.rst + krb5_c_prfplus.rst + krb5_c_prf_length.rst + krb5_c_random_add_entropy.rst + krb5_c_random_make_octets.rst + krb5_c_random_os_entropy.rst + krb5_c_random_to_key.rst + krb5_c_string_to_key.rst + krb5_c_string_to_key_with_params.rst + krb5_c_valid_cksumtype.rst + krb5_c_valid_enctype.rst + krb5_c_verify_checksum.rst + krb5_c_verify_checksum_iov.rst + krb5_cksumtype_to_string.rst + krb5_decode_authdata_container.rst + krb5_decode_ticket.rst + krb5_deltat_to_string.rst + krb5_encode_authdata_container.rst + krb5_enctype_to_name.rst + krb5_enctype_to_string.rst + krb5_free_checksum.rst + krb5_free_checksum_contents.rst + krb5_free_cksumtypes.rst + krb5_free_tgt_creds.rst + krb5_k_create_key.rst + krb5_k_decrypt.rst + krb5_k_decrypt_iov.rst + krb5_k_encrypt.rst + krb5_k_encrypt_iov.rst + krb5_k_free_key.rst + krb5_k_key_enctype.rst + krb5_k_key_keyblock.rst + krb5_k_make_checksum.rst + krb5_k_make_checksum_iov.rst + krb5_k_prf.rst + krb5_k_reference_key.rst + krb5_k_verify_checksum.rst + krb5_k_verify_checksum_iov.rst + + +Legacy convenience interfaces +------------------------------ + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_recvauth.rst + krb5_recvauth_version.rst + krb5_sendauth.rst + + +Deprecated public interfaces +------------------------------ + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_524_convert_creds.rst + krb5_auth_con_getlocalsubkey.rst + krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey.rst + krb5_auth_con_initivector.rst + krb5_build_principal_va.rst + krb5_c_random_seed.rst + krb5_calculate_checksum.rst + krb5_checksum_size.rst + krb5_encrypt.rst + krb5_decrypt.rst + krb5_eblock_enctype.rst + krb5_encrypt_size.rst + krb5_finish_key.rst + krb5_finish_random_key.rst + krb5_cc_gen_new.rst + krb5_get_credentials_renew.rst + krb5_get_credentials_validate.rst + krb5_get_in_tkt_with_password.rst + krb5_get_in_tkt_with_skey.rst + krb5_get_in_tkt_with_keytab.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init.rst + krb5_init_random_key.rst + krb5_kt_free_entry.rst + krb5_random_key.rst + krb5_process_key.rst + krb5_string_to_key.rst + krb5_use_enctype.rst + krb5_verify_checksum.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..37a895f3b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +Complete reference - API and datatypes +====================================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + api/index.rst + types/index.rst + macros/index.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..47c6d4413 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/macros/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@ +krb5 simple macros +========================= + +Public +------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + ADDRTYPE_ADDRPORT.rst + ADDRTYPE_CHAOS.rst + ADDRTYPE_DDP.rst + ADDRTYPE_INET.rst + ADDRTYPE_INET6.rst + ADDRTYPE_IPPORT.rst + ADDRTYPE_ISO.rst + ADDRTYPE_IS_LOCAL.rst + ADDRTYPE_NETBIOS.rst + ADDRTYPE_XNS.rst + AD_TYPE_EXTERNAL.rst + AD_TYPE_FIELD_TYPE_MASK.rst + AD_TYPE_REGISTERED.rst + AD_TYPE_RESERVED.rst + AP_OPTS_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION.rst + AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED.rst + AP_OPTS_RESERVED.rst + AP_OPTS_USE_SESSION_KEY.rst + AP_OPTS_USE_SUBKEY.rst + AP_OPTS_WIRE_MASK.rst + CKSUMTYPE_CMAC_CAMELLIA128.rst + CKSUMTYPE_CMAC_CAMELLIA256.rst + CKSUMTYPE_CRC32.rst + CKSUMTYPE_DESCBC.rst + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR.rst + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128.rst + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256.rst + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA256_128_AES128.rst + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA384_192_AES256.rst + CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3.rst + CKSUMTYPE_MD5_HMAC_ARCFOUR.rst + CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA.rst + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4.rst + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD4_DES.rst + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5.rst + CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES.rst + ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96.rst + ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128.rst + ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96.rst + ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192.rst + ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC.rst + ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_EXP.rst + ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA128_CTS_CMAC.rst + ENCTYPE_CAMELLIA256_CTS_CMAC.rst + ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_ENV.rst + ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW.rst + ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA.rst + ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1.rst + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC.rst + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4.rst + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5.rst + ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW.rst + ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1.rst + ENCTYPE_DSA_SHA1_CMS.rst + ENCTYPE_MD5_RSA_CMS.rst + ENCTYPE_NULL.rst + ENCTYPE_RC2_CBC_ENV.rst + ENCTYPE_RSA_ENV.rst + ENCTYPE_RSA_ES_OAEP_ENV.rst + ENCTYPE_SHA1_RSA_CMS.rst + ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN.rst + KDC_OPT_ALLOW_POSTDATE.rst + KDC_OPT_CANONICALIZE.rst + KDC_OPT_CNAME_IN_ADDL_TKT.rst + KDC_OPT_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK.rst + KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY.rst + KDC_OPT_FORWARDABLE.rst + KDC_OPT_FORWARDED.rst + KDC_OPT_POSTDATED.rst + KDC_OPT_PROXIABLE.rst + KDC_OPT_PROXY.rst + KDC_OPT_RENEW.rst + KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE.rst + KDC_OPT_RENEWABLE_OK.rst + KDC_OPT_REQUEST_ANONYMOUS.rst + KDC_OPT_VALIDATE.rst + KDC_TKT_COMMON_MASK.rst + KRB5_ALTAUTH_ATT_CHALLENGE_RESPONSE.rst + KRB5_ANONYMOUS_PRINCSTR.rst + KRB5_ANONYMOUS_REALMSTR.rst + KRB5_AP_REP.rst + KRB5_AP_REQ.rst + KRB5_AS_REP.rst + KRB5_AS_REQ.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_AND_OR.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_AUTH_INDICATOR.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_CAMMAC.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_FX_ARMOR.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_INITIAL_VERIFIED_CAS.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_KDC_ISSUED.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_MANDATORY_FOR_KDC.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_OSF_DCE.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_SESAME.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET.rst + KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_ADDR.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_LOCAL_FULL_ADDR.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_ADDR.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_GENERATE_REMOTE_FULL_ADDR.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_PERMIT_ALL.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_SEQUENCE.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_RET_TIME.rst + KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_USE_SUBKEY.rst + KRB5_CRED.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_EMPTY.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_STREAM.rst + KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER.rst + KRB5_CYBERSAFE_SECUREID.rst + KRB5_DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS.rst + KRB5_ENCPADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP.rst + KRB5_ERROR.rst + KRB5_FAST_REQUIRED.rst + KRB5_GC_CACHED.rst + KRB5_GC_CANONICALIZE.rst + KRB5_GC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION.rst + KRB5_GC_FORWARDABLE.rst + KRB5_GC_NO_STORE.rst + KRB5_GC_NO_TRANSIT_CHECK.rst + KRB5_GC_USER_USER.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ADDRESS_LIST.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ANONYMOUS.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_CANONICALIZE.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_CHG_PWD_PRMPT.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_ETYPE_LIST.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_FORWARDABLE.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PREAUTH_LIST.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_PROXIABLE.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_RENEW_LIFE.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SALT.rst + KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_TKT_LIFE.rst + KRB5_INIT_CONTEXT_SECURE.rst + KRB5_INIT_CONTEXT_KDC.rst + KRB5_INIT_CREDS_STEP_FLAG_CONTINUE.rst + KRB5_INT16_MAX.rst + KRB5_INT16_MIN.rst + KRB5_INT32_MAX.rst + KRB5_INT32_MIN.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AD_ITE.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AD_KDCISSUED_CKSUM.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AD_MTE.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AD_SIGNEDPATH.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_ENCRYPT.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REP_ENCPART.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AS_REP_ENCPART.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AS_REQ.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AS_REQ_PA_ENC_TS.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_CAMMAC.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_FAST_ENC.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_FAST_FINISHED.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_FAST_REP.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_GSS_TOK_MIC.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_GSS_TOK_WRAP_INTEG.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_GSS_TOK_WRAP_PRIV.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_IAKERB_FINISHED.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KDC_REP_TICKET.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KRB_CRED_ENCPART.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KRB_ERROR_CKSUM.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KRB_PRIV_ENCPART.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_KRB_SAFE_CKSUM.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_AS_FRESHNESS.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_FX_COOKIE.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_OTP_REQUEST.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_PKINIT_KX.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REPLY.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_S4U_X509_USER_REQUEST.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_CHALLENGE_CKSUM.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_CHALLENGE_TRACKID.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_RESPONSE.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_SPAKE.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REP_ENCPART_SESSKEY.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REP_ENCPART_SUBKEY.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SUBKEY.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH.rst + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR.rst + KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ALL_ACCT_EXPTIME.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ALL_LAST_INITIAL.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ALL_LAST_RENEWAL.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ALL_LAST_REQ.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ALL_LAST_TGT.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ALL_LAST_TGT_ISSUED.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ALL_PW_EXPTIME.rst + KRB5_LRQ_NONE.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ONE_ACCT_EXPTIME.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ONE_LAST_INITIAL.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ONE_LAST_RENEWAL.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ONE_LAST_REQ.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ONE_LAST_TGT.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ONE_LAST_TGT_ISSUED.rst + KRB5_LRQ_ONE_PW_EXPTIME.rst + KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL.rst + KRB5_NT_ENT_PRINCIPAL_AND_ID.rst + KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL.rst + KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL_AND_ID.rst + KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL.rst + KRB5_NT_SMTP_NAME.rst + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST.rst + KRB5_NT_SRV_INST.rst + KRB5_NT_SRV_XHST.rst + KRB5_NT_UID.rst + KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN.rst + KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN.rst + KRB5_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL.rst + KRB5_PAC_CLIENT_INFO.rst + KRB5_PAC_CREDENTIALS_INFO.rst + KRB5_PAC_DELEGATION_INFO.rst + KRB5_PAC_LOGON_INFO.rst + KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM.rst + KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM.rst + KRB5_PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO.rst + KRB5_PADATA_AFS3_SALT.rst + KRB5_PADATA_AP_REQ.rst + KRB5_PADATA_AS_CHECKSUM.rst + KRB5_PADATA_AS_FRESHNESS.rst + KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_ENC_SANDIA_SECURID.rst + KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP.rst + KRB5_PADATA_ENC_UNIX_TIME.rst + KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO.rst + KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2.rst + KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER.rst + KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR.rst + KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST.rst + KRB5_PADATA_GET_FROM_TYPED_DATA.rst + KRB5_PADATA_NONE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_OSF_DCE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_OTP_CHALLENGE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_OTP_PIN_CHANGE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_OTP_REQUEST.rst + KRB5_PADATA_PAC_REQUEST.rst + KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX.rst + KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP.rst + KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD.rst + KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ.rst + KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD.rst + KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT.rst + KRB5_PADATA_REFERRAL.rst + KRB5_PADATA_S4U_X509_USER.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SAM_CHALLENGE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SAM_CHALLENGE_2.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SAM_REDIRECT.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SAM_RESPONSE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SAM_RESPONSE_2.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SESAME.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SPAKE.rst + KRB5_PADATA_SVR_REFERRAL_INFO.rst + KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ.rst + KRB5_PADATA_USE_SPECIFIED_KVNO.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_CASEFOLD.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_ENTERPRISE.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_IGNORE_REALM.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_COMPARE_UTF8.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_ENTERPRISE.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_IGNORE_REALM.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_NO_REALM.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_PARSE_REQUIRE_REALM.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM.rst + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_SHORT.rst + KRB5_PRIV.rst + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD.rst + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_NEW_PASSWORD_AGAIN.rst + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PASSWORD.rst + KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH.rst + KRB5_PVNO.rst + KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR.rst + KRB5_RECVAUTH_BADAUTHVERS.rst + KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION.rst + KRB5_REFERRAL_REALM.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_PKINIT_FLAGS_TOKEN_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_PKINIT_FLAGS_TOKEN_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_PKINIT_FLAGS_TOKEN_USER_PIN_LOCKED.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PKINIT.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_OTP_FLAGS_COLLECT_PIN.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_OTP_FLAGS_COLLECT_TOKEN.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_OTP_FLAGS_NEXTOTP.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_OTP_FLAGS_SEPARATE_PIN.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_OTP.rst + KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PASSWORD.rst + KRB5_SAFE.rst + KRB5_SAM_MUST_PK_ENCRYPT_SAD.rst + KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD.rst + KRB5_SAM_USE_SAD_AS_KEY.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_2ND_TKT.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_AUTHDATA.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_FLAGS.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_FLAGS_EXACT.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_IS_SKEY.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_KTYPE.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_SRV_NAMEONLY.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_TIMES.rst + KRB5_TC_MATCH_TIMES_EXACT.rst + KRB5_TC_NOTICKET.rst + KRB5_TC_OPENCLOSE.rst + KRB5_TC_SUPPORTED_KTYPES.rst + KRB5_TGS_NAME.rst + KRB5_TGS_NAME_SIZE.rst + KRB5_TGS_REP.rst + KRB5_TGS_REQ.rst + KRB5_TKT_CREDS_STEP_FLAG_CONTINUE.rst + KRB5_VERIFY_INIT_CREDS_OPT_AP_REQ_NOFAIL.rst + KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAMESTR.rst + LR_TYPE_INTERPRETATION_MASK.rst + LR_TYPE_THIS_SERVER_ONLY.rst + MAX_KEYTAB_NAME_LEN.rst + MSEC_DIRBIT.rst + MSEC_VAL_MASK.rst + SALT_TYPE_AFS_LENGTH.rst + SALT_TYPE_NO_LENGTH.rst + THREEPARAMOPEN.rst + TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS.rst + TKT_FLG_ENC_PA_REP.rst + TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE.rst + TKT_FLG_FORWARDED.rst + TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH.rst + TKT_FLG_INITIAL.rst + TKT_FLG_INVALID.rst + TKT_FLG_MAY_POSTDATE.rst + TKT_FLG_OK_AS_DELEGATE.rst + TKT_FLG_POSTDATED.rst + TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH.rst + TKT_FLG_PROXIABLE.rst + TKT_FLG_PROXY.rst + TKT_FLG_RENEWABLE.rst + TKT_FLG_TRANSIT_POLICY_CHECKED.rst + VALID_INT_BITS.rst + VALID_UINT_BITS.rst + krb5_const.rst + krb5_princ_component.rst + krb5_princ_name.rst + krb5_princ_realm.rst + krb5_princ_set_realm.rst + krb5_princ_set_realm_data.rst + krb5_princ_set_realm_length.rst + krb5_princ_size.rst + krb5_princ_type.rst + krb5_roundup.rst + krb5_x.rst + krb5_xc.rst + +Deprecated macros +------------------------------ + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb524_convert_creds_kdc.rst + krb524_init_ets.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc414cfde --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +krb5 types and structures +========================= + +Public +------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_address.rst + krb5_addrtype.rst + krb5_ap_req.rst + krb5_ap_rep.rst + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part.rst + krb5_authdata.rst + krb5_authdatatype.rst + krb5_authenticator.rst + krb5_boolean.rst + krb5_checksum.rst + krb5_const_pointer.rst + krb5_const_principal.rst + krb5_cred.rst + krb5_cred_enc_part.rst + krb5_cred_info.rst + krb5_creds.rst + krb5_crypto_iov.rst + krb5_cryptotype.rst + krb5_data.rst + krb5_deltat.rst + krb5_enc_data.rst + krb5_enc_kdc_rep_part.rst + krb5_enc_tkt_part.rst + krb5_encrypt_block.rst + krb5_enctype.rst + krb5_error.rst + krb5_error_code.rst + krb5_expire_callback_func.rst + krb5_flags.rst + krb5_get_init_creds_opt.rst + krb5_gic_opt_pa_data.rst + krb5_int16.rst + krb5_int32.rst + krb5_kdc_rep.rst + krb5_kdc_req.rst + krb5_keyblock.rst + krb5_keytab_entry.rst + krb5_keyusage.rst + krb5_kt_cursor.rst + krb5_kvno.rst + krb5_last_req_entry.rst + krb5_magic.rst + krb5_mk_req_checksum_func.rst + krb5_msgtype.rst + krb5_octet.rst + krb5_pa_pac_req.rst + krb5_pa_server_referral_data.rst + krb5_pa_svr_referral_data.rst + krb5_pa_data.rst + krb5_pointer.rst + krb5_post_recv_fn.rst + krb5_pre_send_fn.rst + krb5_preauthtype.rst + krb5_principal.rst + krb5_principal_data.rst + krb5_const_principal.rst + krb5_prompt.rst + krb5_prompt_type.rst + krb5_prompter_fct.rst + krb5_pwd_data.rst + krb5_responder_context.rst + krb5_responder_fn.rst + krb5_responder_otp_challenge.rst + krb5_responder_otp_tokeninfo.rst + krb5_responder_pkinit_challenge.rst + krb5_responder_pkinit_identity.rst + krb5_response.rst + krb5_replay_data.rst + krb5_ticket.rst + krb5_ticket_times.rst + krb5_timestamp.rst + krb5_tkt_authent.rst + krb5_trace_callback.rst + krb5_trace_info.rst + krb5_transited.rst + krb5_typed_data.rst + krb5_ui_2.rst + krb5_ui_4.rst + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt.rst + passwd_phrase_element.rst + + +Internal +--------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + krb5_auth_context.rst + krb5_cksumtype + krb5_context.rst + krb5_cc_cursor.rst + krb5_ccache.rst + krb5_cccol_cursor.rst + krb5_init_creds_context.rst + krb5_key.rst + krb5_keytab.rst + krb5_pac.rst + krb5_rcache.rst + krb5_tkt_creds_context.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/krb5_int32.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/krb5_int32.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2bc914b3c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/krb5_int32.rst @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +.. highlightlang:: c + +.. _krb5-int32-struct: + +krb5_int32 +========== + +.. +.. c:type:: krb5_int32 +.. + +krb5_int32 is a signed 32-bit integer type diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/krb5_ui_4.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/krb5_ui_4.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..de79bafe1 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/refs/types/krb5_ui_4.rst @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +.. highlightlang:: c + +.. _krb5-ui4-struct: + +krb5_ui_4 +========== + +.. +.. c:type:: krb5_ui_4 +.. + +krb5_ui_4 is an unsigned 32-bit integer type. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/y2038.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/y2038.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc4122dad --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/appdev/y2038.rst @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +Year 2038 considerations for uses of krb5_timestamp +=================================================== + +POSIX time values, which measure the number of seconds since January 1 +1970, will exceed the maximum value representable in a signed 32-bit +integer in January 2038. This documentation describes considerations +for consumers of the MIT krb5 libraries. + +Applications or libraries which use libkrb5 and consume the timestamps +included in credentials or other structures make use of the +:c:type:`krb5_timestamp` type. For historical reasons, krb5_timestamp +is a signed 32-bit integer, even on platforms where a larger type is +natively used to represent time values. To behave properly for time +values after January 2038, calling code should cast krb5_timestamp +values to uint32_t, and then to time_t:: + + (time_t)(uint32_t)timestamp + +Used in this way, krb5_timestamp values can represent time values up +until February 2106, provided that the platform uses a 64-bit or +larger time_t type. This usage will also remain safe if a later +version of MIT krb5 changes krb5_timestamp to an unsigned 32-bit +integer. + +The GSSAPI only uses representations of time intervals, not absolute +times. Callers of the GSSAPI should require no changes to behave +correctly after January 2038, provided that they use MIT krb5 release +1.16 or later. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/ccache_def.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/ccache_def.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..53542adde --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/ccache_def.rst @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +.. _ccache_definition: + +Credential cache +================ + +A credential cache (or "ccache") holds Kerberos credentials while they +remain valid and, generally, while the user's session lasts, so that +authenticating to a service multiple times (e.g., connecting to a web +or mail server more than once) doesn't require contacting the KDC +every time. + +A credential cache usually contains one initial ticket which is +obtained using a password or another form of identity verification. +If this ticket is a ticket-granting ticket, it can be used to obtain +additional credentials without the password. Because the credential +cache does not store the password, less long-term damage can be done +to the user's account if the machine is compromised. + +A credentials cache stores a default client principal name, set when +the cache is created. This is the name shown at the top of the +:ref:`klist(1)` *-A* output. + +Each normal cache entry includes a service principal name, a client +principal name (which, in some ccache types, need not be the same as +the default), lifetime information, and flags, along with the +credential itself. There are also other entries, indicated by special +names, that store additional information. + + +ccache types +------------ + +The credential cache interface, like the :ref:`keytab_definition` and +:ref:`rcache_definition` interfaces, uses `TYPE:value` strings to +indicate the type of credential cache and any associated cache naming +data to use. + +There are several kinds of credentials cache supported in the MIT +Kerberos library. Not all are supported on every platform. In most +cases, it should be correct to use the default type built into the +library. + +#. **API** is only implemented on Windows. It communicates with a + server process that holds the credentials in memory for the user, + rather than writing them to disk. + +#. **DIR** points to the storage location of the collection of the + credential caches in *FILE:* format. It is most useful when dealing + with multiple Kerberos realms and KDCs. For release 1.10 the + directory must already exist. In post-1.10 releases the + requirement is for parent directory to exist and the current + process must have permissions to create the directory if it does + not exist. See :ref:`col_ccache` for details. New in release 1.10. + The following residual forms are supported: + + * DIR:dirname + * DIR::dirpath/filename - a single cache within the directory + + Switching to a ccache of the latter type causes it to become the + primary for the directory. + +#. **FILE** caches are the simplest and most portable. A simple flat + file format is used to store one credential after another. This is + the default ccache type if no type is specified in a ccache name. + +#. **KCM** caches work by contacting a daemon process called ``kcm`` + to perform cache operations. If the cache name is just ``KCM:``, + the default cache as determined by the KCM daemon will be used. + Newly created caches must generally be named ``KCM:uid:name``, + where *uid* is the effective user ID of the running process. + + KCM client support is new in release 1.13. A KCM daemon has not + yet been implemented in MIT krb5, but the client will interoperate + with the KCM daemon implemented by Heimdal. macOS 10.7 and higher + provides a KCM daemon as part of the operating system, and the + **KCM** cache type is used as the default cache on that platform in + a default build. + +#. **KEYRING** is Linux-specific, and uses the kernel keyring support + to store credential data in unswappable kernel memory where only + the current user should be able to access it. The following + residual forms are supported: + + * KEYRING:name + * KEYRING:process:name - process keyring + * KEYRING:thread:name - thread keyring + + Starting with release 1.12 the *KEYRING* type supports collections. + The following new residual forms were added: + + * KEYRING:session:name - session keyring + * KEYRING:user:name - user keyring + * KEYRING:persistent:uidnumber - persistent per-UID collection. + Unlike the user keyring, this collection survives after the user + logs out, until the cache credentials expire. This type of + ccache requires support from the kernel; otherwise, it will fall + back to the user keyring. + + See :ref:`col_ccache` for details. + +#. **MEMORY** caches are for storage of credentials that don't need to + be made available outside of the current process. For example, a + memory ccache is used by :ref:`kadmin(1)` to store the + administrative ticket used to contact the admin server. Memory + ccaches are faster than file ccaches and are automatically + destroyed when the process exits. + +#. **MSLSA** is a Windows-specific cache type that accesses the + Windows credential store. + + +.. _col_ccache: + +Collections of caches +--------------------- + +Some credential cache types can support collections of multiple +caches. One of the caches in the collection is designated as the +*primary* and will be used when the collection is resolved as a cache. +When a collection-enabled cache type is the default cache for a +process, applications can search the specified collection for a +specific client principal, and GSSAPI applications will automatically +select between the caches in the collection based on criteria such as +the target service realm. + +Credential cache collections are new in release 1.10, with support +from the **DIR** and **API** ccache types. Starting in release 1.12, +collections are also supported by the **KEYRING** ccache type. +Collections are supported by the **KCM** ccache type in release 1.13. + + +Tool alterations to use cache collection +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +* :ref:`kdestroy(1)` *-A* will destroy all caches in the collection. +* If the default cache type supports switching, :ref:`kinit(1)` + *princname* will search the collection for a matching cache and + store credentials there, or will store credentials in a new unique + cache of the default type if no existing cache for the principal + exists. Either way, kinit will switch to the selected cache. +* :ref:`klist(1)` *-l* will list the caches in the collection. +* :ref:`klist(1)` *-A* will show the content of all caches in the + collection. +* :ref:`kswitch(1)` *-p princname* will search the collection for a + matching cache and switch to it. +* :ref:`kswitch(1)` *-c cachename* will switch to a specified cache. + + +Default ccache name +------------------- + +The default credential cache name is determined by the following, in +descending order of priority: + +#. The **KRB5CCNAME** environment variable. For example, + ``KRB5CCNAME=DIR:/mydir/``. + +#. The **default_ccache_name** profile variable in :ref:`libdefaults`. + +#. The hardcoded default, |ccache|. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/date_format.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/date_format.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6ee82ce6f --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/date_format.rst @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +.. _datetime: + +Supported date and time formats +=============================== + +.. _duration: + +Time duration +------------- + +This format is used to express a time duration in the Kerberos +configuration files and user commands. The allowed formats are: + + ====================== ============== ============ + Format Example Value + ---------------------- -------------- ------------ + h:m[:s] 36:00 36 hours + NdNhNmNs 8h30s 8 hours 30 seconds + N (number of seconds) 3600 1 hour + ====================== ============== ============ + +Here *N* denotes a number, *d* - days, *h* - hours, *m* - minutes, +*s* - seconds. + +.. note:: + + The time interval should not exceed 2147483647 seconds. + +Examples:: + + Request a ticket valid for one hour, five hours, 30 minutes + and 10 days respectively: + + kinit -l 3600 + kinit -l 5:00 + kinit -l 30m + kinit -l "10d 0h 0m 0s" + + +.. _getdate: + +getdate time +------------ + +Some of the kadmin and kdb5_util commands take a date-time in a +human-readable format. Some of the acceptable date-time +strings are: + + +-----------+------------------+-----------------+ + | | Format | Example | + +===========+==================+=================+ + | Date | mm/dd/yy | 07/27/12 | + | +------------------+-----------------+ + | | month dd, yyyy | Jul 27, 2012 | + | +------------------+-----------------+ + | | yyyy-mm-dd | 2012-07-27 | + +-----------+------------------+-----------------+ + | Absolute | HH:mm[:ss]pp | 08:30 PM | + | time +------------------+-----------------+ + | | hh:mm[:ss] | 20:30 | + +-----------+------------------+-----------------+ + | Relative | N tt | 30 sec | + | time | | | + +-----------+------------------+-----------------+ + | Time zone | Z | EST | + | +------------------+-----------------+ + | | z | -0400 | + +-----------+------------------+-----------------+ + +(See :ref:`abbreviation`.) + +Examples:: + + Create a principal that expires on the date indicated: + addprinc test1 -expire "3/27/12 10:00:07 EST" + addprinc test2 -expire "January 23, 2015 10:05pm" + addprinc test3 -expire "22:00 GMT" + Add a principal that will expire in 30 minutes: + addprinc test4 -expire "30 minutes" + + +.. _abstime: + +Absolute time +------------- + +This rarely used date-time format can be noted in one of the +following ways: + + + +------------------------+----------------------+--------------+ + | Format | Example | Value | + +========================+======================+==============+ + | yyyymmddhhmmss | 20141231235900 | One minute | + +------------------------+----------------------+ before 2015 | + | yyyy.mm.dd.hh.mm.ss | 2014.12.31.23.59.00 | | + +------------------------+----------------------+ | + | yymmddhhmmss | 141231235900 | | + +------------------------+----------------------+ | + | yy.mm.dd.hh.mm.ss | 14.12.31.23.59.00 | | + +------------------------+----------------------+ | + | dd-month-yyyy:hh:mm:ss | 31-Dec-2014:23:59:00 | | + +------------------------+----------------------+--------------+ + | hh:mm:ss | 20:00:00 | 8 o'clock in | + +------------------------+----------------------+ the evening | + | hhmmss | 200000 | | + +------------------------+----------------------+--------------+ + +(See :ref:`abbreviation`.) + +Example:: + + Set the default expiration date to July 27, 2012 at 20:30 + default_principal_expiration = 20120727203000 + + +.. _abbreviation: + +Abbreviations used in this document +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +| *month* : locale’s month name or its abbreviation; +| *dd* : day of month (01-31); +| *HH* : hours (00-12); +| *hh* : hours (00-23); +| *mm* : in time - minutes (00-59); in date - month (01-12); +| *N* : number; +| *pp* : AM or PM; +| *ss* : seconds (00-60); +| *tt* : time units (hours, minutes, min, seconds, sec); +| *yyyy* : year; +| *yy* : last two digits of the year; +| *Z* : alphabetic time zone abbreviation; +| *z* : numeric time zone; + +.. note:: + + - If the date specification contains spaces, you may need to + enclose it in double quotes; + - All keywords are case-insensitive. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..87a9b5472 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +.. _basic_concepts: + +Kerberos V5 concepts +==================== + + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + ccache_def + keytab_def + rcache_def + stash_file_def + date_format diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/keytab_def.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/keytab_def.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..33ae67c6c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/keytab_def.rst @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +.. _keytab_definition: + +keytab +====== + +A keytab (short for "key table") stores long-term keys for one or more +principals. Keytabs are normally represented by files in a standard +format, although in rare cases they can be represented in other ways. +Keytabs are used most often to allow server applications to accept +authentications from clients, but can also be used to obtain initial +credentials for client applications. + +Keytabs are named using the format *type*\ ``:``\ *value*. Usually +*type* is ``FILE`` and *value* is the absolute pathname of the file. +Other possible values for *type* are ``SRVTAB``, which indicates a +file in the deprecated Kerberos 4 srvtab format, and ``MEMORY``, which +indicates a temporary keytab stored in the memory of the current +process. + +A keytab contains one or more entries, where each entry consists of a +timestamp (indicating when the entry was written to the keytab), a +principal name, a key version number, an encryption type, and the +encryption key itself. + +A keytab can be displayed using the :ref:`klist(1)` command with the +``-k`` option. Keytabs can be created or appended to by extracting +keys from the KDC database using the :ref:`kadmin(1)` :ref:`ktadd` +command. Keytabs can be manipulated using the :ref:`ktutil(1)` and +:ref:`k5srvutil(1)` commands. + + +Default keytab +-------------- + +The default keytab is used by server applications if the application +does not request a specific keytab. The name of the default keytab is +determined by the following, in decreasing order of preference: + +#. The **KRB5_KTNAME** environment variable. + +#. The **default_keytab_name** profile variable in :ref:`libdefaults`. + +#. The hardcoded default, |keytab|. + + +Default client keytab +--------------------- + +The default client keytab is used, if it is present and readable, to +automatically obtain initial credentials for GSSAPI client +applications. The principal name of the first entry in the client +keytab is used by default when obtaining initial credentials. The +name of the default client keytab is determined by the following, in +decreasing order of preference: + +#. The **KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME** environment variable. + +#. The **default_client_keytab_name** profile variable in + :ref:`libdefaults`. + +#. The hardcoded default, |ckeytab|. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/rcache_def.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/rcache_def.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2de953354 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/rcache_def.rst @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +.. _rcache_definition: + +replay cache +============ + +A replay cache (or "rcache") keeps track of all authenticators +recently presented to a service. If a duplicate authentication +request is detected in the replay cache, an error message is sent to +the application program. + +The replay cache interface, like the credential cache and +:ref:`keytab_definition` interfaces, uses `type:value` strings to +indicate the type of replay cache and any associated cache naming +data to use. + +Background information +---------------------- + +Some Kerberos or GSSAPI services use a simple authentication mechanism +where a message is sent containing an authenticator, which establishes +the encryption key that the client will use for talking to the +service. But nothing about that prevents an eavesdropper from +recording the messages sent by the client, establishing a new +connection, and re-sending or "replaying" the same messages; the +replayed authenticator will establish the same encryption key for the +new session, and the following messages will be decrypted and +processed. The attacker may not know what the messages say, and can't +generate new messages under the same encryption key, but in some +instances it may be harmful to the user (or helpful to the attacker) +to cause the server to see the same messages again a second time. For +example, if the legitimate client sends "delete first message in +mailbox", a replay from an attacker may delete another, different +"first" message. (Protocol design to guard against such problems has +been discussed in :rfc:`4120#section-10`.) + +Even if one protocol uses further protection to verify that the client +side of the connection actually knows the encryption keys (and thus is +presumably a legitimate user), if another service uses the same +service principal name, it may be possible to record an authenticator +used with the first protocol and "replay" it against the second. + +The replay cache mitigates these attacks somewhat, by keeping track of +authenticators that have been seen until their five-minute window +expires. Different authenticators generated by multiple connections +from the same legitimate client will generally have different +timestamps, and thus will not be considered the same. + +This mechanism isn't perfect. If a message is sent to one application +server but a man-in-the-middle attacker can prevent it from actually +arriving at that server, the attacker could then use the authenticator +(once!) against a different service on the same host. This could be a +problem if the message from the client included something more than +authentication in the first message that could be useful to the +attacker (which is uncommon; in most protocols the server has to +indicate a successful authentication before the client sends +additional messages), or if the simple act of presenting the +authenticator triggers some interesting action in the service being +attacked. + +Default rcache type +------------------- + +There is currently only one implemented kind of replay cache, called +**dfl**. It stores replay data in one file, occasionally rewriting it +to purge old, expired entries. + +The default type can be overridden by the **KRB5RCACHETYPE** +environment variable. + +The placement of the replay cache file is determined by the following: + +#. The **KRB5RCACHEDIR** environment variable; + +#. If KRB5RCACHEDIR is unspecified, on UNIX, the library + will fall back to the environment variable **TMPDIR**, and then to + a temporary directory determined at configuration time such as + */tmp* or */var/tmp*; on Windows, it will check the environment + variables *TEMP* and *TMP*, and fall back to the directory C:\\. + +Performance issues +------------------ + +Several known minor performance issues that may occur when replay +cache is enabled on the Kerberos system include: delays due to writing +the authenticator data to disk slowing down response time for very +heavily loaded servers, and delays during the rewrite that may be +unacceptable to high-performance services. + +For use cases where replays are adequately defended against for all +protocols using a given service principal name, or where performance +or other considerations outweigh the risk of replays, the special +replay cache type "none" can be specified:: + + KRB5RCACHETYPE=none + +It doesn't record any information about authenticators, and reports +that any authenticator seen is not a replay. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/stash_file_def.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/stash_file_def.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..256e2c272 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/basic/stash_file_def.rst @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +.. _stash_definition: + + +stash file +============ + +The stash file is a local copy of the master key that resides in +encrypted form on the KDC's local disk. The stash file is used to +authenticate the KDC to itself automatically before starting the +:ref:`kadmind(8)` and :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` daemons (e.g., as part of the +machine's boot sequence). The stash file, like the keytab file (see +:ref:`keytab_file`) is a potential point-of-entry for a break-in, and +if compromised, would allow unrestricted access to the Kerberos +database. If you choose to install a stash file, it should be +readable only by root, and should exist only on the KDC's local disk. +The file should not be part of any backup of the machine, unless +access to the backup data is secured as tightly as access to the +master password itself. + +.. note:: + + If you choose not to install a stash file, the KDC will prompt you for the master key each time it starts up. + This means that the KDC will not be able to start automatically, such as after a system reboot. + + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/directory_org.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/directory_org.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..db0c6c064 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/directory_org.rst @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +Organization of the source directory +==================================== + +Below is a brief overview of the organization of the complete source +directory. More detailed descriptions follow. + +=============== ============================================== +appl Kerberos application client and server programs +ccapi Credential cache services +clients Kerberos V5 user programs (See :ref:`user_commands`) +config Configure scripts +config-files Sample Kerberos configuration files +include include files needed to build the Kerberos system +kadmin Administrative interface to the Kerberos master database: :ref:`kadmin(1)`, :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`, :ref:`ktutil(1)`. +kdc Kerberos V5 Authentication Service and Key Distribution Center +lib_ Libraries for use with/by Kerberos V5 +plugins Kerberos plugins directory +po Localization infrastructure +prototype Templates files containing the MIT copyright message and a placeholder for the title and description of the file. +kprop Utilities for propagating the database to replica KDCs :ref:`kprop(8)` and :ref:`kpropd(8)` +tests Test suite +util_ Various utilities for building/configuring the code, sending bug reports, etc. +windows Source code for building Kerberos V5 on Windows (see windows/README) +=============== ============================================== + + +.. _lib: + +lib +--- + +The lib directory contain several subdirectories as well as some +definition and glue files. + + - The apputils directory contains the code for the generic network + servicing. + - The crypto subdirectory contains the Kerberos V5 encryption + library. + - The gssapi library contains the Generic Security Services API, + which is a library of commands to be used in secure client-server + communication. + - The kadm5 directory contains the libraries for the KADM5 + administration utilities. + - The Kerberos 5 database libraries are contained in kdb. + - The krb5 directory contains Kerberos 5 API. + - The rpc directory contains the API for the Kerberos Remote + Procedure Call protocol. + + +.. _util: + +util +---- + +The util directory contains several utility programs and libraries. + - the programs used to configure and build the code, such as + autoconf, lndir, kbuild, reconf, and makedepend, are in this + directory. + - the profile directory contains most of the functions which parse + the Kerberos configuration files (krb5.conf and kdc.conf). + - the Kerberos error table library and utilities (et); + - the Sub-system library and utilities (ss); + - database utilities (db2); + - pseudo-terminal utilities (pty); + - bug-reporting program send-pr; + - a generic support library support used by several of our other + libraries; + - the build infrastructure for building lightweight Kerberos client + (collected-client-lib) + - the tool for validating Kerberos configuration files + (confvalidator); + - the toolkit for kernel integrators for building krb5 code subsets + (gss-kernel-lib); + - source code for building Kerberos V5 on MacOS (mac) + - Windows getopt operations (windows) diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/doing_build.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/doing_build.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4da199836 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/doing_build.rst @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +Doing the build +=============== + +.. _do_build: + +Building within a single tree +----------------------------- + +If you only need to build Kerberos for one platform, using a single +directory tree which contains both the source files and the object +files is the simplest. However, if you need to maintain Kerberos for +a large number of platforms, you will probably want to use separate +build trees for each platform. We recommend that you look at OS +Incompatibilities, for notes that we have on particular operating +systems. + +If you don't want separate build trees for each architecture, then use +the following abbreviated procedure:: + + cd /u1/krb5-VERSION/src + ./configure + make + +That's it! + +Building with separate build directories +---------------------------------------- + +If you wish to keep separate build directories for each platform, you +can do so using the following procedure. (Note, this requires that +your make program support VPATH. GNU's make will provide this +functionality, for example.) If your make program does not support +this, see the next section. + +For example, if you wish to store the binaries in ``tmpbuild`` build +directory you might use the following procedure:: + + mkdir /u1/tmpbuild + cd /u1/tmpbuild + /u1/krb5-VERSION/src/configure + make + + +Building using lndir +-------------------- + +If you wish to keep separate build directories for each platform, and +you do not have access to a make program which supports VPATH, all is +not lost. You can use the lndir program to create symbolic link trees +in your build directory. + +For example, if you wish to create a build directory for solaris +binaries you might use the following procedure:: + + mkdir /u1/krb5-VERSION/solaris + cd /u1/krb5-VERSION/solaris + /u1/krb5-VERSION/src/util/lndir `pwd`/../src + ./configure + make + +You must give an absolute pathname to lndir because it has a bug that +makes it fail for relative pathnames. Note that this version differs +from the latest version as distributed and installed by the +XConsortium with X11R6. Either version should be acceptable. + + +Installing the binaries +----------------------- + +Once you have built Kerberos, you should install the binaries. You can +do this by running:: + + make install + +If you want to install the binaries into a destination directory that +is not their final destination, which may be convenient if you want to +build a binary distribution to be deployed on multiple hosts, you may +use:: + + make install DESTDIR=/path/to/destdir + +This will install the binaries under *DESTDIR/PREFIX*, e.g., the user +programs will install into *DESTDIR/PREFIX/bin*, the libraries into +*DESTDIR/PREFIX/lib*, etc. *DESTDIR* must be an absolute path. + +Some implementations of make allow multiple commands to be run in +parallel, for faster builds. We test our Makefiles in parallel builds +with GNU make only; they may not be compatible with other parallel +build implementations. + + +Testing the build +----------------- + +The Kerberos V5 distribution comes with built-in regression tests. To +run them, simply type the following command while in the top-level +build directory (i.e., the directory where you sent typed make to +start building Kerberos; see :ref:`do_build`):: + + make check + +However, there are several prerequisites that must be satisfied first: + +* Configure and build Kerberos with Tcl support. Tcl is used to drive + the test suite. This often means passing **-**\ **-with-tcl** to + configure to tell it the location of the Tcl configuration + script. (See :ref:`options2configure`.) +* In addition to Tcl, DejaGnu must be available on the system for some + of the tests to run. The test suite will still run the other tests + if DejaGnu is not present, but the test coverage will be reduced + accordingly. +* On some operating systems, you have to run ``make install`` before + running ``make check``, or the test suite will pick up installed + versions of Kerberos libraries rather than the newly built ones. + You can install into a prefix that isn't in the system library + search path, though. Alternatively, you can configure with + **-**\ **-disable-rpath**, which renders the build tree less suitable for + installation, but allows testing without interference from + previously installed libraries. + +There are additional regression tests available, which are not run +by ``make check``. These tests require manual setup and teardown of +support infrastructure which is not easily automated, or require +excessive resources for ordinary use. The procedure for running +the manual tests is documented at +https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Manual_Testing. + + +Cleaning up the build +--------------------- + +* Use ``make clean`` to remove all files generated by running make + command. +* Use ``make distclean`` to remove all files generated by running + ./configure script. After running ``make distclean`` your source + tree (ideally) should look like the raw (just un-tarred) source + tree. + +Using autoconf +-------------- + +(If you are not a developer, you can ignore this section.) + +In the Kerberos V5 source directory, there is a configure script which +automatically determines the compilation environment and creates the +proper Makefiles for a particular platform. This configure script is +generated using autoconf, which you should already have installed if +you will be making changes to ``src/configure.in``. + +Normal users will not need to worry about running autoconf; the +distribution comes with the configure script already prebuilt. + +The autoconf package comes with a script called ``autoreconf`` that +will automatically run ``autoconf`` and ``autoheader`` as needed. You +should run ``autoreconf`` from the top source directory, e.g.:: + + cd /u1/krb5-VERSION/src + autoreconf --verbose diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f321d0209 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +.. _build_V5: + +Building Kerberos V5 +==================== + +This section details how to build and install MIT Kerberos software +from the source. + +Prerequisites +------------- + +In order to build Kerberos V5, you will need approximately 60-70 +megabytes of disk space. The exact amount will vary depending on the +platform and whether the distribution is compiled with debugging +symbol tables or not. + +Your C compiler must conform to ANSI C (ISO/IEC 9899:1990, "c89"). +Some operating systems do not have an ANSI C compiler, or their +default compiler requires extra command-line options to enable ANSI C +conformance. + +If you wish to keep a separate build tree, which contains the compiled +\*.o file and executables, separate from your source tree, you will +need a make program which supports **VPATH**, or you will need to use +a tool such as lndir to produce a symbolic link tree for your build +tree. + +Obtaining the software +---------------------- + +The source code can be obtained from MIT Kerberos Distribution page, +at https://kerberos.org/dist/index.html. +The MIT Kerberos distribution comes in an archive file, generally +named krb5-VERSION-signed.tar, where *VERSION* is a placeholder for +the major and minor versions of MIT Kerberos. (For example, MIT +Kerberos 1.9 has major version "1" and minor version "9".) + +The krb5-VERSION-signed.tar contains a compressed tar file consisting +of the sources for all of Kerberos (generally named +krb5-VERSION.tar.gz) and a PGP signature file for this source tree +(generally named krb5-VERSION.tar.gz.asc). MIT highly recommends that +you verify the integrity of the source code using this signature, +e.g., by running:: + + tar xf krb5-VERSION-signed.tar + gpg --verify krb5-VERSION.tar.gz.asc + +Unpack krb5-VERSION.tar.gz in some directory. In this section we will assume +that you have chosen the top directory of the distribution the directory +``/u1/krb5-VERSION``. + +Review the README file for the license, copyright and other sprecific to the +distribution information. + +Contents +-------- +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + directory_org.rst + doing_build.rst + options2configure.rst + osconf.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/options2configure.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/options2configure.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ddbee2060 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/options2configure.rst @@ -0,0 +1,408 @@ +.. _options2configure: + +Options to *configure* +====================== + +There are a number of options to configure which you can use to +control how the Kerberos distribution is built. + +Most commonly used options +-------------------------- + +**-**\ **-help** + Provides help to configure. This will list the set of commonly + used options for building Kerberos. + +**-**\ **-prefix=**\ *PREFIX* + By default, Kerberos will install the package's files rooted at + ``/usr/local``. If you desire to place the binaries into the + directory *PREFIX*, use this option. + +**-**\ **-exec-prefix=**\ *EXECPREFIX* + This option allows one to separate the architecture independent + programs from the host-dependent files (configuration files, + manual pages). Use this option to install architecture-dependent + programs in *EXECPREFIX*. The default location is the value of + specified by **-**\ **-prefix** option. + +**-**\ **-localstatedir=**\ *LOCALSTATEDIR* + This option sets the directory for locally modifiable + single-machine data. In Kerberos, this mostly is useful for + setting a location for the KDC data files, as they will be + installed in ``LOCALSTATEDIR/krb5kdc``, which is by default + ``PREFIX/var/krb5kdc``. + +**-**\ **-with-netlib**\ [=\ *libs*] + Allows for suppression of or replacement of network libraries. By + default, Kerberos V5 configuration will look for ``-lnsl`` and + ``-lsocket``. If your operating system has a broken resolver + library or fails to pass the tests in ``src/tests/resolv``, you + will need to use this option. + +**-**\ **-with-tcl=**\ *TCLPATH* + Some of the unit-tests in the build tree rely upon using a program + in Tcl. The directory specified by *TCLPATH* specifies where the + Tcl header file (TCLPATH/include/tcl.h) as well as where the Tcl + library (TCLPATH/lib) should be found. + +**-**\ **-enable-dns-for-realm** + Enable the use of DNS to look up a host's Kerberos realm, + if the information is not provided in + :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. See :ref:`mapping_hostnames` + for information about using DNS to determine the default realm. + DNS lookups for realm names are disabled by default. + +**-**\ **-with-system-et** + Use an installed version of the error-table (et) support software, + the compile_et program, the com_err.h header file and the com_err + library. If these are not in the default locations, you may wish + to specify ``CPPFLAGS=-I/some/dir`` and + ``LDFLAGS=-L/some/other/dir`` options at configuration time as + well. + + If this option is not given, a version supplied with the Kerberos + sources will be built and installed along with the rest of the + Kerberos tree, for Kerberos applications to link against. + +**-**\ **-with-system-ss** + Use an installed version of the subsystem command-line interface + software, the mk_cmds program, the ``ss/ss.h`` header file and the + ss library. If these are not in the default locations, you may + wish to specify ``CPPFLAGS=-I/some/dir`` and + ``LDFLAGS=-L/some/other/dir`` options at configuration time as + well. See also the **SS_LIB** option. + + If this option is not given, the ss library supplied with the + Kerberos sources will be compiled and linked into those programs + that need it; it will not be installed separately. + +**-**\ **-with-system-db** + Use an installed version of the Berkeley DB package, which must + provide an API compatible with version 1.85. This option is + unsupported and untested. In particular, we do not know if the + database-rename code used in the dumpfile load operation will + behave properly. + + If this option is not given, a version supplied with the Kerberos + sources will be built and installed. (We are not updating this + version at this time because of licensing issues with newer + versions that we haven't investigated sufficiently yet.) + + +Environment variables +--------------------- + +**CC=**\ *COMPILER* + Use *COMPILER* as the C compiler. + +**CFLAGS=**\ *FLAGS* + Use *FLAGS* as the default set of C compiler flags. + +**CPP=**\ *CPP* + C preprocessor to use. (e.g., ``CPP='gcc -E'``) + +**CPPFLAGS=**\ *CPPOPTS* + Use *CPPOPTS* as the default set of C preprocessor flags. The + most common use of this option is to select certain #define's for + use with the operating system's include files. + + +**DB_HEADER=**\ *headername* + If db.h is not the correct header file to include to compile + against the Berkeley DB 1.85 API, specify the correct header file + name with this option. For example, ``DB_HEADER=db3/db_185.h``. + +**DB_LIB=**\ *libs*... + If ``-ldb`` is not the correct library specification for the + Berkeley DB library version to be used, override it with this + option. For example, ``DB_LIB=-ldb-3.3``. + +**DEFCCNAME=**\ *ccachename* + Override the built-in default credential cache name. + For example, ``DEFCCNAME=DIR:/var/run/user/%{USERID}/ccache`` + See :ref:`parameter_expansion` for information about supported + parameter expansions. + +**DEFCKTNAME=**\ *keytabname* + Override the built-in default client keytab name. + The format is the same as for *DEFCCNAME*. + +**DEFKTNAME=**\ *keytabname* + Override the built-in default keytab name. + The format is the same as for *DEFCCNAME*. + +**LD=**\ *LINKER* + Use *LINKER* as the default loader if it should be different from + C compiler as specified above. + +**LDFLAGS=**\ *LDOPTS* + This option informs the linker where to get additional libraries + (e.g., ``-L<lib dir>``). + +**LIBS=**\ *LDNAME* + This option allows one to specify libraries to be passed to the + linker (e.g., ``-l<library>``) + +**SS_LIB=**\ *libs*... + If ``-lss`` is not the correct way to link in your installed ss + library, for example if additional support libraries are needed, + specify the correct link options here. Some variants of this + library are around which allow for Emacs-like line editing, but + different versions require different support libraries to be + explicitly specified. + + This option is ignored if **-**\ **-with-system-ss** is not specified. + +**YACC** + The 'Yet Another C Compiler' implementation to use. Defaults to + the first program found out of: '`bison -y`', '`byacc`', + '`yacc`'. + +**YFLAGS** + The list of arguments that will be passed by default to $YACC. + This script will default YFLAGS to the empty string to avoid a + default value of ``-d`` given by some make applications. + + +Fine tuning of the installation directories +------------------------------------------- + +**-**\ **-bindir=**\ *DIR* + User executables. Defaults to ``EXECPREFIX/bin``, where + *EXECPREFIX* is the path specified by **-**\ **-exec-prefix** + configuration option. + +**-**\ **-sbindir=**\ *DIR* + System admin executables. Defaults to ``EXECPREFIX/sbin``, where + *EXECPREFIX* is the path specified by **-**\ **-exec-prefix** + configuration option. + +**-**\ **-sysconfdir=**\ *DIR* + Read-only single-machine data such as krb5.conf. + Defaults to ``PREFIX/etc``, where + *PREFIX* is the path specified by **-**\ **-prefix** configuration + option. + +**-**\ **-libdir=**\ *DIR* + Object code libraries. Defaults to ``EXECPREFIX/lib``, where + *EXECPREFIX* is the path specified by **-**\ **-exec-prefix** + configuration option. + +**-**\ **-includedir=**\ *DIR* + C header files. Defaults to ``PREFIX/include``, where *PREFIX* is + the path specified by **-**\ **-prefix** configuration option. + +**-**\ **-datarootdir=**\ *DATAROOTDIR* + Read-only architecture-independent data root. Defaults to + ``PREFIX/share``, where *PREFIX* is the path specified by + **-**\ **-prefix** configuration option. + +**-**\ **-datadir=**\ *DIR* + Read-only architecture-independent data. Defaults to path + specified by **-**\ **-datarootdir** configuration option. + +**-**\ **-localedir=**\ *DIR* + Locale-dependent data. Defaults to ``DATAROOTDIR/locale``, where + *DATAROOTDIR* is the path specified by **-**\ **-datarootdir** + configuration option. + +**-**\ **-mandir=**\ *DIR* + Man documentation. Defaults to ``DATAROOTDIR/man``, where + *DATAROOTDIR* is the path specified by **-**\ **-datarootdir** + configuration option. + + +Program names +------------- + +**-**\ **-program-prefix=**\ *PREFIX* + Prepend *PREFIX* to the names of the programs when installing + them. For example, specifying ``--program-prefix=mit-`` at the + configure time will cause the program named ``abc`` to be + installed as ``mit-abc``. + +**-**\ **-program-suffix=**\ *SUFFIX* + Append *SUFFIX* to the names of the programs when installing them. + For example, specifying ``--program-suffix=-mit`` at the configure + time will cause the program named ``abc`` to be installed as + ``abc-mit``. + +**-**\ **-program-transform-name=**\ *PROGRAM* + Run ``sed -e PROGRAM`` on installed program names. (*PROGRAM* is a + sed script). + + +System types +------------ + +**-**\ **-build=**\ *BUILD* + Configure for building on *BUILD* + (e.g., ``--build=x86_64-linux-gnu``). + +**-**\ **-host=**\ *HOST* + Cross-compile to build programs to run on *HOST* + (e.g., ``--host=x86_64-linux-gnu``). By default, Kerberos V5 + configuration will look for "build" option. + + +Optional features +----------------- + +**-**\ **-disable-option-checking** + Ignore unrecognized --enable/--with options. + +**-**\ **-disable-**\ *FEATURE* + Do not include *FEATURE* (same as --enable-FEATURE=no). + +**-**\ **-enable-**\ *FEATURE*\ [=\ *ARG*] + Include *FEATURE* [ARG=yes]. + +**-**\ **-enable-maintainer-mode** + Enable rebuilding of source files, Makefiles, etc. + +**-**\ **-disable-delayed-initialization** + Initialize library code when loaded. Defaults to delay until + first use. + +**-**\ **-disable-thread-support** + Don't enable thread support. Defaults to enabled. + +**-**\ **-disable-rpath** + Suppress run path flags in link lines. + +**-**\ **-enable-athena** + Build with MIT Project Athena configuration. + +**-**\ **-disable-kdc-lookaside-cache** + Disable the cache which detects client retransmits. + +**-**\ **-disable-pkinit** + Disable PKINIT plugin support. + +**-**\ **-disable-aesni** + Disable support for using AES instructions on x86 platforms. + +**-**\ **-enable-asan**\ [=\ *ARG*] + Enable building with asan memory error checking. If *ARG* is + given, it controls the -fsanitize compilation flag value (the + default is "address"). + + +Optional packages +----------------- + +**-**\ **-with-**\ *PACKAGE*\ [=ARG\] + Use *PACKAGE* (e.g., ``--with-imap``). The default value of *ARG* + is ``yes``. + +**-**\ **-without-**\ *PACKAGE* + Do not use *PACKAGE* (same as ``--with-PACKAGE=no``) + (e.g., ``--without-libedit``). + +**-**\ **-with-size-optimizations** + Enable a few optimizations to reduce code size possibly at some + run-time cost. + +**-**\ **-with-system-et** + Use the com_err library and compile_et utility that are already + installed on the system, instead of building and installing + local versions. + +**-**\ **-with-system-ss** + Use the ss library and mk_cmds utility that are already installed + on the system, instead of building and using private versions. + +**-**\ **-with-system-db** + Use the berkeley db utility already installed on the system, + instead of using a private version. This option is not + recommended; enabling it may result in incompatibility with key + databases originating on other systems. + +**-**\ **-with-netlib=**\ *LIBS* + Use the resolver library specified in *LIBS*. Use this variable + if the C library resolver is insufficient or broken. + +**-**\ **-with-hesiod=**\ *path* + Compile with Hesiod support. The *path* points to the Hesiod + directory. By default Hesiod is unsupported. + +**-**\ **-with-ldap** + Compile OpenLDAP database backend module. + +**-**\ **-with-lmdb** + Compile LMDB database backend module. + +**-**\ **-with-tcl=**\ *path* + Specifies that *path* is the location of a Tcl installation. + Tcl is needed for some of the tests run by 'make check'; such tests + will be skipped if this option is not set. + +**-**\ **-with-vague-errors** + Do not send helpful errors to client. For example, if the KDC + should return only vague error codes to clients. + +**-**\ **-with-crypto-impl=**\ *IMPL* + Use specified crypto implementation (e.g., **-**\ + **-with-crypto-impl=**\ *openssl*). The default is the native MIT + Kerberos implementation ``builtin``. The other currently + implemented crypto backend is ``openssl``. (See + :ref:`mitK5features`) + +**-**\ **-with-prng-alg=**\ *ALG* + Use specified PRNG algorithm. For example, to use the OS native + prng specify ``--with-prng-alg=os``. The default is ``fortuna``. + (See :ref:`mitK5features`) + +**-**\ **-without-libedit** + Do not compile and link against libedit. Some utilities will no + longer offer command history or completion in interactive mode if + libedit is disabled. + +**-**\ **-with-readline** + Compile and link against GNU readline, as an alternative to libedit. + Building with readline breaks the dejagnu test suite, which is a + subset of the tests run by 'make check'. + +**-**\ **-with-system-verto** + Use an installed version of libverto. If the libverto header and + library are not in default locations, you may wish to specify + ``CPPFLAGS=-I/some/dir`` and ``LDFLAGS=-L/some/other/dir`` options + at configuration time as well. + + If this option is not given, the build system will try to detect + an installed version of libverto and use it if it is found. + Otherwise, a version supplied with the Kerberos sources will be + built and installed. The built-in version does not contain the + full set of back-end modules and is not a suitable general + replacement for the upstream version, but will work for the + purposes of Kerberos. + + Specifying **-**\ **-without-system-verto** will cause the built-in + version of libverto to be used unconditionally. + +**-**\ **-with-krb5-config=**\ *PATH* + Use the krb5-config program at *PATH* to obtain the build-time + default credential cache, keytab, and client keytab names. The + default is to use ``krb5-config`` from the program path. Specify + ``--without-krb5-config`` to disable the use of krb5-config and + use the usual built-in defaults. + + +Examples +-------- + +For example, in order to configure Kerberos on a Solaris machine using +the suncc compiler with the optimizer turned on, run the configure +script with the following options:: + + % ./configure CC=suncc CFLAGS=-O + +For a slightly more complicated example, consider a system where +several packages to be used by Kerberos are installed in +``/usr/foobar``, including Berkeley DB 3.3, and an ss library that +needs to link against the curses library. The configuration of +Kerberos might be done thus:: + + ./configure CPPFLAGS=-I/usr/foobar/include LDFLAGS=-L/usr/foobar/lib \ + --with-system-et --with-system-ss --with-system-db \ + SS_LIB='-lss -lcurses' DB_HEADER=db3/db_185.h DB_LIB=-ldb-3.3 diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/osconf.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/osconf.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..22ee6804e --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build/osconf.rst @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +osconf.hin +========== + +There is one configuration file which you may wish to edit to control +various compile-time parameters in the Kerberos distribution:: + + include/osconf.hin + +The list that follows is by no means complete, just some of the more +interesting variables. + +**DEFAULT_PROFILE_PATH** + The pathname to the file which contains the profiles for the known + realms, their KDCs, etc. The default value is |krb5conf|. +**DEFAULT_KEYTAB_NAME** + The type and pathname to the default server keytab file. The + default is |keytab|. +**DEFAULT_KDC_ENCTYPE** + The default encryption type for the KDC database master key. The + default value is |defmkey|. +**RCTMPDIR** + The directory which stores replay caches. The default is + ``/var/tmp``. +**DEFAULT_KDB_FILE** + The location of the default database. The default value is + |kdcdir|\ ``/principal``. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build_this.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build_this.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..08c330dd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/build_this.rst @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +How to build this documentation from the source +=============================================== + +Pre-requisites for a simple build, or to update man pages: + +* Sphinx 1.0.4 or higher (See http://www.sphinx-doc.org) with the + autodoc extension installed. + +Additional prerequisites to include the API reference based on Doxygen +markup: + +* Python 2.5 with the Cheetah, lxml, and xml modules +* Doxygen + + +Simple build without API reference +---------------------------------- + +To test simple changes to the RST sources, you can build the +documentation without the Doxygen reference by running, from the doc +directory:: + + sphinx-build . test_html + +You will see a number of warnings about missing files. This is +expected. If there is not already a ``doc/version.py`` file, you will +need to create one by first running ``make version.py`` in the +``src/doc`` directory of a configured build tree. + + +Updating man pages +------------------ + +Man pages are generated from the RST sources and checked into the +``src/man`` directory of the repository. This allows man pages to be +installed without requiring Sphinx when using a source checkout. To +regenerate these files, run ``make man`` from the man subdirectory +of a configured build tree. You can also do this from an unconfigured +source tree with:: + + cd src/man + make -f Makefile.in top_srcdir=.. srcdir=. man + make clean + +As with the simple build, it is normal to see warnings about missing +files when rebuilding the man pages. + + +Building for a release tarball or web site +------------------------------------------ + +To generate documentation in HTML format, run ``make html`` in the +``doc`` subdirectory of a configured build tree (the build directory +corresponding to ``src/doc``, not the top-level ``doc`` directory). +The output will be placed in the top-level ``doc/html`` directory. +This build will include the API reference generated from Doxygen +markup in the source tree. + +Documentation generated this way will use symbolic names for paths +(like ``BINDIR`` for the directory containing user programs), with the +symbolic names being links to a table showing typical values for those +paths. + +You can also do this from an unconfigured source tree with:: + + cd src/doc + make -f Makefile.in SPHINX_ARGS= htmlsrc + + +Building for an OS package or site documentation +------------------------------------------------ + +To generate documentation specific to a build of MIT krb5 as you have +configured it, run ``make substhtml`` in the ``doc`` subdirectory of a +configured build tree (the build directory corresponding to +``src/doc``, not the top-level ``doc`` directory). The output will be +placed in the ``html_subst`` subdirectory of that build directory. +This build will include the API reference. + +Documentation generated this way will use concrete paths (like +``/usr/local/bin`` for the directory containing user programs, for a +default custom build). diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/Doxyfile b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/Doxyfile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..734c29c90 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/Doxyfile @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +# Doxyfile 1.5.3 + +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Project related configuration options +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +DOXYFILE_ENCODING = UTF-8 +PROJECT_NAME = "Credentials Cache API " +PROJECT_NUMBER = +OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = . +CREATE_SUBDIRS = NO +OUTPUT_LANGUAGE = English +BRIEF_MEMBER_DESC = YES +REPEAT_BRIEF = YES +ABBREVIATE_BRIEF = "The $name class " \ + "The $name widget " \ + "The $name file " \ + is \ + provides \ + specifies \ + contains \ + represents \ + a \ + an \ + the +ALWAYS_DETAILED_SEC = YES +INLINE_INHERITED_MEMB = NO +FULL_PATH_NAMES = NO +STRIP_FROM_PATH = +STRIP_FROM_INC_PATH = +SHORT_NAMES = NO +JAVADOC_AUTOBRIEF = NO +QT_AUTOBRIEF = NO +MULTILINE_CPP_IS_BRIEF = NO +DETAILS_AT_TOP = YES +INHERIT_DOCS = YES +SEPARATE_MEMBER_PAGES = NO +TAB_SIZE = 8 +ALIASES = +OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES +OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_JAVA = NO +BUILTIN_STL_SUPPORT = NO +CPP_CLI_SUPPORT = NO +DISTRIBUTE_GROUP_DOC = NO +SUBGROUPING = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Build related configuration options +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +EXTRACT_ALL = YES +EXTRACT_PRIVATE = NO +EXTRACT_STATIC = NO +EXTRACT_LOCAL_CLASSES = NO +EXTRACT_LOCAL_METHODS = NO +EXTRACT_ANON_NSPACES = NO +HIDE_UNDOC_MEMBERS = NO +HIDE_UNDOC_CLASSES = NO +HIDE_FRIEND_COMPOUNDS = NO +HIDE_IN_BODY_DOCS = YES +INTERNAL_DOCS = NO +CASE_SENSE_NAMES = YES +HIDE_SCOPE_NAMES = YES +SHOW_INCLUDE_FILES = NO +INLINE_INFO = YES +SORT_MEMBER_DOCS = NO +SORT_BRIEF_DOCS = NO +SORT_BY_SCOPE_NAME = NO +GENERATE_TODOLIST = YES +GENERATE_TESTLIST = YES +GENERATE_BUGLIST = YES +GENERATE_DEPRECATEDLIST= YES +ENABLED_SECTIONS = +MAX_INITIALIZER_LINES = 30 +SHOW_USED_FILES = NO +SHOW_DIRECTORIES = NO +FILE_VERSION_FILTER = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to warning and progress messages +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +QUIET = NO +WARNINGS = YES +WARN_IF_UNDOCUMENTED = YES +WARN_IF_DOC_ERROR = YES +WARN_NO_PARAMDOC = YES +WARN_FORMAT = "$file:$line: $text " +WARN_LOGFILE = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the input files +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +INPUT = ../../Sources/include/CredentialsCache.h +INPUT_ENCODING = UTF-8 +FILE_PATTERNS = *.c \ + *.cc \ + *.cxx \ + *.cpp \ + *.c++ \ + *.d \ + *.java \ + *.ii \ + *.ixx \ + *.ipp \ + *.i++ \ + *.inl \ + *.h \ + *.hh \ + *.hxx \ + *.hpp \ + *.h++ \ + *.idl \ + *.odl \ + *.cs \ + *.php \ + *.php3 \ + *.inc \ + *.m \ + *.mm \ + *.dox \ + *.py \ + *.C \ + *.CC \ + *.C++ \ + *.II \ + *.I++ \ + *.H \ + *.HH \ + *.H++ \ + *.CS \ + *.PHP \ + *.PHP3 \ + *.M \ + *.MM \ + *.PY +RECURSIVE = YES +EXCLUDE = +EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS = NO +EXCLUDE_PATTERNS = +EXCLUDE_SYMBOLS = +EXAMPLE_PATH = +EXAMPLE_PATTERNS = * +EXAMPLE_RECURSIVE = NO +IMAGE_PATH = +INPUT_FILTER = +FILTER_PATTERNS = +FILTER_SOURCE_FILES = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to source browsing +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +SOURCE_BROWSER = NO +INLINE_SOURCES = NO +STRIP_CODE_COMMENTS = YES +REFERENCED_BY_RELATION = YES +REFERENCES_RELATION = YES +REFERENCES_LINK_SOURCE = YES +USE_HTAGS = NO +VERBATIM_HEADERS = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the alphabetical class index +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +ALPHABETICAL_INDEX = NO +COLS_IN_ALPHA_INDEX = 5 +IGNORE_PREFIX = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the HTML output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_HTML = YES +HTML_OUTPUT = html +HTML_FILE_EXTENSION = .html +HTML_HEADER = +HTML_FOOTER = +HTML_STYLESHEET = +HTML_ALIGN_MEMBERS = NO +GENERATE_HTMLHELP = NO +HTML_DYNAMIC_SECTIONS = NO +CHM_FILE = +HHC_LOCATION = +GENERATE_CHI = NO +BINARY_TOC = NO +TOC_EXPAND = NO +DISABLE_INDEX = YES +ENUM_VALUES_PER_LINE = 4 +GENERATE_TREEVIEW = NO +TREEVIEW_WIDTH = 250 +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the LaTeX output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_LATEX = NO +LATEX_OUTPUT = latex +LATEX_CMD_NAME = latex +MAKEINDEX_CMD_NAME = makeindex +COMPACT_LATEX = NO +PAPER_TYPE = letter +EXTRA_PACKAGES = +LATEX_HEADER = +PDF_HYPERLINKS = YES +USE_PDFLATEX = YES +LATEX_BATCHMODE = NO +LATEX_HIDE_INDICES = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the RTF output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_RTF = YES +RTF_OUTPUT = rtf +COMPACT_RTF = YES +RTF_HYPERLINKS = YES +RTF_STYLESHEET_FILE = +RTF_EXTENSIONS_FILE = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the man page output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_MAN = NO +MAN_OUTPUT = man +MAN_EXTENSION = .3 +MAN_LINKS = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the XML output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_XML = NO +XML_OUTPUT = xml +XML_SCHEMA = +XML_DTD = +XML_PROGRAMLISTING = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options for the AutoGen Definitions output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_AUTOGEN_DEF = NO +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# configuration options related to the Perl module output +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +GENERATE_PERLMOD = NO +PERLMOD_LATEX = NO +PERLMOD_PRETTY = YES +PERLMOD_MAKEVAR_PREFIX = +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration options related to the preprocessor +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +ENABLE_PREPROCESSING = YES +MACRO_EXPANSION = NO +EXPAND_ONLY_PREDEF = NO +SEARCH_INCLUDES = NO +INCLUDE_PATH = +INCLUDE_FILE_PATTERNS = +PREDEFINED = +EXPAND_AS_DEFINED = +SKIP_FUNCTION_MACROS = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration::additions related to external references +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +TAGFILES = +GENERATE_TAGFILE = +ALLEXTERNALS = NO +EXTERNAL_GROUPS = NO +PERL_PATH = /usr/bin/perl +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration options related to the dot tool +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +CLASS_DIAGRAMS = NO +MSCGEN_PATH = /Volumes/Ragna-Blade/Developer/Doxygen/Doxygen.app/Contents/Resources/ +HIDE_UNDOC_RELATIONS = YES +HAVE_DOT = NO +CLASS_GRAPH = YES +COLLABORATION_GRAPH = YES +GROUP_GRAPHS = YES +UML_LOOK = NO +TEMPLATE_RELATIONS = NO +INCLUDE_GRAPH = YES +INCLUDED_BY_GRAPH = YES +CALL_GRAPH = NO +CALLER_GRAPH = NO +GRAPHICAL_HIERARCHY = YES +DIRECTORY_GRAPH = YES +DOT_IMAGE_FORMAT = png +DOT_PATH = +DOTFILE_DIRS = +DOT_GRAPH_MAX_NODES = 50 +MAX_DOT_GRAPH_DEPTH = 1000 +DOT_TRANSPARENT = NO +DOT_MULTI_TARGETS = NO +GENERATE_LEGEND = YES +DOT_CLEANUP = YES +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +# Configuration::additions related to the search engine +#--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +SEARCHENGINE = NO diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/ccache-api-v2.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/ccache-api-v2.html new file mode 100755 index 000000000..b8d3f06e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/ccache-api-v2.html @@ -0,0 +1,1217 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> +<HTML> +<HEAD> + <TITLE>Credentials Cache API v2 Specification</TITLE> +</HEAD> +<BODY> +<H1>Credentials Cache API v2 Specification</H1> +<H3>This version of the API is deprecated. <BR> +Please refer to CCAPI version 3 or later for the current API.</H3> + +<UL> + <LI><A HREF="#TypeDefinitions">Type Definitions</A> + + <UL CLASS=small> + <LI><A HREF="#cc_int32">cc_int32 & cc_uint32</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_time_t">cc_time_t</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_nc_flags">cc_nc_flags</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#typedefCC_Cred">cc_cred</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#typedefCC_Data">cc_data</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#typedefV4Cred_type">V4Cred_type</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#enumStringToKey_Type">StringToKey_Type</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#enumCc_cred_vers">cc_cred_vers</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#unionCred_ptr_union">cred_ptr_union</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#unionCred_union">cred_union</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#typdefInfoNC">infoNC</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#opaque_types">opaque types</A> + </UL> + + <LI><A HREF="#ErrorCodeDefinitions">Error Code Definitions</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#ImplementationNotes">Implementation Notes</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#FunctionDefinitions">Function Definitions</A> + + <UL> + <LI><A HREF="#MainCacheFunctions">Main Cache Functions</A> + + <UL CLASS=small> + <LI><A HREF="#cc_initialize">cc_initialize</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_create">cc_create</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_open">cc_open</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_close">cc_close</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_destroy">cc_destroy</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_shutdown">cc_shutdown</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_initialize">cc_initialize</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_get_change_time">cc_get_change_time</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_get_NC_info">cc_get_NC_info</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_seq_fetch_NCs_begin">cc_seq_fetch_NCs_begin</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next">cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_seq_fetch_NCs_end">cc_seq_fetch_NCs_end</A> + + </UL> + + <LI><A HREF="#NCFunctions">NC Functions</A> + + <UL CLASS=small> + <LI><A HREF="#cc_get_name">cc_get_name</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_get_cred_version">cc_get_cred_version</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_get_principal">cc_get_principal</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_get_instance">cc_get_instance</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_remove_cred">cc_remove_cred</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_store">cc_store</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_get_instance">cc_get_instance</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin">cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_seq_fetch_creds_next">cc_seq_fetch_creds_next</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_seq_fetch_creds_end">cc_seq_fetch_creds_end</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_lock_request">cc_lock_request</A> + </UL> + + <LI><A HREF="#LiberationFunctions">Liberation Functions</A> + + <UL CLASS=small> + <LI><A HREF="#cc_free_principal">cc_free_principal</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_free_name">cc_free_name</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_free_creds">cc_free_creds</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#cc_free_NC_info">cc_free_NC_info</A> + </UL> + </UL> + + <LI><A HREF="#RevisionNotes">Revision History/Notes</A> + + <UL> + <LI><A HREF="#ChangesRev3">Changes made during revsion 3</A> + </UL> + + <LI><A HREF="#FutureIdeas">Ideas for Future Versions</A> + + <LI><A HREF="#Abstract">Abstract</A> +</UL> + +<P> +<HR> +<A NAME="Abstract"></A> + +<H2>Abstract</H2> + +<P>This is the specification for an API which provides Credentials +Cache services for both +<A HREF="http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/">Kerberos V5</A> and V4. +The idea behind this API is that multiple Kerberos implementations +can share a single Credentials Cache, mediated by this API +specification. On the Microsoft Windows platform this will allow +single-signon, even when more than one Kerberos DLL is in use on a +particular system. Ideally, this problem could be solved by +standardizing the Kerberos V5 API library interface. However, the +Kerberos API is complicated enough that this would be hard to +accomplish. Standardizing the interface for credentials cache access +is much simpler. This API has also been adopted in the MIT Kerberos +for the Macintosh implementation. + +<P>This specification has been revised to allow storage and +manipulation of both V4 and V5 tickets. A cache contains one or more +"Named Cache"s. It is assumed that V4 and V5 credentials would each +be stored in separate "Named Cache"s and not mixed in a single "Named +Cache". + +<P>Below, "NC" refers to "Named Cache".<BR> + + + +<P> +<HR> +<A NAME="RevisionNotes"></A> + +<H2><B>Revision History/Notes</B></H2> + +<H4>Original version (Draft Version 1)</H4> + +<P>1/27/96 by +<A HREF="http://web.mit.edu/tytso/www/home.html">Theodore Ts'o</A> + +<H4>Revision 2 (Draft Version 1)</H4> + +<P>970628 by <A HREF="http://www.umich.edu/~sgr">Steve Rothwell</A> +for the V4Cache Team (Paul Hill, Jenny Khuon, Jean Luker, Dave +Detlefs, Allan Bjorklund, & Steve Rothwell) + +<P><A NAME="ChangesRev3"></A> + +<H4>Revision 3 (Draft Version 1)</H4> + +<P>970725 by Steve Rothwell after initial implementation and alpha +release. The term "credentials cache" was previously used to mean +both "the main cache" and individual "named cache"s within the main +cache. I have started using the term "NC" for "named cache" to make +the distinction clearer and to reduce the overloading of the word +"cache". + +<H5>Changes made for revision 3 of this API:</H5> + +<UL> + <LI>Added cred version type to cc_create() & cc_open() + + <LI>New functions + + <UL> + <LI>cc_get_NC_info(), returns NC_info list for all NCs + + <LI>cc_free_NC_info(), frees NC_info list + + <LI>cc_get_cred_version(), returns version type of NC + + <LI>cc_get_name(), returns name of NC + + <LI>cc_free_name(), frees name aquired via cc_get_name() + + <LI>cc_seq_fetch_NCs(), iterate over all NCs + </UL> + + <LI>New return codes + + <UL> + <LI>CC_BAD_PARM + + <LI>CC_ERR_CACHE_ATTACH + + <LI>CC_ERR_CACHE_RELEASE + + <LI>CC_ERR_CACHE_FULL + + <LI>CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION + </UL> + + <LI>Modified functions + + <UL> + <LI>cc_create(), cc_open(), pass version type of NC + + <LI>cc_store(), cc_remove(), cc_ + </UL> + + <LI>New & Modified typedefs & data structures + + <UL> + <LI>cc_cred_vers { CC_CRED_VUNKNOWN, CC_CRED_V4, CC_CRED_V5 } + + <LI>cred_ptr_union : contains pointer to credentials (either V4 + or V5) + + <LI>cred_union : contains version type and cred_ptr_union + + <LI>modified V4Cred_type + + <LI>enum StringToKey_Type { STK_AFS or STK_DES } + + <LI>copies of the maximum V4 string size indicators + KRB_PRINCIPAL_SZ, KRB_SERVICE_SZ, KRB_INSTANCE_SZ, + KRB_REALM_SZ, ADDR_SZ + </UL> +</UL> + +<H4>Revision 4 (Draft Version 1)</H4> + +<P>970908 by Steve Rothwell to incorporate changes initiated by Ted +Tso. Further changes are expected in the comments for cc_create() and +cc_get_change_time(). + +<H4>Revision 4a (Final Version 1)</H4> + +<P>980603 by <A HREF="mailto:smcguire@mit.edu">Scott McGuire</A> to +correct typographical errors, HTML errors, and minor clarifications. +Final API Version 1 spec. + +<H4>Revision 5 (Draft Version 2)</H4> + +<P>990201 by <A HREF="mailto:smcguire@mit.edu">Scott McGuire</A>. + +<UL> + <LI>Increased API version number to 2. + + <LI>Added enum's defining version numbers. + + <LI>Changes to cc_initialize() to specify how to deal with + different API version numbers. + + <LI>Added description of cc_int32 and cc_uint32 types. + + <LI>Change some cc_int32's to cc_uint32's. + + <LI>Changed way cc_create() will behave when called on an existing + cache. + + <LI>Replaced cc_seq_fetch_NCs() with cc_seq_fetch_NCs_begin(), + cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next(), and cc_seq_fetch_NCs_end(); + + <LI>Replaced cc_seq_fetch_creds() with cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin(), + cc_seq_fetch_creds_next(), and cc_seq_fetch_creds_end(); + + <LI>Replaced enum type references in structs and function + paramenters with cc_int32 references; + + <LI>Replaced int type references in function parameters with + cc_int32; + + <LI>Added return type of cc_int32 to all functions; + + <LI>Removed #ifdef from cred_union structure; + + <LI>Constant definitions and changes to V4Cred_type structure; + + <LI>Removed incorrect const ccache_p * parameters from cc_store() + and cc_remove_cred(); + + <LI>Added CC_NOERROR and CC_BAD_PARM as possible return codes from + all functions (except no CC_BAD_PARM from cc_shutdown() ); + + <LI>Added CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION as possible return code from + cc_open() and cc_create(); + + <LI>Moved infoNC structure definition up to be with rest of + structure definitions; + + <LI>Changed "struct _infoNC" to "infoNC" in parameter type + references. + + <LI>cc_free_principal() and cc_free_name() now take char ** + instead of char * for final parameter. (This change was made + between rev 4a and rev 5, but I'm re-emphasizing it here.) + + <LI>Added Implementation Notes section with requirement that all + functions must be atomic and name requirements for Windows DLL's. + + <LI>Renamed "the proposed changes to this API are" section to + "Ideas for Future Versions" -- but removed all items but one + because they'd all been done. + + <LI>Removed most of the notes about differences with the Win NT/95 + implementation of the API -- the differences have been reconciled. + + <LI>Removed unnecessary and inconsistent italicizing. +</UL> + +<H4>Revsion 5a (Final Version 2)</H4> + +<P>990723 by <A HREF="mailto:smcguire@mit.edu">Scott McGuire</A>. + +<UL> + <LI>cc_create(): Removed text about "expected" form of name. + Removed note about "the alpha version does not do this." + + <LI>cc_destroy(): Clarified that you do not need to call + cc_close() on the cache_pointer after calling this function. + + <LI>Removed note about Windows cc_get_instance() and + cc_set_instance() functions, they are no longer part of the + Windows code! +</UL> + +<H2><A NAME="FutureIdeas"></A>Ideas for Future Versions</H2> + +<UL> + <LI>Define Get/Set functions for all components of _cc_creds? + (This will allow future changes to the data structure to be + transparent to the caller. This also makes backward compatibility + much easier to maintain.) +</UL> + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- type definitions --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + + +<HR> +<A NAME="TypeDefinitions"></A> + +<H2>Type definitions</H2> + +<PRE>// enums for API versions used in cc_initialize() +enum { + CC_API_VER_1 = 1, + CC_API_VER_2 = 2 +}; + +<A NAME="cc_int32"></A> +// cc_int32 and cc_uint32 are not exactly defined in this API due +// to a lack of standard 32-bit integer size between platforms +// (although there is the C9X standard). +// However, we will place the following constraints: +// +// cc_int32 is a signed integer that is at least 32 bits wide. +// cc_uint32 is an unsigned integer that is at least 32 bits wide + +<A NAME="cc_time_t"></A> +typedef cc_int32 cc_time_t; //see <A HREF="#cc_time_t_Note">notes below</A> +<A NAME="cc_nc_flags"></A> +typedef cc_uint32 cc_nc_flags; + + +<A NAME="opaque_types"></A> +typedef struct opaque_dll_control_block_type* apiCB; +typedef struct opaque_ccache_pointer_type* ccache_p; +typedef struct opaque_credential_iterator_type* ccache_cit; + +// These really are intended to be opaque. All implementations of the cache API must have +// them but what they are is implementation specific. In the case of SGR's implementation, +// the cc_ctx returned available after a call to cc_initialize, is a CCache_ctx class object. The +// code that normally calls the cc_initialize function is straight C, which means the calling +// application doesn't have a chance in hell of manipulating this directly. The API is designed +// so that it does not have to. It does have to pass the pointer to the class around, one reason +// being so that the destructor can eventually be called. + + +<A NAME="typedefCC_Data"></A> +typedef struct _cc_data { + cc_uint32 type; + cc_uint32 length; + unsigned char* data; +} cc_data; + +<A NAME="typedefCC_Cred"></A> +typedef struct _cc_creds { + char* client; /* client's principal identifier */ + char* server; /* server's principal identifier */ + cc_data keyblock; /* session encryption key info */ + cc_time_t authtime; + cc_time_t starttime; + cc_time_t endtime; + cc_time_t renew_till; + cc_uint32 is_skey; /* true if ticket is encrypted in + another ticket's skey */ + cc_uint32 ticket_flags; /* flags in ticket */ + cc_data** addresses; /* addrs in ticket */ + cc_data ticket; /* ticket string itself */ + cc_data second_ticket; /* second ticket, if related to + ticket (via DUPLICATE-SKEY or + ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) */ + cc_data** authdata; /* authorization data */ +} cc_creds; + + +// use an enumerated type so all callers infer the same meaning +// these values are what krbv4win uses internally. +<A NAME="enumStringToKey_Type"></A> +enum StringToKey_Type { STK_AFS = 0, STK_DES = 1 }; + +enum { MAX_V4_CRED_LEN = 1250 }; + + +// V4 Credentials +<A NAME="typedefV4Cred_type"></A> +enum { + KRB_NAME_SZ = 40, + KRB_INSTANCE_SZ = 40, + KRB_REALM_SZ = 40 +}; + +typedef struct _V4credential { + unsigned char kversion; + char principal[KRB_NAME_SZ+1]; + char principal_instance[KRB_INSTANCE_SZ+1]; + char service[KRB_NAME_SZ+1]; + char service_instance[KRB_INSTANCE_SZ+1]; + char realm[KRB_REALM_SZ+1]; + unsigned char session_key[8]; + cc_int32 kvno; // k95 used BYTE skvno + cc_int32 str_to_key; // k4 infers dynamically, k95 stores; of type enum StringToKey_Type + long issue_date; // k95 called this issue_time + cc_int32 lifetime; // k95 used LONG expiration_time + cc_uint32 address; // IP Address of local host as an unsigned 32-bit integer + cc_int32 ticket_sz; // k95 used BYTE, k4 ktext uses int to hold up to 1250 + unsigned char ticket[MAX_V4_CRED_LEN]; + unsigned long oops; // zero to catch runaways +} V4Cred_type; + +<A NAME="enumCc_cred_vers"></A> +enum cc_cred_vers { + CC_CRED_VUNKNOWN = 0, // For validation + CC_CRED_V4 = 1, + CC_CRED_V5 = 2, + CC_CRED_VMAX = 3 // For validation +}; + +<A NAME="unionCred_ptr_union"></A> +typedef union cred_ptr_union_type { + V4Cred_type* pV4Cred; + cc_creds* pV5Cred; +} cred_ptr_union; + +<A NAME="unionCred_union"></A> +typedef struct cred_union_type { + cc_int32 cred_type; // cc_cred_vers + <A HREF="#unionCred_ptr_union">cred_ptr_union</A> cred; +} cred_union; + +<A NAME="typdefInfoNC"></A> +typedef struct _infoNC { + char* name; + char* principal; + cc_int32 vers; // cc_cred_vers +} infoNC;</PRE> + +<H4>The cc_data structure</H4> + +<P>The cc_data structure is used to store the following elements: + +<UL> + <LI>keyblock + + <LI>addresses + + <LI>ticket (and second_ticket) + + <LI>authorization data +</UL> + +<P>For cc_creds.ticket and cc_creds.second_ticket, the cc_data.type +field MUST be zero. For the cc_creds.addresses, cc_creds.authdata, +and cc_data.keyblock, the cc_data.type field should be the address +type, authorization data type, and encryption type, as defined by the +Kerberos V5 protocol definition. + +<H4><A NAME="cc_time_t_Note"></A>cc_time_t</H4> + +<P>The cc_time_t fields are used to represent time. The time must be +stored as the number of seconds since midnight GMT on January 1, +1970. + +<H4>Principal names</H4> + +<P>Principal names are stored as C strings in this API. The C strings +may contain UTF-8 encoded strings for internationalization +purposes.<BR> + + +<HR> +<A NAME="ErrorCodeDefinitions"></A> + +<H2>Error Codes Definition</H2> + +<P><TABLE BORDER=1> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>0 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_NOERROR + </TD><TD> + <P>"Successful return" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>1 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_BADNAME + </TD><TD> + <P>"Bad credential cache name format" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>2 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_NOTFOUD + </TD><TD> + <P>"Matching credential not found" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>3 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_END + </TD><TD> + <P>"End of credential cache reached" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>4 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_IO + </TD><TD> + <P>"Credentials cache I/O operation failed" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>5 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_WRITE + </TD><TD> + <P>"Error writing to credentials cache file" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>6 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_NOMEM + </TD><TD> + <P>"No memory" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>7 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_FORMAT + </TD><TD> + <P>"Corrupted credentials cache" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>8 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_LOCKED + </TD><TD> + <P>"The credentials cache or NC is locked" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>9 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_BAD_API_VERSION + </TD><TD> + <P>"Unsupported API version" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>10 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_NO_EXIST + </TD><TD> + <P>"Credentials cache or NC does not exist" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>11 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_NOT_SUPP + </TD><TD> + <P>"Function not supported" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>12 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_BAD_PARM + </TD><TD> + <P>"Bad Paramter Passed" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>13 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_ERR_CACHE_ATTACH + </TD><TD> + <P>"Failed to attach cache" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>14 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_ERR_CACHE_RELEASE + </TD><TD> + <P>"Failed to release cache" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>15 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_ERR_CACHE_FULL + </TD><TD> + <P>"Cache FULL" + </TD></TR> + <TR> + <TD> + <P>16 + </TD><TD> + <P>CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION + </TD><TD> + <P>"Wrong Cred Version" + </TD></TR> +</TABLE> + +<P> +<HR> +<A NAME="ImplementationNotes"></A> + +<H2>Implementation Notes</H2> + +<H4>All functions are atomic</H4> + +<P>All Credentials Cache API functions must be atomic. + +<P><B>Windows</B> + +<P>DLLs should be named KrbCC16.dll and KrbCC32.dll. + +<P> +<HR> +<A NAME="FunctionDefinitions"></A> + +<H2>Function definitions</H2> + +<P><A NAME="MainCacheFunctions"></A> + +<H3>Main Cache Functions</H3> + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_initialize --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------> + + +<P><A NAME="cc_initialize"></A> + +<H4>cc_initialize</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_initialize(apiCB** cc_ctx, cc_int32 api_version, cc_int32* api_supported, char** vendor)</PRE> + +<P>This function performs any initialization required by the +<I>API</I>. It must be called before any other function in the +<I>API</I> is called. The cc_ctx returned by this function must be +passed to all other <I>API</I> functions as the first argument. + +<P>The application must pass in the maximum version number of the API +it supports in the <B>api_version</B> parameter. + +<P>If <B>api_supported</B> non-NULL, then cc_initialize will store +the maximum API version number supported by the library implementing +the API there. + +<P>If the version requested by <B>api_version</B> is not equal to the +version supported by the library, CC_BAD_API_VERSION will be returned +as the error code (along with the version the library does support in +<B>api_supported</B>) and cc_initialize should not allocate any +memory. + +<P>If the <B>vendor</B> is non-NULL, then cc_initialize will store a +pointer to a read/only C string which contains a string describing +the vendor which implemented the credentials cache <I>API</I>. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NOMEM, CC_BAD_API_VERSION, +CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_shutdown --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_shutdown"></A> + +<H4>cc_shutdown</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_shutdown(apiCB** cc_ctx)</PRE> + +<P>This function performs any cleanup required by the <I>API</I>. +cc_ctx will be NULL on return. The application program must call +cc_initialize() again before making any credentials cache <I>API</I> +calls. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_get_change_time --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_get_change_time"></A> + +<H4>cc_get_change_time</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_get_change_time(apiCB* cc_ctx, cc_time_t* time)</PRE> + +<P>This function returns the time of the most recent change for the +entire cache. There is ONE timestamp maintained for the entire cache. +By maintaining a local copy the caller can deduce whether "something +changed" or not. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_NOMEM, +CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_get_NC_info --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_get_NC_info"></A> + +<H4>cc_get_NC_info</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_get_NC_info(apiCB* cc_ctx, infoNC*** ppNCi)</PRE> + +<P>cc_get_NC_info() is a wrapper for cc_seq_fetch_NCs(), +cc_get_name() cc_get_cred_version(), and cc_get_principal(). It +returns all the information needed to uniquely identify each NC in +the cache (name and cred_version) and the associated principal. +Specifically it returns a null terminated list of pointers to infoNC +structs. Each infoNC struct contain a pointer to the NC's name, a +pointer to the the principal associated with the NC, and the version +number (as an enumerated type) of the credentials stored in this NC. + +<P>The ppNCi (the entire data structure) aquired by this routine +should be freed with cc_free_NC_info(). + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_NOMEM, +CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_open --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_open"></A> + +<H4>cc_open</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_open(apiCB* cc_ctx, const char* name, cc_int32 cred_vers, cc_uint32 cc_flags, + ccache_p** ccache_pointer)</PRE> + +<P>Opens an already exising NC identified by both <B>name</B>, and +<B>cred_vers</B>. It fills in the parameter **ccache_pointer with a +pointer to the NC. + +<P>The list of cache names, principals, and credentials versions may +be retrieved via cc_seq_fetch_NCs(), cc_get_name(), +cc_get_cred_version(), & cc_get_principal() OR via +cc_get_NC_info(). + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_BADNAME, CC_NO_EXIST, +CC_NOMEM, CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_create --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_create"></A> + +<H4>cc_create</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_create(apiCB* cc_ctx, const char* name, const char* principal, + cc_int32 cred_vers, cc_uint32 cc_flags, ccache_p** ccache_pointer)</PRE> + +<P>Create a new NC. The NC is uniquely identified by the combination +of it's name and the "cc_creds_vers" (i.e. which credentials version +it holds). The principal given is also associated with the NC. A NULL +<B>name</B> is not allowed (and CC_BADNAME should be returned if one +is passed in). If <B>name</B> is non-null and there is already a NC +named <B>name</B>, all credentials in the cache are removed, and +handle for the existing cache is returned. If there is already a NC +named name, all existing handles for this cache remain valid. The NC +is created with a primary principal specified by <B>principal</B>. + +<P><I>(Removed text about the "expected" form of the NC name.)</I> + +<P>An NC is intended to hold credentials for a single principal in a +single realm, and for a single credentials version (i.e. V4 or V5). +The cache can contain credentials for other credential versions, +other realms, and even other principals, but each in a separate NC. +This rule will allow callers that can only handle a single principal +in a single realm to continue to work by dealing with only one NC. +Callers that can deal with multiple principals, multiple realms, +and/or multiple credentials versions can do so by dealing with +multiple NCs. By doing it this way, the callers that are able to +handle multiple principals, realms, and/or versions can do so without +interfering with "differently abled" code. + +<P>The list of cache names, principals, & cred_versions may be +retrieved via cc_get_NC_info(). + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_BADNAME, CC_BAD_PARM, +CC_NO_EXIST, CC_NOMEM, CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_close --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_close"></A> + +<H4>cc_close</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_close(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_p** ccache_pointer)</PRE> + +<P>Close the NC. The <B>ccache_pointer</B> related memory is +deallocated, and ccache_pointer is set to NULL before being returned +to caller. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_destroy --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_destroy"></A> + +<H4>cc_destroy</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_destroy(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_p** ccache_pointer)</PRE> + +<P>Destroy the NC pointed to by <B>ccache_pointer</B>. The +<B>ccache_pointer</B> related memory is deallocated, and +ccache_pointer is set to NULL before being returned to caller. The +caller does not need to call cc_close() on the <B>cache_pointer</B> +afterwards. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_seq_fetch_NCs --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + + + +<P><A NAME="cc_seq_fetch_NCs_begin"></A> + +<H4>cc_seq_fetch_NCs_begin</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_seq_fetch_NCs_begin(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_cit** itNCs)</PRE> + +<P>Used to allocate memory and initialize the iterator *itNCs. Use +cc_seq_fetch_NCs_end() to deallocate the memory used by *itNCs. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM, +CC_NOMEM + +<H4><A NAME="cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next"></A></H4> + +<H4>cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_p** ccache_pointer, ccache_cit* itNCs)</PRE> + +<P>Used to sequentially open every NC in the cache. + +<P>Ccache_pointer must be a pointer to a ccache_p*. The +ccache_pointer returned may be used to get information about the NC +by calling cc_get_name(), cc_get_cred_version(), and +cc_get_principal(). Ccache_pointer's returned must be freed via +cc_close() between calls to cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next(). + +<P>itNCs must be a pointer to a ccache_cit* variable provided by the +calling application and which is used by cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next() to +determine the next NC to return. It must have been initialized by +cc_seq_fetch_NCs_begin(). + +<P>If changes are made to the credentials cache while it iterator is +being used, it must return at least the intersection, and at most the +union, of the set of NC's that were in the cache when the iteration +began and the set of NC's that are in the cache when it ends. + +<P>When the last NC in the sequence is returned, the return code from +cc_seq_fetch_NCs_next() will be CC_END. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_END, CC_NO_EXIST. +CC_BAD_PARM, CC_NOMEM + +<H4> </H4> + +<H4><A NAME="cc_seq_fetch_NCs_end"></A></H4> + +<H4>cc_seq_fetch_NCs_end</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_seq_fetch_NCs_end(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_cit** itNCs)</PRE> + +<P>Deallocates the memory used by *itNCs, and sets *itNCs to NULL. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P> + +<P><A NAME="NCFunctions"></A> + +<H3>NC Functions</H3> + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_get_name --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><A NAME="cc_get_name"></A> + + +<H4>cc_get_name</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_get_name(apiCB* cc_ctx, const ccache_p* ccache_pointer, char** name)</PRE> + +<P>cc_get_name() returns the name of the NC indicated by +ccache_pointer. The name can be used in cc_open() or cc_create(). The +combination of the name and the credentials version uniqeuly identify +an NC. The returned name should be freed via cc_free_name(). + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NOMEM, CC_NO_EXIST, +CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_get_cred_version --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_get_cred_version"></A> + +<H4>cc_get_cred_version</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_get_cred_version(apiCB* cc_ctx, const ccache_p* ccache_pointer, cc_int32* cred_vers)</PRE> + +<P>cc_get_cred_version() returns one of the enumerated type +cc_cred_vers in cred_vers. The expected values are CC_CRED_V4, or +CC_CRED_V5. The combination of the name and the credentials version +uniquely identify an NC. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_set_principal --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_set_principal"></A> + +<H4>cc_set_principal</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_set_principal(apiCB* cc_ctx, const ccache_p* ccache_pointer, const cc_int32 cred_vers, + const char* principal)</PRE> + +<P>Set the primary principal for the NC indicated by ccache_pointer. +This is the complement to cc_get_principal(). + +<P>cred_vers is used as a double check. + +<P>principal points to a null terminated string that will be copied +into the NC. This new principal will be returned if you call +cc_get_principal() for this NC. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NOMEM, CC_NO_EXIST, +CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION, CC_BAD_PARM<BR> + + + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_get_principal --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_get_principal"></A> + +<H4>cc_get_principal</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_get_principal(apiCB* cc_ctx, const ccache_p* ccache_pointer, char** principal)</PRE> + +<P>Return the primary principal for the NC that was set via +cc_create() or cc_set_principal(). The returned principal should be +freed via cc_free_principal() . + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NOMEM, CC_NO_EXIST, +CC_BAD_PARM<BR> + + + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_store --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_store"></A> + +<H4>cc_store</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_store(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_p* ccache_pointer, const <A HREF="#unionCred_union">cred_union</A> cred)</PRE> + +<P>Store (make a copy of) <B>cred</B> in the NC indicated by +<B>ccache_pointer</B>. + +<P>A cred_union contains a cred_type indicator and a cred_ptr_union. +A cred_ptr_union can contain either a V4Cred_type pointer or a +cc_creds (V5 creds) pointer. Cred_type indicates which type of +pointer is in the cred_ptr_union. This also allows the <I>API</I> to +enforce the credentials version declared in cc_create() or cc_open(). + + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_ERR_CACHE_FULL, +CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_remove_cred --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_remove_cred"></A> + +<H4>cc_remove_cred</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_remove_cred(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_p* ccache_pointer, const <A HREF="#unionCred_union">cred_union</A> cred)</PRE> + +<P>Removes the credential <B>cred</B> from <B>ccache_pointer</B>. The +credentials in the NC indicated by ccache_pointer are searched to +find a matching credential. If found, that credential is removed from +the NC. The cred parameter is not modified and should be freed via +cc_free_creds(). It is legitimate to call this function during a +sequential fetch, and the deletion of a credential already returned +by cc_seq_fetch_creds() should not disturb sequence of credentials +returned by cc_seq_fetch_creds(). + +<P>Use of cred_union is the same as is explained in cc_store(). + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_NOTFOUND, +CC_ERR_CRED_VERSION, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_seq_fetch_creds --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin"></A> + +<H4>cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin(apiCB* cc_ctx, const ccache_p* ccache_pointer, ccache_cit** itCreds)</PRE> + +<P>Allocates memory for and initializes *itCreds. This memory must be +deallocated using cc_seq_fetch_creds_end(). + +<P>Ccache_pointer must be a valid pointer to the NC containing the +creds to be returned by the iterator. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM, +CC_NOMEM + +<P> + +<P><A NAME="cc_seq_fetch_creds_next"></A> + +<H4>cc_seq_fetch_creds_next</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_seq_fetch_creds_next(apiCB* cc_ctx, cred_union** cred, ccache_cit* itCreds)</PRE> + +<P>cc_seq_fetch_creds_next() is used to sequentially read every set +of credentials in an NC. The NC has been indicated in the call to +cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin(). + +<P>itCreds must be a pointer to a ccache_cit* variable provided by +the calling application and which is used by +cc_seq_fetch_creds_next() to determine the next cached credential to +return. The ccache_cit* variable must be initialized by calling +cc_seq_fetch_creds_begin(). + +<P>The credentials are filled into the cred_union pointed to by +creds. Note that the cred_union contains elements which are +dynamically allocated, so must be freed using cc_free_creds() between +calls to cc_seq_fetch_creds_next(). + +<P>If changes are made to the NC while it iterator is being used, it +must return at least the intersection, and at most the union, of the +set of credentials that were in the NC when the iteration began and +the set of credentials that are in the NC when it ends. + +<P>When the last credential in the sequence is returned, the return +code from cc_seq_fetch_creds_next() will be CC_END. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_END, CC_NO_EXIST, +CC_BAD_PARM, CC_NOMEM + +<P> + +<P><A NAME="cc_seq_fetch_creds_end"></A> + +<H4>cc_seq_fetch_creds_end</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_seq_fetch_creds_end(apiCB* cc_ctx, ccache_cit** itCreds)</PRE> + +<P>Deallocates memory used by *itCreds and sets *itCreds to NULL. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_lock_request --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_lock_request"></A> + +<H4>cc_lock_request</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_lock_request(apiCB* cc_ctx, const ccache_p* ccache_pointer, cc_int32 lock_type)</PRE> + +<DL> + <DD>99/02/11 - smcguire + + <DD><B>As of this date there is no locking in the Win NT/95 + or Machintosh implementations. The description below may not be + completely accurate as to how this function should be + implemented.</B> +</DL> + +<P>This function is currently NOT IMPLEMENTED. All functions attach +to the cache, take action, and detach from the cache before returning +to the caller. + +<P>This function will lock or unlock the NC based on the argument +value of lock_type: + +<PRE> CC_LOCK_UNLOCK 1 Unlock the NC + CC_LOCK_READER 2 Lock the NC for reading + CC_LOCK_WRITER 3 Lock the NC for writing + + CC_LOCK_NOBLOCK 16 Don't block, but return an error code if + the request cannot be satisfied. + </PRE> + +<P>Locking is done on a per-thread basis. At most one thread may have +the credentials locked for writing; if so, there must not be any +threads that have the credentials locked for reading. + +<P>Multiple threads may have the cache locked for reading, as long as +there is not a writer lock asserted on the cache. + +<P>If a thread has a cache locked for reading, that lock may be +upgraded to a writer lock by calling cc_lock_request() with a +lock_type of CC_LOCK_WRITER. If a thread has the cache locked for +reading or writing, a request to cc_lock_request() for a reader or +writer lock, respectively, is a no-op. If a thread does not have the +cache locked, and calls cc_lock_request() with a lock_type of +CC_LOCK_UNLOCK, this is also a no-op. + +<P>A request for CC_LOCK_READER and CC_LOCK_WRITER may be made +non-blocking by logical or'ing the value CC_LOCK_NOBLOCK. In that +case, if it is not possible to satisfy the lock request, the error +CC_LOCKED will be returned. + +<P> + +<P><A NAME="LiberationFunctions"></A> + +<H3>Liberation Functions</H3> + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_free_principal --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><A NAME="cc_free_principal"></A> + + +<H4>cc_free_principal</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_free_principal(apiCB* cc_ctx, char** principal)</PRE> + +<P>This function frees the <B>principal</B> returned by +cc_get_principal() and sets *principal to NULL. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_free_name --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_free_name"></A> + +<H4>cc_free_name</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_free_name(apiCB* cc_ctx, char** name)</PRE> + +<P>This function frees the <B>name</B> returned by cc_get_name() and +sets *name to NULL. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_free_creds --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_free_creds"></A> + +<H4>cc_free_creds</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_free_creds(apiCB* cc_ctx, cred_union** creds)</PRE> + +<P>This function frees all storage associated with creds returned by +cc_seq_fetch_creds() and sets the creds pointer to NULL. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<P><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><!-- cc_free_NC_info --><!-- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------><BR> + +<A NAME="cc_free_NC_info"></A> + +<H4>cc_free_NC_info</H4> + +<PRE>cc_int32 cc_free_NC_info(apiCB* cc_ctx, infoNC*** ppNCi)</PRE> + +<P>This routine frees all storage aquired by cc_get_NC_info() and +sets ppNCi to NULL. + +<P>Possible error codes: CC_NOERROR, CC_NO_EXIST, CC_BAD_PARM + +<!-- Begin MIT-use only web reporting counter --> + <IMG SRC="http://counter.mit.edu/tally" WIDTH=1 HEIGHT=1 ALT=""> +<!-- End MIT-use only web reporting counter --> +</BODY></HTML> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/doxygen.css b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/doxygen.css new file mode 100644 index 000000000..05615b2e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/doxygen.css @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@ +BODY,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6,P,CENTER,TD,TH,UL,DL,DIV { + font-family: Geneva, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; 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+} +.memTemplParams { + padding: 1px 0px 0px 8px; + margin: 4px; + border-top-width: 1px; + border-right-width: 1px; + border-bottom-width: 1px; + border-left-width: 1px; + border-top-color: #E0E0E0; + border-right-color: #E0E0E0; + border-bottom-color: #E0E0E0; + border-left-color: #E0E0E0; + border-top-style: solid; + border-right-style: none; + border-bottom-style: none; + border-left-style: none; + color: #606060; + background-color: #FAFAFA; + font-size: 80%; +} +.search { color: #003399; + font-weight: bold; +} +FORM.search { + margin-bottom: 0px; + margin-top: 0px; +} +INPUT.search { font-size: 75%; + color: #000080; + font-weight: normal; + background-color: #e8eef2; +} +TD.tiny { font-size: 75%; +} +a { + color: #1A41A8; +} +a:visited { + color: #2A3798; +} +.dirtab { padding: 4px; + border-collapse: collapse; + border: 1px solid #84b0c7; +} +TH.dirtab { background: #e8eef2; + font-weight: bold; +} +HR { height: 1px; + border: none; + border-top: 1px solid black; +} + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/doxygen.png b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/doxygen.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 000000000..f0a274bba --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/doxygen.png diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2c8bfe27b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_ccache_iterator_t Overview</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_ccache_iterator_t Overview</h1><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +The cc_ccache_iterator_t type represents an iterator that iterates over a set of ccaches and returns them in all in some order. A new instance of this type can be obtained by calling <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g6957bc9570e4769a5b1213d2a1d90cd7">cc_context_new_ccache_iterator()</a>.<p> +For API function documentation see <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Structures</h2> +<ul> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_d</a> +</ul> +<h2>Typedefs</h2> +<ul> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html#g55a6d891b6840466cc956bdd327dc314">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_d</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html#g0ab4121cf78b7e0f92a90e9d4c15f0cf">cc_ccache_iterator_d</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_d</a> * <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html#gce800a50d1fe0dcb05b6be0884232318">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Typedef Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="g55a6d891b6840466cc956bdd327dc314"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_iterator_f" ref="g55a6d891b6840466cc956bdd327dc314" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g0ab4121cf78b7e0f92a90e9d4c15f0cf"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_iterator_d" ref="g0ab4121cf78b7e0f92a90e9d4c15f0cf" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_d</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_d</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gce800a50d1fe0dcb05b6be0884232318"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_iterator_t" ref="gce800a50d1fe0dcb05b6be0884232318" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_d</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__ccache__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__ccache__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ce47b73c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__ccache__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_ccache_t Overview</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_ccache_t Overview</h1><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +The cc_ccache_t type represents a reference to a ccache. Callers can access a ccache and the credentials stored in it via a cc_ccache_t. A cc_ccache_t can be acquired via <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g256a5ba17fe0e4502e0722d9b081bbef">cc_context_open_ccache()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g45a7ce29eb409baabadcae1bc95d5c57">cc_context_open_default_ccache()</a>, or <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcff0b3e247a2adc95442324fec6c5651">cc_ccache_iterator_next()</a>.<p> +For API function documentation see <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Structures</h2> +<ul> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_d</a> +</ul> +<h2>Typedefs</h2> +<ul> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__reference.html#ga88aed938d3678e263f6507fcd6e5e38">cc_ccache_f</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_d</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__reference.html#g8eaae84d4f6a48e1e21eb4fe8a0b367a">cc_ccache_d</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_d</a> * <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__reference.html#gf59e3c32bf0b7d9cc409438cebb2f048">cc_ccache_t</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Typedef Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="ga88aed938d3678e263f6507fcd6e5e38"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_f" ref="ga88aed938d3678e263f6507fcd6e5e38" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g8eaae84d4f6a48e1e21eb4fe8a0b367a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_d" ref="g8eaae84d4f6a48e1e21eb4fe8a0b367a" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_d</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_d</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gf59e3c32bf0b7d9cc409438cebb2f048"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_t" ref="gf59e3c32bf0b7d9cc409438cebb2f048" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_d</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__context__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__context__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cd7e6be3d --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__context__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_context_t Overview</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_context_t Overview</h1><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +The cc_context_t type gives the caller access to a ccache collection. Before being able to call any functions in the CCache API, the caller needs to acquire an instance of cc_context_t by calling <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82">cc_initialize()</a>.<p> +For API function documentation see <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Structures</h2> +<ul> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_d</a> +</ul> +<h2>Typedefs</h2> +<ul> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#gf285100b13ebff78db5ce1efb30e689d">cc_context_f</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_d</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#g989a601250a2a05fd23b46c546084add">cc_context_d</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_d</a> * <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#gea6f60fd799984a7178bcb4d4c7290c0">cc_context_t</a> +</ul> +<h2>Functions</h2> +<ul> +<li>CCACHE_API <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82">cc_initialize</a> (<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> *out_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> in_version, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> *out_supported_version, char const **out_vendor) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight">Initialize a new cc_context. <a href="#ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Typedef Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="gf285100b13ebff78db5ce1efb30e689d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_f" ref="gf285100b13ebff78db5ce1efb30e689d" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g989a601250a2a05fd23b46c546084add"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_d" ref="g989a601250a2a05fd23b46c546084add" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_d</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_d</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gea6f60fd799984a7178bcb4d4c7290c0"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_t" ref="gea6f60fd799984a7178bcb4d4c7290c0" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_d</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr><h2>Function Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_initialize" ref="ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82" args="(cc_context_t *out_context, cc_int32 in_version, cc_int32 *out_supported_version, char const **out_vendor)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">CCACHE_API <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> cc_initialize </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> * </td> + <td class="mdname" nowrap> <em>out_context</em>, </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> </td> + <td class="mdname" nowrap> <em>in_version</em>, </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> * </td> + <td class="mdname" nowrap> <em>out_supported_version</em>, </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>char const ** </td> + <td class="mdname" nowrap> <em>out_vendor</em></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md">) </td> + <td class="md" colspan="2"></td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Initialize a new cc_context. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_context</em> </td><td>on exit, a new context object. Must be free with <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g8ff82ce108889d4ed29f46ffe6efc40e">cc_context_release()</a>. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_version</em> </td><td>the requested API version. This should be the maximum version the application supports. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_supported_version</em> </td><td>if non-NULL, on exit contains the maximum API version supported by the implementation. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_vendor</em> </td><td>if non-NULL, on exit contains a pointer to a read-only C string which contains a string describing the vendor which implemented the credentials cache API. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. May return CCAPI v2 error CC_BAD_API_VERSION if <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bafee271af4e43ec6c9bb2e3e849cc1f9">ccapi_version_2</a> is passed in. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41ba42f86 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_iterator_t</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_iterator_t</h1><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +The cc_credentials_iterator_t type represents an iterator that iterates over a set of credentials. A new instance of this type can be obtained by calling <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g893b31c419e71c2f528781d3036fa3ff">cc_ccache_new_credentials_iterator()</a>.<p> +For API function documentation see <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Structures</h2> +<ul> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_d</a> +</ul> +<h2>Typedefs</h2> +<ul> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html#g220581901999fe870ab65046e56cd1d6">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_d</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html#ga1ad98d009f803bb13c04331bb47aee8">cc_credentials_iterator_d</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_d</a> * <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html#g0d07a146ead685954032d0d7a6af7d4a">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> +</ul> +<h2>Variables</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html#g7d765e583b5994785e214df663e8959c">cc_credentials_iterator_f::clone</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> in_credentials_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> *out_credentials_iterator) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g59a9f96a6c00b64c0ab971f7e9b5aae2">cc_credentials_iterator_clone()</a></b>: Make a copy of a credentials iterator. <a href="#g7d765e583b5994785e214df663e8959c"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Typedef Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="g220581901999fe870ab65046e56cd1d6"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_iterator_f" ref="g220581901999fe870ab65046e56cd1d6" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ga1ad98d009f803bb13c04331bb47aee8"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_iterator_d" ref="ga1ad98d009f803bb13c04331bb47aee8" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_d</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_d</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g0d07a146ead685954032d0d7a6af7d4a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_iterator_t" ref="g0d07a146ead685954032d0d7a6af7d4a" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_d</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr><h2>Variable Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="g7d765e583b5994785e214df663e8959c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_iterator_f::clone" ref="g7d765e583b5994785e214df663e8959c" args=")(cc_credentials_iterator_t in_credentials_iterator, cc_credentials_iterator_t *out_credentials_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* clone)(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> in_credentials_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> *out_credentials_iterator)<code> [inherited]</code> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g59a9f96a6c00b64c0ab971f7e9b5aae2">cc_credentials_iterator_clone()</a></b>: Make a copy of a credentials iterator. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_iterator</em> </td><td>a credentials iterator object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_credentials_iterator</em> </td><td>on exit, a copy of <em>in_credentials_iterator</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__credentials__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__credentials__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d083e6c07 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__credentials__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_t Overview</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_t Overview</h1><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +The cc_credentials_t type is used to store a single set of credentials for either Kerberos v4 or Kerberos v5. In addition to its only function, release(), it contains a pointer to a <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> structure. A <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> structure contains an integer of the enumerator type cc_credentials_version, which is either <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c017c26531bad42f92f7f3e1f697b58fa">cc_credentials_v4</a> or <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c98335a31ad81a10632568375dcc10668">cc_credentials_v5</a>, and a pointer union, which contains either a <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a> pointer or a <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a> pointer, depending on the value in version.<p> +Variables of the type cc_credentials_t are allocated by the CCAPI implementation, and should be released with their release() function. API functions which receive credentials structures from the caller always accept <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a>, which is allocated by the caller, and accordingly disposed by the caller.<p> +For API functions see <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Structures</h2> +<ul> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_d</a> +</ul> +<h2>Typedefs</h2> +<ul> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html#g15918c5c162aa2edf2bd1890f8a78c70">cc_credentials_v4_t</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html#g5004a9b025c5cef3364c4a614b700f50">cc_data</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html#g5e882157ba93358ac4a78760a2ccdbd6">cc_credentials_v5_t</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html#ge277840865f515373fcab3c6299901a3">cc_credentials_union</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html#g85b7bf154216b8f780ddaae4b8b0a96c">cc_credentials_f</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_d</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html#g04cec8816d2e51bb3ee5b1b3c1f5429d">cc_credentials_d</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_d</a> * <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html#gf7b0ec03495a6818dd9cd0c1d395ece2">cc_credentials_t</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Typedef Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="g15918c5c162aa2edf2bd1890f8a78c70"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_v4_t" ref="g15918c5c162aa2edf2bd1890f8a78c70" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g5004a9b025c5cef3364c4a614b700f50"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_data" ref="g5004a9b025c5cef3364c4a614b700f50" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g5e882157ba93358ac4a78760a2ccdbd6"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_v5_t" ref="g5e882157ba93358ac4a78760a2ccdbd6" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge277840865f515373fcab3c6299901a3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_union" ref="ge277840865f515373fcab3c6299901a3" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g85b7bf154216b8f780ddaae4b8b0a96c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_f" ref="g85b7bf154216b8f780ddaae4b8b0a96c" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g04cec8816d2e51bb3ee5b1b3c1f5429d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_d" ref="g04cec8816d2e51bb3ee5b1b3c1f5429d" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_d</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_d</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gf7b0ec03495a6818dd9cd0c1d395ece2"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_t" ref="gf7b0ec03495a6818dd9cd0c1d395ece2" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_d</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__string__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__string__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ce3b7195 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__cc__string__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_string_t Overview</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_string_t Overview</h1><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +The cc_string_t represents a C string returned by the API. It has a pointer to the string data and a release() function. This type is used for both principal names and ccache names returned by the API. Principal names may contain UTF-8 encoded strings for internationalization purposes.<p> +For API function documentation see <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_f</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Structures</h2> +<ul> +<li>struct <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_d</a> +</ul> +<h2>Typedefs</h2> +<ul> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_f</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__string__reference.html#g3d01e5c05378e9e78f126156137d51ce">cc_string_f</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_d</a> <a class="el" href="group__cc__string__reference.html#g80f57852683632a4c587af5b0f545dea">cc_string_d</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_d</a> * <a class="el" href="group__cc__string__reference.html#ge6bb6a8c574096b66b5def65eb87a40e">cc_string_t</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Typedef Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="g3d01e5c05378e9e78f126156137d51ce"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_string_f" ref="g3d01e5c05378e9e78f126156137d51ce" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_f</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_f</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g80f57852683632a4c587af5b0f545dea"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_string_d" ref="g80f57852683632a4c587af5b0f545dea" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef struct <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_d</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_d</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge6bb6a8c574096b66b5def65eb87a40e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_string_t" ref="ge6bb6a8c574096b66b5def65eb87a40e" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_d</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__ccapi__constants__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__ccapi__constants__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..87ec30b83 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__ccapi__constants__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,407 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : Constants</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>Constants</h1> +<p> +<h2>Enumerations</h2> +<ul> +<li>enum { <br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bafee271af4e43ec6c9bb2e3e849cc1f9">ccapi_version_2</a> = 2, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b26f201de4113dda3b4ec78dcda95d5a1">ccapi_version_3</a> = 3, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b833d16677b6eb5531fb1285b216c8f3b">ccapi_version_4</a> = 4, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc3ad534e2499e8e48c86f852c39c8415">ccapi_version_5</a> = 5, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc462c2766a9fe8fa84d8fccea65b8ab3">ccapi_version_6</a> = 6, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b9c325640a04bb548b92d49df89381bc8">ccapi_version_7</a> = 7, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc33d8c3e3c172be1515cc0d2df8e3d71">ccapi_version_max</a> = ccapi_version_7 +<br> + } +<li>enum { <br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a> = 0, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b748d5a55ed773e002ccc271beb4512c0a">ccIteratorEnd</a> = 201, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b775735bfd0c621b1c5c2a0067f60cfa9d">ccErrBadParam</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b74f31ee78c32ed1bea75d364ccbf1e690">ccErrNoMem</a>, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d9bf97d9c57a6a14ac5b6a7a06e008f7">ccErrInvalidContext</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b708791e8ed735ecc02c1e6b222f913c71">ccErrInvalidCCache</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b742b40a71ad0c84171c8d982f6cfdeec9">ccErrInvalidString</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b78705dd3f7b52ce8e23e9a25f552b4a84">ccErrInvalidCredentials</a>, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7fbc118bc7860198fc6a0b8e4a161363a">ccErrInvalidCCacheIterator</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b751c0c94d8b4dfb834b27fa7090f7b4f2">ccErrInvalidCredentialsIterator</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73e2425cf044691597d10bbc14b3c90ba">ccErrInvalidLock</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7b508b53d9628aa7e0fca3253d619e78e">ccErrBadName</a>, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d2f35f60002115819c8c443e67191ea4">ccErrBadCredentialsVersion</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b759ae48c63ae4aaaa3cd7bc5504847660">ccErrBadAPIVersion</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b78df04862b2e05986499f0d93268fa7b8">ccErrContextLocked</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b71606d0e0540ead205a400306e5933c04">ccErrContextUnlocked</a>, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a453f3f6d7e578f47efbb1734cb46002">ccErrCCacheLocked</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d3ebfa156acf72a3a86f14760d315e24">ccErrCCacheUnlocked</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7b0fa85b2c59d51c3ec205e40191e7619">ccErrBadLockType</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7604f23ab0c8c3e1d97f8b32c4501a895">ccErrNeverDefault</a>, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b74c8c5082e236270c5dc55e998dfb9288">ccErrCredentialsNotFound</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73098feac66058e6ebd02c5e44fa20a9c">ccErrCCacheNotFound</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b793bd0c54010e2a36d2e2af1e8aaef06f">ccErrContextNotFound</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7267b21d05e1f4005392c52e439de03a4">ccErrServerUnavailable</a>, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a18e1555d7af1a60ce1978069e95fe6f">ccErrServerInsecure</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7fd9fdcb22b761cb3e53e1d6d6b545884">ccErrServerCantBecomeUID</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d6825aa88394eb52df80bef870d986db">ccErrTimeOffsetNotSet</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b75f8cef73e4ac4c8894c4318ef921350e">ccErrBadInternalMessage</a>, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a35748a788a849ff09dd453ac66f8314">ccErrNotImplemented</a>, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b79cab6af44e2358aa12f176a60e245d67">ccErrClientNotFound</a> +<br> + } +<li>enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c">cc_credential_versions</a> { <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c017c26531bad42f92f7f3e1f697b58fa">cc_credentials_v4</a> = 1, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c98335a31ad81a10632568375dcc10668">cc_credentials_v5</a> = 2, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35ca49ae6c35599f5860241601dcb0c9e0d">cc_credentials_v4_v5</a> = 3 + } +<li>enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#g2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611">cc_lock_types</a> { <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc6110a9a6083623e4c7c8340c0146f032154">cc_lock_read</a> = 0, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611bc97eae3b375c4cee90087597b7f375d">cc_lock_write</a> = 1, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc61184bf8feb65a88dc09aa52c6d955111a3">cc_lock_upgrade</a> = 2, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611426c331fb09e249b6944d8ba28893eba">cc_lock_downgrade</a> = 3 + } +<li>enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#g0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e948">cc_lock_modes</a> { <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e9485fe1eddb0bba9df16dbcc63aeeb79aa3">cc_lock_noblock</a> = 0, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e94827e385feb864d167880744d0874834d8">cc_lock_block</a> = 1 + } +<li>enum { <br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5ae3147869a486588adf6bc588ee8cc30">cc_v4_name_size</a> = 40, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b55abe44162300eabb9a9f65b324cad493">cc_v4_instance_size</a> = 40, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5714d28ea3d6c6807817d7b377afc22f8">cc_v4_realm_size</a> = 40, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5b52bd33d187632efd597f282540b081a">cc_v4_ticket_size</a> = 1254, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b57532f28276c3a759e487560ee4666a29">cc_v4_key_size</a> = 8 +<br> + } +<li>enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3">cc_string_to_key_type</a> { <br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3c0beda03d5c9e36ce9a199c98573d39a">cc_v4_stk_afs</a> = 0, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c31b71e069604cd1cebc2b694ef04aedd1">cc_v4_stk_des</a> = 1, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3db66296923c38aa2d7c7420da28d7014">cc_v4_stk_columbia_special</a> = 2, +<a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3816b6bb45f51557bc3de5e13d38dc310">cc_v4_stk_krb5</a> = 3, +<br> + <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3e19e1a52a4289172671e91d87ab027bb">cc_v4_stk_unknown</a> = 4 +<br> + } +</ul> +<hr><h2>Enumeration Type Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="g06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::@0" ref="g06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">anonymous enum </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +API version numbers<p> +These constants are passed into <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82">cc_initialize()</a> to indicate the version of the API the caller wants to use.<p> +CCAPI v1 and v2 are deprecated and should not be used. <dl compact><dt><b>Enumerator: </b></dt><dd> +<table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bafee271af4e43ec6c9bb2e3e849cc1f9"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccapi_version_2" ref="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bafee271af4e43ec6c9bb2e3e849cc1f9" args="" -->ccapi_version_2</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b26f201de4113dda3b4ec78dcda95d5a1"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccapi_version_3" ref="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b26f201de4113dda3b4ec78dcda95d5a1" args="" -->ccapi_version_3</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b833d16677b6eb5531fb1285b216c8f3b"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccapi_version_4" ref="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b833d16677b6eb5531fb1285b216c8f3b" args="" -->ccapi_version_4</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc3ad534e2499e8e48c86f852c39c8415"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccapi_version_5" ref="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc3ad534e2499e8e48c86f852c39c8415" args="" -->ccapi_version_5</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc462c2766a9fe8fa84d8fccea65b8ab3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccapi_version_6" ref="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc462c2766a9fe8fa84d8fccea65b8ab3" args="" -->ccapi_version_6</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b9c325640a04bb548b92d49df89381bc8"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccapi_version_7" ref="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b9c325640a04bb548b92d49df89381bc8" args="" -->ccapi_version_7</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc33d8c3e3c172be1515cc0d2df8e3d71"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccapi_version_max" ref="gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55bc33d8c3e3c172be1515cc0d2df8e3d71" args="" -->ccapi_version_max</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +</table> +</dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::@1" ref="gdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">anonymous enum </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Error codes <dl compact><dt><b>Enumerator: </b></dt><dd> +<table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccNoError" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26" args="" -->ccNoError</em> </td><td> +Success. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b748d5a55ed773e002ccc271beb4512c0a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccIteratorEnd" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b748d5a55ed773e002ccc271beb4512c0a" args="" -->ccIteratorEnd</em> </td><td> +Iterator is done iterating. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b775735bfd0c621b1c5c2a0067f60cfa9d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrBadParam" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b775735bfd0c621b1c5c2a0067f60cfa9d" args="" -->ccErrBadParam</em> </td><td> +Bad parameter (NULL or invalid pointer where valid pointer expected). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b74f31ee78c32ed1bea75d364ccbf1e690"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrNoMem" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b74f31ee78c32ed1bea75d364ccbf1e690" args="" -->ccErrNoMem</em> </td><td> +Not enough memory to complete the operation. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d9bf97d9c57a6a14ac5b6a7a06e008f7"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrInvalidContext" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d9bf97d9c57a6a14ac5b6a7a06e008f7" args="" -->ccErrInvalidContext</em> </td><td> +Context is invalid (e.g., it was released). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b708791e8ed735ecc02c1e6b222f913c71"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrInvalidCCache" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b708791e8ed735ecc02c1e6b222f913c71" args="" -->ccErrInvalidCCache</em> </td><td> +CCache is invalid (e.g., it was released or destroyed). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b742b40a71ad0c84171c8d982f6cfdeec9"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrInvalidString" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b742b40a71ad0c84171c8d982f6cfdeec9" args="" -->ccErrInvalidString</em> </td><td> +String is invalid (e.g., it was released). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b78705dd3f7b52ce8e23e9a25f552b4a84"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrInvalidCredentials" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b78705dd3f7b52ce8e23e9a25f552b4a84" args="" -->ccErrInvalidCredentials</em> </td><td> +Credentials are invalid (e.g., they were released), or they have a bad version. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7fbc118bc7860198fc6a0b8e4a161363a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrInvalidCCacheIterator" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7fbc118bc7860198fc6a0b8e4a161363a" args="" -->ccErrInvalidCCacheIterator</em> </td><td> +CCache iterator is invalid (e.g., it was released). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b751c0c94d8b4dfb834b27fa7090f7b4f2"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrInvalidCredentialsIterator" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b751c0c94d8b4dfb834b27fa7090f7b4f2" args="" -->ccErrInvalidCredentialsIterator</em> </td><td> +Credentials iterator is invalid (e.g., it was released). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73e2425cf044691597d10bbc14b3c90ba"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrInvalidLock" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73e2425cf044691597d10bbc14b3c90ba" args="" -->ccErrInvalidLock</em> </td><td> +Lock is invalid (e.g., it was released). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7b508b53d9628aa7e0fca3253d619e78e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrBadName" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7b508b53d9628aa7e0fca3253d619e78e" args="" -->ccErrBadName</em> </td><td> +Bad credential cache name format. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d2f35f60002115819c8c443e67191ea4"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrBadCredentialsVersion" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d2f35f60002115819c8c443e67191ea4" args="" -->ccErrBadCredentialsVersion</em> </td><td> +Credentials version is invalid. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b759ae48c63ae4aaaa3cd7bc5504847660"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrBadAPIVersion" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b759ae48c63ae4aaaa3cd7bc5504847660" args="" -->ccErrBadAPIVersion</em> </td><td> +Unsupported API version. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b78df04862b2e05986499f0d93268fa7b8"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrContextLocked" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b78df04862b2e05986499f0d93268fa7b8" args="" -->ccErrContextLocked</em> </td><td> +Context is already locked. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b71606d0e0540ead205a400306e5933c04"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrContextUnlocked" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b71606d0e0540ead205a400306e5933c04" args="" -->ccErrContextUnlocked</em> </td><td> +Context is not locked by the caller. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a453f3f6d7e578f47efbb1734cb46002"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrCCacheLocked" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a453f3f6d7e578f47efbb1734cb46002" args="" -->ccErrCCacheLocked</em> </td><td> +CCache is already locked. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d3ebfa156acf72a3a86f14760d315e24"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrCCacheUnlocked" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d3ebfa156acf72a3a86f14760d315e24" args="" -->ccErrCCacheUnlocked</em> </td><td> +CCache is not locked by the caller. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7b0fa85b2c59d51c3ec205e40191e7619"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrBadLockType" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7b0fa85b2c59d51c3ec205e40191e7619" args="" -->ccErrBadLockType</em> </td><td> +Bad lock type. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7604f23ab0c8c3e1d97f8b32c4501a895"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrNeverDefault" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7604f23ab0c8c3e1d97f8b32c4501a895" args="" -->ccErrNeverDefault</em> </td><td> +CCache was never default. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b74c8c5082e236270c5dc55e998dfb9288"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrCredentialsNotFound" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b74c8c5082e236270c5dc55e998dfb9288" args="" -->ccErrCredentialsNotFound</em> </td><td> +Matching credentials not found in the ccache. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73098feac66058e6ebd02c5e44fa20a9c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrCCacheNotFound" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73098feac66058e6ebd02c5e44fa20a9c" args="" -->ccErrCCacheNotFound</em> </td><td> +Matching ccache not found in the collection. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b793bd0c54010e2a36d2e2af1e8aaef06f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrContextNotFound" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b793bd0c54010e2a36d2e2af1e8aaef06f" args="" -->ccErrContextNotFound</em> </td><td> +Matching cache collection not found. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7267b21d05e1f4005392c52e439de03a4"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrServerUnavailable" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7267b21d05e1f4005392c52e439de03a4" args="" -->ccErrServerUnavailable</em> </td><td> +CCacheServer is unavailable. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a18e1555d7af1a60ce1978069e95fe6f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrServerInsecure" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a18e1555d7af1a60ce1978069e95fe6f" args="" -->ccErrServerInsecure</em> </td><td> +CCacheServer has detected that it is running as the wrong user. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7fd9fdcb22b761cb3e53e1d6d6b545884"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrServerCantBecomeUID" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7fd9fdcb22b761cb3e53e1d6d6b545884" args="" -->ccErrServerCantBecomeUID</em> </td><td> +CCacheServer failed to start running as the user. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d6825aa88394eb52df80bef870d986db"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrTimeOffsetNotSet" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d6825aa88394eb52df80bef870d986db" args="" -->ccErrTimeOffsetNotSet</em> </td><td> +KDC time offset not set for this ccache. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b75f8cef73e4ac4c8894c4318ef921350e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrBadInternalMessage" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b75f8cef73e4ac4c8894c4318ef921350e" args="" -->ccErrBadInternalMessage</em> </td><td> +The client and CCacheServer can't communicate (e.g., a version mismatch). </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a35748a788a849ff09dd453ac66f8314"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrNotImplemented" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7a35748a788a849ff09dd453ac66f8314" args="" -->ccErrNotImplemented</em> </td><td> +API function not supported by this implementation. </td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b79cab6af44e2358aa12f176a60e245d67"></a><!-- doxytag: member="ccErrClientNotFound" ref="ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b79cab6af44e2358aa12f176a60e245d67" args="" -->ccErrClientNotFound</em> </td><td> +CCacheServer has no record of the caller's process (e.g., the server crashed). </td></tr> +</table> +</dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credential_versions" ref="gae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c">cc_credential_versions</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Credentials versions<p> +These constants are used in several places in the API to discern between Kerberos v4 and Kerberos v5. Not all values are valid inputs and outputs for all functions; function specifications below detail the allowed values.<p> +Kerberos version constants will always be a bit-field, and can be tested as such; for example the following test will tell you if a ccacheVersion includes v5 credentials:<p> +if ((ccacheVersion & cc_credentials_v5) != 0) <dl compact><dt><b>Enumerator: </b></dt><dd> +<table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c017c26531bad42f92f7f3e1f697b58fa"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4" ref="ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c017c26531bad42f92f7f3e1f697b58fa" args="" -->cc_credentials_v4</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c98335a31ad81a10632568375dcc10668"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5" ref="ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c98335a31ad81a10632568375dcc10668" args="" -->cc_credentials_v5</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35ca49ae6c35599f5860241601dcb0c9e0d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_v5" ref="ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35ca49ae6c35599f5860241601dcb0c9e0d" args="" -->cc_credentials_v4_v5</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +</table> +</dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_lock_types" ref="g2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#g2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611">cc_lock_types</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Lock types<p> +These constants are used in the locking functions to describe the type of lock requested. Note that all CCAPI locks are advisory so only callers using the lock calls will be blocked by each other. This is because locking functions were introduced after the CCAPI came into common use and we did not want to break existing callers. <dl compact><dt><b>Enumerator: </b></dt><dd> +<table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc6110a9a6083623e4c7c8340c0146f032154"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_lock_read" ref="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc6110a9a6083623e4c7c8340c0146f032154" args="" -->cc_lock_read</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611bc97eae3b375c4cee90087597b7f375d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_lock_write" ref="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611bc97eae3b375c4cee90087597b7f375d" args="" -->cc_lock_write</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc61184bf8feb65a88dc09aa52c6d955111a3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_lock_upgrade" ref="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc61184bf8feb65a88dc09aa52c6d955111a3" args="" -->cc_lock_upgrade</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611426c331fb09e249b6944d8ba28893eba"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_lock_downgrade" ref="gg2081cbacd4ec3d5a64c8729fd78fc611426c331fb09e249b6944d8ba28893eba" args="" -->cc_lock_downgrade</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +</table> +</dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e948"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_lock_modes" ref="g0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e948" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#g0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e948">cc_lock_modes</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Locking Modes<p> +These constants are used in the advisory locking functions to describe whether or not the lock function should block waiting for a lock or return an error immediately. For example, attempting to acquire a lock with a non-blocking call will result in an error if the lock cannot be acquired; otherwise, the call will block until the lock can be acquired. <dl compact><dt><b>Enumerator: </b></dt><dd> +<table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e9485fe1eddb0bba9df16dbcc63aeeb79aa3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_lock_noblock" ref="gg0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e9485fe1eddb0bba9df16dbcc63aeeb79aa3" args="" -->cc_lock_noblock</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e94827e385feb864d167880744d0874834d8"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_lock_block" ref="gg0eff5be22e263d0bd9e4bb6fb0a8e94827e385feb864d167880744d0874834d8" args="" -->cc_lock_block</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +</table> +</dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::@2" ref="g99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">anonymous enum </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Sizes of fields in <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a>. <dl compact><dt><b>Enumerator: </b></dt><dd> +<table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5ae3147869a486588adf6bc588ee8cc30"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_name_size" ref="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5ae3147869a486588adf6bc588ee8cc30" args="" -->cc_v4_name_size</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b55abe44162300eabb9a9f65b324cad493"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_instance_size" ref="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b55abe44162300eabb9a9f65b324cad493" args="" -->cc_v4_instance_size</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5714d28ea3d6c6807817d7b377afc22f8"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_realm_size" ref="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5714d28ea3d6c6807817d7b377afc22f8" args="" -->cc_v4_realm_size</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5b52bd33d187632efd597f282540b081a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_ticket_size" ref="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b5b52bd33d187632efd597f282540b081a" args="" -->cc_v4_ticket_size</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b57532f28276c3a759e487560ee4666a29"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_key_size" ref="gg99fb83031ce9923c84392b4e92f956b57532f28276c3a759e487560ee4666a29" args="" -->cc_v4_key_size</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +</table> +</dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_string_to_key_type" ref="ge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">enum <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3">cc_string_to_key_type</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +String to key type (Kerberos v4 only) <dl compact><dt><b>Enumerator: </b></dt><dd> +<table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3c0beda03d5c9e36ce9a199c98573d39a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_stk_afs" ref="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3c0beda03d5c9e36ce9a199c98573d39a" args="" -->cc_v4_stk_afs</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c31b71e069604cd1cebc2b694ef04aedd1"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_stk_des" ref="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c31b71e069604cd1cebc2b694ef04aedd1" args="" -->cc_v4_stk_des</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3db66296923c38aa2d7c7420da28d7014"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_stk_columbia_special" ref="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3db66296923c38aa2d7c7420da28d7014" args="" -->cc_v4_stk_columbia_special</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3816b6bb45f51557bc3de5e13d38dc310"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_stk_krb5" ref="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3816b6bb45f51557bc3de5e13d38dc310" args="" -->cc_v4_stk_krb5</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +<tr><td valign="top"><em><a class="anchor" name="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3e19e1a52a4289172671e91d87ab027bb"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_v4_stk_unknown" ref="gge78c8fbb79f8ff963ec7c88c431721c3e19e1a52a4289172671e91d87ab027bb" args="" -->cc_v4_stk_unknown</em> </td><td> +</td></tr> +</table> +</dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__ccapi__types__reference.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__ccapi__types__reference.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9c646b8d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__ccapi__types__reference.html @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : Basic Types</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>Basic Types</h1> +<p> +<h2>Typedefs</h2> +<ul> +<li>typedef uint32_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> +<li>typedef int32_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> +<li>typedef int64_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#gb6fb75be8c6af177e86f1b3bc562f031">cc_int64</a> +<li>typedef uint64_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g44f60a4b4db805be9d55b476dd949a66">cc_uint64</a> +<li>typedef <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Typedef Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_uint32" ref="ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef uint32_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Unsigned 32-bit integer type </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_int32" ref="g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef int32_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Signed 32-bit integer type </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gb6fb75be8c6af177e86f1b3bc562f031"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_int64" ref="gb6fb75be8c6af177e86f1b3bc562f031" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef int64_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#gb6fb75be8c6af177e86f1b3bc562f031">cc_int64</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Unsigned 64-bit integer type </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g44f60a4b4db805be9d55b476dd949a66"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_uint64" ref="g44f60a4b4db805be9d55b476dd949a66" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef uint64_t <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g44f60a4b4db805be9d55b476dd949a66">cc_uint64</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Signed 64-bit integer type </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_time_t" ref="ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">typedef <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The cc_time_t type is used to represent a time in seconds. The time must be stored as the number of seconds since midnight GMT on January 1, 1970. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__helper__macros.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__helper__macros.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cf1c681dc --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/group__helper__macros.html @@ -0,0 +1,1377 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : CCAPI Function Helper Macros</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>CCAPI Function Helper Macros</h1> +<p> +<h2>Defines</h2> +<ul> +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g8ff82ce108889d4ed29f46ffe6efc40e">cc_context_release</a>(context) ((context) -> functions -> release (context)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907">cc_context_get_change_time</a>(context, change_time) ((context) -> functions -> get_change_time (context, change_time)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51">cc_context_get_default_ccache_name</a>(context, name) ((context) -> functions -> get_default_ccache_name (context, name)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g256a5ba17fe0e4502e0722d9b081bbef">cc_context_open_ccache</a>(context, name, ccache) ((context) -> functions -> open_ccache (context, name, ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g45a7ce29eb409baabadcae1bc95d5c57">cc_context_open_default_ccache</a>(context, ccache) ((context) -> functions -> open_default_ccache (context, ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf">cc_context_create_ccache</a>(context, name, version, principal, ccache) ((context) -> functions -> create_ccache (context, name, version, principal, ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72">cc_context_create_default_ccache</a>(context, version, principal, ccache) ((context) -> functions -> create_default_ccache (context, version, principal, ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09">cc_context_create_new_ccache</a>(context, version, principal, ccache) ((context) -> functions -> create_new_ccache (context, version, principal, ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g6957bc9570e4769a5b1213d2a1d90cd7">cc_context_new_ccache_iterator</a>(context, iterator) ((context) -> functions -> new_ccache_iterator (context, iterator)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcf4595340ddc8dafa539a86ac317625d">cc_context_lock</a>(context, type, block) ((context) -> functions -> lock (context, type, block)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g544261b88c9ac0f2379a35648cae3f27">cc_context_unlock</a>(context) ((context) -> functions -> unlock (context)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9258ef05d06f3d4dc798ec654f78b967">cc_context_compare</a>(context, compare_to, equal) ((context) -> functions -> compare (context, compare_to, equal)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a">cc_context_wait_for_change</a>(context) ((context) -> functions -> wait_for_change (context)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge517135d87d8775d77b426d57a491ef0">cc_ccache_release</a>(ccache) ((ccache) -> functions -> release (ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge05b68d91bece2f99b531e96cde8d457">cc_ccache_destroy</a>(ccache) ((ccache) -> functions -> destroy (ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g535b92993b85d92b67fa622447afbe13">cc_ccache_set_default</a>(ccache) ((ccache) -> functions -> set_default (ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g934f93499765bdd179bb2342ae0f0fa6">cc_ccache_get_credentials_version</a>(ccache, version) ((ccache) -> functions -> get_credentials_version (ccache, version)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g042bea6044879ec03996b190792e3ae9">cc_ccache_get_name</a>(ccache, name) ((ccache) -> functions -> get_name (ccache, name)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g464aa49a2e8054c9c3c2a3410eaf5c54">cc_ccache_get_principal</a>(ccache, version, principal) ((ccache) -> functions -> get_principal (ccache, version, principal)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2">cc_ccache_set_principal</a>(ccache, version, principal) ((ccache) -> functions -> set_principal (ccache, version, principal)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g35c1548dbacb8907da7b8c3124eabf39">cc_ccache_store_credentials</a>(ccache, credentials) ((ccache) -> functions -> store_credentials (ccache, credentials)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ga1bbc05414ad4c17cea9cd5e5c50c7cc">cc_ccache_remove_credentials</a>(ccache, credentials) ((ccache) -> functions -> remove_credentials (ccache, credentials)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g893b31c419e71c2f528781d3036fa3ff">cc_ccache_new_credentials_iterator</a>(ccache, iterator) ((ccache) -> functions -> new_credentials_iterator (ccache, iterator)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb8c2624719ee1c4be5f1b1bc4844f0cc">cc_ccache_lock</a>(ccache, type, block) ((ccache) -> functions -> lock (ccache, type, block)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9b13c950cb6ee636c4a73d6c569a811">cc_ccache_unlock</a>(ccache) ((ccache) -> functions -> unlock (ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g884b0c60718fa1057574a3cd844e96ee">cc_ccache_get_last_default_time</a>(ccache, last_default_time) ((ccache) -> functions -> get_last_default_time (ccache, last_default_time)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time</a>(ccache, change_time) ((ccache) -> functions -> get_change_time (ccache, change_time)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38">cc_ccache_move</a>(source, destination) ((source) -> functions -> move (source, destination)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g197ff60fac986634fbef8ca102ec54a5">cc_ccache_compare</a>(ccache, compare_to, equal) ((ccache) -> functions -> compare (ccache, compare_to, equal)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1fa36a89752da4a491d2ecdad17f8b0e">cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset</a>(ccache, version, time_offset) ((ccache) -> functions -> get_kdc_time_offset (ccache, version, time_offset)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g519bf0ab152e5a3d2beee8a76a27d16e">cc_ccache_set_kdc_time_offset</a>(ccache, version, time_offset) ((ccache) -> functions -> set_kdc_time_offset (ccache, version, time_offset)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g803c35f92992dc0b73e8809d13ebabab">cc_ccache_clear_kdc_time_offset</a>(ccache, version) ((ccache) -> functions -> clear_kdc_time_offset (ccache, version)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199">cc_ccache_wait_for_change</a>(ccache) ((ccache) -> functions -> wait_for_change (ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9bebfed2d574e69f29dd341bc8a63d9">cc_string_release</a>(string) ((string) -> functions -> release (string)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gab5cad8ca82847950956b0f493132c14">cc_credentials_release</a>(credentials) ((credentials) -> functions -> release (credentials)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g39ae30e49dba65b87c6b9794f20fb784">cc_credentials_compare</a>(credentials, compare_to, equal) ((credentials) -> functions -> compare (credentials, compare_to, equal)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g34f37496fb8bc414aafb0b265afecb1b">cc_ccache_iterator_release</a>(iterator) ((iterator) -> functions -> release (iterator)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcff0b3e247a2adc95442324fec6c5651">cc_ccache_iterator_next</a>(iterator, ccache) ((iterator) -> functions -> next (iterator, ccache)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g904d7757fd7ac40f4ee9b448a389f2dd">cc_ccache_iterator_clone</a>(iterator, new_iterator) ((iterator) -> functions -> clone (iterator, new_iterator)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g79f914583e8076ac24c0d5dde4ddb712">cc_credentials_iterator_release</a>(iterator) ((iterator) -> functions -> release (iterator)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4">cc_credentials_iterator_next</a>(iterator, credentials) ((iterator) -> functions -> next (iterator, credentials)) +<li>#define <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g59a9f96a6c00b64c0ab971f7e9b5aae2">cc_credentials_iterator_clone</a>(iterator, new_iterator) ((iterator) -> functions -> clone (iterator, new_iterator)) +</ul> +<hr><h2>Define Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="g8ff82ce108889d4ed29f46ffe6efc40e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_release" ref="g8ff82ce108889d4ed29f46ffe6efc40e" args="(context)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_release </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> release (context))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> release() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_get_change_time" ref="g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907" args="(context, change_time)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_get_change_time </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>change_time </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> get_change_time (context, change_time))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> get_change_time() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_get_default_ccache_name" ref="gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51" args="(context, name)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_get_default_ccache_name </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>name </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> get_default_ccache_name (context, name))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> get_default_ccache_name() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g256a5ba17fe0e4502e0722d9b081bbef"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_open_ccache" ref="g256a5ba17fe0e4502e0722d9b081bbef" args="(context, name, ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_open_ccache </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>name, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> open_ccache (context, name, ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> open_ccache() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g45a7ce29eb409baabadcae1bc95d5c57"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_open_default_ccache" ref="g45a7ce29eb409baabadcae1bc95d5c57" args="(context, ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_open_default_ccache </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> open_default_ccache (context, ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> open_default_ccache() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_create_ccache" ref="g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf" args="(context, name, version, principal, ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_create_ccache </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>name, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>principal, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> create_ccache (context, name, version, principal, ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> create_ccache() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_create_default_ccache" ref="g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72" args="(context, version, principal, ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_create_default_ccache </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>principal, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> create_default_ccache (context, version, principal, ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> create_default_ccache() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_create_new_ccache" ref="g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09" args="(context, version, principal, ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_create_new_ccache </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>principal, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> create_new_ccache (context, version, principal, ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> create_new_ccache() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g6957bc9570e4769a5b1213d2a1d90cd7"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_new_ccache_iterator" ref="g6957bc9570e4769a5b1213d2a1d90cd7" args="(context, iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_new_ccache_iterator </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>iterator </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> new_ccache_iterator (context, iterator))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> new_ccache_iterator() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gcf4595340ddc8dafa539a86ac317625d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_lock" ref="gcf4595340ddc8dafa539a86ac317625d" args="(context, type, block)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_lock </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>type, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>block </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> lock (context, type, block))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> lock() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g544261b88c9ac0f2379a35648cae3f27"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_unlock" ref="g544261b88c9ac0f2379a35648cae3f27" args="(context)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_unlock </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> unlock (context))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> unlock() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g9258ef05d06f3d4dc798ec654f78b967"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_compare" ref="g9258ef05d06f3d4dc798ec654f78b967" args="(context, compare_to, equal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_compare </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>compare_to, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>equal </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> compare (context, compare_to, equal))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> compare() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_context_wait_for_change" ref="g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a" args="(context)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_context_wait_for_change </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">context </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((context) -> functions -> wait_for_change (context))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> wait_for_change() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge517135d87d8775d77b426d57a491ef0"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_release" ref="ge517135d87d8775d77b426d57a491ef0" args="(ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_release </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> release (ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> release() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge05b68d91bece2f99b531e96cde8d457"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_destroy" ref="ge05b68d91bece2f99b531e96cde8d457" args="(ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_destroy </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> destroy (ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> destroy() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g535b92993b85d92b67fa622447afbe13"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_set_default" ref="g535b92993b85d92b67fa622447afbe13" args="(ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_set_default </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> set_default (ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> set_default() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g934f93499765bdd179bb2342ae0f0fa6"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_get_credentials_version" ref="g934f93499765bdd179bb2342ae0f0fa6" args="(ccache, version)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_get_credentials_version </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> get_credentials_version (ccache, version))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> get_credentials_version() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g042bea6044879ec03996b190792e3ae9"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_get_name" ref="g042bea6044879ec03996b190792e3ae9" args="(ccache, name)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_get_name </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>name </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> get_name (ccache, name))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> get_name() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g464aa49a2e8054c9c3c2a3410eaf5c54"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_get_principal" ref="g464aa49a2e8054c9c3c2a3410eaf5c54" args="(ccache, version, principal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_get_principal </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>principal </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> get_principal (ccache, version, principal))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> get_principal() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_set_principal" ref="gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2" args="(ccache, version, principal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_set_principal </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>principal </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> set_principal (ccache, version, principal))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> set_principal() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g35c1548dbacb8907da7b8c3124eabf39"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_store_credentials" ref="g35c1548dbacb8907da7b8c3124eabf39" args="(ccache, credentials)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_store_credentials </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>credentials </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> store_credentials (ccache, credentials))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> store_credentials() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ga1bbc05414ad4c17cea9cd5e5c50c7cc"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_remove_credentials" ref="ga1bbc05414ad4c17cea9cd5e5c50c7cc" args="(ccache, credentials)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_remove_credentials </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>credentials </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> remove_credentials (ccache, credentials))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> remove_credentials() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g893b31c419e71c2f528781d3036fa3ff"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_new_credentials_iterator" ref="g893b31c419e71c2f528781d3036fa3ff" args="(ccache, iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_new_credentials_iterator </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>iterator </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> new_credentials_iterator (ccache, iterator))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> new_credentials_iterator() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gb8c2624719ee1c4be5f1b1bc4844f0cc"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_lock" ref="gb8c2624719ee1c4be5f1b1bc4844f0cc" args="(ccache, type, block)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_lock </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>type, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>block </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> lock (ccache, type, block))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> lock() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge9b13c950cb6ee636c4a73d6c569a811"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_unlock" ref="ge9b13c950cb6ee636c4a73d6c569a811" args="(ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_unlock </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> unlock (ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> unlock() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g884b0c60718fa1057574a3cd844e96ee"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_get_last_default_time" ref="g884b0c60718fa1057574a3cd844e96ee" args="(ccache, last_default_time)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_get_last_default_time </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>last_default_time </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> get_last_default_time (ccache, last_default_time))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> get_last_default_time() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_get_change_time" ref="gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6" args="(ccache, change_time)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_get_change_time </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>change_time </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> get_change_time (ccache, change_time))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> get_change_time() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_move" ref="ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38" args="(source, destination)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_move </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">source, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>destination </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((source) -> functions -> move (source, destination))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> move() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g197ff60fac986634fbef8ca102ec54a5"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_compare" ref="g197ff60fac986634fbef8ca102ec54a5" args="(ccache, compare_to, equal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_compare </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>compare_to, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>equal </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> compare (ccache, compare_to, equal))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> compare() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g1fa36a89752da4a491d2ecdad17f8b0e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset" ref="g1fa36a89752da4a491d2ecdad17f8b0e" args="(ccache, version, time_offset)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>time_offset </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> get_kdc_time_offset (ccache, version, time_offset))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> get_kdc_time_offset() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g519bf0ab152e5a3d2beee8a76a27d16e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_set_kdc_time_offset" ref="g519bf0ab152e5a3d2beee8a76a27d16e" args="(ccache, version, time_offset)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_set_kdc_time_offset </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>time_offset </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> set_kdc_time_offset (ccache, version, time_offset))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> set_kdc_time_offset() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g803c35f92992dc0b73e8809d13ebabab"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_clear_kdc_time_offset" ref="g803c35f92992dc0b73e8809d13ebabab" args="(ccache, version)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_clear_kdc_time_offset </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>version </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> clear_kdc_time_offset (ccache, version))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> clear_kdc_time_offset() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_wait_for_change" ref="gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199" args="(ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_wait_for_change </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((ccache) -> functions -> wait_for_change (ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> wait_for_change() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ge9bebfed2d574e69f29dd341bc8a63d9"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_string_release" ref="ge9bebfed2d574e69f29dd341bc8a63d9" args="(string)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_string_release </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">string </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((string) -> functions -> release (string))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_f</a> release() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gab5cad8ca82847950956b0f493132c14"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_release" ref="gab5cad8ca82847950956b0f493132c14" args="(credentials)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_credentials_release </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">credentials </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((credentials) -> functions -> release (credentials))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a> release() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g39ae30e49dba65b87c6b9794f20fb784"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_compare" ref="g39ae30e49dba65b87c6b9794f20fb784" args="(credentials, compare_to, equal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_credentials_compare </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">credentials, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>compare_to, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>equal </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((credentials) -> functions -> compare (credentials, compare_to, equal))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a> compare() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g34f37496fb8bc414aafb0b265afecb1b"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_iterator_release" ref="g34f37496fb8bc414aafb0b265afecb1b" args="(iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_iterator_release </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">iterator </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((iterator) -> functions -> release (iterator))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> release() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="gcff0b3e247a2adc95442324fec6c5651"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_iterator_next" ref="gcff0b3e247a2adc95442324fec6c5651" args="(iterator, ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_iterator_next </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">iterator, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>ccache </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((iterator) -> functions -> next (iterator, ccache))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> next() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g904d7757fd7ac40f4ee9b448a389f2dd"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_ccache_iterator_clone" ref="g904d7757fd7ac40f4ee9b448a389f2dd" args="(iterator, new_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_ccache_iterator_clone </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">iterator, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>new_iterator </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((iterator) -> functions -> clone (iterator, new_iterator))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> clone() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g79f914583e8076ac24c0d5dde4ddb712"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_iterator_release" ref="g79f914583e8076ac24c0d5dde4ddb712" args="(iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_credentials_iterator_release </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">iterator </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((iterator) -> functions -> release (iterator))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> release() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_iterator_next" ref="g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4" args="(iterator, credentials)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_credentials_iterator_next </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">iterator, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>credentials </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((iterator) -> functions -> next (iterator, credentials))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> next() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="g59a9f96a6c00b64c0ab971f7e9b5aae2"></a><!-- doxytag: member="CredentialsCache.h::cc_credentials_iterator_clone" ref="g59a9f96a6c00b64c0ab971f7e9b5aae2" args="(iterator, new_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">#define cc_credentials_iterator_clone </td> + <td class="md" valign="top">( </td> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">iterator, <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap align="right"></td> + <td class="md"></td> + <td class="md" nowrap>new_iterator </td> + <td class="mdname1" valign="top" nowrap> </td> + <td class="md" valign="top"> ) </td> + <td class="md" nowrap> ((iterator) -> functions -> clone (iterator, new_iterator))</td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Helper macro for <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> clone() </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/index.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/index.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bf920052f --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/index.html @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : Credentials Cache API (CCAPI) Documentation</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>Credentials Cache API (CCAPI) Documentation</h1> +<p> +<h2><a class="anchor" name="toc"> +Table of Contents</a></h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="index.html#introduction">Introduction</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="index.html#error_handling">Error Handling</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="index.html#synchronization_atomicity">Synchronization and Atomicity</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="index.html#memory_management">Object Memory Management</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="index.html#opaque_types">Opaque Types</a></li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html">Constants</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html">Basic Types</a></li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html">cc_context_t Overview</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_t Functions</a></li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__reference.html">cc_ccache_t Overview</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_t Functions</a></li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html">cc_credentials_t Overview</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_t Functions</a></li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t Overview</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t Functions</a></li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t Functions</a></li> +</ul> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__cc__string__reference.html">cc_string_t Overview</a> </li> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_t Functions</a></li> +</ul> +<h2><a class="anchor" name="introduction"> +Introduction</a></h2> +This is the specification for an API which provides Credentials Cache services for both Kerberos v5 and v4. The idea behind this API is that multiple Kerberos implementations can share a single collection of credentials caches, mediated by this API specification. On the Mac OS and Microsoft Windows platforms this will allow single-login, even when more than one Kerberos shared library is in use on a particular system.<p> +Abstractly, a credentials cache collection contains one or more credentials caches, or ccaches. A ccache is uniquely identified by its name, which is a string internal to the API and not intended to be presented to users. The user presentable identifier of a ccache is its principal.<p> +Unlike the previous versions of the API, version 3 of the API stores both Kerberos v4 and v5 credentials in the same ccache.<p> +At any given time, one ccache is the "default" ccache. The exact meaning of a default ccache is OS-specific; refer to implementation requirements for details.<h2><a class="anchor" name="error_handling"> +Error Handling</a></h2> +All functions of the API return some of the error constants listed FIXME; the exact list of error constants returned by any API function is provided in the function descriptions below.<p> +When returning an error constant other than ccNoError or ccIteratorEnd, API functions never modify any of the values passed in by reference.<h2><a class="anchor" name="synchronization_atomicity"> +Synchronization and Atomicity</a></h2> +Every function in the API is atomic. In order to make a series of calls atomic, callers should lock the ccache or cache collection they are working with to advise other callers not to modify that container. Note that advisory locks are per container so even if you have a read lock on the cache collection other callers can obtain write locks on ccaches in that cache collection.<p> +Note that iterators do not iterate over ccaches and credentials atomically because locking ccaches and the cache collection over every iteration would degrade performance considerably under high load. However, iterators do guarantee a consistent view of items they are iterating over. Iterators will never return duplicate entries or skip entries when items are removed or added to the container they are iterating over.<p> +An application can always lock a ccache or the cache collection to guarantee that other callers participating in the advisory locking system do not modify the ccache or cache collection.<p> +Implementations should not use copy-on-write techniques to implement locks because those techniques imply that same parts of the ccache collection remain visible to some callers even though they are not present in the collection, which is a potential security risk. For example, a copy-on-write technique might make a copy of the entire collection when a read lock is acquired, so as to allow the owner of the lock to access the collection in an apparently unmodified state, while also allowing others to make modifications to the collection. However, this would also enable the owner of the lock to indefinitely (until the expiration time) use credentials that have actually been deleted from the collection.<h2><a class="anchor" name="memory_management"> +Object Memory Management</a></h2> +The lifetime of an object returned by the API is until release() is called for it. Releasing one object has no effect on existence of any other object. For example, a ccache obtained within a context continue to exist when the context is released.<p> +Every object returned by the API (cc_context_t, cc_ccache_t, cc_ccache_iterator_t, cc_credentials_t, cc_credentials_iterator_t, cc_string_t) is owned by the caller of the API, and it is the responsibility of the caller to call release() for every object to prevent memory leaks.<h2><a class="anchor" name="opaque_types"> +Opaque Types</a></h2> +All of the opaque high-level types in CCache API are implemented as structures of function pointers and private data. To perform some operation on a type, the caller of the API has to first obtain an instance of that type, and then call the appropriate function pointer from that instance. For example, to call get_change_time() on a cc_context_t, one would call <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82">cc_initialize()</a> which creates a new cc_context_t and then call its get_change_time(), like this:<p> +<div class="fragment"><pre class="fragment"> <a class="code" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> context; + <a class="code" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> err = <a class="code" href="group__cc__context__reference.html#ge4174587d8bb261e32194bbb9585fb82">cc_initialize</a> (&context, <a class="code" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#gg06fc87d81c62e9abb8790b6e5713c55b26f201de4113dda3b4ec78dcda95d5a1">ccapi_version_3</a>, nil, nil); + <span class="keywordflow">if</span> (err == <a class="code" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>) + time = context-><a class="code" href="structcc__context__d.html#ac5b195bc75b92f5c1924e6a3a6aa611">functions</a>-><a class="code" href="structcc__context__f.html#51bd5a48dcd263bfb3128cc5838b4cd7">get_change_time</a> (context) +</pre></div><p> +All API functions also have convenience preprocessor macros, which make the API seem completely function-based. For example, cc_context_get_change_time (context, time) is equivalent to context->functions->get_change_time (context, time). The convenience macros follow the following naming convention:<p> +The API function some_function() <div class="fragment"><pre class="fragment"> cc_type_t an_object; + result = an_object->functions->some_function (opaque_pointer, args) +</pre></div><p> +has an equivalent convenience macro of the form cc_type_some_function(): <div class="fragment"><pre class="fragment"> cc_type_t an_object; + result = cc_type_some_function (an_object, args) +</pre></div><p> +The specifications below include the names for both the functions and the convenience macros, in that order. For clarity, it is recommended that clients using the API use the convenience macros, but that is merely a stylistic choice.<p> +Implementing the API in this manner allows us to extend and change the interface in the future, while preserving compatibility with older clients.<p> +For example, consider the case when the signature or the semantics of a cc_ccache_t function is changed. The API version number is incremented. The library implementation contains both a function with the old signature and semantics and a function with the new signature and semantics. When a context is created, the API version number used in that context is stored in the context, and therefore it can be used whenever a ccache is created in that context. When a ccache is created in a context with the old API version number, the function pointer structure for the ccache is filled with pointers to functions implementing the old semantics; when a ccache is created in a context with the new API version number, the function pointer structure for the ccache is filled with poitners to functions implementing the new semantics.<p> +Similarly, if a function is added to the API, the version number in the context can be used to decide whether to include the implementation of the new function in the appropriate function pointer structure or not. <hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:05 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__d.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__d.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c19aa2b59 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__d.html @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_ccache_d Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_ccache_d Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__reference.html">cc_ccache_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_ccache_d" --><h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li>const <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html#55d1ef4ddfa9a0e84a35791bb5da4bb3">functions</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="55d1ef4ddfa9a0e84a35791bb5da4bb3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_d::functions" ref="55d1ef4ddfa9a0e84a35791bb5da4bb3" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html">cc_ccache_f</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html#55d1ef4ddfa9a0e84a35791bb5da4bb3">functions</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:05 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__f.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__f.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ddab94ff9 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__f.html @@ -0,0 +1,722 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_ccache_f Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_ccache_f Struct Reference</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_ccache_f" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +Function pointer table for cc_ccache_t. For more information see <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__reference.html">cc_ccache_t Overview</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#ef46c1c04ceb1a0a479db84ddba7160c">release</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge517135d87d8775d77b426d57a491ef0">cc_ccache_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_ccache_t object. <a href="#ef46c1c04ceb1a0a479db84ddba7160c"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#86872ea5155e7ff57f4674a8f8c1d6c5">destroy</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge05b68d91bece2f99b531e96cde8d457">cc_ccache_destroy()</a></b>: Destroy a ccache. <a href="#86872ea5155e7ff57f4674a8f8c1d6c5"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#93c7e154d7472227b02d240a13dd53da">set_default</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g535b92993b85d92b67fa622447afbe13">cc_ccache_set_default()</a></b>: Make a ccache the default ccache. <a href="#93c7e154d7472227b02d240a13dd53da"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#934cc9927404ee42460008b49e572158">get_credentials_version</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_credentials_version) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g934f93499765bdd179bb2342ae0f0fa6">cc_ccache_get_credentials_version()</a></b>: Get the credentials version of a ccache. <a href="#934cc9927404ee42460008b49e572158"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#e60fec8fe34019df7108e8deed0f52ac">get_name</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> *out_name) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g042bea6044879ec03996b190792e3ae9">cc_ccache_get_name()</a></b>: Get the name of a ccache. <a href="#e60fec8fe34019df7108e8deed0f52ac"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#ef23df23bb71b1f01138b791bc8b6255">get_principal</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> *out_principal) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g464aa49a2e8054c9c3c2a3410eaf5c54">cc_ccache_get_principal()</a></b>: Get the principal of a ccache. <a href="#ef23df23bb71b1f01138b791bc8b6255"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#0d72ae907e8357633fe4ff2248818f42">set_principal</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, const char *in_principal) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2">cc_ccache_set_principal()</a></b>: Set the principal of a ccache. <a href="#0d72ae907e8357633fe4ff2248818f42"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#c4ac7d0cb5e15309978d8c4990f769a3">store_credentials</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> *in_credentials_union) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g35c1548dbacb8907da7b8c3124eabf39">cc_ccache_store_credentials()</a></b>: Store credentials in a ccache. <a href="#c4ac7d0cb5e15309978d8c4990f769a3"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#6cc6d19ff6044fafc3cd9f42c338341c">remove_credentials</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> in_credentials) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ga1bbc05414ad4c17cea9cd5e5c50c7cc">cc_ccache_remove_credentials()</a></b>: Remove credentials from a ccache. <a href="#6cc6d19ff6044fafc3cd9f42c338341c"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#4efc19a7cd2ac6695da44cb7f7e9be14">new_credentials_iterator</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> *out_credentials_iterator) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g893b31c419e71c2f528781d3036fa3ff">cc_ccache_new_credentials_iterator()</a></b>: Iterate over credentials in a ccache. <a href="#4efc19a7cd2ac6695da44cb7f7e9be14"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#d4e0dc020d293643405a07396b6f5942">move</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_source_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_destination_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38">cc_ccache_move()</a></b>: Move the contents of one ccache into another, destroying the source. <a href="#d4e0dc020d293643405a07396b6f5942"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#731d262d2aa179451f824d320c460f58">lock</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_lock_type, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_block) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb8c2624719ee1c4be5f1b1bc4844f0cc">cc_ccache_lock()</a></b>: Lock a ccache. <a href="#731d262d2aa179451f824d320c460f58"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#bffbfe60a3e8da64224623df5235159a">unlock</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9b13c950cb6ee636c4a73d6c569a811">cc_ccache_unlock()</a></b>: Unlock a ccache. <a href="#bffbfe60a3e8da64224623df5235159a"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#c65301a0ef050524286130185c3ec06d">get_last_default_time</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_last_default_time) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a></b>: Get the last time a ccache was the default ccache. <a href="#c65301a0ef050524286130185c3ec06d"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#a73ffc6e33ca8155cd644aa5d702c36f">get_change_time</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_change_time) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a></b>: Get the last time a ccache changed. <a href="#a73ffc6e33ca8155cd644aa5d702c36f"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#30719ac8b49a62bf73cb2841e397a81d">compare</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_compare_to_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_equal) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g197ff60fac986634fbef8ca102ec54a5">cc_ccache_compare()</a></b>: Compare two ccache objects. <a href="#30719ac8b49a62bf73cb2841e397a81d"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#106ee10feffc1681c7583d6aac4d33b4">get_kdc_time_offset</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_time_offset) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1fa36a89752da4a491d2ecdad17f8b0e">cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset()</a></b>: Get the KDC time offset for credentials in a ccache. <a href="#106ee10feffc1681c7583d6aac4d33b4"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#d537ad02da9b4eae3f5e51df0c58ee2e">set_kdc_time_offset</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> in_time_offset) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g519bf0ab152e5a3d2beee8a76a27d16e">cc_ccache_set_kdc_time_offset()</a></b>: Set the KDC time offset for credentials in a ccache. <a href="#d537ad02da9b4eae3f5e51df0c58ee2e"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#bc092bd23b9081d12e695faa55913257">clear_kdc_time_offset</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g803c35f92992dc0b73e8809d13ebabab">cc_ccache_clear_kdc_time_offset()</a></b>: Clear the KDC time offset for credentials in a ccache. <a href="#bc092bd23b9081d12e695faa55913257"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#4c815231f7e071a1dedd9aef3cedb0ef">wait_for_change</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199">cc_ccache_wait_for_change()</a></b>: Wait for the next change to a ccache. <a href="#4c815231f7e071a1dedd9aef3cedb0ef"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="ef46c1c04ceb1a0a479db84ddba7160c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::release" ref="ef46c1c04ceb1a0a479db84ddba7160c" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#ef46c1c04ceb1a0a479db84ddba7160c">release</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge517135d87d8775d77b426d57a491ef0">cc_ccache_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_ccache_t object. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache</em> </td><td>the ccache object to release. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Note:</b></dt><dd>Does not modify the ccache. If you wish to remove the ccache see <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge05b68d91bece2f99b531e96cde8d457">cc_ccache_destroy()</a>. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="86872ea5155e7ff57f4674a8f8c1d6c5"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::destroy" ref="86872ea5155e7ff57f4674a8f8c1d6c5" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#86872ea5155e7ff57f4674a8f8c1d6c5">destroy</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge05b68d91bece2f99b531e96cde8d457">cc_ccache_destroy()</a></b>: Destroy a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache</em> </td><td>the ccache object to destroy and release. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Destroy the ccache referred to by <em>io_ccache</em> and releases memory associated with the <em>io_ccache</em> object. After this call <em>io_ccache</em> becomes invalid. If <em>io_ccache</em> was the default ccache, the next ccache in the cache collection (if any) becomes the new default. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="93c7e154d7472227b02d240a13dd53da"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::set_default" ref="93c7e154d7472227b02d240a13dd53da" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#93c7e154d7472227b02d240a13dd53da">set_default</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g535b92993b85d92b67fa622447afbe13">cc_ccache_set_default()</a></b>: Make a ccache the default ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object to make the new default ccache. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="934cc9927404ee42460008b49e572158"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::get_credentials_version" ref="934cc9927404ee42460008b49e572158" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_uint32 *out_credentials_version)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#934cc9927404ee42460008b49e572158">get_credentials_version</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_credentials_version) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g934f93499765bdd179bb2342ae0f0fa6">cc_ccache_get_credentials_version()</a></b>: Get the credentials version of a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_credentials_version</em> </td><td>on exit, the credentials version of <em>in_ccache</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +<a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g934f93499765bdd179bb2342ae0f0fa6">cc_ccache_get_credentials_version()</a> returns one value of the enumerated type cc_credentials_vers. The possible return values are <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c017c26531bad42f92f7f3e1f697b58fa">cc_credentials_v4</a> (if ccache's v4 principal has been set), <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c98335a31ad81a10632568375dcc10668">cc_credentials_v5</a> (if ccache's v5 principal has been set), or <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35ca49ae6c35599f5860241601dcb0c9e0d">cc_credentials_v4_v5</a> (if both ccache's v4 and v5 principals have been set). A ccache's principal is set with one of <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf">cc_context_create_ccache()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09">cc_context_create_new_ccache()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72">cc_context_create_default_ccache()</a>, or <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2">cc_ccache_set_principal()</a>. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="e60fec8fe34019df7108e8deed0f52ac"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::get_name" ref="e60fec8fe34019df7108e8deed0f52ac" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_string_t *out_name)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#e60fec8fe34019df7108e8deed0f52ac">get_name</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> *out_name) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g042bea6044879ec03996b190792e3ae9">cc_ccache_get_name()</a></b>: Get the name of a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_name</em> </td><td>on exit, a cc_string_t representing the name of <em>in_ccache</em>. <em>out_name</em> must be released with <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9bebfed2d574e69f29dd341bc8a63d9">cc_string_release()</a>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ef23df23bb71b1f01138b791bc8b6255"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::get_principal" ref="ef23df23bb71b1f01138b791bc8b6255" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_uint32 in_credentials_version, cc_string_t *out_principal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#ef23df23bb71b1f01138b791bc8b6255">get_principal</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> *out_principal) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g464aa49a2e8054c9c3c2a3410eaf5c54">cc_ccache_get_principal()</a></b>: Get the principal of a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_version</em> </td><td>the credentials version to get the principal for. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_principal</em> </td><td>on exit, a cc_string_t representing the principal of <em>in_ccache</em>. <em>out_principal</em> must be released with <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9bebfed2d574e69f29dd341bc8a63d9">cc_string_release()</a>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Return the principal for the ccache that was set via <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf">cc_context_create_ccache()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72">cc_context_create_default_ccache()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09">cc_context_create_new_ccache()</a>, or <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2">cc_ccache_set_principal()</a>. Principals for v4 and v5 are separate, but should be kept synchronized for each ccache; they can be retrieved by passing cc_credentials_v4 or cc_credentials_v5 in cred_vers. Passing cc_credentials_v4_v5 will result in the error ccErrBadCredentialsVersion. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="0d72ae907e8357633fe4ff2248818f42"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::set_principal" ref="0d72ae907e8357633fe4ff2248818f42" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache, cc_uint32 in_credentials_version, const char *in_principal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#0d72ae907e8357633fe4ff2248818f42">set_principal</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, const char *in_principal) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2">cc_ccache_set_principal()</a></b>: Set the principal of a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_version</em> </td><td>the credentials version to set the principal for. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_principal</em> </td><td>a C string representing the new principal of <em>in_ccache</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Set the a principal for ccache. The v4 and v5 principals can be set independently, but they should always be kept equal, up to differences in string representation between v4 and v5. Passing cc_credentials_v4_v5 in cred_vers will result in the error ccErrBadCredentialsVersion. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="c4ac7d0cb5e15309978d8c4990f769a3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::store_credentials" ref="c4ac7d0cb5e15309978d8c4990f769a3" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache, const cc_credentials_union *in_credentials_union)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#c4ac7d0cb5e15309978d8c4990f769a3">store_credentials</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> *in_credentials_union) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g35c1548dbacb8907da7b8c3124eabf39">cc_ccache_store_credentials()</a></b>: Store credentials in a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_union</em> </td><td>the credentials to store in <em>io_ccache</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Store a copy of credentials in the ccache.<p> +See the description of the credentials types for the meaning of <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> fields.<p> +Before credentials of a specific credential type can be stored in a ccache, the corresponding principal version has to be set. For example, before you can store Kerberos v4 credentials in a ccache, the Kerberos v4 principal has to be set either by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf">cc_context_create_ccache()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72">cc_context_create_default_ccache()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09">cc_context_create_new_ccache()</a>, or <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2">cc_ccache_set_principal()</a>; likewise for Kerberos v5. Otherwise, ccErrBadCredentialsVersion is returned. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="6cc6d19ff6044fafc3cd9f42c338341c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::remove_credentials" ref="6cc6d19ff6044fafc3cd9f42c338341c" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache, cc_credentials_t in_credentials)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#6cc6d19ff6044fafc3cd9f42c338341c">remove_credentials</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> in_credentials) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ga1bbc05414ad4c17cea9cd5e5c50c7cc">cc_ccache_remove_credentials()</a></b>: Remove credentials from a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials</em> </td><td>the credentials to remove from <em>io_ccache</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Removes credentials from a ccache. Note that credentials must be previously acquired from the CCache API; only exactly matching credentials will be removed. (This places the burden of determining exactly which credentials to remove on the caller, but ensures there is no ambigity about which credentials will be removed.) cc_credentials_t objects can be obtained by iterating over the ccache's credentials with <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g893b31c419e71c2f528781d3036fa3ff">cc_ccache_new_credentials_iterator()</a>.<p> +If found, the credentials are removed from the ccache. The credentials parameter is not modified and should be freed by the caller. It is legitimate to call this function while an iterator is traversing the ccache, and the deletion of a credential already returned by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4">cc_credentials_iterator_next()</a> will not disturb sequence of credentials returned by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4">cc_credentials_iterator_next()</a>. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="4efc19a7cd2ac6695da44cb7f7e9be14"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::new_credentials_iterator" ref="4efc19a7cd2ac6695da44cb7f7e9be14" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_credentials_iterator_t *out_credentials_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#4efc19a7cd2ac6695da44cb7f7e9be14">new_credentials_iterator</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> *out_credentials_iterator) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g893b31c419e71c2f528781d3036fa3ff">cc_ccache_new_credentials_iterator()</a></b>: Iterate over credentials in a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_credentials_iterator</em> </td><td>a credentials iterator for <em>io_ccache</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Allocates memory for iterator and initializes it. Successive calls to <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4">cc_credentials_iterator_next()</a> will return credentials from the ccache.<p> +If changes are made to the ccache while an iterator is being used on it, the iterator must return at least the intersection, and at most the union, of the set of credentials that were in the ccache when the iteration began and the set of credentials that are in the ccache when it ends. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="d4e0dc020d293643405a07396b6f5942"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::move" ref="d4e0dc020d293643405a07396b6f5942" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_source_ccache, cc_ccache_t io_destination_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#d4e0dc020d293643405a07396b6f5942">move</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_source_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_destination_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38">cc_ccache_move()</a></b>: Move the contents of one ccache into another, destroying the source. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_source_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object to move. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_destination_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object replace with the contents of <em>io_source_ccache</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +<a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38">cc_ccache_move()</a> atomically copies the credentials, credential versions and principals from one ccache to another. On successful completion <em>io_source_ccache</em> will be released and the ccache it points to will be destroyed. Any credentials previously in <em>io_destination_ccache</em> will be replaced with credentials from <em>io_source_ccache</em>. The only part of <em>io_destination_ccache</em> which remains constant is the name. Any other callers referring to <em>io_destination_ccache</em> will suddenly see new data in it.<p> +Typically <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38">cc_ccache_move()</a> is used when the caller wishes to safely overwrite the contents of a ccache with new data which requires several steps to generate. <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge1238f80c37ae89486f2ba29bcbcae38">cc_ccache_move()</a> allows the caller to create a temporary ccache (which can be destroyed if any intermediate step fails) and the atomically copy the temporary cache into the destination. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="731d262d2aa179451f824d320c460f58"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::lock" ref="731d262d2aa179451f824d320c460f58" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache, cc_uint32 in_lock_type, cc_uint32 in_block)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#731d262d2aa179451f824d320c460f58">lock</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_lock_type, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_block) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb8c2624719ee1c4be5f1b1bc4844f0cc">cc_ccache_lock()</a></b>: Lock a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache</em> </td><td>the ccache object for the ccache you wish to lock. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_lock_type</em> </td><td>the type of lock to obtain. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_block</em> </td><td>whether or not the function should block if the lock cannot be obtained immediately. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Attempts to acquire an advisory lock for a ccache. Allowed values for lock_type are:<p> +<ul> +<li>cc_lock_read: a read lock. </li> +<li>cc_lock_write: a write lock </li> +<li>cc_lock_upgrade: upgrade an already-obtained read lock to a write lock </li> +<li>cc_lock_downgrade: downgrade an already-obtained write lock to a read lock</li> +</ul> +If block is cc_lock_block, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#731d262d2aa179451f824d320c460f58">lock()</a> will not return until the lock is acquired. If block is cc_lock_noblock, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#731d262d2aa179451f824d320c460f58">lock()</a> will return immediately, either acquiring the lock and returning ccNoError, or failing to acquire the lock and returning an error explaining why.<p> +To avoid having to deal with differences between thread semantics on different platforms, locks are granted per ccache, rather than per thread or per process. That means that different threads of execution have to acquire separate contexts in order to be able to synchronize with each other.<p> +The lock should be unlocked by using <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9b13c950cb6ee636c4a73d6c569a811">cc_ccache_unlock()</a>.<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Note:</b></dt><dd>All locks are advisory. For example, callers which do not call <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb8c2624719ee1c4be5f1b1bc4844f0cc">cc_ccache_lock()</a> and <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9b13c950cb6ee636c4a73d6c569a811">cc_ccache_unlock()</a> will not be prevented from writing to the ccache when you have a read lock. This is because the CCAPI locking was added after the first release and thus adding mandatory locks would have changed the user experience and performance of existing applications. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="bffbfe60a3e8da64224623df5235159a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::unlock" ref="bffbfe60a3e8da64224623df5235159a" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#bffbfe60a3e8da64224623df5235159a">unlock</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9b13c950cb6ee636c4a73d6c569a811">cc_ccache_unlock()</a></b>: Unlock a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="c65301a0ef050524286130185c3ec06d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::get_last_default_time" ref="c65301a0ef050524286130185c3ec06d" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_time_t *out_last_default_time)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#c65301a0ef050524286130185c3ec06d">get_last_default_time</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_last_default_time) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a></b>: Get the last time a ccache was the default ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a cache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_last_default_time</em> </td><td>on exit, the last time the ccache was default. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +This function returns the last time when the ccache was made the default ccache. This allows clients to sort the ccaches by how recently they were default, which is useful for user listing of ccaches. If the ccache was never default, ccErrNeverDefault is returned. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="a73ffc6e33ca8155cd644aa5d702c36f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::get_change_time" ref="a73ffc6e33ca8155cd644aa5d702c36f" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_time_t *out_change_time)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#a73ffc6e33ca8155cd644aa5d702c36f">get_change_time</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_change_time) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a></b>: Get the last time a ccache changed. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a cache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_change_time</em> </td><td>on exit, the last time the ccache changed. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. If the ccache was never the default ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7604f23ab0c8c3e1d97f8b32c4501a895">ccErrNeverDefault</a>. Otherwise, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +This function returns the time of the most recent change made to a ccache. By maintaining a local copy the caller can deduce whether or not the ccache has been modified since the previous call to <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a>.<p> +The time returned by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a> increases whenever:<p> +<ul> +<li>a credential is stored </li> +<li>a credential is removed </li> +<li>a ccache principal is changed </li> +<li>the ccache becomes the default ccache </li> +<li>the ccache is no longer the default ccache</li> +</ul> +<dl compact><dt><b>Note:</b></dt><dd>In order to be able to compare two values returned by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a>, the caller must use the same ccache object to acquire them. Callers should maintain a single ccache object in memory for <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a> calls rather than creating a new ccache object for every call.</dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>See also:</b></dt><dd><a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#4c815231f7e071a1dedd9aef3cedb0ef">wait_for_change</a> </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="30719ac8b49a62bf73cb2841e397a81d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::compare" ref="30719ac8b49a62bf73cb2841e397a81d" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_ccache_t in_compare_to_ccache, cc_uint32 *out_equal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#30719ac8b49a62bf73cb2841e397a81d">compare</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_compare_to_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_equal) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g197ff60fac986634fbef8ca102ec54a5">cc_ccache_compare()</a></b>: Compare two ccache objects. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_compare_to_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object to compare with <em>in_ccache</em>. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_equal</em> </td><td>on exit, whether or not the two ccaches refer to the same ccache. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="106ee10feffc1681c7583d6aac4d33b4"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::get_kdc_time_offset" ref="106ee10feffc1681c7583d6aac4d33b4" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache, cc_uint32 in_credentials_version, cc_time_t *out_time_offset)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#106ee10feffc1681c7583d6aac4d33b4">get_kdc_time_offset</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_time_offset) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1fa36a89752da4a491d2ecdad17f8b0e">cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset()</a></b>: Get the KDC time offset for credentials in a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_version</em> </td><td>the credentials version to get the time offset for. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_time_offset</em> </td><td>on exit, the KDC time offset for <em>in_ccache</em> for credentials version <em>in_credentials_version</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a> if a time offset was obtained or <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7d6825aa88394eb52df80bef870d986db">ccErrTimeOffsetNotSet</a> if a time offset has not been set. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>See also:</b></dt><dd><a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#d537ad02da9b4eae3f5e51df0c58ee2e">set_kdc_time_offset</a>, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#bc092bd23b9081d12e695faa55913257">clear_kdc_time_offset</a></dd></dl> +Sometimes the KDC and client's clocks get out of sync. <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1fa36a89752da4a491d2ecdad17f8b0e">cc_ccache_get_kdc_time_offset()</a> returns the difference between the KDC and client's clocks at the time credentials were acquired. This offset allows callers to figure out how much time is left on a given credential even though the end_time is based on the KDC's clock not the client's clock. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="d537ad02da9b4eae3f5e51df0c58ee2e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::set_kdc_time_offset" ref="d537ad02da9b4eae3f5e51df0c58ee2e" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache, cc_uint32 in_credentials_version, cc_time_t in_time_offset)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#d537ad02da9b4eae3f5e51df0c58ee2e">set_kdc_time_offset</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> in_time_offset) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g519bf0ab152e5a3d2beee8a76a27d16e">cc_ccache_set_kdc_time_offset()</a></b>: Set the KDC time offset for credentials in a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_version</em> </td><td>the credentials version to get the time offset for. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_time_offset</em> </td><td>the new KDC time offset for <em>in_ccache</em> for credentials version <em>in_credentials_version</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>See also:</b></dt><dd><a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#106ee10feffc1681c7583d6aac4d33b4">get_kdc_time_offset</a>, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#bc092bd23b9081d12e695faa55913257">clear_kdc_time_offset</a></dd></dl> +Sometimes the KDC and client's clocks get out of sync. <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g519bf0ab152e5a3d2beee8a76a27d16e">cc_ccache_set_kdc_time_offset()</a> sets the difference between the KDC and client's clocks at the time credentials were acquired. This offset allows callers to figure out how much time is left on a given credential even though the end_time is based on the KDC's clock not the client's clock. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="bc092bd23b9081d12e695faa55913257"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::clear_kdc_time_offset" ref="bc092bd23b9081d12e695faa55913257" args=")(cc_ccache_t io_ccache, cc_uint32 in_credentials_version)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#bc092bd23b9081d12e695faa55913257">clear_kdc_time_offset</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> io_ccache, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_credentials_version) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g803c35f92992dc0b73e8809d13ebabab">cc_ccache_clear_kdc_time_offset()</a></b>: Clear the KDC time offset for credentials in a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_version</em> </td><td>the credentials version to get the time offset for. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>See also:</b></dt><dd><a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#106ee10feffc1681c7583d6aac4d33b4">get_kdc_time_offset</a>, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#d537ad02da9b4eae3f5e51df0c58ee2e">set_kdc_time_offset</a></dd></dl> +Sometimes the KDC and client's clocks get out of sync. <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g803c35f92992dc0b73e8809d13ebabab">cc_ccache_clear_kdc_time_offset()</a> clears the difference between the KDC and client's clocks at the time credentials were acquired. This offset allows callers to figure out how much time is left on a given credential even though the end_time is based on the KDC's clock not the client's clock. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="4c815231f7e071a1dedd9aef3cedb0ef"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_f::wait_for_change" ref="4c815231f7e071a1dedd9aef3cedb0ef" args=")(cc_ccache_t in_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#4c815231f7e071a1dedd9aef3cedb0ef">wait_for_change</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> in_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199">cc_ccache_wait_for_change()</a></b>: Wait for the next change to a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache</em> </td><td>a ccache object. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +This function blocks until the next change is made to the ccache referenced by <em>in_ccache</em>. By repeatedly calling <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199">cc_ccache_wait_for_change()</a> from a worker thread the caller can effectively receive callbacks whenever the ccache changes. This is considerably more efficient than polling with <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb19ef7d2b1bcfb474e18e157fb3bc9c6">cc_ccache_get_change_time()</a>.<p> +<a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199">cc_ccache_wait_for_change()</a> will return whenever:<p> +<ul> +<li>a credential is stored </li> +<li>a credential is removed </li> +<li>the ccache principal is changed </li> +<li>the ccache becomes the default ccache </li> +<li>the ccache is no longer the default ccache</li> +</ul> +<dl compact><dt><b>Note:</b></dt><dd>In order to make sure that the caller doesn't miss any changes, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199">cc_ccache_wait_for_change()</a> always returns immediately after the first time it is called on a new ccache object. Callers must use the same ccache object for successive calls to <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gc508ad0c010c88ad8ff0739b43a2b199">cc_ccache_wait_for_change()</a> rather than creating a new ccache object for every call.</dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>See also:</b></dt><dd><a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__f.html#a73ffc6e33ca8155cd644aa5d702c36f">get_change_time</a> </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:05 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5e85ee2da --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_ccache_iterator_d Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_ccache_iterator_d Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_ccache_iterator_d" --><h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li>const <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html#7cd2785c0dd1902e651805f478acae3e">functions</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="7cd2785c0dd1902e651805f478acae3e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_iterator_d::functions" ref="7cd2785c0dd1902e651805f478acae3e" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html">cc_ccache_iterator_f</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html#7cd2785c0dd1902e651805f478acae3e">functions</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:05 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..333aab8f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_ccache_iterator_f Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_ccache_iterator_f Struct Reference</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_ccache_iterator_f" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +Function pointer table for cc_ccache_iterator_t. For more information see <a class="el" href="group__cc__ccache__iterator__reference.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t Overview</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html#4df0298826e5004ca873b005d6d3b9d0">release</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> io_ccache_iterator) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g34f37496fb8bc414aafb0b265afecb1b">cc_ccache_iterator_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_ccache_iterator_t object. <a href="#4df0298826e5004ca873b005d6d3b9d0"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html#6f1c5bf2a8c3ca2fb1761a039fbf30cb">next</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> in_ccache_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcff0b3e247a2adc95442324fec6c5651">cc_ccache_iterator_next()</a></b>: Get the next ccache in the cache collection. <a href="#6f1c5bf2a8c3ca2fb1761a039fbf30cb"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html#3a2fc1000215e7e8a2ef5b29eb4af890">clone</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> in_ccache_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> *out_ccache_iterator) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g904d7757fd7ac40f4ee9b448a389f2dd">cc_ccache_iterator_clone()</a></b>: Make a copy of a ccache iterator. <a href="#3a2fc1000215e7e8a2ef5b29eb4af890"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="4df0298826e5004ca873b005d6d3b9d0"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_iterator_f::release" ref="4df0298826e5004ca873b005d6d3b9d0" args=")(cc_ccache_iterator_t io_ccache_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html#4df0298826e5004ca873b005d6d3b9d0">release</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> io_ccache_iterator) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g34f37496fb8bc414aafb0b265afecb1b">cc_ccache_iterator_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_ccache_iterator_t object. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_ccache_iterator</em> </td><td>the ccache iterator object to release. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="6f1c5bf2a8c3ca2fb1761a039fbf30cb"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_iterator_f::next" ref="6f1c5bf2a8c3ca2fb1761a039fbf30cb" args=")(cc_ccache_iterator_t in_ccache_iterator, cc_ccache_t *out_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html#6f1c5bf2a8c3ca2fb1761a039fbf30cb">next</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> in_ccache_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcff0b3e247a2adc95442324fec6c5651">cc_ccache_iterator_next()</a></b>: Get the next ccache in the cache collection. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache_iterator</em> </td><td>a ccache iterator object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_ccache</em> </td><td>on exit, the next ccache in the cache collection. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a> if the next ccache in the cache collection was obtained or <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b748d5a55ed773e002ccc271beb4512c0a">ccIteratorEnd</a> if there are no more ccaches. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="3a2fc1000215e7e8a2ef5b29eb4af890"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_ccache_iterator_f::clone" ref="3a2fc1000215e7e8a2ef5b29eb4af890" args=")(cc_ccache_iterator_t in_ccache_iterator, cc_ccache_iterator_t *out_ccache_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__f.html#3a2fc1000215e7e8a2ef5b29eb4af890">clone</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> in_ccache_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> *out_ccache_iterator) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g904d7757fd7ac40f4ee9b448a389f2dd">cc_ccache_iterator_clone()</a></b>: Make a copy of a ccache iterator. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_ccache_iterator</em> </td><td>a ccache iterator object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_ccache_iterator</em> </td><td>on exit, a copy of <em>in_ccache_iterator</em>. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:05 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__context__d.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__context__d.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d3904a2a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__context__d.html @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_context_d Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_context_d Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html">cc_context_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_context_d" --><h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li>const <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html#ac5b195bc75b92f5c1924e6a3a6aa611">functions</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="ac5b195bc75b92f5c1924e6a3a6aa611"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_d::functions" ref="ac5b195bc75b92f5c1924e6a3a6aa611" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html">cc_context_f</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html#ac5b195bc75b92f5c1924e6a3a6aa611">functions</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:05 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__context__f.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__context__f.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fe310518a --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__context__f.html @@ -0,0 +1,513 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_context_f Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_context_f Struct Reference</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_context_f" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +Function pointer table for cc_context_t. For more information see <a class="el" href="group__cc__context__reference.html">cc_context_t Overview</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#239ea938e3c076e6e245a9236bb05b24">release</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> io_context) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g8ff82ce108889d4ed29f46ffe6efc40e">cc_context_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_context_t. <a href="#239ea938e3c076e6e245a9236bb05b24"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#51bd5a48dcd263bfb3128cc5838b4cd7">get_change_time</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_time) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907">cc_context_get_change_time()</a></b>: Get the last time the cache collection changed. <a href="#51bd5a48dcd263bfb3128cc5838b4cd7"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#4e9432f5a1a10319037b0f04e8219c1b">get_default_ccache_name</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> *out_name) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51">cc_context_get_default_ccache_name()</a></b>: Get the name of the default ccache. <a href="#4e9432f5a1a10319037b0f04e8219c1b"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#bf8e7415758b890ca8f01ce5a00985ab">open_ccache</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, const char *in_name, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g256a5ba17fe0e4502e0722d9b081bbef">cc_context_open_ccache()</a></b>: Open a ccache. <a href="#bf8e7415758b890ca8f01ce5a00985ab"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#7f101feaa1c88c8997b678507c029c39">open_default_ccache</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g45a7ce29eb409baabadcae1bc95d5c57">cc_context_open_default_ccache()</a></b>: Open the default ccache. <a href="#7f101feaa1c88c8997b678507c029c39"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#82d3579723a0f909cb46c2016ed4ae22">create_ccache</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, const char *in_name, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf">cc_context_create_ccache()</a></b>: Create a new ccache. <a href="#82d3579723a0f909cb46c2016ed4ae22"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#b52a31c1fb59ac752baa16503d8e0e3f">create_default_ccache</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72">cc_context_create_default_ccache()</a></b>: Create a new default ccache. <a href="#b52a31c1fb59ac752baa16503d8e0e3f"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#939a8ed76079bf71000347c40aeb5b2f">create_new_ccache</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09">cc_context_create_new_ccache()</a></b>: Create a new uniquely named ccache. <a href="#939a8ed76079bf71000347c40aeb5b2f"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#0f945985d42255226915403df147667f">new_ccache_iterator</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> *out_iterator) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g6957bc9570e4769a5b1213d2a1d90cd7">cc_context_new_ccache_iterator()</a></b>: Get an iterator for the cache collection. <a href="#0f945985d42255226915403df147667f"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#1be78f795193b04c4f45cb7d3c46480c">lock</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_lock_type, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_block) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcf4595340ddc8dafa539a86ac317625d">cc_context_lock()</a></b>: Lock the cache collection. <a href="#1be78f795193b04c4f45cb7d3c46480c"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#55e38bd72efee8445b3abbc3fa5e7e27">unlock</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_cc_context) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g544261b88c9ac0f2379a35648cae3f27">cc_context_unlock()</a></b>: Unlock the cache collection. <a href="#55e38bd72efee8445b3abbc3fa5e7e27"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#bb728ccd97eb387991feed0500475112">compare</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_cc_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_compare_to_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_equal) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9258ef05d06f3d4dc798ec654f78b967">cc_context_compare()</a></b>: Compare two context objects. <a href="#bb728ccd97eb387991feed0500475112"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#39a27ecd6d29fb7288f983c42d5686d0">wait_for_change</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_cc_context) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a">cc_context_wait_for_change()</a></b>: Wait for the next change in the cache collection. <a href="#39a27ecd6d29fb7288f983c42d5686d0"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="239ea938e3c076e6e245a9236bb05b24"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::release" ref="239ea938e3c076e6e245a9236bb05b24" args=")(cc_context_t io_context)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#239ea938e3c076e6e245a9236bb05b24">release</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> io_context) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g8ff82ce108889d4ed29f46ffe6efc40e">cc_context_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_context_t. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_context</em> </td><td>the context object to free. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="51bd5a48dcd263bfb3128cc5838b4cd7"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::get_change_time" ref="51bd5a48dcd263bfb3128cc5838b4cd7" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, cc_time_t *out_time)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#51bd5a48dcd263bfb3128cc5838b4cd7">get_change_time</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> *out_time) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907">cc_context_get_change_time()</a></b>: Get the last time the cache collection changed. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection to examine. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_time</em> </td><td>on exit, the time of the most recent change for the entire ccache collection. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +This function returns the time of the most recent change for the entire ccache collection. By maintaining a local copy the caller can deduce whether or not the ccache collection has been modified since the previous call to <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907">cc_context_get_change_time()</a>.<p> +The time returned by cc_context_get_changed_time() increases whenever:<p> +<ul> +<li>a ccache is created </li> +<li>a ccache is destroyed </li> +<li>a credential is stored </li> +<li>a credential is removed </li> +<li>a ccache principal is changed </li> +<li>the default ccache is changed</li> +</ul> +<dl compact><dt><b>Note:</b></dt><dd>In order to be able to compare two values returned by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907">cc_context_get_change_time()</a>, the caller must use the same context to acquire them. Callers should maintain a single context in memory for <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907">cc_context_get_change_time()</a> calls rather than creating a new context for every call.</dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>See also:</b></dt><dd><a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#39a27ecd6d29fb7288f983c42d5686d0">wait_for_change</a> </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="4e9432f5a1a10319037b0f04e8219c1b"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::get_default_ccache_name" ref="4e9432f5a1a10319037b0f04e8219c1b" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, cc_string_t *out_name)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#4e9432f5a1a10319037b0f04e8219c1b">get_default_ccache_name</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> *out_name) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51">cc_context_get_default_ccache_name()</a></b>: Get the name of the default ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_name</em> </td><td>on exit, the name of the default ccache. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +This function returns the name of the default ccache. When the default ccache exists, its name is returned. If there are no ccaches in the collection, and thus there is no default ccache, the name that the default ccache should have is returned. The ccache with that name will be used as the default ccache by all processes which initialized Kerberos libraries before the ccache was created.<p> +If there is no default ccache, and the client is creating a new ccache, it should be created with the default name. If there already is a default ccache, and the client wants to create a new ccache (as opposed to reusing an existing ccache), it should be created with any unique name; <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#939a8ed76079bf71000347c40aeb5b2f">create_new_ccache()</a> can be used to accomplish that more easily.<p> +If the first ccache is created with a name other than the default name, then the processes already running will not notice the credentials stored in the new ccache, which is normally undesirable. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="bf8e7415758b890ca8f01ce5a00985ab"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::open_ccache" ref="bf8e7415758b890ca8f01ce5a00985ab" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, const char *in_name, cc_ccache_t *out_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#bf8e7415758b890ca8f01ce5a00985ab">open_ccache</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, const char *in_name, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g256a5ba17fe0e4502e0722d9b081bbef">cc_context_open_ccache()</a></b>: Open a ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_name</em> </td><td>the name of the ccache to open. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_ccache</em> </td><td>on exit, a ccache object for the ccache </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. If no ccache named <em>in_name</em> exists, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73098feac66058e6ebd02c5e44fa20a9c">ccErrCCacheNotFound</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Opens an already existing ccache identified by its name. It returns a reference to the ccache in <em>out_ccache</em>.<p> +The list of all ccache names, principals, and credentials versions may be retrieved by calling cc_context_new_cache_iterator(), <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g042bea6044879ec03996b190792e3ae9">cc_ccache_get_name()</a>, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g464aa49a2e8054c9c3c2a3410eaf5c54">cc_ccache_get_principal()</a>, and cc_ccache_get_cred_version(). </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="7f101feaa1c88c8997b678507c029c39"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::open_default_ccache" ref="7f101feaa1c88c8997b678507c029c39" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, cc_ccache_t *out_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#7f101feaa1c88c8997b678507c029c39">open_default_ccache</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g45a7ce29eb409baabadcae1bc95d5c57">cc_context_open_default_ccache()</a></b>: Open the default ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_ccache</em> </td><td>on exit, a ccache object for the default ccache </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. If no default ccache exists, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b73098feac66058e6ebd02c5e44fa20a9c">ccErrCCacheNotFound</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Opens the default ccache. It returns a reference to the ccache in *ccache.<p> +This function performs the same function as calling cc_context_get_default_ccache_name followed by cc_context_open_ccache, but it performs it atomically. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="82d3579723a0f909cb46c2016ed4ae22"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::create_ccache" ref="82d3579723a0f909cb46c2016ed4ae22" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, const char *in_name, cc_uint32 in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, cc_ccache_t *out_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#82d3579723a0f909cb46c2016ed4ae22">create_ccache</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, const char *in_name, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf">cc_context_create_ccache()</a></b>: Create a new ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_name</em> </td><td>the name of the new ccache to create </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_cred_vers</em> </td><td>the version of the credentials the new ccache will hold </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_principal</em> </td><td>the client principal of the credentials the new ccache will hold </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_ccache</em> </td><td>on exit, a ccache object for the newly created ccache </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Create a new credentials cache. The ccache is uniquely identified by its name. The principal given is also associated with the ccache and the credentials version specified. A NULL name is not allowed (and ccErrBadName is returned if one is passed in). Only cc_credentials_v4 and cc_credentials_v5 are valid input values for cred_vers. If you want to create a new ccache that will hold both versions of credentials, call <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9fbcbd0f1b107cdaa2a0179e227f82cf">cc_context_create_ccache()</a> with one version, and then <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gfaa81492b5d7b3ba00208a9577ce0ba2">cc_ccache_set_principal()</a> with the other version.<p> +If you want to create a new ccache (with a unique name), you should use <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09">cc_context_create_new_ccache()</a> instead. If you want to create or reinitialize the default cache, you should use <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72">cc_context_create_default_ccache()</a>.<p> +If name is non-NULL and there is already a ccache named name:<p> +<ul> +<li>the credentials in the ccache whose version is cred_vers are removed </li> +<li>the principal (of the existing ccache) associated with cred_vers is set to principal </li> +<li>a handle for the existing ccache is returned and all existing handles for the ccache remain valid</li> +</ul> +If no ccache named name already exists:<p> +<ul> +<li>a new empty ccache is created </li> +<li>the principal of the new ccache associated with cred_vers is set to principal </li> +<li>a handle for the new ccache is returned</li> +</ul> +For a new ccache, the name should be any unique string. The name is not intended to be presented to users.<p> +If the created ccache is the first ccache in the collection, it is made the default ccache. Note that normally it is undesirable to create the first ccache with a name different from the default ccache name (as returned by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51">cc_context_get_default_ccache_name()</a>); see the description of <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51">cc_context_get_default_ccache_name()</a> for details.<p> +The principal should be a C string containing an unparsed Kerberos principal in the format of the appropriate Kerberos version, i.e.<div class="fragment"><pre class="fragment">foo.bar/@BAZ + * </pre></div> for Kerberos v4 and<div class="fragment"><pre class="fragment">foo/bar/@BAZ </pre></div> for Kerberos v5. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="b52a31c1fb59ac752baa16503d8e0e3f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::create_default_ccache" ref="b52a31c1fb59ac752baa16503d8e0e3f" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, cc_uint32 in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, cc_ccache_t *out_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#b52a31c1fb59ac752baa16503d8e0e3f">create_default_ccache</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g10a184dd699cae4df6f3480290804a72">cc_context_create_default_ccache()</a></b>: Create a new default ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_cred_vers</em> </td><td>the version of the credentials the new default ccache will hold </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_principal</em> </td><td>the client principal of the credentials the new default ccache will hold </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_ccache</em> </td><td>on exit, a ccache object for the newly created default ccache </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Create the default credentials cache. The behavior of this function is similar to that of cc_create_ccache(). If there is a default ccache (which is always the case except when there are no ccaches at all in the collection), it is initialized with the specified credentials version and principal, as per cc_create_ccache(); otherwise, a new ccache is created, and its name is the name returned by <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcb4eb9f1db6f8ebf261339ad87cb6c51">cc_context_get_default_ccache_name()</a>. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="939a8ed76079bf71000347c40aeb5b2f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::create_new_ccache" ref="939a8ed76079bf71000347c40aeb5b2f" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, cc_uint32 in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, cc_ccache_t *out_ccache)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#939a8ed76079bf71000347c40aeb5b2f">create_new_ccache</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_cred_vers, const char *in_principal, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__d.html">cc_ccache_t</a> *out_ccache) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g1a6dffb1db25590351646fdcf9824f09">cc_context_create_new_ccache()</a></b>: Create a new uniquely named ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_cred_vers</em> </td><td>the version of the credentials the new ccache will hold </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_principal</em> </td><td>the client principal of the credentials the new ccache will hold </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_ccache</em> </td><td>on exit, a ccache object for the newly created ccache </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Create a new unique credentials cache. The behavior of this function is similar to that of cc_create_ccache(). If there are no ccaches, and therefore no default ccache, the new ccache is created with the default ccache name as would be returned by <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#4e9432f5a1a10319037b0f04e8219c1b">get_default_ccache_name()</a>. If there are some ccaches, and therefore there is a default ccache, the new ccache is created with a new unique name. Clearly, this function never reinitializes a ccache, since it always uses a unique name. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="0f945985d42255226915403df147667f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::new_ccache_iterator" ref="0f945985d42255226915403df147667f" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, cc_ccache_iterator_t *out_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#0f945985d42255226915403df147667f">new_ccache_iterator</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__ccache__iterator__d.html">cc_ccache_iterator_t</a> *out_iterator) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g6957bc9570e4769a5b1213d2a1d90cd7">cc_context_new_ccache_iterator()</a></b>: Get an iterator for the cache collection. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_iterator</em> </td><td>on exit, a ccache iterator object for the ccache collection. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Used to allocate memory and initialize iterator. Successive calls to iterator's next() function will return ccaches in the collection.<p> +If changes are made to the collection while an iterator is being used on it, the iterator must return at least the intersection, and at most the union, of the set of ccaches that were present when the iteration began and the set of ccaches that are present when it ends. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="1be78f795193b04c4f45cb7d3c46480c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::lock" ref="1be78f795193b04c4f45cb7d3c46480c" args=")(cc_context_t in_context, cc_uint32 in_lock_type, cc_uint32 in_block)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#1be78f795193b04c4f45cb7d3c46480c">lock</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_lock_type, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> in_block) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcf4595340ddc8dafa539a86ac317625d">cc_context_lock()</a></b>: Lock the cache collection. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_lock_type</em> </td><td>the type of lock to obtain. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_block</em> </td><td>whether or not the function should block if the lock cannot be obtained immediately. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +Attempts to acquire an advisory lock for the ccache collection. Allowed values for lock_type are:<p> +<ul> +<li>cc_lock_read: a read lock. </li> +<li>cc_lock_write: a write lock </li> +<li>cc_lock_upgrade: upgrade an already-obtained read lock to a write lock </li> +<li>cc_lock_downgrade: downgrade an already-obtained write lock to a read lock</li> +</ul> +If block is cc_lock_block, <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#1be78f795193b04c4f45cb7d3c46480c">lock()</a> will not return until the lock is acquired. If block is cc_lock_noblock, <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#1be78f795193b04c4f45cb7d3c46480c">lock()</a> will return immediately, either acquiring the lock and returning ccNoError, or failing to acquire the lock and returning an error explaining why.<p> +Locks apply only to the list of ccaches, not the contents of those ccaches. To prevent callers participating in the advisory locking from changing the credentials in a cache you must also lock that ccache with <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gb8c2624719ee1c4be5f1b1bc4844f0cc">cc_ccache_lock()</a>. This is so that you can get the list of ccaches without preventing applications from simultaneously obtaining service tickets.<p> +To avoid having to deal with differences between thread semantics on different platforms, locks are granted per context, rather than per thread or per process. That means that different threads of execution have to acquire separate contexts in order to be able to synchronize with each other.<p> +The lock should be unlocked by using <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g544261b88c9ac0f2379a35648cae3f27">cc_context_unlock()</a>.<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Note:</b></dt><dd>All locks are advisory. For example, callers which do not call <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gcf4595340ddc8dafa539a86ac317625d">cc_context_lock()</a> and <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g544261b88c9ac0f2379a35648cae3f27">cc_context_unlock()</a> will not be prevented from writing to the cache collection when you have a read lock. This is because the CCAPI locking was added after the first release and thus adding mandatory locks would have changed the user experience and performance of existing applications. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="55e38bd72efee8445b3abbc3fa5e7e27"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::unlock" ref="55e38bd72efee8445b3abbc3fa5e7e27" args=")(cc_context_t in_cc_context)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#55e38bd72efee8445b3abbc3fa5e7e27">unlock</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_cc_context) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g544261b88c9ac0f2379a35648cae3f27">cc_context_unlock()</a></b>: Unlock the cache collection. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>the context object for the cache collection. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="bb728ccd97eb387991feed0500475112"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::compare" ref="bb728ccd97eb387991feed0500475112" args=")(cc_context_t in_cc_context, cc_context_t in_compare_to_context, cc_uint32 *out_equal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#bb728ccd97eb387991feed0500475112">compare</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_cc_context, <a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_compare_to_context, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_equal) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9258ef05d06f3d4dc798ec654f78b967">cc_context_compare()</a></b>: Compare two context objects. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>a context object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_compare_to_context</em> </td><td>a context object to compare with <em>in_context</em>. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_equal</em> </td><td>on exit, whether or not the two contexts refer to the same cache collection. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="39a27ecd6d29fb7288f983c42d5686d0"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_context_f::wait_for_change" ref="39a27ecd6d29fb7288f983c42d5686d0" args=")(cc_context_t in_cc_context)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#39a27ecd6d29fb7288f983c42d5686d0">wait_for_change</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__context__d.html">cc_context_t</a> in_cc_context) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a">cc_context_wait_for_change()</a></b>: Wait for the next change in the cache collection. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_context</em> </td><td>a context object. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure.</dd></dl> +This function blocks until the next change is made to the cache collection ccache collection. By repeatedly calling <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a">cc_context_wait_for_change()</a> from a worker thread the caller can effectively receive callbacks whenever the cache collection changes. This is considerably more efficient than polling with <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g82f551af17455b78fa3a2e3f83c96907">cc_context_get_change_time()</a>.<p> +<a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a">cc_context_wait_for_change()</a> will return whenever:<p> +<ul> +<li>a ccache is created </li> +<li>a ccache is destroyed </li> +<li>a credential is stored </li> +<li>a credential is removed </li> +<li>a ccache principal is changed </li> +<li>the default ccache is changed</li> +</ul> +<dl compact><dt><b>Note:</b></dt><dd>In order to make sure that the caller doesn't miss any changes, <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a">cc_context_wait_for_change()</a> always returns immediately after the first time it is called on a new context object. Callers must use the same context object for successive calls to <a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g9eb3508958528c00844a101275497e5a">cc_context_wait_for_change()</a> rather than creating a new context for every call.</dd></dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>See also:</b></dt><dd><a class="el" href="structcc__context__f.html#51bd5a48dcd263bfb3128cc5838b4cd7">get_change_time</a> </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:05 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__d.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__d.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8a13251e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__d.html @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_d Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_d Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html">cc_credentials_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_credentials_d" --><h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li>const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html#35a5997194639f90a5178c5526ea1bf3">data</a> +<li>const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html#f94340ad2254e9ae5bc24e184f2ea923">functions</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="35a5997194639f90a5178c5526ea1bf3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_d::data" ref="35a5997194639f90a5178c5526ea1bf3" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html">cc_credentials_union</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html#35a5997194639f90a5178c5526ea1bf3">data</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="f94340ad2254e9ae5bc24e184f2ea923"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_d::functions" ref="f94340ad2254e9ae5bc24e184f2ea923" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html">cc_credentials_f</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html#f94340ad2254e9ae5bc24e184f2ea923">functions</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__f.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__f.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91f4b3adb --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__f.html @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_f Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_f Struct Reference</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_credentials_f" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +Function pointer table for cc_credentials_t. For more information see <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html">cc_credentials_t Overview</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html#6cc7338e31fd5f2436fb15b23506f57d">release</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> io_credentials) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gab5cad8ca82847950956b0f493132c14">cc_credentials_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_credentials_t object. <a href="#6cc7338e31fd5f2436fb15b23506f57d"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html#8511e9a8220b2003a1c66b314ca6bc9f">compare</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> in_credentials, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> in_compare_to_credentials, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_equal) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g39ae30e49dba65b87c6b9794f20fb784">cc_credentials_compare()</a></b>: Compare two credentials objects. <a href="#8511e9a8220b2003a1c66b314ca6bc9f"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="6cc7338e31fd5f2436fb15b23506f57d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_f::release" ref="6cc7338e31fd5f2436fb15b23506f57d" args=")(cc_credentials_t io_credentials)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html#6cc7338e31fd5f2436fb15b23506f57d">release</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> io_credentials) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#gab5cad8ca82847950956b0f493132c14">cc_credentials_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_credentials_t object. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_credentials</em> </td><td>the credentials object to release. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="8511e9a8220b2003a1c66b314ca6bc9f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_f::compare" ref="8511e9a8220b2003a1c66b314ca6bc9f" args=")(cc_credentials_t in_credentials, cc_credentials_t in_compare_to_credentials, cc_uint32 *out_equal)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__f.html#8511e9a8220b2003a1c66b314ca6bc9f">compare</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> in_credentials, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> in_compare_to_credentials, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> *out_equal) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g39ae30e49dba65b87c6b9794f20fb784">cc_credentials_compare()</a></b>: Compare two credentials objects. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials</em> </td><td>a credentials object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_compare_to_credentials</em> </td><td>a credentials object to compare with <em>in_credentials</em>. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_equal</em> </td><td>on exit, whether or not the two credentials objects refer to the same credentials in the cache collection. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5682db0ed --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_iterator_d Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_iterator_d Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_credentials_iterator_d" --><h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li>const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html#4533a2f8b94b150439d777f749cedc12">functions</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="4533a2f8b94b150439d777f749cedc12"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_iterator_d::functions" ref="4533a2f8b94b150439d777f749cedc12" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html">cc_credentials_iterator_f</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html#4533a2f8b94b150439d777f749cedc12">functions</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..66aec178a --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_iterator_f Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_iterator_f Struct Reference</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_credentials_iterator_f" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +Function pointer table for cc_credentials_iterator_t. For more information see <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html#16c385de50a458e4223af5680488c95c">release</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> io_credentials_iterator) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g79f914583e8076ac24c0d5dde4ddb712">cc_credentials_iterator_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_credentials_iterator_t object. <a href="#16c385de50a458e4223af5680488c95c"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html#8ba419513434ba0b03a1be0c17da1478">next</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> in_credentials_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> *out_credentials) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4">cc_credentials_iterator_next()</a></b>: Get the next credentials in the ccache. <a href="#8ba419513434ba0b03a1be0c17da1478"></a><br></dl><li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html#g7d765e583b5994785e214df663e8959c">clone</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> in_credentials_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> *out_credentials_iterator) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g59a9f96a6c00b64c0ab971f7e9b5aae2">cc_credentials_iterator_clone()</a></b>: Make a copy of a credentials iterator. <a href="group__cc__credentials__iterator__reference.html#g7d765e583b5994785e214df663e8959c"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="16c385de50a458e4223af5680488c95c"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_iterator_f::release" ref="16c385de50a458e4223af5680488c95c" args=")(cc_credentials_iterator_t io_credentials_iterator)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html#16c385de50a458e4223af5680488c95c">release</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> io_credentials_iterator) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g79f914583e8076ac24c0d5dde4ddb712">cc_credentials_iterator_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_credentials_iterator_t object. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_credentials_iterator</em> </td><td>the credentials iterator object to release. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="8ba419513434ba0b03a1be0c17da1478"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_iterator_f::next" ref="8ba419513434ba0b03a1be0c17da1478" args=")(cc_credentials_iterator_t in_credentials_iterator, cc_credentials_t *out_credentials)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__f.html#8ba419513434ba0b03a1be0c17da1478">next</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__iterator__d.html">cc_credentials_iterator_t</a> in_credentials_iterator, <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__d.html">cc_credentials_t</a> *out_credentials) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#g0c2f41d90f478b2415b699085f8fcaa4">cc_credentials_iterator_next()</a></b>: Get the next credentials in the ccache. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>in_credentials_iterator</em> </td><td>a credentials iterator object. </td></tr> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>out_credentials</em> </td><td>on exit, the next credentials in the ccache. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a> if the next credential in the ccache was obtained or <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b748d5a55ed773e002ccc271beb4512c0a">ccIteratorEnd</a> if there are no more credentials. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__union.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__union.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6082346cc --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__union.html @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_union Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_union Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html">cc_credentials_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_credentials_union" --><h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2">version</a> +<li>union { +<ul> +<li> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#5cd1c69704fe9706f69fdde1d954bba5">credentials_v4</a> +<li> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#9d28c534b1b7c41da162f26620e92ded">credentials_v5</a> +</ul> +<li>} <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#9e7108eff62e2df10a768cec653fe9c3">credentials</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_union::version" ref="2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2">version</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The credentials version of this credentials object. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="5cd1c69704fe9706f69fdde1d954bba5"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_union::credentials_v4" ref="5cd1c69704fe9706f69fdde1d954bba5" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#5cd1c69704fe9706f69fdde1d954bba5">credentials_v4</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +If <em>version</em> is <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c017c26531bad42f92f7f3e1f697b58fa">cc_credentials_v4</a>, a pointer to a <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html">cc_credentials_v4_t</a>. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="9d28c534b1b7c41da162f26620e92ded"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_union::credentials_v5" ref="9d28c534b1b7c41da162f26620e92ded" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#9d28c534b1b7c41da162f26620e92ded">credentials_v5</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +If <em>version</em> is <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggae76da96fff95c157c3b28c4455dc35c98335a31ad81a10632568375dcc10668">cc_credentials_v5</a>, a pointer to a <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html">cc_credentials_v5_t</a>. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="9e7108eff62e2df10a768cec653fe9c3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_union::credentials" ref="9e7108eff62e2df10a768cec653fe9c3" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">union { ... } <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__union.html#9e7108eff62e2df10a768cec653fe9c3">credentials</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The credentials. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__v4__t.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__v4__t.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..086e7fea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__v4__t.html @@ -0,0 +1,358 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_v4_t Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_v4_t Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html">cc_credentials_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_credentials_v4_t" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +If a cc_credentials_t variable is used to store Kerberos v4 credentials, then credentials.credentials_v4 points to a v4 credentials structure. This structure is similar to a krb4 API CREDENTIALS structure. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2">version</a> +<li>char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#9f819063dece13be2211723c071cc05a">principal</a> [cc_v4_name_size] +<li>char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#76949f2eaa30043f779dd32a617b36b2">principal_instance</a> [cc_v4_instance_size] +<li>char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#2034c72f7997740d1bd0526fde941f36">service</a> [cc_v4_name_size] +<li>char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#188bf95cfe0ec75c60e5df82a65ce4f1">service_instance</a> [cc_v4_instance_size] +<li>char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#1965bd82f992c9448d2600d241c11143">realm</a> [cc_v4_realm_size] +<li>unsigned char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#5833b04b0672722de1dc40148eac67ca">session_key</a> [cc_v4_key_size] +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#cee6149add6477c273b3318d6497ca0b">kvno</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#dbfece338488ae1e84f642e1675a2248">string_to_key_type</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#02d649915754b7903b7a60ef9fb9f036">issue_date</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#a546cc61e206f01e8657cc4d22e9e4cd">lifetime</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#99252d53c89be046c8ce4d12e8bb2fe4">address</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#fbf8c355fc354f976f66db1e51034d9e">ticket_size</a> +<li>unsigned char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#c4f3ef871699e35563771cfe9889c8e5">ticket</a> [cc_v4_ticket_size] +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::version" ref="2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#2d41fe5eaeafcfae38d60dae26985ac2">version</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="9f819063dece13be2211723c071cc05a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::principal" ref="9f819063dece13be2211723c071cc05a" args="[cc_v4_name_size]" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#9f819063dece13be2211723c071cc05a">principal</a>[cc_v4_name_size] </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +A properly quoted string representation of the first component of the client principal </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="76949f2eaa30043f779dd32a617b36b2"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::principal_instance" ref="76949f2eaa30043f779dd32a617b36b2" args="[cc_v4_instance_size]" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#76949f2eaa30043f779dd32a617b36b2">principal_instance</a>[cc_v4_instance_size] </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +A properly quoted string representation of the second component of the client principal </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="2034c72f7997740d1bd0526fde941f36"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::service" ref="2034c72f7997740d1bd0526fde941f36" args="[cc_v4_name_size]" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#2034c72f7997740d1bd0526fde941f36">service</a>[cc_v4_name_size] </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +A properly quoted string representation of the first component of the service principal </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="188bf95cfe0ec75c60e5df82a65ce4f1"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::service_instance" ref="188bf95cfe0ec75c60e5df82a65ce4f1" args="[cc_v4_instance_size]" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#188bf95cfe0ec75c60e5df82a65ce4f1">service_instance</a>[cc_v4_instance_size] </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +A properly quoted string representation of the second component of the service principal </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="1965bd82f992c9448d2600d241c11143"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::realm" ref="1965bd82f992c9448d2600d241c11143" args="[cc_v4_realm_size]" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#1965bd82f992c9448d2600d241c11143">realm</a>[cc_v4_realm_size] </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +A properly quoted string representation of the realm </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="5833b04b0672722de1dc40148eac67ca"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::session_key" ref="5833b04b0672722de1dc40148eac67ca" args="[cc_v4_key_size]" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">unsigned char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#5833b04b0672722de1dc40148eac67ca">session_key</a>[cc_v4_key_size] </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Ticket session key </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="cee6149add6477c273b3318d6497ca0b"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::kvno" ref="cee6149add6477c273b3318d6497ca0b" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#cee6149add6477c273b3318d6497ca0b">kvno</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Key version number </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="dbfece338488ae1e84f642e1675a2248"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::string_to_key_type" ref="dbfece338488ae1e84f642e1675a2248" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#dbfece338488ae1e84f642e1675a2248">string_to_key_type</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +String to key type used. See cc_string_to_key_type for valid values </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="02d649915754b7903b7a60ef9fb9f036"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::issue_date" ref="02d649915754b7903b7a60ef9fb9f036" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#02d649915754b7903b7a60ef9fb9f036">issue_date</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Time when the ticket was issued </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="a546cc61e206f01e8657cc4d22e9e4cd"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::lifetime" ref="a546cc61e206f01e8657cc4d22e9e4cd" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#a546cc61e206f01e8657cc4d22e9e4cd">lifetime</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Ticket lifetime in 5 minute units </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="99252d53c89be046c8ce4d12e8bb2fe4"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::address" ref="99252d53c89be046c8ce4d12e8bb2fe4" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#99252d53c89be046c8ce4d12e8bb2fe4">address</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +IPv4 address of the client the ticket was issued for </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="fbf8c355fc354f976f66db1e51034d9e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::ticket_size" ref="fbf8c355fc354f976f66db1e51034d9e" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#fbf8c355fc354f976f66db1e51034d9e">ticket_size</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Ticket size (no greater than cc_v4_ticket_size) </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="c4f3ef871699e35563771cfe9889c8e5"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v4_t::ticket" ref="c4f3ef871699e35563771cfe9889c8e5" args="[cc_v4_ticket_size]" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">unsigned char <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v4__t.html#c4f3ef871699e35563771cfe9889c8e5">ticket</a>[cc_v4_ticket_size] </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Ticket data </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__v5__t.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__v5__t.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ad0996281 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__credentials__v5__t.html @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_credentials_v5_t Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_credentials_v5_t Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html">cc_credentials_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_credentials_v5_t" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +If a cc_credentials_t variable is used to store Kerberos v5 c redentials, and then credentials.credentials_v5 points to a v5 credentials structure. This structure is similar to a krb5_creds structure. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li>char * <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#9a07d92f0eb56a4db24f14d21be5923b">client</a> +<li>char * <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#ffeefede74d4b54c220f6a43dd2beabd">server</a> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#c02ecbe79ca87f90c4f6771c330b9057">keyblock</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#43f17e3cff872e49a0d2b88deccb5c97">authtime</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#709d64dcb56e208a02f9dbd59ef703d7">starttime</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#0ebf7b3d5d28b0e9000c435af3ee9d59">endtime</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#1c710d76f8e94dc2c51e68bab258f15a">renew_till</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#7fb325cd1ddca84f9033cd2f5122e1d3">is_skey</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#c8380b3eee0768bc6c1fe8c719b72f04">ticket_flags</a> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> ** <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#80f824d334544ae2bd33c69eda1c9a09">addresses</a> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#6cf74018168214de0ea09704d9436c03">ticket</a> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#bb02ec4ece756277bceaa85626f2bc34">second_ticket</a> +<li><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> ** <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#0a8d97c740085a737b6aaec587f7fa9e">authdata</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="9a07d92f0eb56a4db24f14d21be5923b"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::client" ref="9a07d92f0eb56a4db24f14d21be5923b" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">char* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#9a07d92f0eb56a4db24f14d21be5923b">client</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +A properly quoted string representation of the client principal. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="ffeefede74d4b54c220f6a43dd2beabd"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::server" ref="ffeefede74d4b54c220f6a43dd2beabd" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">char* <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#ffeefede74d4b54c220f6a43dd2beabd">server</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +A properly quoted string representation of the service principal. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="c02ecbe79ca87f90c4f6771c330b9057"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::keyblock" ref="c02ecbe79ca87f90c4f6771c330b9057" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#c02ecbe79ca87f90c4f6771c330b9057">keyblock</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Session encryption key info. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="43f17e3cff872e49a0d2b88deccb5c97"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::authtime" ref="43f17e3cff872e49a0d2b88deccb5c97" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#43f17e3cff872e49a0d2b88deccb5c97">authtime</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The time when the ticket was issued. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="709d64dcb56e208a02f9dbd59ef703d7"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::starttime" ref="709d64dcb56e208a02f9dbd59ef703d7" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#709d64dcb56e208a02f9dbd59ef703d7">starttime</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The time when the ticket becomes valid. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="0ebf7b3d5d28b0e9000c435af3ee9d59"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::endtime" ref="0ebf7b3d5d28b0e9000c435af3ee9d59" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#0ebf7b3d5d28b0e9000c435af3ee9d59">endtime</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The time when the ticket expires. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="1c710d76f8e94dc2c51e68bab258f15a"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::renew_till" ref="1c710d76f8e94dc2c51e68bab258f15a" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ge7a754cfe5664beadddaa100646c9742">cc_time_t</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#1c710d76f8e94dc2c51e68bab258f15a">renew_till</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The time when the ticket becomes no longer renewable (if renewable). </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="7fb325cd1ddca84f9033cd2f5122e1d3"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::is_skey" ref="7fb325cd1ddca84f9033cd2f5122e1d3" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#7fb325cd1ddca84f9033cd2f5122e1d3">is_skey</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +1 if the ticket is encrypted in another ticket's key, or 0 otherwise. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="c8380b3eee0768bc6c1fe8c719b72f04"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::ticket_flags" ref="c8380b3eee0768bc6c1fe8c719b72f04" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#c8380b3eee0768bc6c1fe8c719b72f04">ticket_flags</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Ticket flags, as defined by the Kerberos 5 API. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="80f824d334544ae2bd33c69eda1c9a09"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::addresses" ref="80f824d334544ae2bd33c69eda1c9a09" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a>** <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#80f824d334544ae2bd33c69eda1c9a09">addresses</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The the list of network addresses of hosts that are allowed to authenticate using this ticket. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="6cf74018168214de0ea09704d9436c03"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::ticket" ref="6cf74018168214de0ea09704d9436c03" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#6cf74018168214de0ea09704d9436c03">ticket</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Ticket data. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="bb02ec4ece756277bceaa85626f2bc34"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::second_ticket" ref="bb02ec4ece756277bceaa85626f2bc34" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#bb02ec4ece756277bceaa85626f2bc34">second_ticket</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Second ticket data. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="0a8d97c740085a737b6aaec587f7fa9e"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_credentials_v5_t::authdata" ref="0a8d97c740085a737b6aaec587f7fa9e" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a>** <a class="el" href="structcc__credentials__v5__t.html#0a8d97c740085a737b6aaec587f7fa9e">authdata</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +Authorization data. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__data.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__data.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..346f6a41d --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__data.html @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_data Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_data Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__credentials__reference.html">cc_credentials_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_data" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +The CCAPI data structure. This structure is similar to a krb5_data structure. In a v5 credentials structure, <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html">cc_data</a> structures are used to store tagged variable-length binary data. Specifically, for cc_credentials_v5.ticket and cc_credentials_v5.second_ticket, the <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#1cfc8b2545d7999b7a760b47bfbbf6e7">cc_data.type</a> field must be zero. For the cc_credentials_v5.addresses, cc_credentials_v5.authdata, and cc_credentials_v5.keyblock, the <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#1cfc8b2545d7999b7a760b47bfbbf6e7">cc_data.type</a> field should be the address type, authorization data type, and encryption type, as defined by the Kerberos v5 protocol definition. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#1cfc8b2545d7999b7a760b47bfbbf6e7">type</a> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#61dffab9209fdc97d53c4cb31f746aa5">length</a> +<li>void * <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#735984d41155bc1032e09bece8f8d66d">data</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="1cfc8b2545d7999b7a760b47bfbbf6e7"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_data::type" ref="1cfc8b2545d7999b7a760b47bfbbf6e7" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#1cfc8b2545d7999b7a760b47bfbbf6e7">type</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The type of the data as defined by the krb5_data structure. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="61dffab9209fdc97d53c4cb31f746aa5"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_data::length" ref="61dffab9209fdc97d53c4cb31f746aa5" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#ga00783c3f4aa70580d0900b1a79aab9d">cc_uint32</a> <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#61dffab9209fdc97d53c4cb31f746aa5">length</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The length of <em>data</em>. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="735984d41155bc1032e09bece8f8d66d"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_data::data" ref="735984d41155bc1032e09bece8f8d66d" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">void* <a class="el" href="structcc__data.html#735984d41155bc1032e09bece8f8d66d">data</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +The data buffer. </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__string__d.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__string__d.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b38286b3e --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__string__d.html @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_string_d Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_string_d Struct Reference<br> +<small> +[<a class="el" href="group__cc__string__reference.html">cc_string_t Overview</a>]</small> +</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_string_d" --><h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li>const char * <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html#8f64897c7ccc5c13f276d1d07c4e7095">data</a> +<li>const <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_f</a> * <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html#002f78b173b7dd8a6925385cd11f4b0f">functions</a> +</ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="8f64897c7ccc5c13f276d1d07c4e7095"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_string_d::data" ref="8f64897c7ccc5c13f276d1d07c4e7095" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const char* <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html#8f64897c7ccc5c13f276d1d07c4e7095">data</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<a class="anchor" name="002f78b173b7dd8a6925385cd11f4b0f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_string_d::functions" ref="002f78b173b7dd8a6925385cd11f4b0f" args="" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top">const <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html">cc_string_f</a>* <a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html#002f78b173b7dd8a6925385cd11f4b0f">functions</a> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__string__f.html b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__string__f.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d5f738f49 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/ccapi/html/structcc__string__f.html @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"> +<title>Credentials Cache API : cc_string_f Struct Reference</title> +<link href="doxygen.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +<link href="tabs.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> +</head><body> +<!-- Generated by Doxygen 1.4.6 --> +<h1>cc_string_f Struct Reference</h1><!-- doxytag: class="cc_string_f" --><hr><a name="_details"></a><h2>Detailed Description</h2> +Function pointer table for cc_string_t. For more information see <a class="el" href="group__cc__string__reference.html">cc_string_t Overview</a>. +<p> +<h2>Data Fields</h2> +<ul> +<li><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html#ba3623018f7ad67de1f29f4cf1a9c66f">release</a> )(<a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> io_string) +<dl class="el"><dd class="mdescRight"><b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9bebfed2d574e69f29dd341bc8a63d9">cc_string_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_string_t object. <a href="#ba3623018f7ad67de1f29f4cf1a9c66f"></a><br></dl></ul> +<hr><h2>Field Documentation</h2> +<a class="anchor" name="ba3623018f7ad67de1f29f4cf1a9c66f"></a><!-- doxytag: member="cc_string_f::release" ref="ba3623018f7ad67de1f29f4cf1a9c66f" args=")(cc_string_t io_string)" --><p> +<table class="mdTable" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"> + <tr> + <td class="mdRow"> + <table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td class="md" nowrap valign="top"><a class="el" href="group__ccapi__types__reference.html#g0ce639c8d65dc6367fb361d5bbcea874">cc_int32</a>(* <a class="el" href="structcc__string__f.html#ba3623018f7ad67de1f29f4cf1a9c66f">release</a>)(<a class="el" href="structcc__string__d.html">cc_string_t</a> io_string) </td> + </tr> + </table> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<table cellspacing="5" cellpadding="0" border="0"> + <tr> + <td> + + </td> + <td> + +<p> +<b><a class="el" href="group__helper__macros.html#ge9bebfed2d574e69f29dd341bc8a63d9">cc_string_release()</a></b>: Release memory associated with a cc_string_t object. +<p> +<dl compact><dt><b>Parameters:</b></dt><dd> + <table border="0" cellspacing="2" cellpadding="0"> + <tr><td valign="top"></td><td valign="top"><em>io_string</em> </td><td>the string object to release. </td></tr> + </table> +</dl> +<dl compact><dt><b>Returns:</b></dt><dd>On success, <a class="el" href="group__ccapi__constants__reference.html#ggdf764cbdea00d65edcd07bb9953ad2b7386efd60970fd1740c97093a79558c26">ccNoError</a>. On failure, an error code representing the failure. </dd></dl> + </td> + </tr> +</table> +<hr size="1"><address style="align: right;"><small>Generated on Tue Oct 2 17:16:06 2007 for Credentials Cache API by +<a href="http://www.doxygen.org/index.html"> +<img src="doxygen.png" alt="doxygen" align="middle" border="0"></a> 1.4.6 </small></address> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/coding-style b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/coding-style new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2e57c2343 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/coding-style @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +Please see + + http://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Coding_style + +for the current coding style. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/conf.py b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/conf.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7c688d871 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/conf.py @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- +# +# MIT Kerberos documentation build configuration file, created by +# sphinx-quickstart on Wed Oct 13 09:14:03 2010. +# +# This file is execfile()d with the current directory set to its containing dir. +# +# Note that not all possible configuration values are present in this +# autogenerated file. +# +# All configuration values have a default; values that are commented out +# serve to show the default. + +import sys, os + +# If extensions (or modules to document with autodoc) are in another directory, +# add these directories to sys.path here. If the directory is relative to the +# documentation root, use os.path.abspath to make it absolute, like shown here. +#sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath('.')) + +# -- General configuration ----------------------------------------------------- + +# If your documentation needs a minimal Sphinx version, state it here. +#needs_sphinx = '1.0' + +# Add any Sphinx extension module names here, as strings. They can be extensions +# coming with Sphinx (named 'sphinx.ext.*') or your custom ones. +#extensions = ['sphinx.ext.autodoc', 'sphinxcontrib.doxylink'] +extensions = ['sphinx.ext.autodoc'] + +# Add any paths that contain templates here, relative to this directory. +templates_path = ['_templates'] + +# The suffix of source filenames. +source_suffix = '.rst' + +# The encoding of source files. +#source_encoding = 'utf-8-sig' + +# The master toctree document. +if 'notice' in tags: + master_doc = 'notice' +else: + master_doc = 'index' + +# General information about the project. +project = u'MIT Kerberos' +copyright = u'1985-2019, MIT' + +# The version info for the project you're documenting, acts as replacement for +# |version| and |release|, also used in various other places throughout the +# built documents. +exec(open("version.py").read()) +# The short X.Y version. +r_list = [r_major, r_minor] +if r_patch: + r_list += [r_patch] +version = '.'.join(map(str, r_list)) +# The full version, including alpha/beta/rc tags. +release = version +if r_tail: + release += '-' + r_tail + +# The language for content autogenerated by Sphinx. Refer to documentation +# for a list of supported languages. +#language = None + +# There are two options for replacing |today|: either, you set today to some +# non-false value, then it is used: +today = ' ' +# Else, today_fmt is used as the format for a strftime call. +#today_fmt = '%B %d, %Y' + +# List of patterns, relative to source directory, that match files and +# directories to ignore when looking for source files. +exclude_patterns = [] + +# The reST default role (used for this markup: `text`) to use for all documents. +#default_role = None + +# If true, '()' will be appended to :func: etc. cross-reference text. +#add_function_parentheses = True + +# If true, the current module name will be prepended to all description +# unit titles (such as .. function::). +#add_module_names = True + +# If true, sectionauthor and moduleauthor directives will be shown in the +# output. They are ignored by default. +#show_authors = False + +# The name of the Pygments (syntax highlighting) style to use. +pygments_style = 'sphinx' + +# A list of ignored prefixes for module index sorting. +#modindex_common_prefix = [] + + +# -- Options for HTML output --------------------------------------------------- + +# The theme to use for HTML and HTML Help pages. See the documentation for +# a list of builtin themes. +# html_theme = 'default' +html_theme = 'agogo' + +# Theme options are theme-specific and customize the look and feel of a theme +# further. For a list of options available for each theme, see the +# documentation. +html_theme_options = { "linkcolor": "#881f0d", "footerbg": "#5d1509", + "bgcolor": "#5d1509", "documentwidth": "80%", + "pagewidth": "auto", "sidebarwidth": "20%" } + +# Add any paths that contain custom themes here, relative to this directory. +#html_theme_path = [] + +# The name for this set of Sphinx documents. If None, it defaults to +# "<project> v<release> documentation". +html_title = "MIT Kerberos Documentation" + +# A shorter title for the navigation bar. Default is the same as html_title. +#html_short_title = None + +# The name of an image file (relative to this directory) to place at the top +# of the sidebar. +if os.environ.get('HTML_LOGO'): + html_logo = os.environ['HTML_LOGO'] + +# The name of an image file (within the static path) to use as favicon of the +# docs. This file should be a Windows icon file (.ico) being 16x16 or 32x32 +# pixels large. +#html_favicon = None + +# Add any paths that contain custom static files (such as style sheets) here, +# relative to this directory. They are copied after the builtin static files, +# so a file named "default.css" will overwrite the builtin "default.css". +html_static_path = ['_static'] + +# If not '', a 'Last updated on:' timestamp is inserted at every page bottom, +# using the given strftime format. +#html_last_updated_fmt = '%b %d, %Y' + +# If true, SmartyPants will be used to convert quotes and dashes to +# typographically correct entities. +html_use_smartypants = True + +# Custom sidebar templates, maps document names to template names. +#html_sidebars = {} + +# Additional templates that should be rendered to pages, maps page names to +# template names. +#html_additional_pages = {} + +# If false, no module index is generated. +#html_domain_indices = True + +# If false, no index is generated. +#html_use_index = True + +# If true, the index is split into individual pages for each letter. +html_split_index = True + +# If true, links to the reST sources are added to the pages. +html_show_sourcelink = False + +# If true, "Created using Sphinx" is shown in the HTML footer. Default is True. +#html_show_sphinx = True + +# If true, "(C) Copyright ..." is shown in the HTML footer. Default is True. +#html_show_copyright = True + +# If true, an OpenSearch description file will be output, and all pages will +# contain a <link> tag referring to it. The value of this option must be the +# base URL from which the finished HTML is served. +#html_use_opensearch = '' + +# This is the file name suffix for HTML files (e.g., ".xhtml"). +#html_file_suffix = None + +# Output file base name for HTML help builder. +htmlhelp_basename = 'MIT Kerberos' + +pointsize = '10pt' + +# -- Options for LaTeX output -------------------------------------------------- + +# The paper size ('letter' or 'a4'). +#latex_paper_size = 'letter' + +# The font size ('10pt', '11pt' or '12pt'). +#latex_font_size = '10pt' + +# Grouping the document tree into LaTeX files. List of tuples +# (source start file, target name, title, author, documentclass [howto/manual]). +latex_documents = [ + ('admin/index', 'admin.tex', u"Kerberos Administration Guide", u'MIT', + 'manual'), + ('appdev/index', 'appdev.tex', u"Kerberos Application Developer Guide", + u'MIT', 'manual'), + ('basic/index', 'basic.tex', u"Kerberos Concepts", u'MIT', 'manual'), + ('build/index', 'build.tex', u"Building MIT Kerberos", u'MIT', 'manual'), + ('plugindev/index', 'plugindev.tex', u"Kerberos Plugin Module Developer Guide", + u'MIT', 'manual'), + ('user/index', 'user.tex', u"Kerberos User Guide", u'MIT', 'manual') +] + +# The name of an image file (relative to this directory) to place at the top of +# the title page. +#latex_logo = None + +# For "manual" documents, if this is true, then toplevel headings are parts, +# not chapters. +#latex_use_parts = False + +# If true, show page references after internal links. +#latex_show_pagerefs = False + +# If true, show URL addresses after external links. +#latex_show_urls = False + +# Additional stuff for the LaTeX preamble. +#latex_preamble = '' + +# Documents to append as an appendix to all manuals. +#latex_appendices = [] + +# If false, no module index is generated. +#latex_domain_indices = True + +if 'mansubs' in tags: + bindir = '``@BINDIR@``' + sbindir = '``@SBINDIR@``' + libdir = '``@LIBDIR@``' + localstatedir = '``@LOCALSTATEDIR@``' + runstatedir = '``@RUNSTATEDIR@``' + sysconfdir = '``@SYSCONFDIR@``' + ccache = '``@CCNAME@``' + keytab = '``@KTNAME@``' + ckeytab = '``@CKTNAME@``' +elif 'pathsubs' in tags: + # Read configured paths from a file produced by the build system. + exec(open("paths.py").read()) +else: + bindir = ':ref:`BINDIR <paths>`' + sbindir = ':ref:`SBINDIR <paths>`' + libdir = ':ref:`LIBDIR <paths>`' + localstatedir = ':ref:`LOCALSTATEDIR <paths>`' + runstatedir = ':ref:`RUNSTATEDIR <paths>`' + sysconfdir = ':ref:`SYSCONFDIR <paths>`' + ccache = ':ref:`DEFCCNAME <paths>`' + keytab = ':ref:`DEFKTNAME <paths>`' + ckeytab = ':ref:`DEFCKTNAME <paths>`' + +rst_epilog = '\n' + +if 'notice' in tags: + exclude_patterns = [ 'admin', 'appdev', 'basic', 'build', + 'plugindev', 'user' ] + exclude_patterns += [ 'about.rst', 'build_this.rst', 'copyright.rst', + 'index.rst', 'mitK5*.rst', 'resources.rst' ] + rst_epilog += '.. |copy| replace:: \(C\)' +else: + exclude_patterns += [ 'notice.rst' ] + rst_epilog += '.. |bindir| replace:: %s\n' % bindir + rst_epilog += '.. |sbindir| replace:: %s\n' % sbindir + rst_epilog += '.. |libdir| replace:: %s\n' % libdir + rst_epilog += '.. |kdcdir| replace:: %s\\ ``/krb5kdc``\n' % localstatedir + rst_epilog += '.. |kdcrundir| replace:: %s\\ ``/krb5kdc``\n' % runstatedir + rst_epilog += '.. |sysconfdir| replace:: %s\n' % sysconfdir + rst_epilog += '.. |ccache| replace:: %s\n' % ccache + rst_epilog += '.. |keytab| replace:: %s\n' % keytab + rst_epilog += '.. |ckeytab| replace:: %s\n' % ckeytab + rst_epilog += ''' +.. |krb5conf| replace:: ``/etc/krb5.conf`` +.. |defkeysalts| replace:: ``aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:normal`` +.. |defetypes| replace:: ``aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96 aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 aes128-cts-hmac-sha256-128 des3-cbc-sha1 arcfour-hmac-md5 camellia256-cts-cmac camellia128-cts-cmac des-cbc-crc des-cbc-md5 des-cbc-md4`` +.. |defmkey| replace:: ``aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96`` +.. |copy| unicode:: U+000A9 +''' + +# -- Options for manual page output -------------------------------------------- + +# One entry per manual page. List of tuples +# (source start file, name, description, authors, manual section). +man_pages = [ + ('user/user_commands/kinit', 'kinit', u'obtain and cache Kerberos ticket-granting ticket', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_commands/klist', 'klist', u'list cached Kerberos tickets', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_commands/kdestroy', 'kdestroy', u'destroy Kerberos tickets', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_commands/kswitch', 'kswitch', u'switch primary ticket cache', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_commands/kpasswd', 'kpasswd', u'change a user\'s Kerberos password', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_commands/kvno', 'kvno', u'print key version numbers of Kerberos principals', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_commands/ksu', 'ksu', u'Kerberized super-user', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_commands/krb5-config', 'krb5-config', u'tool for linking against MIT Kerberos libraries', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('user/user_config/k5login', 'k5login', u'Kerberos V5 acl file for host access', [u'MIT'], 5), + ('user/user_config/k5identity', 'k5identity', u'Kerberos V5 client principal selection rules', [u'MIT'], 5), + ('user/user_config/kerberos', 'kerberos', u'Overview of using Kerberos', [u'MIT'], 7), + ('admin/admin_commands/krb5kdc', 'krb5kdc', u'Kerberos V5 KDC', [u'MIT'], 8), + ('admin/admin_commands/kadmin_local', 'kadmin', u'Kerberos V5 database administration program', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('admin/admin_commands/kprop', 'kprop', u'propagate a Kerberos V5 principal database to a replica server', [u'MIT'], 8), + ('admin/admin_commands/kproplog', 'kproplog', u'display the contents of the Kerberos principal update log', [u'MIT'], 8), + ('admin/admin_commands/kpropd', 'kpropd', u'Kerberos V5 replica KDC update server', [u'MIT'], 8), + ('admin/admin_commands/kdb5_util', 'kdb5_util', u'Kerberos database maintenance utility', [u'MIT'], 8), + ('admin/admin_commands/ktutil', 'ktutil', u'Kerberos keytab file maintenance utility', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('admin/admin_commands/k5srvutil', 'k5srvutil', u'host key table (keytab) manipulation utility', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('admin/admin_commands/kadmind', 'kadmind', u'KADM5 administration server', [u'MIT'], 8), + ('admin/admin_commands/kdb5_ldap_util', 'kdb5_ldap_util', u'Kerberos configuration utility', [u'MIT'], 8), + ('admin/conf_files/krb5_conf', 'krb5.conf', u'Kerberos configuration file', [u'MIT'], 5), + ('admin/conf_files/kdc_conf', 'kdc.conf', u'Kerberos V5 KDC configuration file', [u'MIT'], 5), + ('admin/conf_files/kadm5_acl', 'kadm5.acl', u'Kerberos ACL file', [u'MIT'], 5), + ('user/user_commands/sclient', 'sclient', u'sample Kerberos version 5 client', [u'MIT'], 1), + ('admin/admin_commands/sserver', 'sserver', u'sample Kerberos version 5 server', [u'MIT'], 8), +] diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/contributing.txt b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/contributing.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..776c5d58d --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/contributing.txt @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ + Contributing to MIT Kerberos + +DESIGN +====== + +If you are planning to contribute a substantial amount of work, please +ensure that you have a discussion about the design on the +krbdev@mit.edu list. Some changes may require coordination with +standards groups. For example, interface changes and extensions for +the GSS-API should be discussed in the IETF KITTEN Working Group. + +STYLE +===== + +Please follow the guidelines in doc/coding-style for new code. For +existing code, please preserve its existing indentation and brace +conventions. These existing conventions usually resemble the +guidelines in doc/coding-style. Exceptions to the style in +doc/coding-style are usually large past contributions or imports from +other parties. These include (not an exhaustive list): + + src/appl/bsd + src/appl/gssftp + src/appl/telnet + src/kadmin + src/lib/kadm5 + src/lib/gssapi/mechglue + src/lib/rpc + +PATCHES +======= + +We prefer patches in either unified or context diff format (diff -u or +diff -c). As is usual practice, please specify the original file +before the modified file on the diff command line. It's also useful +to perform the diff from the top level of the tree, e.g., + + diff -ur src.orig src + +It's even more useful if you use our anonymous Subversion repository +at + + svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5 + +and use "svn diff" (or "svk diff" if you prefer to use SVK) to +generate your patches. + +It is much easier for us to integrate patches which are generated +against current code on the trunk. Please ensure that your source +tree is up-to-date before generating your patch. + +COPYRIGHT +========= + +If you are submitting substantial quantities of new code, or are +substantially modifying existing code, please be clear about the +copyright status of your contributions. Note that if your +contribution was created in the course of your employment, your +employer may own copyright in your contribution. + +We prefer that MIT receives the ownership of the contributions, but +will generally accept contributed code with copyright owned by other +parties provided that the license conditions are substantially +identical to the existing license on the MIT krb5 code. + +Appropriate copyright notices and license terms should be added to new +or changed files, unless the contributed code is being assigned to the +already-listed copyright holder in the file, or the contribution is +being released to the public domain. Please make sure that the +year in the copyright statement is kept up-to-date. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/copyright.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/copyright.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3a596582c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/copyright.rst @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +Copyright +========= + +Copyright |copy| 1985-2019 by the Massachusetts Institute of +Technology and its contributors. All rights reserved. + +See :ref:`mitK5license` for additional copyright and license +information. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/cc_set_config.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/cc_set_config.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..838ff7e22 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/cc_set_config.c @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/** @example cc_set_config.c + * + * Usage examples for krb5_cc_set_config and krb5_cc_get_config functions + */ +#include <k5-int.h> + +krb5_error_code +func_set(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, + krb5_const_principal principal, const char *key) +{ + krb5_data config_data; + + config_data.data = "yes"; + config_data.length = strlen(config_data.data); + return krb5_cc_set_config(context, id, principal, key, &config_data); +} + +krb5_error_code +func_get(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache id, + krb5_const_principal principal, const char *key) +{ + krb5_data config_data; + krb5_error_code ret; + + config_data.data = NULL; + ret = krb5_cc_get_config(context, id, principal, key, &config_data); + if (ret){ + return ret; + } + /* do something */ + krb5_free_data_contents(context, &config_data); + return ret; +} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/cc_unique.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/cc_unique.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0a03edb52 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/cc_unique.c @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/** @example cc_unique.c + * + * Usage example for krb5_cc_new_unique function + */ +#include "k5-int.h" + +krb5_error_code +func(krb5_context context) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + + ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(context, "MEMORY", NULL, &ccache); + if (ret){ + ccache = NULL; + return ret; + } + /* do something */ + if (ccache) + (void)krb5_cc_destroy(context, ccache); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/error_message.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/error_message.c new file mode 100755 index 000000000..1e1569760 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/error_message.c @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/** @example error_message.c + * + * Demo for krb5_get/set/free_error_message function family + */ +#include <k5-int.h> + +krb5_error_code +func(krb5_context context) +{ + krb5_error_code ret; + + ret = krb5_func(context); + if (ret) { + const char *err_str = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret); + krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, + "Failed krb5_func: %s", err_str); + krb5_free_error_message(context, err_str); + } +} + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/tkt_creds.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/tkt_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ddf5cc8e --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/tkt_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/** @example tkt_creds.c + * + * Usage example for krb5_tkt_creds function family + */ +#include "krb5.h" + +krb5_error_code +func(krb5_context context, krb5_flags options, + krb5_ccache ccache, krb5_creds *in_creds, + krb5_creds **out_creds) +{ + krb5_error_code code = KRB5_OK; + krb5_creds *ncreds = NULL; + krb5_tkt_creds_context ctx = NULL; + + *out_creds = NULL; + + /* Allocate a container. */ + ncreds = k5alloc(sizeof(*ncreds), &code); + if (ncreds == NULL) + goto cleanup; + + /* Make and execute a krb5_tkt_creds context to get the credential. */ + code = krb5_tkt_creds_init(context, ccache, in_creds, options, &ctx); + if (code != KRB5_OK) + goto cleanup; + code = krb5_tkt_creds_get(context, ctx); + if (code != KRB5_OK) + goto cleanup; + code = krb5_tkt_creds_get_creds(context, ctx, ncreds); + if (code != KRB5_OK) + goto cleanup; + + *out_creds = ncreds; + ncreds = NULL; + +cleanup: + krb5_free_creds(context, ncreds); + krb5_tkt_creds_free(context, ctx); + return code; +} + +/* Allocate zeroed memory; set *code to 0 on success or ENOMEM on failure. */ +static inline void * +k5alloc(size_t len, krb5_error_code *code) +{ + void *ptr; + + /* Allocate at least one byte since zero-byte allocs may return NULL. */ + ptr = calloc((len > 0) ? len : 1, 1); + *code = (ptr == NULL) ? ENOMEM : 0; + return ptr; +} + + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/verify_init_creds.c b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/verify_init_creds.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c22e25284 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/doxy_examples/verify_init_creds.c @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/** @example verify_init_creds.c + * + * Usage example for krb5_verify_init_creds function family + */ +#include "k5-int.h" + +krb5_error_code +func(krb5_context context, krb5_creds *creds, krb5_principal server_principal) +{ + krb5_error_code ret = KRB5_OK; + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt options; + + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init (&options); + krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_set_ap_req_nofail (&options, 1); + + ret = krb5_verify_init_creds(context, + creds, + server_principal, + NULL /* use default keytab */, + NULL /* don't store creds in ccache */, + &options); + if (ret) { + /* error while verifying credentials for server */ + } + + return ret; +} + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/ccache_file_format.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/ccache_file_format.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6349e0d29 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/ccache_file_format.rst @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +.. _ccache_file_format: + +Credential cache file format +============================ + +There are four versions of the file format used by the FILE credential +cache type. The first byte of the file always has the value 5, and +the value of the second byte contains the version number (1 through +4). Versions 1 and 2 of the file format use native byte order for integer +representations. Versions 3 and 4 always use big-endian byte order. + +After the two-byte version indicator, the file has three parts: the +header (in version 4 only), the default principal name, and a sequence +of credentials. + + +Header format +------------- + +The header appears only in format version 4. It begins with a 16-bit +integer giving the length of the entire header, followed by a sequence +of fields. Each field consists of a 16-bit tag, a 16-bit length, and +a value of the given length. A file format implementation should +ignore fields with unknown tags. + +At this time there is only one defined header field. Its tag value is +1, its length is always 8, and its contents are two 32-bit integers +giving the seconds and microseconds of the time offset of the KDC +relative to the client. Adding this offset to the current time on the +client should give the current time on the KDC, if that offset has not +changed since the initial authentication. + + +.. _cache_principal_format: + +Principal format +---------------- + +The default principal is marshalled using the following informal +grammar:: + + principal ::= + name type (32 bits) [omitted in version 1] + count of components (32 bits) [includes realm in version 1] + realm (data) + component1 (data) + component2 (data) + ... + + data ::= + length (32 bits) + value (length bytes) + +There is no external framing on the default principal, so it must be +parsed according to the above grammar in order to find the sequence of +credentials which follows. + + +.. _ccache_credential_format: + +Credential format +----------------- + +The credential format uses the following informal grammar (referencing +the ``principal`` and ``data`` types from the previous section):: + + credential ::= + client (principal) + server (principal) + keyblock (keyblock) + authtime (32 bits) + starttime (32 bits) + endtime (32 bits) + renew_till (32 bits) + is_skey (1 byte, 0 or 1) + ticket_flags (32 bits) + addresses (addresses) + authdata (authdata) + ticket (data) + second_ticket (data) + + keyblock ::= + enctype (16 bits) [repeated twice in version 3] + data + + addresses ::= + count (32 bits) + address1 + address2 + ... + + address ::= + addrtype (16 bits) + data + + authdata ::= + count (32 bits) + authdata1 + authdata2 + ... + + authdata ::= + ad_type (16 bits) + data + +There is no external framing on a marshalled credential, so it must be +parsed according to the above grammar in order to find the next +credential. There is also no count of credentials or marker at the +end of the sequence of credentials; the sequence ends when the file +ends. + + +Credential cache configuration entries +-------------------------------------- + +Configuration entries are encoded as credential entries. The client +principal of the entry is the default principal of the cache. The +server principal has the realm ``X-CACHECONF:`` and two or three +components, the first of which is ``krb5_ccache_conf_data``. The +server principal's second component is the configuration key. The +third component, if it exists, is a principal to which the +configuration key is associated. The configuration value is stored in +the ticket field of the entry. All other entry fields are zeroed. + +Programs using credential caches must be aware of configuration +entries for several reasons: + +* A program which displays the contents of a cache should not + generally display configuration entries. + +* The ticket field of a configuration entry is not (usually) a valid + encoding of a Kerberos ticket. An implementation must not treat the + cache file as malformed if it cannot decode the ticket field. + +* Configuration entries have an endtime field of 0 and might therefore + always be considered expired, but they should not be treated as + unimportant as a result. For instance, a program which copies + credentials from one cache to another should not omit configuration + entries because of the endtime. + +The following configuration keys are currently used in MIT krb5: + +fast_avail + The presence of this key with a non-empty value indicates that the + KDC asserted support for FAST (see :rfc:`6113`) during the initial + authentication, using the negotiation method described in + :rfc:`6806` section 11. This key is not associated with any + principal. + +pa_config_data + The value of this key contains a JSON object representation of + parameters remembered by the preauthentication mechanism used + during the initial authentication. These parameters may be used + when refreshing credentials. This key is associated with the + server principal of the initial authentication (usually the local + krbtgt principal of the client realm). + +pa_type + The value of this key is the ASCII decimal representation of the + preauth type number used during the initial authentication. This + key is associated with the server principal of the initial + authentication. + +proxy_impersonator + The presence of this key indicates that the cache is a synthetic + delegated credential for use with S4U2Proxy. The value is the + name of the intermediate service whose TGT can be used to make + S4U2Proxy requests for target services. This key is not + associated with any principal. + +refresh_time + The presence of this key indicates that the cache was acquired by + the GSS mechanism using a client keytab. The value is the ASCII + decimal representation of a timestamp at which the GSS mechanism + should attempt to refresh the credential cache from the client + keytab. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/cookie.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/cookie.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e32365daa --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/cookie.rst @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +KDC cookie format +================= + +:rfc:`6113` section 5.2 specifies a pa-data type PA-FX-COOKIE, which +clients are required to reflect back to the KDC during +pre-authentication. The MIT krb5 KDC uses the following formats for +cookies. + + +Trivial cookie (version 0) +-------------------------- + +If there is no pre-authentication mechanism state information to save, +a trivial cookie containing the value "MIT" is used. A trivial cookie +is needed to indicate that the conversation can continue. + + +Secure cookie (version 1) +------------------------- + +In release 1.14 and later, a secure cookie can be sent if there is any +mechanism state to save for the next request. A secure cookie +contains the concatenation of the following: + +* the four bytes "MIT1" +* a four-byte big-endian kvno value +* an :rfc:`3961` ciphertext + +The ciphertext is encrypted in the cookie key with key usage +number 513. The cookie key is derived from a key in the local krbtgt +principal entry for the realm (e.g. ``krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM@KRBTEST.COM`` +if the request is to the ``KRBTEST.COM`` realm). The first krbtgt key +for the indicated kvno value is combined with the client principal as +follows:: + + cookie-key <- random-to-key(PRF+(tgt-key, "COOKIE" | client-princ)) + +where **random-to-key** is the :rfc:`3961` random-to-key operation for +the krbtgt key's encryption type, **PRF+** is defined in :rfc:`6113`, +and ``|`` denotes concatenation. *client-princ* is the request client +principal name with realm, marshalled according to :rfc:`1964` section +2.1.1. + +The plain text of the encrypted part of a cookie is the DER encoding +of the following ASN.1 type:: + + SecureCookie ::= SEQUENCE { + time INTEGER, + data SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA, + ... + } + +The time field represents the cookie creation time; for brevity, it is +encoded as an integer giving the POSIX timestamp rather than as an +ASN.1 GeneralizedTime value. The data field contains one element for +each pre-authentication type which requires saved state. For +mechanisms which have separate request and reply types, the request +type is used; this allows the KDC to determine whether a cookie is +relevant to a request by comparing the request pa-data types to the +cookie data types. + +SPAKE cookie format (version 1) +------------------------------- + +Inside the SecureCookie wrapper, a data value of type 151 contains +state for SPAKE pre-authentication. This data is the concatenation of +the following: + +* a two-byte big-endian version number with the value 1 +* a two-byte big-endian stage number +* a four-byte big-endian group number +* a four-byte big-endian length and data for the SPAKE value +* a four-byte big-endian length and data for the transcript hash +* zero or more second factor records, each consisting of: + - a four-byte big-endian second-factor type + - a four-byte big-endian length and data + +The stage value is 0 if the cookie was sent with a challenge message. +Otherwise it is 1 for the first encdata message sent by the KDC during +an exchange, 2 for the second, etc.. + +The group value indicates the group number used in the SPAKE challenge. + +For a stage-0 cookie, the SPAKE value is the KDC private key, +represented in the scalar marshalling form of the group. For other +cookies, the SPAKE value is the SPAKE result K, represented in the +group element marshalling form. + +For a stage-0 cookie, the transcript hash is the intermediate hash +after updating with the client support message (if one was sent) and +challenge. For other cookies it is the final hash. + +For a stage-0 cookie, there may be any number of second-factor +records, including none; a second-factor type need not create a state +field if it does not need one, and no record is created for SF-NONE. +For other cookies, there must be exactly one second-factor record +corresponding to the factor type chosen by the client. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/freshness_token.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/freshness_token.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3127621a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/freshness_token.rst @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +PKINIT freshness tokens +======================= + +:rfc:`8070` specifies a pa-data type PA_AS_FRESHNESS, which clients +should reflect within signed PKINIT data to prove recent access to the +client certificate private key. The contents of a freshness token are +left to the KDC implementation. The MIT krb5 KDC uses the following +format for freshness tokens (starting in release 1.17): + +* a four-byte big-endian POSIX timestamp +* a four-byte big-endian key version number +* an :rfc:`3961` checksum, with no ASN.1 wrapper + +The checksum is computed using the first key in the local krbtgt +principal entry for the realm (e.g. ``krbtgt/KRBTEST.COM@KRBTEST.COM`` +if the request is to the ``KRBTEST.COM`` realm) of the indicated key +version. The checksum type must be the mandatory checksum type for +the encryption type of the krbtgt key. The key usage value for the +checksum is 514. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4ad534424 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +Protocols and file formats +========================== + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + ccache_file_format + keytab_file_format + cookie + freshness_token diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/keytab_file_format.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/keytab_file_format.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8424d058f --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/formats/keytab_file_format.rst @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +.. _keytab_file_format: + +Keytab file format +================== + +There are two versions of the file format used by the FILE keytab +type. The first byte of the file always has the value 5, and the +value of the second byte contains the version number (1 or 2). +Version 1 of the file format uses native byte order for integer +representations. Version 2 always uses big-endian byte order. + +After the two-byte version indicator, the file contains a sequence of +signed 32-bit record lengths followed by key records or holes. A +positive record length indicates a valid key entry whose size is equal +to or less than the record length. A negative length indicates a +zero-filled hole whose size is the inverse of the length. A length of +0 indicates the end of the file. + + +Key entry format +---------------- + +A key entry may be smaller in size than the record length which +precedes it, because it may have replaced a hole which is larger than +the key entry. Key entries use the following informal grammar:: + + entry ::= + principal + timestamp (32 bits) + key version (8 bits) + enctype (16 bits) + key length (16 bits) + key contents + key version (32 bits) [in release 1.14 and later] + + principal ::= + count of components (16 bits) [includes realm in version 1] + realm (data) + component1 (data) + component2 (data) + ... + name type (32 bits) [omitted in version 1] + + data ::= + length (16 bits) + value (length bytes) + +The 32-bit key version overrides the 8-bit key version. To determine +if it is present, the implementation must check that at least 4 bytes +remain in the record after the other fields are read, and that the +value of the 32-bit integer contained in those bytes is non-zero. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..543a9d1b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +MIT Kerberos Documentation (|release|) +====================================== + + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + user/index.rst + admin/index.rst + appdev/index.rst + plugindev/index.rst + build/index.rst + basic/index.rst + formats/index.rst + mitK5features.rst + build_this.rst + about.rst + resources diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/iprop-notes.txt b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/iprop-notes.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..722b0392e --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/iprop-notes.txt @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +Some (intentional) changes from Sun's submission are noted in the +install guide. + +Bugs or issues: + +The "full resync" part of the protocol involves the master side firing +off a normal kprop (and going back to servicing requests), and the +replica side stopping all the incremental propagation stuff and +waiting for the kprop. If the connection from the master never comes +in for some reason, the replica side just blocks forever, and never +resumes incremental propagation. + +The protocol does not currently pass policy database changes; this was +an intentional decision on Sun's part. The policy database is only +relevant to the master KDC, and is usually fairly static (aside from +refcount updates), but not propagating it does mean that a replica +maintained via iprop can't simply be promoted to a master in disaster +recovery or other cases without doing a full propagation or restoring +a database from backups. + +Shawn had a good suggestion after I started the integration work, and +which I haven't had a chance to implement: Make the update-log code +fit in as a sort of pseudo-database layer via the DAL, being called +through the standard DAL methods, and doing its work around calls +through to the real database back end again through the DAL methods. +So for example, creating a "iprop+db2" database would create an update +log and the real db2 database; storing a principal entry would update +the update log as well; etc. At least initially, we wouldn't treat it +as a differently-named database; the installation of the hooks would +be done by explicitly checking if iprop is enabled, etc. + +The "iprop role" is assumed to be either master or replica. The +master writes a log, and the replica fetches it. But what about a +cascade propagation model where A sends to B which sends to C, perhaps +because A's bandwidth is highly limited, or B and C are co-located? +In such a case, B would want to operate in both modes. Granted, with +iprop the bandwidth issues should be less important, but there may +still be reasons one may wish to run in such a configuration. + +The propagation of changes does not happen in real time. It's not a +"push" protocol; the replicas poll periodically for changes. Perhaps +a future revision of the protocol could address that. + +kadmin/cli/kadmin.c call to kadm5_init_iprop - is this needed in +client-side program? Should it be done in libkadm5srv instead as part +of the existing kadm5_init* so that database-accessing applications +that don't get updated at the source level will automatically start +changing the update log as needed? + +Locking: Currently DAL exports the DB locking interface to the caller; +we want to slip the iprop code in between -- run it plus the DB update +operation with the DB lock held, whether or not the caller grabbed the +lock. (Does the caller always grab the lock before making changes?) +Currently we're using a file lock on the update log itself; this will +be independent of whether the DB back end implements locking (which +may be a good thing or a bad thing, depending). + +Various logging calls with odd format strings like "<null>" should be +fixed. + +Why are different principal names used, when incremental propagation +requires that normal kprop (which uses host principals) be possible +anyways? + +Why is this tied to kadmind, aside from (a) wanting to prevent other +db changes, which locking protocols should deal with anyways, (b) +existing acl code, (c) existing server process? + +The incremental propagation protocol requires an ACL entry on the +master, listing the replica. Since the full-resync part uses normal +kprop, the replica also has to have an ACL entry for the master. If +this is missing, I suspect the behavior will be that every two +minutes, the master side will (at the prompting of the replica) dump +out the database and attempt a full propagation. + +Possible optimizations: If an existing dump file has a recent enough +serial number, just send it, without dumping again? Use just one dump +file instead of one per replica? + +Requiring normal kprop means the replica still can't be behind a NAT +or firewall without special configuration. The incremental parts can +work in such a configuration, so long as outgoing TCP connections are +allowed. + +Still limited to IPv4 because of limitations in MIT's version of the +RPC code. (This could be fixed for kprop, if IPv6 sites want to do +full propagation only. Doing incremental propagation over IPv6 will +take work on the RPC library, and probably introduce +backwards-incompatible ABI changes.) + +Overflow checks for ulogentries times block size? + +If file can't be made the size indicated by ulogentries, shoud we +truncate or error out? If we error out, this could blow out when +resizing the log because of a too-large log entry. + +The kprop invocation doesn't specify a realm name, so it'll only work +for the default realm. No clean way to specify a port number, either. +Would it be overkill to come up with a way to configure host+port for +kpropd on the master? Preferably in a way that'd support cascading +propagations. + +The kadmind process, when it needs to run kprop, extracts the replica +host name from the client principal name. It assumes that the +principal name will be of the form foo/hostname@REALM, and looks +specifically for the "/" and "@" to chop up the string form of the +name. If looking up that name won't give a working IPv4 address for +the replica, kprop will fail (and kpropd will keep waiting, +incremental updates will stop, etc). + +Mapping between file offsets and structure addresses, we should be +careful about alignment. We're probably okay on current platforms, +but if we break log-format compatibility with Sun at some point, use +the chance to make the kdb_ent_header_t offsets be more strictly +aligned in the file. (16 or 32 bytes?) + +Not thread safe! The kdb5.c code will get a lock on the update log +file while making changes, but the lock is per-process. Currently +there are no processes I know of that use multiple threads and change +the database. (There's the Novell patch to make the KDC +multithreaded, but the kdc-kdb-update option doesn't currently +compile.) + +Logging in kpropd is poor to useless. If there are any problems, run +it in debug mode ("-d"). You'll still lose all output from the +invocation of kdb5_util dump and kprop run out of kadmind. + +Other man page updates needed: Anything with new -x options. + +Comments from lha: + +Verify both client and server are demanding privacy from RPC. + +Authorization code in check_iprop_rpcsec_auth is weird. Check realm +checking, is it trusting the client realm length? + +What will happen if my realm is named "A" and I can get a cross realm +(though multihop) to ATHENA.MIT.EDU's iprop server? + +Why is the ACL not applied before we get to the functions themselves? diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5-errmsg.txt b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5-errmsg.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..76404bcaa --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5-errmsg.txt @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +Proposed approach for passing more detailed error messages across the +kadm5 API: + +We've already got too many init functions and too many options. +Multiplying the number of init functions isn't feasible. + +Create an (opaque to application) init-options type, create/destroy +functions for it, set-creds/set-keytab/set-password functions, and a +kadm5-init-with-options function. (Optional: Reimplement the current +init functions as wrappers around these.) + +Add a set-context function which saves away in the init-options object +a krb5_context to be used in the new server handle instead of creating +a new one. (Destroying a server handle with such a "borrowed" krb5 +context should probably not destroy the context.) Calls within the +library should store any error messages in the context contained in +the server handle. Error messages produced during initialization +should also be stored in this context. + +The caller of these functions can use krb5_get_error_message to +extract the text of the error message from the supplied context. + +Unless we determine it's safe, we should probably assert (for now) +that each server handle must have a different context. (That's aside +from the thread safety issues.) + +These contexts should have been created with kadm5_init_krb5_context, +which will decide whether to look at the KDC config file depending on +whether you're using the client-side or server-side version of the +library. (Same as for kadmin vs kadmin.local.) + +Notes: + + * The existing API must continue to work, without changes. There is + external code we need to continue to support. + + * We considered a variant where the application could retrieve the + error message from the server handle using a new + kadm5_get_error_message function. However, the initialization code + is one likely place where the errors would occur (can't + authenticate, etc), and in that case, there is no server handle + from which to extract the context. + + A function to retrieve the library-created krb5_context from the + server handle would have the same problem. + + Using a separate approach to deal with errors at initialization + time, in combination with the above, might work. But we still wind + up either creating the init-with-options interface or adding + error-message-return variants of multiple existing init functions. + +To do: + + * Write up specifics (including function names -- the names used here + aren't meant to be definitive) and discuss on krbdev. + + * Implement library part. + + * Change kadmin and kdc to use it. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/adb-unit-test.tex b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/adb-unit-test.tex new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d401342df --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/adb-unit-test.tex @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +\documentstyle[times,fullpage,rcsid]{article} + +\rcs$Id$ + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Make _ actually generate an _, and allow line-breaking after it. +\let\underscore=\_ +\catcode`_=13 +\def_{\underscore\penalty75\relax} +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +\newcommand{\test}[1]{\begin{description} +\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt} +#1 +\end{description} + +} + +\newcommand{\numtest}[2]{\begin{description} +\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt} +\Number{#1} +#2 +\end{description} + +} + +\newcommand{\Number}[1]{\item[Number:] #1} +\newcommand{\Reason}[1]{\item[Reason:] #1} +%\newcommand{\Call}[1]{\item[Call:] #1} +\newcommand{\Expected}[1]{\item[Expected:] #1} +\newcommand{\Conditions}[1]{\item[Conditions:] #1} +\newcommand{\Priority}[1]{\item[Priority:] #1} +\newcommand{\Status}[1]{\item[Status:] #1} +%\newcommand{\Number}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Reason}[1]{} +\newcommand{\Call}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Expected}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Conditions}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Priority}[1]{} + +\title{OpenV*Secure Admin Database API\\ +Unit Test Description\footnote{\rcsId}} +\author{Jonathan I. Kamens} + +\begin{document} + +\maketitle + +%\tableofcontents + +\section{Introduction} + +The following is a description of a black-box unit test of the +OpenV*Secure Admin Database API (osa_adb). Each API function is +listed, followed by the tests that shoud be performed on it. + +The tests described here are based on the ``OV*Secure Admin Server +Implementation Design'' revision 1.14. + +\section{osa_adb_get_lock and osa_adb_release_lock} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{A shared lock can be acquired.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{An exclusive lock can be acquired and released.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{A permanent lock can be acquired and released.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Attempting to release a lock when none is held fails with +NOTLOCKED.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{Two processes can both acquire a shared lock.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Reason{An attempt to acquire a shared lock while another process holds an +exclusive lock fails with CANTLOCK_DB.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{An attempt to acquire an exclusive lock while another process holds a +shared lock fails with CANTLOCK_DB.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{An attempt to open the database while a process holds a +permanent lock fails with NO_LOCKFILE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Reason{An attempt to acquire an exclusive lock while a process holds a +permanent lock fails with NO_LOCKFILE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Reason{Acquiring a permanent lock deletes the lockfile.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Reason{Releasing a permanent lock re-creates the lockfile.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Reason{A process can perform a get operation while another process holds a +shared lock.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Reason{A process that is running and has opened the adb principal database +can retrieve a principal created after the open occurred.} +\Status{Implemented, but not working} +} + +\end{document} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-funcspec.tex b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-funcspec.tex new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c13090a51 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-funcspec.tex @@ -0,0 +1,2014 @@ +\documentstyle[12pt,fullpage,rcsid]{article} + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Make _ actually generate an _, and allow line-breaking after it. +\let\underscore=\_ +\catcode`_=13 +\def_{\underscore\penalty75\relax} +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +\rcs$Id$ + +\setlength{\parskip}{.7\baselineskip} +\setlength{\parindent}{0pt} + +\def\v#1{\verb+#1+} + +\title{Kerberos Administration System \\ + KADM5 API Functional Specifications\thanks{\rcsId}} +\author{Barry Jaspan} + +\begin{document} + +\sloppy +\maketitle + +{\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}\tableofcontents} + +\section{Introduction} + +This document describes the Admin API that can be used to maintain +principals and policies. It describes the data structures used for +each function and the interpretation of each data type field, the +semantics of each API function, and the possible return codes. + +The Admin API is intended to be used by remote clients using an RPC +interface. It is implemented by the admin server running on the +Kerberos master server. It is also possible for a program running on +the Kerberos master server to use the Admin API directly, without +going through the admin server. + +\section{Versions of the API} + +The versions of this API and a brief description of the changes for +each are: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_API_VERSION_1] The initial version of this API, written by +OpenVision Technologies and donated to MIT for including in the public +release. Originally called OVSEC_KADM_API_VERSION_1. Most everything +has been renamed in one way or another, including functions, header +files, and data structures. Where possible, the old OVSEC_KADM names +have been left behind for compatibility with version 1, and +KADM5_API_VERSION_1 is compatible with OVSEC_KADM_API_VERSION_1 at +compile-, link-, and run-time. + +The OVSEC_KADM name compatibility will not be extended to new +functionality in future versions because no existing OVSEC_KADM +clients will use that functionality; new clients should be written to +the KADM5 API. + +\item[KADM5_API_VERSION_2] This version contains the initial changes +necessary to make the OpenVision administration system work with the +mid-1996 MIT version of Kerberos 5. Changes include +\begin{enumerate} +\item The kadm5_init functions now take a structure of parameters +instead of just a realm name, allowing the calling program to specify +non-default values for various configuration options. See section +\ref{sec:configparams} for details. + +\item The KADM5 API has been extended to support new features of the +Kerberos database, including multiple encryption and salt types per +principal. See section \ref{sec:keys} for details. + +\item kadm5_get_principal now allows a principal's keys to be +retrieved {\it by local clients only}. This is necessary in order for +the kadm5 API to provide the primary Kerberos database interface. + +\item The KADM5 authorization system has been completely changed. + +\item The functions kadm5_flush, kadm5_get_principals, and +kadm5_get_policies have been added. + +\item The KADM5 API now obeys a caller-allocates rather than +callee-allocates system. kadm5_get_principal and kadm5_get_policy are +affected. +\end{enumerate} +\end{description} + +\section{Policies and Password Quality} + +The Admin API Password Quality mechanism provides the following +controls. Note that two strings are defined to be ``significantly +different'' if they differ by at least one character. The compare is not +case sensitive. + +\begin{itemize} +\item A minimum length can be required; a password with +fewer than the specified number of characters will not be accepted. + +\item A minimum number of character classes can be required; a +password that does not contain at least one character from at least +the specified number of character classes will not be accepted. The +character classes are defined by islower(), isupper(), isdigit(), +ispunct(), and other. + +\item Passwords can be required to be different from +previous passwords; a password that generates the same encryption key +as any of the principal's specified previous number of passwords will +not be accepted. This comparison is performed on the encryption keys +generated from the passwords, not on the passwords themselves. + +\item A single ``forbidden password'' dictionary can be specified for all +users; a password that is not significantly different from every word +in the dictionary will not be accepted. +\end{itemize} + +\section{Data Structures} + +This section describes the data structures used by the Admin API. +They are defined in $<$kadm5/admin.h$>$. + +\subsection{Principals, kadm5_principal_ent_t} +\label{sec:principal-structure} + +A Kerberos principal entry is represented by a kadm5_principal_ent_t. +It contains a subset of the information stored in the master Kerberos +database as well as the additional information maintained by the admin +system. In the current version, the only additional information is +the principal's policy and the aux_attributes flags. + +The principal may or may not have a policy enforced on it. If the +POLICY bit (see section \ref{sec:masks}) is set in aux_attributes, the +policy field names the principal's policy. If the POLICY bit is not +set in aux_attributes, no policy is enforced on the principal and the +value of the policy field is undefined. + +\begin{figure}[htbp] +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _kadm5_principal_ent_t { + krb5_principal principal; + + krb5_timestamp princ_expire_time; + krb5_timestamp last_pwd_change; + krb5_timestamp pw_expiration; + krb5_deltat max_life; + krb5_principal mod_name; + krb5_timestamp mod_date; + krb5_flags attributes; + krb5_kvno kvno; + krb5_kvno mkvno; + + char * policy; + u_int32 aux_attributes; + + krb5_deltat max_renewable_life; + krb5_timestamp last_success; + krb5_timestamp last_failed; + krb5_kvno fail_auth_count; + krb5_int16 n_key_data; + krb5_int16 n_tl_data; + krb5_tl_data *tl_data; + krb5_key_data *key_data; +} kadm5_principal_ent_rec, *kadm5_principal_ent_t; +\end{verbatim} +\caption{Definition of kadm5_principal_ent_t.} +\label{fig:princ-t} +\end{figure} + +The fields of an kadm5_principal_ent_t are interpreted as +follows. + +\begin{description} +\item[principal] The name of the principal; must conform to Kerberos +naming specifications. + +\item[princ_expire_time] The expire time of the principal as a Kerberos +timestamp. No Kerberos tickets will be issued for a principal after +its expire time. + +\item[last_pwd_change] The time this principal's password was last +changed, as a Kerberos timestamp. + +\item[pw_expiration] The expire time of the user's current password, as a +Kerberos timestamp. No application service tickets will be issued for the +principal once the password expire time has passed. Note that the user can +only obtain tickets for services that have the PW_CHANGE_SERVICE bit set in +the attributes field. + +\item[max_life] The maximum lifetime of any Kerberos ticket issued to +this principal. + +\item[attributes] A bitfield of attributes for use by the KDC. The +symbols and constant values are defined below; their interpretation +appears in the libkdb functional specification. + +\begin{tabular}{clr} +{\bf Name} & {\bf Value} \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_POSTDATED & 0x00000001 \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_FORWARDABLE & 0x00000002 \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED & 0x00000004 \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_RENEWABLE & 0x00000008 \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_PROXIABLE & 0x00000010 \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_DUP_SKEY & 0x00000020 \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX & 0x00000040 \\ +KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PRE_AUTH & 0x00000080 \\ +KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_HW_AUTH & 0x00000100 \\ +KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE & 0x00000200 \\ +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_SVR & 0x00001000 \\ +KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE & 0x00002000 \\ +KRB5_KDB_SUPPORT_DESMD5 & 0x00004000 \\ +KRB5_KDB_NEW_PRINC & 0x00008000 +\end{tabular} + +\item[mod_name] The name of the Kerberos principal that most recently +modified this principal. + +\item[mod_date] The time this principal was last modified, as a Kerberos +timestamp. + +\item[kvno] The version of the principal's current key. + +\item[mkvno] The version of the Kerberos Master Key in effect when +this principal's key was last changed. In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, this +field is always zero. + +\item[policy] If the POLICY bit is set in aux_attributes, the name +of the policy controlling this principal. + +\item[aux_attributes] A bitfield of flags for use by the +administration system. Currently, the only valid flag is POLICY, and +it indicates whether or not the principal has a policy enforced on it. + +\item[max_renewable_life] The maximum renewable lifetime of any +Kerberos ticket issued to or for this principal. This field only +exists in KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +\item[last_success] The KDC time of the last successful AS_REQ. This +is only updated if KRBCONF_KDC_MODIFIES_KDB is defined during +compilation of the KDC. This field only exists in +KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +\item[last_failed] The KDC time of the last failed AS_REQ. This is +only updated if KRBCONF_KDC_MODIFIES_KDB is defined during compilation +of the KDC. This field only exists in KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +\item[fail_auth_count] The number of consecutive failed AS_REQs. When +this number reaches KRB5_MAX_FAIL_COUNT, the KRB5_KDC_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX +is set on the principal. This is only updated if +KRBCONF_KDC_MODIFIES_KDB is defined during compilation. This field +only exists in KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +\item[n_tl_data] The number of elements in the \v{tl_data} linked +list. This field only exists in KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +\item[n_key_data] The number of elements in the \v{key_data} +array. This field only exists in KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +\item[tl_data] A linked list of tagged data. This list is a mechanism +by which programs can store extended information in a principal entry, +without having to modify the database API. Each element is of type +krb5_tl_data: +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _krb5_tl_data { + struct _krb5_tl_data* tl_data_next; + krb5_int16 tl_data_type; + krb5_int16 tl_data_length; + krb5_octet * tl_data_contents; +} krb5_tl_data; +\end{verbatim} +% +The KADM5 API only allows elements whose tl_data_type is greater than +or equal to 256. Values less than 256 are reserved for internal use +by the KADM5 or kdb system. They are filtered out of the list +returned by kadm5_get_principal, and generate an error if given to +kadm5_modify_principal. + +The libkdb library defines the tagged data types +KRB5_TL_LAST_PWD_CHANGE, KRB5_TL_MOD_PRINC, and KRB5_TL_KADM_DATA, all +with values less than 256, which store the last password modification +time, time and modifier of last principal modification, and +administration system data. All of these entries are expected by the +administration system and parsed out into fields of the +kadm5_principal_ent_rec structure; as described above, they are not +included in the tl_data list. + +Tagged data elements with types greater than 256 are handled without +interpretation by KADM5. Note that an application that calls +kadm5_modify_principal with the KADM5_TL_DATA mask bit set is +responsible for providing the {\it complete} tl_data list, which it +necessarily must obtain from kadm5_get_principal. It is {\it never} +possible for an application to construct a complete tl_data list from +scratch. + +\item[key_data] An array of the principal's keys. The keys contained +in this array are encrypted in the Kerberos master key. See section +\ref{sec:keys} for a discussion of the krb5_key_data structure. +\end{description} + +\subsection{Policies, kadm5_policy_ent_t} +\label{sec:policy-fields} + +If the POLICY bit is set in aux_attributes, the \v{policy} name field +in the kadm5_principal_ent_t structure refers to a password policy +entry defined in a \v{kadm5_policy_ent_t}. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _kadm5_policy_ent_t { + char *policy; + + u_int32 pw_min_life; + u_int32 pw_max_life; + u_int32 pw_min_length; + u_int32 pw_min_classes; + u_int32 pw_history_num; + u_int32 policy_refcnt; +} kadm5_policy_ent_rec, *kadm5_policy_ent_t; +\end{verbatim} + +The fields of an kadm5_policy_ent_t are interpreted as follows. +Note that a policy's values only apply to a principal using that +policy. + +\begin{description} +\item[policy] The name of this policy, as a NULL-terminated string. +The ASCII characters between 32 (space) and 126 (tilde), inclusive, +are legal. + +\item[pw_min_life] The minimum password lifetime, in seconds. +A principal cannot change its password before pw_min_life seconds have +passed since last_pwd_change. + +\item[pw_max_life] The default duration, in seconds, used to compute +pw_expiration when a principal's password is changed. + +\item[pw_min_length] The minimum password length, in characters. A +principal cannot set its password to anything with fewer than this +number of characters. This value must be greater than zero. + +\item[pw_min_classes] The minimum number of character classes in the +password. This value can only be 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. A principal cannot +set its password to anything with fewer than this number of character +classes in it. + +\item[pw_history_num] The number of past passwords that are +stored for the principal; the minimum value is 1 and the maximum value +is 10. A principal cannot set its password to any of its previous +pw_history_num passwords. The first ``previous'' password is the +current password; thus, a principal with a policy can never reset its +password to its current value. + +\item[policy_refcnt] The number of principals currently using this policy. +A policy cannot be deleted unless this number is zero. +\end{description} + +\subsection{Configuration parameters} +\label{sec:configparams} + +The KADM5 API acquires configuration information from the Kerberos +configuration file (\$KRB5_CONFIG or DEFAULT_PROFILE_PATH) and from +the KDC configuration file (\$KRB5_KDC_CONFIG or DEFAULT_KDC_PROFILE). +In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, some of the configuration parameters used by +the KADM5 API can be controlled by the caller by providing a +kadm5_config_params structure to kadm5_init: +% +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _kadm5_config_params { + u_int32 mask; + + /* Client and server fields */ + char *realm; + char *profile; + int kadmind_port; + + /* client fields */ + char *admin_server; + + /* server fields */ + char *dbname; + char *admin_dbname; + char *admin_lockfile; + char *acl_file; + char *dict_file; + char *admin_keytab; + + /* server library (database) fields */ + int mkey_from_kbd; + char *stash_file; + char *mkey_name; + krb5_enctype enctype; + krb5_deltat max_life; + krb5_deltat max_rlife; + krb5_timestamp expiration; + krb5_flags flags; + krb5_key_salt_tuple *keysalts; + krb5_int32 num_keysalts; +} kadm5_config_params; +\end{verbatim} +% +The following list describes each of the fields of the structure, +along with the profile relation it overrides, its mask value, its +default value, and whether it is valid on the client, server, or both, +or neither. +\begin{description} +\item[mask] No variable. No mask value. A bitfield specifying which +fields of the structure contain valid information. A caller sets this +mask before calling kadm5_init_*, indicating which parameters are +specified. The mask values are defined in $<$kadm5/admin.h$>$ and are +all prefixed with KADM5_CONFIG_; the prefix is not included in the +descriptions below. + +\item[realm] No variable. REALM. Client and server. The realm to +which these parameters apply, and the realm for which additional +parameters are to be acquired, if any. If this field is not specified +in the mask, the default local realm is used. + +\item[profile] Variable: profile (server only). PROFILE. Client and +server. The Kerberos profile to use. On the client, the default is +the value of the KRB5_CONFIG environment variable, or +DEFAULT_PROFILE_PATH if that is not set. On the server, the value of +the ``profile'' variable of the KDC configuration file will be used as +the first default if it exists; otherwise, the default is the value of +the KRB5_KDC_PROFILE environment variable or DEFAULT_KDC_PROFILE. + +\item[kadmind_port] Variable: kadmind_port. KADMIND_PORT. Client and +server. The port number the kadmind server listens on. The client +uses this field to determine where to connect, and the server to +determine where to listen. The default is 749, which has been +assigned by IANA. + +\item[admin_server] Variable: admin_server. ADMIN_SERVER. Client. +The host name of the admin server to which to connect. There is no +default. If the value of this field contains a colon (:), the text +following the colon is treated as an integer and assigned to the +kadmind_port field, overriding any value of the kadmind_port variable. + +\item[dbname] Variable: dbname. DBNAME. Server. The Kerberos +database name to use; the Kerberos database stores principal +information. The default is DEFAULT_KDB_FILE. + +\item[admin_dbname] Variable: admin_database_name. ADBNAME. +Neither. If the dbname field is set, this field is set to the value +of dbname followed by ``.kadm5''. + +\item[admin_lockfile] Variable: admin_database_lockfile. +ADB_LOCKFILE. Neither. If the admin_dbname field is set, this field +is set to the value of admin_dbname followed by ``.lock''. + +\item[acl_file] Variable: acl_file. ACL_FILE. Server. The admin +server's ACL file. The default is DEFAULT_KADM5_ACL_FILE. + +\item[dict_file] Variable: admin_dict_file. DICT_FILE. Server. The +admin server's dictionary file of passwords to disallow. No default. + +\item[admin_keytab] Variable: admin_keytab. ADMIN_KEYTAB. Server. +The keytab file containing the kadmin/admin and kadmin/changepw +entries for the server to use. The default is the value of the +KRB5_KTNAME environment variable, if defined, else +DEFAULT_KADM5_KEYTAB. + +\item[mkey_from_keyboard] No variable. MKEY_FROM_KEYBOARD. Server. +If non-zero, prompt for the master password via the tty instead of +using the stash file. If this mask bit is not set, or is set and the +value is zero, the stash file is used. + +\item[stash_file] Variable: key_stash_file. STASH_FILE. Server. The +file name containing the master key stash file. No default; libkdb +will work with a NULL value. + +\item[mkey_name] Variable: master_key_name. MKEY_NAME. Server. The +name of the master principal for the realm. No default; lbkdb will +work with a NULL value. + +\item[enctype] Variable: master_key_type. ENCTYPE. Server. The +encryption type of the master principal. The default is +DEFAULT_KDC_ENCTYPE. + +\item[max_life] Variable: max_life. MAX_LIFE. Maximum lifetime for +all tickets issued to the principal. The default is 28800, which is 8 +hours. + +\item[max_rlife, expiration, flags] Variables: max_renewable_life, +default_principal_expiration, default_principal_flags. MAX_LIFE, +MAX_RLIFE, EXPIRATION, FLAGS. Server. Default values for new +principals. All default to 0. + +\item[keysalts, num_keysalts] Variable: supported_enctypes. ENCTYPES. +Server. The list of supported encryption type/salt type tuples; both +fields must be assigned if ENCTYPES is set. The default is a list +containing one enctype, DES-CBC-CRC with normal salt. +\end{description} + +\subsection{Principal keys} +\label{sec:keys} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_1, all principals had a single key. The +encryption method was always DES, and the salt type was determined +outside the API (by command-line options to the administration +server). + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, principals can have multiple keys, each with +its own encryption type and salt. Each time a principal's key is +changed with kadm5_create_principal, kadm5_chpass_principal or +kadm5_randkey_principal, existing key entries are removed and a key +entry for each encryption and salt type tuple specified in the +configuration parameters is added. There is no provision for +specifying encryption and salt type information on a per-principal +basis; in a future version, this will probably be part of the admin +policy. There is also presently no provision for keeping multiple key +versions for a single principal active in the database. + +A single key is represented by a krb5_key_data: +% +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _krb5_key_data { + krb5_int16 key_data_ver; /* Version */ + krb5_int16 key_data_kvno; /* Key Version */ + krb5_int16 key_data_type[2]; /* Array of types */ + krb5_int16 key_data_length[2]; /* Array of lengths */ + krb5_octet * key_data_contents[2]; /* Array of pointers */ +} krb5_key_data; +\end{verbatim} +% +\begin{description} +\item[key_data_ver] The verion number of the structure. Versions 1 +and 2 are currently defined. If key_data_ver is 1 then the key is +either a random key (not requiring a salt) or the salt is the normal +v5 salt which is the same as the realm and therefore doesn't need to +be saved in the database. + +\item[key_data_kvno] The key version number of this key. + +\item[key_data_type] The first element is the enctype of this key. In +a version 2 structure, the second element is the salttype of this key. +The legal encryption types are defined in $<$krb5.h$>$. The legal +salt types are defined in $<$k5-int.h$>$. + +\item[key_data_length] The first element is length this key. In a +version 2 structure, the second element is length of the salt for this +key. + +\item[key_data_contents] The first element is the content of this key. +In a version 2 structure, the second element is the contents of the +salt for this key. +\end{description} + +\subsection{Field masks} +\label{sec:masks} + +The API functions for creating, retrieving, and modifying principals +and policies allow for a relevant subset of the fields of the +kadm5_principal_ent_t and kadm5_policy_ent_t to be specified or +changed. The chosen fields are determined by a bitmask that is passed +to the relevant function. Each API function has different rules for +which mask values can be specified, and can specify whether a given +mask value is mandatory, optional, or forbidden. Mandatory fields +must be present and forbidden fields must not be present or an error +is generated. When creating a principal or policy, optional fields +have a default value if they are not specified. When modifying a +principal or policy, optional fields are unchanged if they are not +specified. When retrieving a principal, optional fields are simply +not provided if they are not specified; not specifying undeeded fields +for retrieval may improve efficiency. The values for forbidden fields +are defined in the function semantics. + +The masks for principals are in table \ref{tab:princ-bits} and the +masks for policies are in table \ref{tab:policy-bits}. They are +defined in $<$kadm5/admin.h$>$. The KADM5_ prefix has been removed +from the Name fields. In the Create and Modify fields, M means +mandatory, F means forbidden, and O means optional. Create fields +that are optional specify the default value. The notation ``K/M +value'' means that the field inherits its value from the corresponding +field in the Kerberos master principal, for KADM5_API_VERSION_1, and +from the configuration parameters for KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +All masks for principals are optional for retrevial, {\it except} that +the KEY_DATA mask is illegal when specified by a remote client; for +details, see the function semantics for kadm5_get_principal. + +Note that the POLICY and POLICY_CLR bits are special. When POLICY is +set, the policy is assigned to the principal. When POLICY_CLR is +specified, the policy is unassigned to the principal and as a result +no policy controls the principal. + +For convenience, the mask KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK contains all of +the principal masks {\it except} KADM5_KEY_DATA and KADM5_TL_DATA, and +the mask KADM5_POLICY_NORMAL_MASK contains all of the policy masks. + +\begin{table}[htbp] +\begin{tabular}{@{}lclll} +{\bf Name} & {\bf Value} & {\bf Fields Affected} & {\bf Create} & + {\bf Modify} \\ +PRINCIPAL & 0x000001 & principal & M & F \\ +PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME & 0x000002 & princ_expire_time & O, K/M value & O \\ +PW_EXPIRATION & 0x000004 & pw_expiration & O, now+pw_max_life & O \\ +LAST_PWD_CHANGE & 0x000008 & last_pwd_change & F & F \\ +ATTRIBUTES & 0x000010 & attributes & O, 0 & O \\ +MAX_LIFE & 0x000020 & max_life & O, K/M value & O \\ +MOD_TIME & 0x000040 & mod_date & F & F \\ +MOD_NAME & 0x000080 & mod_name & F & F \\ +KVNO & 0x000100 & kvno & O, 1 & O \\ +MKVNO & 0x000200 & mkvno & F & F \\ +AUX_ATTRIBUTES & 0x000400 & aux_attributes & F & F \\ +POLICY & 0x000800 & policy & O, none & O \\ +POLICY_CLR & 0x001000 & policy & F & O \\ +MAX_RLIFE & 0x002000 & max_renewable_life & O, K/M value & O \\ +LAST_SUCCESS & 0x004000 & last_success & F & F \\ +LAST_FAILED & 0x008000 & last_failed & F & F \\ +FAIL_AUTH_COUNT & 0x010000 & fail_auth_count & F & O \\ +KEY_DATA & 0x020000 & n_key_data, key_data & F & F \\ +TL_DATA & 0x040000 & n_tl_data, tl_data & O, 0, NULL & O +\end{tabular} +\caption{Mask bits for creating, retrieving, and modifying principals.} +\label{tab:princ-bits} +\end{table} + +\begin{table}[htbp] +\begin{tabular}{@{}lclll} +Name & Value & Field Affected & Create & Modify \\ +POLICY & same & policy & M & F \\ +PW_MAX_LIFE & 0x004000 & pw_max_life & O, 0 (infinite) & O \\ +PW_MIN_LIFE & 0x008000 & pw_min_life & O, 0 & O \\ +PW_MIN_LENGTH & 0x010000 & pw_min_length & O, 1 & O \\ +PW_MIN_CLASSES & 0x020000 & pw_min_classes & O, 1 & O \\ +PW_HISTORY_NUM & 0x040000 & pw_history_num & O, 0 & O \\ +REF_COUNT & 0x080000 & pw_refcnt & F & F +\end{tabular} +\caption{Mask bits for creating/modifying policies.} +\label{tab:policy-bits} +\end{table} + +\section{Constants, Header Files, Libraries} + +$<$kadm5/admin.h$>$ includes a number of required header files, +including RPC, Kerberos 5, com_err, and admin com_err +defines. It contains prototypes for all kadm5 routines mentioned +below, as well as all Admin API data structures, type definitions and +defines mentioned in this document. + +Before \v{\#include}ing $<$kadm5/admin.h$>$, the programmer can +specify the API version number that the program will use by +\v{\#define}ing USE_KADM5_API_VERSION; for example, define that symbol +to be 1 to use KADM5_API_VERSION_1. This will ensure that the correct +functional protoypes and data structures are defined. If no version +symbol is defined, the most recent version supported by the header +files will be used. + +Some of the defines and their values contained in $<$kadm5/admin.h$>$ +include the following, whose KADM5_ prefixes have been removed. +Symbols that do not exist in KADM5_API_VERSION_2 do not have a KADM5_ +prefix, but instead retain only with OVSEC_KADM_ prefix for +compatibility. +\begin{description} +\item[admin service principal] ADMIN_SERVICE (``kadmin/admin'') +\item[admin history key] HIST_PRINCIPAL (``kadmin/history'') +\item[change password principal] CHANGEPW_SERVICE (``kadmin/changepw'') +\item[server acl file path] ACLFILE (``/krb5/ovsec_adm.acl''). In +KADM5_API_VERSION 2, this is controlled by configuration parameters. +\item[dictionary] WORDFILE (``/krb5/kadmind.dict''). In +KADM5_API_VERSION 2, this is controlled by configuration parameters. +\end{description} + +KADM5 errors are described in $<$kadm5/kadm_err.h$>$, which +is included by $<$kadm5/admin.h$>$. + +The locations of the admin policy and principal databases, as well as +defines and type definitions for the databases, are defined in +$<$kadm5/adb.h$>$. Some of the defines in that file are: +\begin{description} +\item[admin policy database] POLICY_DB (``/krb5/kadm5_policy.db''). In +KADM5_API_VERSION 2, this is controlled by configuration parameters. +\item[admin principal database] PRINCIPAL_DB +(``/krb5/ovsec_principal.db''). In KADM5_API_VERSION 2, this is +controlled by configuration parameters. +\end{description} + +Client applications will link against libkadm5clnt.a and server +programs against libkadm5srv.a. Client applications must also link +against: libgssapi_krb5.a, libkrb5.a, libcrypto.a, libgssrpc.a, +libcom_err.a, and libdyn.a. Server applications must also link +against: libkdb5.a, libkrb5.a, libcrypto.a, libgssrpc.a, libcom_err.a, +and libdyn.a. + +\section{Error Codes} + +The error codes that can be returned by admin functions are listed +below. Error codes indicated with a ``*'' can be returned by every +admin function and always have the same meaning; these codes are +omitted from the list presented with each function. + +The admin system guarantees that a function that returns an error code +has no other side effect. + +The Admin system will use \v{com_err} for error codes. Note that this +means \v{com_err} codes may be returned from functions that the admin +routines call (e.g. the kerberos library). Callers should not expect +that only KADM5 errors will be returned. The Admin system error code +table name will be ``ovk'', and the offsets will be the same as the +order presented here. As mentioned above, the error table include file +will be $<$kadm5/kadm_err.h$>$. + +Note that these error codes are also used as protocol error code +constants and therefore must not change between product releases. +Additional codes should be added at the end of the list, not in the +middle. The integer value of KADM5_FAILURE is 43787520; the +remaining values are assigned in sequentially increasing order. + +\begin{description} +\item[* KADM5_FAILURE] Operation failed for unspecified reason +\item[* KADM5_AUTH_GET] Operation requires ``get'' privilege +\item[* KADM5_AUTH_ADD] Operation requires ``add'' privilege +\item[* KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY] Operation requires ``modify'' privilege +\item[* KADM5_AUTH_DELETE] Operation requires ``delete'' privilege +\item[* KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT] Insufficient authorization for +operation +\item[* KADM5_BAD_DB] Database inconsistency detected +\item[KADM5_DUP] Principal or policy already exists +\item[KADM5_RPC_ERROR] Communication failure with server +\item[KADM5_NO_SRV] No administration server found for realm +\item[KADM5_BAD_HIST_KEY] Password history principal key version +mismatch +\item[KADM5_NOT_INIT] Connection to server not initialized +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Principal does not exist +\item[KADM5_UNK_POLICY] Policy does not exist +\item[KADM5_BAD_MASK] Invalid field mask for operation +\item[KADM5_BAD_CLASS] Invalid number of character classes +\item[KADM5_BAD_LENGTH] Invalid password length +\item[KADM5_BAD_POLICY] Illegal policy name +\item[KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL] Illegal principal name. +\item[KADM5_BAD_AUX_ATTR] Invalid auxillary attributes +\item[KADM5_BAD_HISTORY] Invalid password history count +\item[KADM5_BAD_MIN_PASS_LIFE] Password minimum life is greater +then password maximum life +\item[KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT] Password is too short +\item[KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS] Password does not contain enough +character classes +\item[KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT] Password is in the password dictionary +\item[KADM5_PASS_REUSE] Cannot resuse password +\item[KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON] Current password's minimum life has not +expired +\item[KADM5_POLICY_REF] Policy is in use +\item[KADM5_INIT] Connection to server already initialized +\item[KADM5_BAD_PASSWORD] Incorrect password +\item[KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL] Cannot change protected principal +\item[* KADM5_BAD_SERVER_HANDLE] Programmer error! Bad Admin server handle +\item[* KADM5_BAD_STRUCT_VERSION] Programmer error! Bad API structure version +\item[* KADM5_OLD_STRUCT_VERSION] API structure version specified by application is no longer supported (to fix, recompile application against current Admin API header files and libraries) +\item[* KADM5_NEW_STRUCT_VERSION] API structure version specified by application is unknown to libraries (to fix, obtain current Admin API header files and libraries and recompile application) +\item[* KADM5_BAD_API_VERSION] Programmer error! Bad API version +\item[* KADM5_OLD_LIB_API_VERSION] API version specified by application is no longer supported by libraries (to fix, update application to adhere to current API version and recompile) +\item[* KADM5_OLD_SERVER_API_VERSION] API version specified by application is no longer supported by server (to fix, update application to adhere to current API version and recompile) +\item[* KADM5_NEW_LIB_API_VERSION] API version specified by application is unknown to libraries (to fix, obtain current Admin API header files and libraries and recompile application) +\item[* KADM5_NEW_SERVER_API_VERSION] API version specified by +application is unknown to server (to fix, obtain and install newest +Admin Server) +\item[KADM5_SECURE_PRINC_MISSING] Database error! Required principal missing +\item[KADM5_NO_RENAME_SALT] The salt type of the specified principal +does not support renaming +\item[KADM5_BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS] Illegal configuration parameter for +remote KADM5 client +\item[KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS] Illegal configuration parameter for +local KADM5 client. +\item[KADM5_AUTH_LIST] Operation requires ``list'' privilege +\item[KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW] Operation requires ``change-password'' privilege +\item[KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE] Programmer error! Illegal tagged data list +element type +\item[KADM5_MISSING_CONF_PARAMS] Required parameters in kdc.conf missing +\item[KADM5_BAD_SERVER_NAME] Bad krb5 admin server hostname +\item[KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY] Operation requires ``set-key'' privilege +\item[KADM5_SETKEY_DUP_ENCTYPES] Multiple values for single or folded enctype +\end{description} + +\section{Authentication and Authorization} +\label{sec:auth} + +Two Kerberos principals exist for use in communicating with the Admin +system: kadmin/admin and kadmin/changepw. Both principals +have the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_TGT_BASED bit set in their attributes so +that service tickets for them can only be acquired via a +password-based (AS_REQ) request. Additionally, kadmin/changepw +has the KRB5_KDB_PWCHANGE_SERVICE bit set so that a principal with an +expired password can still obtain a service ticket for it. + +The Admin system accepts requests that are authenticated to either +service principal, but the sets of operations that can be performed by +a request authenticated to each service are different. In particular, +only the functions chpass_principal, randkey_principal, get_principal, +and get_policy can be performed by a request authenticated to the +kadmin/changepw service, and they can only be performed when the +target principal of the operation is the same as the authenticated +client principal; the function semantics descriptions below give the +precise details. This means that administrative operations can only +be performed when authenticated to the kadmin/admin service. The +reason for this distinction is that tickets for kadmin/changepw can be +acquired with an expired password, and the KADM system does not want +to allow an administrator with an expired password to perform +administrative operations on arbitrary principals. + +Each Admin API operation authenticated to the kadmin/admin service +requires a specific authorization to run. This version uses a simple +named privilege system with the following names and meanings: + +\begin{description} +\item[Get] Able to examine the attributes (NOT key data) of principals +and policies. +\item[Add] Able to add principals and policies. +\item[Modify] Able to modify attributes of existing principals and +policies; this does not include changing passwords. +\item[Delete] Able to remove principals and policies. +\item[List] Able to retrieve a list of principals and policies. +\item[Changepw] Able to change the password of principals. +\item[Setkey] Able to set principal keys directly. +\end{description} + +Privileges are specified via an external configuration file on the +Kerberos master server. + +Table \ref{tab:func-overview} summarizes the authorization +requirements of each function. Additionally, each API function +description identifies the privilege required to perform it. The +Authorization checks only happen if you are using the RPC mechanism. +If you are using the server-side API functions locally on the admin +server, the only authorization check is if you can access the +approporiate local files. + +\section{Functions} + +\subsection{Overview} + +The functions provided by the Admin API, and the authorization they +require, are listed in the table \ref{tab:func-overview}. The +``kadm5_'' prefix has been removed from each function name. + +The function semantics in the following sections omit details that are +the same for every function. + +\begin{itemize} +\item The effects of every function are atomic. + +\item Every function performs an authorization check and returns +the appropriate KADM5_AUTH_* error code if the caller does not +have the required privilege. No other information or error code is +ever returned to an unauthorized user. + +\item Every function checks its arguments for NULL pointers or other +obviously invalid values, and returns EINVAL if any are detected. + +\item Any function that performs a policy check uses the policy named +in the principal's policy field. If the POLICY bit is not set in the +principal's aux_attributes field, however, the principal has no +policy, so the policy check is not performed. + +\item Unless otherwise specified, all functions return KADM5_OK. +\end{itemize} + +\begin{table}[htbp] +\caption{Summary of functions and required authorization.} +\label{tab:func-overview} +\begin{tabular}{@{}llp{3.24in}} +\\ +{\bf Function Name} & {\bf Authorization} & {\bf Operation} \\ + +init & none & Open a connection with the kadm5 library. OBSOLETE +but still provided---use init_with_password instead. \\ +init_with_password & none & Open a connection with the kadm5 +library using a password to obtain initial credentials. \\ +init_with_skey & none & Open a connection with the kadm5 library +using the keytab entry to obtain initial credentials. \\ +destroy & none & Close the connection with the kadm5 library. \\ +flush & none & Flush all database changes to disk; no-op when called +remotely. \\ +create_principal & add & Create a new principal. \\ +delete_principal & delete & Delete a principal. \\ +modify_principal & modify & Modify the attributes of an existing + principal (not password). \\ +rename_principal & add and delete & Rename a principal. \\ +get_principal & get\footnotemark & Retrieve a principal. \\ +get_principals & list & Retrieve some or all principal names. \\ +chpass_principal & changepw\footnotemark[\thefootnote] & + Change a principal's password. \\ +chpass_principal_util & changepw\footnotemark[\thefootnote] & Utility wrapper around chpass_principal. \\ +randkey_principal & changepw\footnotemark[\thefootnote] & + Randomize a principal's key. \\ +setkey_principal & setkey & Explicitly set a principal's keys. \\ +decrypt_key & none & Decrypt a principal key. \\ +create_policy & add & Create a new policy. \\ +delete_policy & delete & Delete a policy. \\ +modify_policy & modify & Modify the attributes of a policy. \\ +get_policy & get & Retrieve a policy. \\ +get_policies & list & Retrieve some or all policy names. \\ +free_principal_ent & none & Free the memory associated with an + kadm5_principal_ent_t. \\ +free_policy_ent & none & Free the memory associated with an + kadm5_policy_ent_t. \\ +get_privs & none & Return the caller's admin server privileges. +\end{tabular} +\end{table} +\footnotetext[\thefootnote]{These functions also allow a principal to +perform the operation on itself; see the function's semantics for +details.} + +\subsection{kadm5_init_*} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION 1: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_init_with_password(char *client_name, char *pass, + char *service_name, char *realm, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) + +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_init_with_skey(char *client_name, char *keytab, + char *service_name, char *realm, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) + +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_init(char *client_name, char *pass, + char *service_name, char *realm, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) +\end{verbatim} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION 2: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_init_with_password(char *client_name, char *pass, + char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) + +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_init_with_skey(char *client_name, char *keytab, + char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) + +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_init(char *client_name, char *pass, + char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *realm_params, + unsigned long struct_version, + unsigned long api_version, + void **server_handle) + +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_init_with_creds(char *client_name, + krb5_ccache ccache, + char *service_name, + kadm5_config_params *params, + krb5_ui_4 struct_version, + krb5_ui_4 api_version, + void **server_handle) +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: none + +NOTE: kadm5_init is an obsolete function provided for backwards +compatibility. It is identical to kadm5_init_with_password. + +These three functions open a connection to the kadm5 library and +initialize any neccessary state information. They behave differently +when called from local and remote clients. + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, these functions take a kadm5_config_params +structure instead of a realm name as an argument. The semantics are +similar: if a NULL pointer is passed for the realm_params argument, +the default realm and default parameters for that realm, as specified +in the krb5 configuration file (e.g. /etc/krb5.conf) are used. If a +realm_params structure is provided, the fields that are set override +the default values. If a parameter is specified to the local or +remote libraries that does not apply to that side, an error code +(KADM5_BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS or KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS) is returned. See +section \ref{sec:configparams} for a discussion of configuration +parameters. + +For remote clients, the semantics are: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Initializes all the com_err error tables used by the Admin +system. + +\item Acquires configuration parameters. In KADM5_API_VERSION_1, all +the defaults specified in the configuration file are used, according +to the realm. In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, the values in params_in are +merged with the default values. If an illegal mask value is +specified, KADM5_BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS is returned. + +\item Acquires a Kerberos ticket for the specified service. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item The ticket's client is client_name, which can be any valid +Kerberos principal. If client_name does not include a realm, the +default realm of the local host is used +\item The ticket's service is service_name@realm. service_name must +be one of the constants KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE or +KADM5_CHANGEPW_SERVICE. +\item If realm is NULL, client_name's realm is used. + +\item For init_with_password, an initial ticket is acquired and +decoded with the password pass, which must be client_name's password. +If pass is NULL or an empty string, the user is prompted (via the tty) +for a password. + +\item For init_with_skey, an initial ticket is acquired and decoded +with client_name's key obtained from the specified keytab. If keytab +is NULL or an empty string the default keytab is used. + +\item For init_with_creds, ccache must be an open credential cache +that already has a ticket for the specified client and server. +Alternatively, if a site chooses to disable the DISALLOW_TGT_BASED +flag on the admin and changepw principals, the ccache can contain a +ticket-granting ticket for client_name. +\end{enumerate} + +\item Creates a GSS-API authenticated connection to the Admin server, +using the just-acquired Kerberos ticket. + +\item Verifies that the struct_version and api_version specified by +the caller are valid and known to the library. + +\item Sends the specified api_version to the server. + +\item Upon successful completion, fills in server_handle with a handle +for this connection, to be used in all subsequent API calls. +\end{enumerate} + +The caller should always specify KADM5_STRUCT_VERSION for the +struct_version argument, a valid and supported API version constant +for the api_version argument (currently, KADM5_API_VERSION_1 or +KADM5_API_VERSION_2), and a valid pointer in which the server handle +will be stored. + +If any kadm5_init_* is invoked locally its semantics are: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Initializes all the com_err error tables used by the Admin +system. + +\item Acquires configuration parameters. In KADM5_API_VERSION_1, all +the defaults specified in the configuration file are used, according +to the realm. In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, the values in params_in are +merged with the default values. If an illegal mask value is +specified, KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS is returned. + +\item Initializes direct access to the KDC database. In +KADM5_API_VERISON_1, if pass (or keytab) is NULL or an empty string, +reads the master password from the stash file; otherwise, the non-NULL +password is ignored and the user is prompted for it via the tty. In +KADM5_API_VERSION_2, if the MKEY_FROM_KEYBOARD parameter mask is set +and the value is non-zero, reads the master password from the user via +the tty; otherwise, the master key is read from the stash file. +Calling init_with_skey or init_with_creds with the MKEY_FROM_KEYBOARD +mask set with a non-zero field is illegal, and calling them without +the mask set is exactly like calling init_with_password. + +\item Initializes the dictionary (if present) for dictionary checks. + +\item Parses client_name as a Kerberos principal. client_name should +usually be specified as the name of the program. + +\item Verifies that the struct_version and api_version specified by +the caller are valid. + +\item Fills in server_handle with a handle containing all state +information (version numbers and client name) for this ``connection.'' +\end{enumerate} +The service_name argument is not used. + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_NO_SRV] No Admin server can be found for the +specified realm. + +\item[KADM5_RPC_ERROR] The RPC connection to the server cannot be +initiated. + +\item[KADM5_BAD_PASSWORD] Incorrect password. + +\item[KADM5_SECURE_PRINC_MISSING] The principal +KADM5_ADMIN_SERVICE or KADM5_CHANGEPW_SERVICE does not +exist. This is a special-case replacement return code for ``Server +not found in database'' for these required principals. + +\item[KADM5_BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS] A field in the parameters mask was +specified to the remote client library that is not legal for remote +clients. + +\item[KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS] A field in the parameters mask was +specified to the local client library that is not legal for local +clients. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_flush} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_flush(void *server_handle) +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: none + +Flush all changes to the Kerberos databases, leaving the connection to +the Admin API open. This function behaves differently when called by +local and remote clients. + +For local clients, the function closes and reopens the Kerberos +database with krb5_db_fini() and krb5_db_init(). +Although it is unlikely, either of these functions +could return errors; in that case, this function calls +kadm5_destroy and returns the error code. Therefore, if +kadm5_flush does not return KADM5_OK, the connection to the +Admin server has been terminated and, in principle, the databases +might be corrupt. + +For remote clients, the function is a no-op. + +\subsection{kadm5_destroy} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_destroy(void *server_handle) +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: none + +Close the connection to the Admin server and releases all related +resources. This function behaves differently when called by local and +remote clients. + +For remote clients, the semantics are: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Destroy the temporary credential cache created by +kadm5_init. + +\item Tear down the GSS-API context negotiated with the server. + +\item Close the RPC connection. + +\item Free storage space associated with server_handle, after erasing +its magic number so it won't be mistaken for a valid handle by the +library later. +\end{enumerate} + +For local clients, this function just frees the storage space +associated with server_handle after erasing its magic number. + +RETURN CODES: + +\subsection{kadm5_create_principal} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, u_int32 mask, + char *pw); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: add + +\begin{enumerate} + +\item Return KADM5_BAD_MASK if the mask is invalid. +\item If the named principal exists, return KADM5_DUP. +\item If the POLICY bit is set and the named policy does not exist, +return KADM5_UNK_POLICY. +\item If KADM5_POLICY bit is set in aux_attributes check to see if +the password does not meets quality standards, return the appropriate +KADM5_PASS_Q_* error code if it fails. +\item Store the principal, set the key; see section \ref{sec:keys}. +\item If the POLICY bit is set, increment the named policy's reference +count by one. + +\item Set the pw_expiration field. +\begin{enumerate} +\item If the POLICY bit is set in mask, then if pw_max_life is non-zero, +set pw_expiration to now + pw_maxlife, otherwise set pw_max_life to +never. +\item If the PW_EXPIRATION bit is set in mask, set pw_expiration to +the requested value, overriding the value set above. +\end{enumerate} +NOTE: This is a change from the original semantics, in which policy +expiration was enforced even on administrators. The old semantics are +not preserved, even for version 1 callers, because this is a +server-specific policy decision; besides, the new semantics are less +restrictive, so all previous callers should continue to function +properly. + +\item Set mod_date to now and set mod_name to caller. +\item Set last_pwd_change to now. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_BAD_MASK] The field mask is invalid for a create +operation. +\item[KADM5_DUP] Principal already exists. +\item[KADM5_UNK_POLICY] Policy named in entry does not exist. +\item[KADM5_PASS_Q_*] Specified password does not meet policy +standards. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_delete_principal} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: delete + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Return KADM5_UNK_PRINC if the principal does not exist. +\item If the POLICY bit is set in aux_attributes, decrement the named +policy's reference count by one. +\item Delete principal. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Principal does not exist. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_modify_principal} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_principal(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ, u_int32 mask); +\end{verbatim} + +Modify the attributes of the principal named in +kadm5_principal_ent_t. This does not allow the principal to be +renamed or for its password to be changed. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: modify + +Although a principal's pw_expiration is usually computed based on its +policy and the time at which it changes its password, this function +also allows it to be specified explicitly. This allows an +administrator, for example, to create a principal and assign it to a +policy with a pw_max_life of one month, but to declare that the new +principal must change its password away from its initial value +sometime within the first week. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Return KADM5_UNK_PRINC if the principal does not exist. +\item Return KADM5_BAD_MASK if the mask is invalid. +\item If POLICY bit is set but the new policy does not exist, return +KADM5_UNK_POLICY. +\item If either the POLICY or POLICY_CLR bits are set, update the +corresponding bits in aux_attributes. + +\item Update policy reference counts. +\begin{enumerate} +\item If the POLICY bit is set, then increment policy count on new +policy. +\item If the POLICY or POLICY_CLR bit is set, and the POLICY bit in +aux_attributes is set, decrement policy count on old policy. +\end{enumerate} + +\item Set pw_expiration appropriately. pw_expiration can change if: +the POLICY bit is set in mask, so the principal is changing to a +policy (either from another policy or no policy); the POLICY_CLR bit +is set in mask, so the principal is changing to no policy; or +PW_EXPIRATION is set. +\begin{enumerate} +\item If the POLICY bit is set in mask, set pw_expiration to +last_pwd_change + pw_max_life if pw_max_life is non-zero, otherwise +set pw_expiration to never. +\item If the POLICY_CLR biti s set in mask, set pw_expiration to +never. +\item If PW_EXPIRATION is set, set pw_expiration to the requested +value, overriding the value from the previous two cases. NOTE: This +is a change from the original semantics, in which policy expiration +was enforced even on administrators. The old semantics are not +preserved, even for version 1 callers, because this is a +server-specific policy decision; besides, the new semantics are less +restrictive, so all previous callers should continue to function +properly. +\end{enumerate} + +% Here is the previous, and confusing, text of pw_expiration semantics: +%\begin{enumerate} +%\item If the POLICY bit is not set in aux_attributes, then +%\begin{enumerate} +%\item if the PW_EXPIRATION bit is set, set pw_expiration to the given +%value, else +%\item set pw_expiration to never. +%\end{enumerate} +%\item Otherwise, if the PW_EXPIRATION bit is set, set pw_expiration to +%the sooner of the given value and last_pwd_change + pw_max_life. +%\item Otherwise, set pw_expiration to last_pwd_change + pw_max_life. +%\end{enumerate} + +\item Update the remaining fields specified in the mask. +\item Update mod_name field to caller and mod_date to now. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Entry does not exist. +\item[KADM5_BAD_MASK] The mask is not valid for a modify +operation. +\item[KADM5_UNK_POLICY] The POLICY bit is set but the new +policy does not exist. +\item[KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE] The KADM5_TL_DATA bit is set in mask, and the +given tl_data list contains an element whose type is less than 256. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_rename_principal} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_rename_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal source, + krb5_principal target); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: add and delete + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Check to see if source principal exists, if not return +KADM5_UNK_PRINC error. +\item Check to see if target exists, if so return KADM5_DUP error. +\item Create the new principal named target, then delete the old +principal named source. All of target's fields will be the same as +source's fields, except that mod_name and mod_date will be updated to +reflect the current caller and time. +\end{enumerate} + +Note that since the principal name may have been used as the salt for +the principal's key, renaming the principal may render the principal's +current password useless; with the new salt, the key generated by +string-to-key on the password will suddenly be different. Therefore, +an application that renames a principal must also require the user to +specify a new password for the principal (and administrators should +notify the affected party). + +Note also that, by the same argument, renaming a principal will +invalidate that principal's password history information; since the +salt will be different, a user will be able to select a previous +password without error. + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Source principal does not exist. +\item[KADM5_DUP] Target principal already exist. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_chpass_principal} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ, + char *pw); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: changepw, or the calling principal being the +same as the princ argument. If the request is authenticated to the +kadmin/changepw service, the changepw privilege is disregarded. + +Change a principal's password. See section \ref{sec:keys} for a +description of how the keys are determined. + +This function enforces password policy and dictionary checks. If the new +password specified is in the password dictionary, and the policy bit is set +KADM5_PASS_DICT is returned. If the principal's POLICY bit is set in +aux_attributes, compliance with each of the named policy fields is verified +and an appropriate error code is returned if verification fails. + +Note that the policy checks are only be performed if the POLICY bit is +set in the principal's aux_attributes field. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Make sure principal exists, if not return KADM5_UNK_PRINC error. +\item If caller does not have modify privilege, (now - last_pwd_change) $<$ +pw_min_life, and the KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE bit is not set in the +principal's attributes, return KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON. +\item If the principal your are trying to change is kadmin/history +return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL. +\item If the password does not meet the quality +standards, return the appropriate KADM5_PASS_Q_* error code. +\item Convert password to key; see section \ref{sec:keys}. +\item If the new key is in the principal's password history, return +KADM5_PASS_REUSE. +\item Store old key in history. +\item Update principal to have new key. +\item Increment principal's key version number by one. +\item If the POLICY bit is set, set pw_expiration to now + +max_pw_life. If the POLICY bit is not set, set pw_expiration to +never. +\item If the KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE bit is set in the principal's +attributes, clear it. +\item Update last_pwd_change and mod_date to now, update mod_name to +caller. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Principal does not exist. +\item[KADM5_PASS_Q_*] Requested password does not meet quality +standards. +\item[KADM5_PASS_REUSE] Requested password is in user's +password history. +\item[KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON] Current password has not reached minimum life +\item[KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL] Cannot change the password of a special principal +\end{description} + + +\subsection{kadm5_chpass_principal_util} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_chpass_principal_util(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ, + char *new_pw, char **pw_ret, + char *msg_ret); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: changepw, or the calling principal being the +same as the princ argument. If the request is authenticated to the +kadmin/changepw service, the changepw privilege is disregarded. + +This function is a wrapper around kadm5_chpass_principal. It can +read a new password from a user, change a principal's password, and +return detailed error messages. msg_ret should point to a char buffer +in the caller's space of sufficient length for the error messages +described below. 1024 bytes is recommended. It will also return the +new password to the caller if pw_ret is non-NULL. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item If new_pw is NULL, this routine will prompt the user for the new +password (using the strings specified by KADM5_PW_FIRST_PROMPT and +KADM5_PW_SECOND_PROMPT) and read (without echoing) the password input. +Since it is likely that this will simply call krb5_read_password only +terminal-based applications will make use of the password reading +functionality. If the passwords don't match the string ``New passwords do +not match - password not changed.'' will be copied into msg_ret, and the +error code KRB5_LIBOS_BADPWDMATCH will be returned. For other errors that +ocurr while reading the new password, copy the string ``<com_err message$>$ +occurred while trying to read new password.'' followed by a blank line and +the string specified by CHPASS_UTIL_PASSWORD_NOT_CHANGED into msg_ret and +return the error code returned by krb5_read_password. + +\item If pw_ret is non-NULL, and the password was prompted, set *pw_ret to +point to a static buffer containing the password. If pw_ret is non-NULL +and the password was supplied, set *pw_ret to the supplied password. + +\item Call kadm5_chpass_principal with princ, and new_pw. + +\item If successful copy the string specified by CHPASS_UTIL_PASSWORD_CHANGED +into msg_ret and return zero. + +\item For a policy related failure copy the appropriate message (from below) +followed by a newline and ``Password not changed.'' into msg_ret +filling in the parameters from the principal's policy information. If +the policy information cannot be obtained copy the generic message if +one is specified below. Return the error code from +kadm5_chpass_principal. + +Detailed messages: +\begin{description} + +\item[PASS_Q_TOO_SHORT] +New password is too short. Please choose a +password which is more than $<$pw-min-len$>$ characters. + +\item[PASS_Q_TOO_SHORT - generic] +New password is too short. Please choose a longer password. + +\item[PASS_REUSE] +New password was used previously. Please choose a +different password. + +\item[PASS_Q_CLASS] +New password does not have enough character classes. Classes include +lower class letters, upper case letters, digits, punctuation and all +other characters. Please choose a password with at least +$<$min-classes$>$ character classes. + +\item[PASS_Q_CLASS - generic] +New password does not have enough character classes. Classes include +lower class letters, upper case letters, digits, punctuation and all +other characters. + +\item[PASS_Q_DICT] +New password was found in a dictionary of possible passwords and +therefore may be easily guessed. Please choose another password. See +the kpasswd man page for help in choosing a good password. + +\item[PASS_TOOSOON] +Password cannot be changed because it was changed too recently. Please +wait until $<$last-pw-change+pw-min-life$>$ before you change it. If you +need to change your password before then, contact your system +security administrator. + +\item[PASS_TOOSOON - generic] +Password cannot be changed because it was changed too recently. If you +need to change your now please contact your system security +administrator. +\end{description} + +\item For other errors copy the string ``$<$com_err message$>$ +occurred while trying to change password.'' following by a blank line +and ``Password not changed.'' into msg_ret. Return the error code +returned by kadm5_chpass_principal. +\end{enumerate} + + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KRB5_LIBOS_BADPWDMATCH] Typed new passwords did not match. +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Principal does not exist. +\item[KADM5_PASS_Q_*] Requested password does not meet quality +standards. +\item[KADM5_PASS_REUSE] Requested password is in user's +password history. +\item[KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON] Current password has not reached minimum +life. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_randkey_principal} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_1: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_key) +\end{verbatim} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_2: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_randkey_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock **new_keys, int *n_keys) +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: changepw, or the calling principal being the +same as the princ argument. If the request is authenticated to the +kadmin/changepw service, the changepw privilege is disregarded. + +Generate and assign a new random key to the named principal, and +return the generated key in allocated storage. In +KADM5_API_VERSION_2, multiple keys may be generated and returned as an +array, and n_new_keys is filled in with the number of keys generated. +See section \ref{sec:keys} for a description of how the keys are +chosen. In KADM5_API_VERSION_1, the caller must free the returned +krb5_keyblock * with krb5_free_keyblock. In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, the +caller must free each returned keyblock with krb5_free_keyblock. + +If the principal's POLICY bit is set in aux_attributes and the caller does +not have modify privilege , compliance with the password minimum life +specified by the policy is verified and an appropriate error code is returned +if verification fails. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item If the principal does not exist, return KADM5_UNK_PRINC. +\item If caller does not have modify privilege, (now - last_pwd_change) $<$ +pw_min_life, and the KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE bit is not set in the +principal's attributes, return KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON. +\item If the principal you are trying to change is kadmin/history return +KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL. +\item Store old key in history. +\item Update principal to have new key. +\item Increment principal's key version number by one. +\item If the POLICY bit in aux_attributes is set, set pw_expiration to +now + max_pw_life. +\item If the KRB5_KDC_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE bit is set in the principal's +attributes, clear it. +\item Update last_pwd_change and mod_date to now, update mod_name to +caller. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Principal does not exist. +\item[KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON] The minimum lifetime for the current +key has not expired. +\item[KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL] Cannot change the password of a special +principal +\end{description} + +This function can also be used as part of a sequence to create a new +principal with a random key. The steps to perform the operation +securely are + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Create the principal with kadm5_create_principal with a +random password string and with the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX bit set +in the attributes field. + +\item Randomize the principal's key with kadm5_randkey_principal. + +\item Call kadm5_modify_principal to reset the +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX bit in the attributes field. +\end{enumerate} + +The three steps are necessary to ensure secure creation. Since an +attacker might be able to guess the initial password assigned by the +client program, the principal must be disabled until the key can be +truly randomized. + +\subsection{kadm5_setkey_principal} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_setkey_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ, + krb5_keyblock *new_keys, int n_keys) +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: setkey. This function does not allow the use +of regular changepw authorization because it bypasses the password +policy mechanism. + +This function only exists in KADM5_API_VERSION_2. + +Explicitly sets the specified principal's keys to the n_keys keys in +the new_keys array. The keys in new_keys should not be encrypted in +the Kerberos master key; this function will perform that operation +itself (the keys will be protected during transmission from the +calling client to the kadmind server by the AUTH_GSSAPI RPC layer). +This function completely bypasses the principal's password policy, if +set. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item If the principal does not exist, return KADM5_UNK_PRINC. +\item If the principal you are trying to change is kadmin/history return +KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL. +\item If new_keys contains more than one key of any ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_* +type that is folded, return KADM5_SETKEY_DUP_ENCTYPES. +\item Store old key in history. +\item Update principal to have new key. +\item Increment principal's key version number by one. +\item If the POLICY bit in aux_attributes is set, set pw_expiration to +now + max_pw_life. +\item If the KRB5_KDC_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE bit is set in the principal's +attributes, clear it. +\item Update last_pwd_change and mod_date to now, update mod_name to +caller. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Principal does not exist. +\item[KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL] Cannot change the password of a special +principal +\end{description} + +This function can also be used as part of a sequence to create a new +principal with an explicitly key. The steps to perform the operation +securely are + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Create the principal with kadm5_create_principal with a +random password string and with the KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX bit set +in the attributes field. + +\item Set the principal's key with kadm5_setkey_principal. + +\item Call kadm5_modify_principal to reset the +KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX bit in the attributes field. +\end{enumerate} + +The three steps are necessary to ensure secure creation. Since an +attacker might be able to guess the initial password assigned by the +client program, the principal must be disabled until the key can be +truly randomized. + +\subsection{kadm5_get_principal} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_1: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t *ent); +\end{verbatim} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_2: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principal(void *server_handle, krb5_principal princ, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, u_int32 mask); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: get, or the calling principal being the same +as the princ argument. If the request is authenticated to the +kadmin/changepw service, the get privilege is disregarded. + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_1, return all of the principal's attributes in +allocated memory; if an error is returned entry is set to NULL. In +KADM5_API_VERSION_2, fill in the fields of the principal structure +specified in the mask; memory for the structure is not allocated. +Typically, a caller will specify the mask KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK, +which includes all the fields {\it except} key_data and tl_data to +improve time and memory efficiency. A caller that wants key_data and +tl_data can bitwise-OR those masks onto NORMAL_MASK. Note that even +if KADM5_TL_DATA is specified, this function will not return internal +tl_data elements whose type is less than 256. + +The caller must free the returned entry with kadm5_free_principal_ent. + +The function behaves differently for local and remote clients. For +remote clients, the KEY_DATA mask is illegal and results in a +KADM5_BAD_MASK error. + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_UNK_PRINC] Principal does not exist. +\item[KADM5_BAD_MASK] The mask is not valid for a get operation. + +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_decyrpt_key} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_decrypt_key(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, krb5_int32 + ktype, krb5_int32 stype, krb5_int32 + kvno, krb5_keyblock *keyblock, + krb5_keysalt *keysalt, int *kvnop) +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: none, local function + +Searches a principal's key_data array to find a key with the specified +enctype, salt type, and kvno, and decrypts the key into keyblock and +keysalt if found. entry must have been returned by +kadm5_get_principal with at least the KADM5_KEY_DATA mask set. +Returns ENOENT if the key cannot be found, EINVAL if the key_data +array is empty (as it always is in an RPC client). + +If ktype or stype is -1, it is ignored for the search. If kvno is -1, +ktype and stype are ignored and the key with the max kvno is returned. +If kvno is 0, only the key with the max kvno is returned and only if +it matches the ktype and stype; otherwise, ENOENT is returned. + +\subsection{kadm5_get_principals} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_principals(void *server_handle, char *exp, + char ***princs, int *count) +\end{verbatim} + +Retrieves the list of principal names. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: list + +If \v{exp} is NULL, all principal names are retrieved; otherwise, +principal names that match the expression exp are retrieved. +\v{princs} is filled in with a pointer to a NULL-terminated array of +strings, and \v{count} is filled in with the number of principal names +in the array. \v{princs} must be freed with a call to +\v{kadm5_free_name_list}. + +All characters in the expression match themselves except ``?'' which +matches any single character, ``*'' which matches any number of +consecutive characters, and ``[chars]'' which matches any single +character of ``chars''. Any character which follows a ``$\backslash$'' +matches itself exactly, and a ``$\backslash$'' cannot be the last +character in the string. + +\subsection{kadm5_create_policy} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_create_policy(void *server_handle, + kadm5_policy_ent_t policy, u_int32 mask); +\end{verbatim} + +Create a new policy. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: add + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Check to see if mask is valid, if not return KADM5_BAD_MASK error. +\item Return KADM5_BAD_POLICY if the policy name contains illegal +characters. + +\item Check to see if the policy already exists, if so return +KADM5_DUP error. +\item If the PW_MIN_CLASSES bit is set and pw_min_classes is not 1, 2, +3, 4, or 5, return KADM5_BAD_CLASS. +\item Create a new policy setting the appropriate fields determined +by the mask. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_DUP] Policy already exists +\item[KADM5_BAD_MASK] The mask is not valid for a create +operation. +\item[KADM5_BAD_CLASS] The specified number of character classes +is invalid. +\item[KADM5_BAD_POLICY] The policy name contains illegal characters. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_delete_policy} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_delete_policy(void *server_handle, char *policy); +\end{verbatim} + +Deletes a policy. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: delete + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Return KADM5_BAD_POLICY if the policy name contains illegal +characters. +\item Return KADM5_UNK_POLICY if the named policy does not exist. +\item Return KADM5_POLICY_REF if the named policy's refcnt is not 0. +\item Delete policy. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_BAD_POLICY] The policy name contains illegal characters. +\item[KADM5_UNK_POLICY] Policy does not exist. +\item[KADM5_POLICY_REF] Policy is being referenced. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_modify_policy} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_modify_policy(void *server_handle, + kadm5_policy_ent_t policy, u_int32 mask); +\end{verbatim} + +Modify an existing policy. Note that modifying a policy has no affect +on a principal using the policy until the next time the principal's +password is changed. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: modify + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Return KADM5_BAD_POLICY if the policy name contains illegal +characters. +\item Check to see if mask is legal, if not return KADM5_BAD_MASK error. +\item Check to see if policy exists, if not return +KADM5_UNK_POLICY error. +\item If the PW_MIN_CLASSES bit is set and pw_min_classes is not 1, 2, +3, 4, or 5, return KADM5_BAD_CLASS. +\item Update the fields specified in the mask. +\end{enumerate} + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_BAD_POLICY] The policy name contains illegal characters. +\item[KADM5_UNK_POLICY] Policy not found. +\item[KADM5_BAD_MASK] The mask is not valid for a modify +operation. +\item[KADM5_BAD_CLASS] The specified number of character classes +is invalid. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_get_policy} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_1: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_policy(void *server_handle, char *policy, kadm5_policy_ent_t *ent); +\end{verbatim} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_2: + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_policy(void *server_handle, char *policy, kadm5_policy_ent_t ent); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: get, or the calling principal's policy being +the same as the policy argument. If the request is authenticated to +the kadmin/changepw service, the get privilege is disregarded. + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_1, return the policy's attributes in allocated +memory; if an error is returned entry is set to NULL. In +KADM5_API_VERSION_2, fill in fields of the policy structure allocated +by the caller. The caller must free the returned entry with +kadm5_free_policy_ent + +RETURN CODES: + +\begin{description} +\item[KADM5_BAD_POLICY] The policy name contains illegal characters. +\item[KADM5_UNK_POLICY] Policy not found. +\end{description} + +\subsection{kadm5_get_policies} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_policies(void *server_handle, char *exp, + char ***pols, int *count) +\end{verbatim} + +Retrieves the list of principal names. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: list + +If \v{exp} is NULL, all principal names are retrieved; otherwise, +principal names that match the expression exp are retrieved. \v{pols} +is filled in with a pointer to a NULL-terminated array of strings, and +\v{count} is filled in with the number of principal names in the +array. \v{pols} must be freed with a call to +\v{kadm5_free_name_list}. + +All characters in the expression match themselves except ``?'' which +matches any single character, ``*'' which matches any number of +consecutive characters, and ``[chars]'' which matches any single +character of ``chars''. Any character which follows a ``$\backslash$'' +matches itself exactly, and a ``$\backslash$'' cannot be the last +character in the string. + +\subsection{kadm5_free_principal_ent, _policy_ent} + +\begin{verbatim} +void kadm5_free_principal_ent(void *server_handle, + kadm5_principal_ent_t princ); +\end{verbatim} + +In KADM5_API_VERSION_1, free the structure and contents allocated by a +call to kadm5_get_principal. In KADM5_API_VERSION_2, free the +contents allocated by a call to kadm5_get_principal. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: none (local operation) + +\begin{verbatim} +void kadm5_free_policy_ent(kadm5_policy_ent_t policy); +\end{verbatim} + +Free memory that was allocated by a call to kadm5_get_policy. If +the argument is NULL, the function returns succesfully. + +AUTHORIZATION REQUIRED: none (local operation) + +\subsection{kadm5_free_name_list} + +\begin{verbatim} +void kadm5_free_name_list(void *server_handle, + char **names, int *count); +\end{verbatim} + +Free the memory that was allocated by kadm5_get_principals or +kadm5_get_policies. names and count must be a matched pair of +values returned from one of those two functions. + +\subsection{kadm5_free_key_data} + +\begin{verbatim} +void kadm5_free_key_data(void *server_handle, + krb5_int16 *n_key_data, krb5_key_data *key_data) +\end{verbatim} + +Free the memory that was allocated by kadm5_randkey_principal. +n_key_data and key_data must be a matched pair of values returned from +that function. + +\subsection{kadm5_get_privs} + +\begin{verbatim} +kadm5_ret_t +kadm5_get_privs(void *server_handle, u_int32 *privs); +\end{verbatim} + +Return the caller's admin server privileges in the integer pointed to +by the argument. The Admin API does not define any way for a +principal's privileges to be set. Note that this function will +probably be removed or drastically changed in future versions of this +system. + +The returned value is a bitmask indicating the caller's privileges: + +\begin{tabular}{llr} +{\bf Privilege} & {\bf Symbol} & {\bf Value} \\ +Get & KADM5_PRIV_GET & 0x01 \\ +Add & KADM5_PRIV_ADD & 0x02 \\ +Modify & KADM5_PRIV_MODIFY & 0x04 \\ +Delete & KADM5_PRIV_DELETE & 0x08 \\ +List & KADM5_PRIV_LIST & 0x10 \\ +Changepw & KADM5_PRIV_CPW & 0x20 +\end{tabular} + +There is no guarantee that a caller will have a privilege indicated by +this function for any length of time or for any particular target; +applications using this function must still be prepared to handle all +possible KADM5_AUTH_* error codes. + +In the initial MIT Kerberos version of the admin server, permissions +depend both on the caller and the target; this function returns a +bitmask representing all privileges the caller can possibly have for +any possible target. + +\end{document} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-server-design.tex b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-server-design.tex new file mode 100644 index 000000000..228e83113 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-server-design.tex @@ -0,0 +1,1053 @@ +\documentstyle[12pt,fullpage,rcsid]{article} + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Make _ actually generate an _, and allow line-breaking after it. +\let\underscore=\_ +\catcode`_=13 +\def_{\underscore\penalty75\relax} +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +\rcs$Id$ + +\setlength{\parskip}{.7\baselineskip} +\setlength{\parindent}{0pt} + +\def\v#1{\verb+#1+} +\def\k#1{K$_#1$} + +\title{KADM5 Library and Server \\ Implementation Design\thanks{\rcsId}} +\author{Barry Jaspan} + +\begin{document} + +\sloppy +\maketitle + +{\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}\tableofcontents} + +\section{Overview} + +The KADM5 administration system is designed around the KADM5 API. The +``server-side'' library libkadm5srv.a implements the KADM5 API by +operating directly on the underlying KDC and admin databases. The +``client-side'' library libkadm5clnt.a implements the KADM5 API via an +RPC mechanism. The administration server kadmind accepts RPC requests +from the client-side library and translates them into calls to the +server-side library, performing authentication, authorization, and +logging along the way. + +The two libraries, libkadm5clnt.a and libkadm5srv.a, export the +identical kadm5 interface; for example, both contain definitions for +kadm5_get_principal, and all other kadm5 functions. In most cases, +the client library function just marshalls arguments and results into +and out of an RPC call, whereas the server library function performs +the actual operation on the database file. kadm5_init_*, however, are +substantially different even though they export the same interface: on +the client, they establish the RPC connection and GSS-API context, +whereas on the server side the open the database files, read in the +password dictionary, and the like. Also, the kadm5_free functions +operate on local process memory in both libraries. + +The admin server is implemented as a nearly-stateless transaction +server, where each admin API function represents a single transaction. +No per-client or per-connection information is stored; only local +database handles are maintained between requests. The RPC mechanism +provides access to remote callers' authentication credentials for +authorization purposes. + +The admin API is exported via an RPC interface that hides all details +about network encoding, authentication, and encryption of data on the +wire. The RPC mechanism does, however, allow the server to access the +underlying authentication credentials for authorization purposes. + +The admin system maintains two databases: +% +\begin{itemize} +\item The master Kerberos (KDC) database is used to store all the +information that the Kerberos server understands, thus allowing the +greatest functionality with no modifications to a standard KDC. + +\item The KDC database also stores kadm5-specific per-principal +information in each principal's krb5_tl_data list. In a prior +version, this data was stored in a separate admin principal database; +thus, when this document refers to ``the admin principal database,'' +it now refers to the appropriate krb5_tl_data entries in the KDC +database. + +\item The policy database stores kadm5 policy information. +\end{itemize} + +The per-principal information stored in the admin principal database +consists of the principal's policy name and an array of the +principal's previous keys. The old keys are stored encrypted in the +key of the special principal ``kadmin/history'' that is created by the +server library when it is first needed. Since a change in +kadmin/history's key renders every principal's key history array +useless, it can only be changed using the ovsec_adm_edit utility; that +program will reencrypt every principal's key history in the new +key.\footnote{ovsec_adm_edit has not yet been implemented, and there +are currently no plans to implement it; thus, the history cannot +currently be changed.} The server library refuses all requests to +change kadmin/history's key. + +\section{API Handles} + +Each call to kadm5_init_* on the client or server creates a new API +handle. The handles encapsulate the API and structure versions +specified by kadm5_init_*'s caller and all other internal data needed +by the library. A process can have multiple open API handles +simultaneously by calling kadm5_init_* multiple times, and call can +specify a different version, client or service principal, and so +forth. + +Each kadm5 function verifies the handle it is given with the +CHECK_HANDLE or _KADM5_CHECK_HANDLE macros. The CHECK_HANDLE macro +differs for the client and server library because the handle types +used by those libraries differ, so it is defined in both +$<$client_internal.h$>$ and $<$server_internal.h$>$ in the library +source directory. In each header file, CHECK_HANDLE first calls +GENERIC_CHECK_HANDLE, defined in $<$admin_internal.h$>$, which +verifies the magic number, API version, and structure version that is +contained in both client and server handles. CHECK_HANDLE then calls +either CLIENT_CHECK_HANDLE or SERVER_CHECK_HANDLE respectively to +verify the client- or server-library specific handle fields. + +The CHECK_HANDLE macro is useful because it inlines the handle check +instead of requiring a separate function call. However, using +CHECK_HANDLE means that a source file cannot be compiled once and +included into both the client and server library, because CHECK_HANDLE +is always either specific to either the client or server library, not +both. There are a number of functions that can be implemented with +the same code in both the client and server libraries, however, +including all of the kadm5_free functions and +kadm5_chpass_principal_util. The _KADM5_CHECK_HANDLE macro solves +this problem; instead of inlining the handle check, it calls the +function _kadm5_check_handle which is defined separately in both the +client and server library, in client_init.c and server_init.c. +Since these two files are only compiled once and put in a single +library, they simply verify the handle they are passed with +CHECK_HANDLE and return the result. + +\section{API Versioning} + +The KADM5 system was designed by OpenVision to support multiple +versions of the KADM5 API. MIT has not adopted this level of support, +and considers the KADM5 C API to be unstable from release to release. +This section describes the original design intent; bear in mind that +only the most recent API is supported by current MIT krb5 releases, +and that the API version does not necessarily change with API changes +unless there is a need to do so for wire compatibility. + +Historically, three versions of the KADM5 API have existed: +KADM5_API_VERSION_1 through KADM5_API_VERSION_3. The first version +was equivalent to the initial OpenVision API, +OVSEC_KADM_API_VERSION_1; the second was created during the initial +integration of the OpenVision system into the MIT release; and the +third was created for MIT krb5 1.8 to add lockout fields to policy +entries. MIT dropped wire compatibility support for version 1 in MIT +krb5 1.8 (as version 1 was never used in shipped MIT code), but +retains wire compatibility support for version 2. + +Implementing a versioned API in C via with both local and RPC access +presents a number of design issues, some of them quite subtle. The +contexts in which versioning considerations must be made include: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item Typedefs, function declarations, and defined constants depend on +the API version a client is written to and must be correct at compile +time. + +\item Each function in the server library must behave according to the +API version specified by the caller at runtime to kadm5_init_*. + +\item The XDR functions used by the RPC layer to transmit function +arguments and results must encode data structures correctly depending +on the API version specified by the client at runtime. + +\item Each function in the client library must behave according to the +API version specified by the caller at runtime to kadm5_init_*. + +\item The RPC server (kadmind) must accept calls from a client using +any supported API version, and must then invoke the function in the +server library corresponding to the RPC with the API version indicated +by the client caller. + +\item When a first API function is invoked that needs to call a second +function in the API on its own behalf, and that second API function's +behavior depends on the API version specified, the first API function +must either be prepared to call the second API function at whatever +version its caller specifies or have a means of always calling the +second API function at a pre-determined version. +\end{enumerate} + +The following functions describe how each context is handled. + +\subsection{Designing for future compatibility} + +Any code whose behavior depends on the API version should be written +so as to be compatible with future, currently unknown API versions on +the grounds that any particuarly piece of API behavior will most +likely not change between versions. For example, in the current +system, the code is not written as ``if this is VERSION_1, do X, else +if this is VERSION_2, do Y''; instead, it is written as ``if this is +VERSION_1, do X; else, do Y.'' The former will require additional +work when VERSION_3 is defined, even if ``do Y'' is still the correct +action, whereas the latter will work without modification in that +case. + +\subsection{Header file declarations} + +Typedefs, defined constants and macros, and function declarations may +change between versions. A client is always written to a single, +specific API version, and thus expects the header files to define +everything according to that API. Failure of a header file to define +values correctly will result in either compiler warnings (e.g. if the +pointer type of a function argument changes) or fatal errors (e.g. if +the number of arguments to a function changes, or the fields of a +structure change). For example, in VERSION_1, kadm5_get_policy took a +pointer to a pointer to a structure, and in VERSION_2 it takes a +pointer to a structure; that would generate a warning if not correct. +In VERSION_1, kadm5_randkey_principal accepted three arguments but in +VERSION_2 accepts four; that would generate a fatal error. + +The header file defines everything correctly based on the value of the +USE_KADM5_API_VERSION constant. The constant can be assigned to an +integer corresponding to any supported API version, and defaults to +the newest version. The header files then simply use an \#ifdef to +include the right definitions: +% +\begin{verbatim} +#if USE_KADM5_API_VERSION == 1 +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + kadm5_principal_ent_t *ent); +#else +kadm5_ret_t kadm5_get_principal(void *server_handle, + krb5_principal principal, + kadm5_principal_ent_t ent, + long mask); +#endif +\end{verbatim} + +\subsection{Server library functions} + +Server library functions must know how many and what type of arguments +to expect, and must operate on those arguments correctly, based on the +API version with which they are invoked. The API version is contained +in the handle that is alwasy passed as their first argument, generated +by kadm5_init_* (to which the client specified the API version to use +at run-time). + +In general, it is probably unsafe for a compiled function in a library +to re-interpret the number and type of defined arguments at run-time +since the calling conventions may not allow it; for example, a +function whose first argument was a short in one version and a pointer +in the next might fail if it simply typed-casted the argument. In +that case, the function would have to written to take variable +arguments (i.e. use $<$stdarg.h$>$) and extract them from the stack +based on the API version. Alternatively, a separate function for each +API version could be defined, and $<$kadm5/admin.h$>$ could be written +to \v{\#define} the exported function name based on the value of +USE_KADM5_API_VERSION. + +In the current system, it turns out, that isn't necessary, and future +implementors should take try to ensure that no version has semantics +that will cause such problems in the future. All the functions in +KADM5 that have different arguments or results between VERSION_1 and +VERSION_2 do so simply by type-casting their arguments to the +appropriate version and then have separate code paths to handle each +one correctly. kadm5_get_principal, in svr_principal.c, is a good +example. In VERSION_1, it took the address of a pointer to a +kadm5_principal_ent_t to fill in with a pointer to allocated memory; +in VERSION_2, it takes a pointer to a structure to fill in, and a mask +of which fields in that structure should be filled in. Also, the +contents of the kadm5_principal_ent_t changed slightly between the two +versions. kadm5_get_principal handles versioning as follows +(following along in the source code will be helpful): + +\begin{enumerate} +\item If VERSION_1, it saves away its entry argument (address of a +pointer to a structure) and resets its value to contain the address of +a locally stack-allocated entry structure; this allows most of the +function to written once, in terms of VERSION_2 semantics. If +VERSION_1, it also resets its mask argument to be +KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK, because that is the equivalent to +VERSION_1 behavior, which was to return all the fields of the +structure. + +\item The bulk of the function is implemented as expected for +VERSION_2. + +\item The new fields in the VERSION_2 entry structure are assigned +inside a block that is only execute if the caller specified +VERSION_2. This saves a little time for a VERSION_1 caller. + +\item After the entry structure is filled, the function checks again +if it was called as VERSION_1. If so, it allocates a new +kadm5_principal_ent_t_v1 structure (which is conveniently defined in +the header file) with malloc, copies the appropriate values from the +entry structure into the VERSION_1 entry structure, and then writes +the address of the newly allocated memory into address specified by +the original entry argument which it had previously saved away. +\end{enumerate} + +There is another complication involved in a function re-interpreting +the number of arguments it receives at compile time---it cannot assign +any value to an argument for which the client did not pass a value. +For example, a VERSION_1 client only passes three arguments to +kadm5_get_principal. If the implementation of kadm5_get_principal +notices that the caller is VERSION_1 and therefore assigns its fourth +argument, mask, to a value that mimics the VERSION_1 behavior, it may +inadvertently overwrite data on its caller's stack. This problem can +be avoided simply by using a true local variable in such cases, +instead of treating an unpassed argument as a local variable. + +\subsection{XDR functions} + +The XDR functions used to encode function arguments and results must +know how to encode the data for any API version. This is important +both so that all the data gets correctly transmitted and so that +protocol compatibility between clients or servers using the new +library but an old API version is maintained; specific, new kadmind +servers should support old kadm5 clients. + +The signature of all XDR functions is strictly defined: they take the +address of an XDR function and the address of the data object to be +encoded or decoded. It is thus impossible to provide the API version +of the data object as an additional argument to an XDR function. +There are two other means to convey the information, storing the API +version to use as a field in the data object itself and creating +separate XDR functions to handle each different version of the data +object, and both of them are used in KADM5. + +In the client library, each kadm5 function collects its arguments into +a single structure to be passed by the RPC; similarly, it expects all +of the results to come back as a single structure from the RPC that it +will then decode back into its constituent pieces (these are the +standard ONC RPC semantics). In order to pass versioning information +to the XDR functions, each function argument and result datatype has a +filed to store the API version. For example, consider +kadm5_get_principal's structures: +% +\begin{verbatim} +struct gprinc_arg { + krb5_ui_4 api_version; + krb5_principal princ; + long mask; +}; +typedef struct gprinc_arg gprinc_arg; +bool_t xdr_gprinc_arg(); + +struct gprinc_ret { + krb5_ui_4 api_version; + kadm5_ret_t code; + kadm5_principal_ent_rec rec; +}; +typedef struct gprinc_ret gprinc_ret; +bool_t xdr_gprinc_ret(); +\end{verbatim} +% +kadm5_get_principal (in client_principal.c) assigns the api_version +field of the gprinc_arg to the version specified by its caller, +assigns the princ field based on its arguments, and assigns the mask +field from its argument if the caller specified VERSION_2. It then +calls the RPC function clnt_call, specifying the XDR functions +xdr_gprinc_arg and xdr_gprinc_ret to handle the arguments and results. + +xdr_gprinc_arg is invoked with a pointer to the gprinc_arg structure +just described. It first encodes the api_version field; this allows +the server to know what to expect. It then encodes the krb5_principal +structure and, if api_version is VERSION_2, the mask. If api_version +is not VERSION_2, it does not encode {\it anything} in place of the +mask, because an old VERSION_1 server will not expect any other data +to arrive on the wire there. + +The server performs the kadm5_get_principal call and returns its +results in an XDR encoded gprinc_ret structure. clnt_call, which has +been blocking until the results arrived, invokes xdr_gprinc_ret with a +pointer to the encoded data for it to decode. xdr_gprinc_ret first +decodes the api_version field, and then the code field since that is +present in all versions to date. The kadm5_principal_ent_rec presents +a problem, however. The structure does not itself contain an +api_version field, but the structure is different between the two +versions. Thus, a single XDR function cannot decode both versions of +the structure because it will have no way to decide which version to +expect. The solution is to have two functions, +kadm5_principal_ent_rec_v1 and kadm5_principal_ent_rec, which always +decode according to VERSION_1 or VERSION_2, respectively. gprinc_ret +knows which one to invoke because it has the api_version field +returned by the server (which is always the same as that specified by +the client in the gpring_arg). + +In hindsight, it probably would have been better to encode the API +version of all structures directly in a version field in the structure +itself; then multiple XDR functions for a single data type wouldn't be +necessary, and the data objects would stand complete on their own. +This can be added in a future API version if desired. + +\subsection{Client library functions} + +Just as with server library functions, client library functions must +be able to interpret their arguments and provide result according to +the API version specified by the caller. Again, kadm5_get_principal +(in client_principal.c) is a good example. The gprinc_ret structure +that it gets back from clnt_call contains a kadm5_principal_ent_rec or +a kadm5_principal_ent_rec_v1 (the logic is simplified somewhat because +the VERSION_2 structure only has new fields added on the end). If +kadm5_get_principal was invoked with VERSION_2, that structure should +be copied into the pointer provided as the entry argument; if it was +invoked with VERSION_1, however, the structure should be copied into +allocated memory whose address is then written into the pointer +provided by the entry argument. Client library functions make this +determination based on the API version specified in the provided +handle, just like server library functions do. + +\subsection{Admin server stubs} + +When an RPC call arrives at the server, the RPC layer authenticates +the call using the GSS-API, decodes the arguments into their +single-structure form (ie: a gprinc_arg) and dispatches the call to a +stub function in the server (in server_stubs.c). The stub function +first checks the caller's authorization to invoke the function and, if +authorized, calls the kadm5 function corresponding to the RPC function +with the arguments specified in the single-structure argument. + +Once again, kadm5_get_principal is a good example for the issues +involved. The contents of the gprinc_arg given to the stub +(get_principal_1) depends on the API version the caller on the client +side specified; that version is available to the server in the +api_version field of the gprinc_arg. When the server calls +kadm5_get_principal in the server library, it must give that function +an API handle that contains the API version requested by the client; +otherwise the function semantics might not be correct. One +possibility would be for the server to call kadm5_init for each client +request, specifing the client's API version number and thus generating +an API handle with the correct version, but that would be +prohibitively inefficient. Instead, the server dips down in the +server library's internal abstraction barrier, using the function +new_server_handle to cons up a server handle based on the server's own +global_server_handle but using the API version specified by the +client. The server then passes the newly generated handle to +kadm5_get_principal, ensuring the right behavior, and creates the +gprinc_ret structure in a manner similar to that described above. + +Although new_server_handle solves the problem of providing the server +with an API handle containing the right API version number, it does +not solve another problem: that a single source file, server_stubs.c, +needs to be able to invoke functions with arguments appropriate for +multiple API versions. If the client specifies VERSION_1, for +example, the server must invoke kadm5_get_principal with three +arguments, but if the client specifies VERSION_2 the server must +invoke kadm5_get_principal with four arguments. The compiler will not +allow this inconsistency. The server defines wrapper functions in a +separate source file that match the old version, and the separate +source file is compiled with USE_KADM5_API_VERSION set to the old +version; see kadm5_get_principal_v1 in server_glue_v1.c. The server +then calls the correct variant of kadm5_get_principal_* based on the +API version and puts the return values into the gprinc_ret in a manner +similar to that described above. + +Neither of these solutions are necessarily correct. new_server_handle +violates the server library's abstraction barrier and is at best a +kludge; the server library should probably export a function to +provide this behavior without violating the abstraction; +alternatively, the librar should be modified so that having the server +call kadm5_init for each client RPC request would not be too +inefficient. The glue functions in server_glue_v1.c really are not +necessary, because the server stubs could always just pass dummy +arguments for the extra arguments; after all, the glue functions pass +{\it nothing} for the extra arguments, so they just end up as stack +garbage anyway. + +Another alternative to the new_server_handle problem is to have the +server always invoke server library functions at a single API version, +and then have the stubs take care of converting the function arguments +and results back into the form expected by the caller. In general, +however, this might require the stubs to duplicate substantial logic +already present in the server library and further violate the server +library's abstraction barrier. + +\subsection{KADM5 self-reference} + +Some kadm5 functions call other kadm5 functions ``on their own +behalf'' to perform functionality that is necessary but that does not +directly affect what the client sees. For example, +kadm5_chpass_principal has to enforce password policies; thus, it +needs to call kadm5_get_principal and, if the principal has a policy, +kadm5_get_policy and kadm5_modify_principal in the process of changing +a principal's password. This leads to a complication: what API handle +should kadm5_chpass_principal pass to the other kadm5 functions it +calls? + +The ``obvious,'' but wrong, answer is that it should pass the handle +it was given by its caller. The caller may provide an API handle +specifying any valid API version. Although the semantics of +kadm5_chpass_principal did not change between VERSION_1 and VERSION_2, +the declarations of both kadm5_get_principal and kadm5_get_policy +did. Thus, to use the caller's API handle, kadm5_chpass_principal +will have to have a separate code path for each API version, even +though it itself did not change bewteen versions, and duplicate a lot +of logic found elsewhere in the library. + +Instead, each API handle contains a ``local-use handle,'' or lhandle, +that kadm5 functions should use to call other kadm5 functions. For +example, the client-side library's handle structure is: +% +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _kadm5_server_handle_t { + krb5_ui_4 magic_number; + krb5_ui_4 struct_version; + krb5_ui_4 api_version; + char * cache_name; + int destroy_cache; + CLIENT * clnt; + krb5_context context; + kadm5_config_params params; + struct _kadm5_server_handle_t *lhandle; +} kadm5_server_handle_rec, *kadm5_server_handle_t; +\end{verbatim} +% +The lhandle field is allocated automatically when the handle is +created. All of the fields of the API handle that are accessed +outside kadm5_init are also duplicated in the lhandle; however, the +api_version field of the lhandle is always set to a {\it constant} +value, regardless of the API version specified by the caller to +kadm5_init. In the current implementation, the lhandle's api_version +is always VERSION_2. + +By passing the caller's handle's lhandle to recursively called kadm5 +functions, a kadm5 function is assured of invoking the second kadm5 +function with a known API version. Additionally, the lhandle's +lhandle field points back to the lhandle, in case kadm5 functions call +themselves more than one level deep; handle$->$lhandle always points +to the same lhandle, no matter how many times the indirection is +performed. + +This scheme might break down if a kadm5 function has to call another +kadm5 function to perform operations that they client will see and for +its own benefit, since the semantics of the recursively-called kadm5 +function may depend on the API version specified and the client may be +depending on a particular version's behavior. Future implementators +should avoid creating a situation in which this is possible. + +\section{Server Main} + +The admin server starts by trapping all fatal signals and directing +them to a cleanup-and-exit function. It then creates and exports the +RPC interface and enters its main loop. + +The main loop dispatches all incoming requests to the RPC mechanism. +In a previous version, after 15 seconds of inactivity, the server +closed all open databases; each database was be automatically reopened +by the API function implementations as necessary. That behavior +existed to protect against loss of written data before the process +exited. The current database libraries write all changes out to disk +immediately, however, so this behavior is no longer required or +performed. + +\section{Remote Procedure Calls} + +The RPC for the Admin system will be based on ONC RPC. ONC RPC is +used because it is a well-known, portable RPC mechanism. The +underlying external data representation (xdr) mechanisms for wire +encapsulation are well-known and extensible. Authentication to the +admin server and encryption of all RPC functional arguments and +results are be handled via the AUTH_GSSAPI authentication flavor of +ONC RPC. + +\section{Database Record Types} +\label{sec:db-types} + +\subsection{Admin Principal, osa_princ_ent_t} + +The admin principal database stores records of the type +osa_princ_ent_t (declared in $<$kadm5/adb.h$>$), which is the +subset of the kadm5_principal_ent_t structure that is not stored +in the Kerberos database plus the necessary bookkeeping information. +The records are keyed by the ASCII representation of the principal's +name, including the trailing NULL. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _osa_pw_hist_t { + int n_key_data; + krb5_key_data *key_data; +} osa_pw_hist_ent, *osa_pw_hist_t; + +typedef struct _osa_princ_ent_t { + char * policy; + u_int32 aux_attributes; + + unsigned int old_key_len; + unsigned int old_key_next; + krb5_kvno admin_history_kvno; + osa_pw_hist_ent *old_keys; + + + u_int32 num_old_keys; + u_int32 next_old_key; + krb5_kvno admin_history_kvno; + osa_pw_hist_ent *old_keys; +} osa_princ_ent_rec, *osa_princ_ent_t; +\end{verbatim} + +The fields that are different from kadm5_principal_ent_t are: + +\begin{description} +\item[num_old_keys] The number of previous keys in the old_keys array. +This value must be 0 $\le$ num_old_keys $<$ pw_history_num. + +\item[old_key_next] The index into old_keys where the next key should +be inserted. This value must be 0 $\le$ old_key_next $\le$ +num_old_keys. + +\item[admin_history_kvno] The key version number of the kadmin/history +principal's key used to encrypt the values in old_keys. If the server +library finds that kadmin/history's kvno is different from the value +in this field, it returns KADM5_BAD_HIST_KEY. + +\item[old_keys] The array of the principal's previous passwords, each +encrypted in the kadmin/history key. There are num_old_keys +elements. Each ``password'' in the array is itself an array of +n_key_data krb5_key_data structures, one for each keysalt type the +password was encoded in. +\end{description} + +\subsection{Policy, osa_policy_ent_t} + +The policy database stores records of the type osa_policy_ent_t +(declared in $<$kadm5/adb.h$>$) , which is all of +kadm5_policy_ent_t plus necessary bookkeeping information. The +records are keyed by the policy name. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _osa_policy_ent_t { + char *policy; + + u_int32 pw_min_life; + u_int32 pw_max_life; + u_int32 pw_min_length; + u_int32 pw_min_classes; + u_int32 pw_history_num; + + u_int32 refcnt; +} osa_policy_ent_rec, *osa_policy_ent_t; +\end{verbatim} + +\subsection{Kerberos, krb5_db_entry} + +The Kerberos database stores records of type krb5_db_entry, which is +defined in the $<$k5-int.h$>$ header file. The semantics of each +field are defined in the libkdb functional specification. + +\section{Database Access Methods} + +\subsection{Principal and Policy Databases} + +This section describes the database abstraction used for the admin +policy database; the admin principal database used to be treated in +the same manner but is now handled more directly as krb5_tl_data; +thus, nothing in this section applies to it any more. Since both +databases export equivalent functionality, the API is only described +once. The character T is used to represent both ``princ'' and +``policy''. The location of the principal database is defined by the +configuration parameters given to any of the kadm5_init functions in +the server library. + +Note that this is {\it only} a database abstraction. All functional +intelligence, such as maintaining policy reference counts or sanity +checking, must be implemented above this layer. + +Prototypes for the osa functions are supplied in +$<$kadm5/adb.h$>$. The routines are defined in libkadm5srv.a. They +require linking with the Berkely DB library. + +\subsubsection{Error codes} + +The database routines use com_err for error codes. The error code +table name is ``adb'' and the offsets are the same as the order +presented here. The error table header file is +$<$kadm5/adb_err.h$>$. Callers of the OSA routines should first call +init_adb_err_tbl() to initialize the database table. + +\begin{description} +\item[OSA_ADB_OK] Operation successful. +\item[OSA_ADB_FAILURE] General failure. +\item[OSA_ADB_DUP] Operation would create a duplicate database entry. +\item[OSA_ADB_NOENT] Named entry not in database. +\item[OSA_ADB_BAD_PRINC] The krb5_principal structure is invalid. +\item[OSA_ADB_BAD_POLICY] The specified policy name is invalid. +\item[OSA_ADB_XDR_FAILURE] The principal or policy structure cannot be +encoded for storage. +\item[OSA_ADB_BADLOCKMODE] Bad lock mode specified. +\item[OSA_ADB_CANTLOCK_DB] Cannot lock database, presumably because it +is already locked. +\item[OSA_ADB_NOTLOCKED] Internal error, database not locked when +unlock is called. +\item[OSA_ADB_NOLOCKFILE] KADM5 administration database lock file missing. +\end{description} + +Database functions can also return system errors. Unless otherwise +specified, database functions return OSA_ADB_OK. + +\subsubsection{Locking} + +All of the osa_adb functions except open and close lock and unlock the +database to prevent concurrency collisions. The overall locking +algorithm is as follows: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item osa_adb_open_T calls osa_adb_init_db to allocate the osa_adb_T_t +structure and open the locking file for further use. + +\item Each osa_adb functions locks the locking file and opens the +appropriate database with osa_adb_open_and_lock, performs its action, +and then closes the database and unlocks the locking file with +osa_adb_close_and_unlock. + +\item osa_adb_close_T calls osa_adb_fini_db to close the locking file +and deallocate the db structure. +\end{enumerate} + +Functions which modify the database acquire an exclusive lock, others +acqure a shared lock. osa_adb_iter_T acquires an exclusive lock for +safety but as stated below consequences of modifying the database in +the iteration function are undefined. + +\subsubsection{Function descriptions} + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t osa_adb_create_T_db(kadm5_config_params *params) +\end{verbatim} +% +Create the database and lockfile specified in params. The database +must not already exist, or EEXIST is returned. The lock file is only +created after the database file has been created successfully. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t osa_adb_rename_T_db(kadm5_config_params *fromparams, + kadm5_config_params *toparams) +\end{verbatim} +% +Rename the database named by fromparams to that named by toparams. +The fromparams database must already exist; the toparams database may +exist or not. When the function returns, the database named by +fromparams no longer exists, and toparams has been overwritten with +fromparams. This function acquires a permanent lock on both databases +for the duration of its operation, so a failure is likely to leave the +databases unusable. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t osa_adb_destroy_policy_db(kadm5_config_params *params) +\end{verbatim} +% +Destroy the database named by params. The database file and lock file +are deleted. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t +osa_adb_open_T(osa_adb_T_t *db, char *filename); +\end{verbatim} +% +Open the database named filename. Returns OSA_ADB_NOLOCKFILE if the +database does not exist or if the lock file is missing. The database +is not actually opened in the operating-system file sense until a lock +is acquire. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t +osa_adb_close_T(osa_adb_T_t db); +\end{verbatim} +% +Release all shared or exclusive locks (on BOTH databases, since they +use the same lock file) and close the database. + +It is an error to exit while a permanent lock is held; +OSA_ADB_NOLOCKFILE is returned in this case. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t osa_adb_get_lock(osa_adb_T_t db, int mode) +\end{verbatim} + +Acquire a lock on the administration databases; note that both +databases are locked simultaneously by a single call. The mode +argument can be OSA_ADB_SHARED, OSA_ADB_EXCLUSIVE, or +OSA_ADB_PERMANENT. The first two and the third are really disjoint +locking semantics and should not be interleaved. + +Shared and exclusive locks have the usual semantics, and a program can +upgrade a shared lock to an exclusive lock by calling the function +again. A reference count of open locks is maintained by this function +and osa_adb_release_lock so the functions can be called multiple +times; the actual lock is not released until the final +osa_adb_release_lock. Note, however, that once a lock is upgraded +from shared to exclusive, or from exclusive to permanent, it is not +downgraded again until released completely. In other words, +get_lock(SHARED), get_lock(EXCLUSIVE), release_lock() leaves the +process with an exclusive lock with a reference count of one. An +attempt to get a shared or exclusive lock that conflicts with another +process results in the OSA_ADB_CANLOCK_DB error code. + +This function and osa_adb_release_lock are called automatically as +needed by all other osa_adb functions to acquire shared and exclusive +locks and so are not normally needed. They can be used explicitly by +a program that wants to perform multiple osa_adb functions within the +context of a single lock. + +Acquiring an OSA_ADB_PERMANENT lock is different. A permanent lock +consists of first acquiring an exclusive lock and then {\it deleting +the lock file}. Any subsequent attempt to acquire a lock by a +different process will fail with OSA_ADB_NOLOCKFILE instead of +OSA_ADB_CANTLOCK_DB (attempts in the same process will ``succeed'' +because only the reference count gets incremented). The lock file is +recreated by osa_adb_release_lock when the last pending lock is released. + +The purpose of a permanent lock is to absolutely ensure that the +database remain locked during non-atomic operations. If the locking +process dies while holding a permanent lock, all subsequent osa_adb +operations will fail, even through a system reboot. This is useful, +for example, for ovsec_adm_import which creates both new database +files in a temporary location and renames them into place. If both +renames do not fully complete the database will probably be +inconsistent and everything should stop working until an administrator +can clean it up. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t osa_adb_release_lock(osa_adb_T_t db) +\end{verbatim} + +Releases a shared, exclusive, or permanent lock acquired with +osa_adb_get_lock, or just decrements the reference count if multiple +locks are held. When a permanent lock is released, the lock file is +re-created. + +All of a process' shared or exclusive database locks are released when +the process terminates. A permanent lock is {\it not} released when +the process exits (although the exclusive lock it begins with +obviously is). + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t +osa_adb_create_T(osa_adb_T_t db, osa_T_ent_t entry); +\end{verbatim} +% +Adds the entry to the database. All fields are defined. Returns +OSA_ADB_DUP if it already exists. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t +osa_adb_destroy_T(osa_adb_T_t db, osa_T_t name); +\end{verbatim} + +Removes the named entry from the database. Returns OSA_ADB_NOENT if +it does not exist. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t +osa_adb_get_T(osa_adb_T_t db, osa_T_t name, + osa_princ_ent_t *entry); +\end{verbatim} + +Looks up the named entry in the db, and returns it in *entry in +allocated storage that must be freed with osa_adb_free_T. Returns +OSA_ADB_NOENT if name does not exist, OSA_ADB_MEM if memory cannot be +allocated. + +\begin{verbatim} +osa_adb_ret_t +osadb_adb_put_T(osa_adb_T_t db, osa_T_ent_t entry); +\end{verbatim} + +Modifies the existing entry named in entry. All fields must be filled +in. Returns OSA_DB_NOENT if the named entry does not exist. Note +that this cannot be used to rename an entry; rename is implemented by +deleting the old name and creating the new one (NOT ATOMIC!). + +\begin{verbatim} +void osa_adb_free_T(osa_T_ent_t); +\end{verbatim} + +Frees the memory associated with an osa_T_ent_t allocated by +osa_adb_get_T. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef osa_adb_ret_t (*osa_adb_iter_T_func)(void *data, + osa_T_ent_t entry); + +osa_adb_ret_t osa_adb_iter_T(osa_adb_T_t db, osa_adb_iter_T_func func, + void *data); +\end{verbatim} + +Iterates over every entry in the database. For each entry ent in the +database db, the function (*func)(data, ent) is called. If func +returns an error code, osa_adb_iter_T returns an error code. If all +invokations of func return OSA_ADB_OK, osa_adb_iter_T returns +OSA_ADB_OK. The function func is permitted to access the database, +but the consequences of modifying the database during the iteration +are undefined. + +\subsection{Kerberos Database} + +Kerberos uses the libkdb interface to store krb5_db_entry records. It +can be accessed and modified in parallel with the Kerberos server, +using functions that are defined inside the KDC and the libkdb.a. The +libkdb interface is defined in the libkdb functional specifications. + +\subsubsection{Initialization and Key Access} + +Keys stored in the Kerberos database are encrypted in the Kerberos +master key. The admin server will therefore have to acquire the key +before it can perform any key-changing operations, and will have to +decrypt and encrypt the keys retrieved from and placed into the +database via krb5_db_get_principal and _put_principal. This section +describes the internal admin server API that will be used to perform +these functions. + +\begin{verbatim} +krb5_principal master_princ; +krb5_encrypt_block master_encblock; +krb5_keyblock master_keyblock; + +void kdc_init_master() +\end{verbatim} + +kdc_init_master opens the database and acquires the master key. It +also sets the global variables master_princ, master_encblock, and +master_keyblock: + +\begin{itemize} +\item master_princ is set to the name of the Kerberos master principal +(\v{K/M@REALM}). + +\item master_encblock is something I have no idea about. + +\item master_keyblock is the Kerberos master key +\end{itemize} + +\begin{verbatim} +krb5_error_code kdb_get_entry_and_key(krb5_principal principal, + krb5_db_entry *entry, + krb5_keyblock *key) +\end{verbatim} + +kdb_get_entry_and_key retrieves the named principal's entry from the +database in entry, and decrypts its key into key. The caller must +free entry with krb5_dbm_db_free_principal and free key-$>$contents with +free.\footnote{The caller should also \v{memset(key-$>$contents, 0, +key-$>$length)}. There should be a function krb5_free_keyblock_contents +for this, but there is not.} + +\begin{verbatim} +krb5_error_code kdb_put_entry_pw(krb5_db_entry *entry, char *pw) +\end{verbatim} + +kdb_put_entry_pw stores entry in the database. All the entry values +must already be set; this function does not change any of them except +the key. pw, the NULL-terminated password string, is converted to a +key using string-to-key with the salt type specified in +entry-$>$salt_type.\footnote{The salt_type should be set based on the +command line arguments to the kadmin server (see the ``Command Line'' +section of the functional specification).} + +\section{Admin Principal and Policy Database Implementation} + +The admin principal and policy databases will each be stored in a +single hash table, implemented by the Berkeley 4.4BSD db library. +Each record will consist of an entire osa_T_ent_t. The key into the +hash table is the entry name (for principals, the ASCII representation +of the name). The value is the T entry structure. Since the key and +data must be self-contained, with no pointers, the Sun xdr mechanisms +will be used to marshal and unmarshal data in the database. + +The server in the first release will be single-threaded in that a +request will run to completion (or error) before the next will run, +but multiple connections will be allowed simultaneously. + +\section{ACLs, acl_check} + +The ACL mechanism described in the ``Authorization ACLs'' section of +the functional specifications will be implemented by the acl_check +function. + +\begin{verbatim} +enum access_t { + ACCESS_DENIED = 0, + ACCESS_OK = 1, +}; + +enum access_t acl_check(krb5_principal princ, char *priv); +\end{verbatim} + +The priv argument must be one of ``get'', ``add'', ``delete'', or +``modify''. acl_check returns 1 if the principal princ has the named +privilege, 0 if it does not. + +\section{Function Details} + +This section discusses specific design issues for Admin API functions +that are not addresed by the functional specifications. + +\subsection{kadm5_create_principal} + +If the named principal exists in either the Kerberos or admin +principal database, but not both, return KADM5_BAD_DB. + +The principal's initial key is not stored in the key history array at +creation time. + +\subsection{kadm5_delete_principal} + +If the named principal exists in either the Kerberos or admin +principal database, but not both, return KADM5_BAD_DB. + +\subsection{kadm5_modify_principal} + +If the named principal exists in either the Kerberos or admin +principal database, but not both, return KADM5_BAD_DB. + +If pw_history_num changes and the new value $n$ is smaller than the +current value of num_old_keys, old_keys should end up with the $n$ +most recent keys; these are found by counting backwards $n$ elements +in old_keys from old_key_next. old_key_nexts should then be reset to +0, the oldest of the saved keys, and num_old_keys set to $n$, the +new actual number of old keys in the array. + +\subsection{kadm5_chpass_principal, randkey_principal} + +The algorithm for determining whether a password is in the principal's +key history is complicated by the use of the kadmin/history \k{h} +encrypting key. + +\begin{enumerate} +\item For kadm5_chpass_principal, convert the password to a key +using string-to-key and the salt method specified by the command line +arguments. + +\item If the POLICY bit is set and pw_history_num is not zero, check +if the new key is in the history. +\begin{enumerate} +\item Retrieve the principal's current key and decrypt it with \k{M}. +If it is the same as the new key, return KADM5_PASS_REUSE. +\item Retrieve the kadmin/history key \k{h} and decrypt it with \k{M}. +\item Encrypt the principal's new key in \k{h}. +\item If the principal's new key encrypted in \k{h} is in old_keys, +return KADM5_PASS_REUSE. +\item Encrypt the principal's current key in \k{h} and store it in +old_keys. +\item Erase the memory containing \k{h}. +\end{enumerate} + +\item Encrypt the principal's new key in \k{M} and store it in the +database. +\item Erase the memory containing \k{M}. +\end{enumerate} + +To store the an encrypted key in old_keys, insert it as the +old_key_next element of old_keys, and increment old_key_next by one +modulo pw_history_num. + +\subsection{kadm5_get_principal} + +If the named principal exists in either the Kerberos or admin +principal database, but not both, return KADM5_BAD_DB. + +\end{document} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-unit-test.tex b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-unit-test.tex new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3e0eb503e --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/api-unit-test.tex @@ -0,0 +1,2679 @@ +\documentstyle[times,fullpage,rcsid]{article} + +\rcs$Id$ + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Make _ actually generate an _, and allow line-breaking after it. +\let\underscore=\_ +\catcode`_=13 +\def_{\underscore\penalty75\relax} +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +\newcommand{\test}[1]{\begin{description} +\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt} +#1 +\end{description} + +} + +\newcommand{\numtest}[2]{\begin{description} +\setlength{\itemsep}{0pt} +\Number{#1} +#2 +\end{description} + +} + +\newcommand{\Number}[1]{\item[Number:] #1} +\newcommand{\Reason}[1]{\item[Reason:] #1} +\newcommand{\Expected}[1]{\item[Expected:] #1} +\newcommand{\Conditions}[1]{\item[Conditions:] #1} +\newcommand{\Priority}[1]{\item[Priority:] #1} +\newcommand{\Status}[1]{\item[Status:] #1} +\newcommand{\Vtwonote}[1]{\item[V2 note:] #1} +\newcommand{\Version}[1]{\item[Version:] #1} +\newcommand{\Call}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Call}[1]{\item[Call:] #1} +%\newcommand{\Number}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Reason}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Expected}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Conditions}[1]{} +%\newcommand{\Priority}[1]{} + +\title{KADM5 Admin API\\ +Unit Test Description\footnote{\rcsId}} +\author{Jonathan I. Kamens} + +\begin{document} + +\maketitle + +%\tableofcontents + +\section{Introduction} + +The following is a description of a black-box unit test of the KADM5 +API. Each API function is listed, followed by the tests that shoud be +performed on it. + +The tests described here are based on the ``Kerberos Administration +System KADM5 API Functional Specifications'', revision 1.68. This +document was originally written based on the OpenVision API functional +specifications, version 1.41, dated August 18, 1994, and many +indications of the original version remain. + +All tests which test for success should verify, using some means other +than the return value of the function being tested, that the requested +operation was successfully performed. For example: for init, test +that other operations can be performed after init; for destroy, test +that other operations can't be performed after destroy; for modify +functions, verify that all modifications to the database which should +have taken place did, and that the new, modified data is in effect; +for get operations, verify that the data retrieved is the data that +should actually be in the database. + +The tests would be better if they compared the actual contents of the +database before and after each test, rather than relying on the KADM5 +API to report the results of changes. + +Similarly, all tests which test for failure should verify that the +no component of the requested operation took place. For example: if +init fails, other operations should not work. If a modify fails, all +data in the database should be the same as it was before the attempt +to modify, and the old data should still be what is enforced. +Furthermore, tests which test for failure should verify that the +failure code returned is correct for the specific failure condition +tested. + +Most of the tests listed below should be run twice -- once locally on +the server after linking against the server API library, and once +talking to the server via authenticated Sun RPC after linking against +the client API library. Tests which should only be run locally or via +RPC are labelled with a ``local'' or ``RPC''. + +Furthermore, in addition to the tests labelled below, a test should be +implemented to verify that a client can't perform operations on the +server through the client API library when it's linked against +standard Sun RPC instead of OpenV*Secure's authenticated Sun RPC. +This will require a client with a modified version of ovsec_kadm_init +which doesn't call auth_gssapi_create. This client should call this +modified ovsec_kadm_init and then call some other admin API function, +specifying arguments to both functions that would work if the +authenticated Sun RPC had been used, but shouldn't if authentication +wasn't used. The test should verify that the API function call after +the init doesn't succeed. + +There is also another test to see if all the API functions handle getting an +invalid server handle correctly. This is not done as part of the tests that +are run through the TCL program cause the TCL program has no way of +invalidating a server handle. So there is a program that calls init and +changes the handle magic number, and then attempts to call each API function +with the corrupted server handle. + +A number of tests have been added or changed to correspond with KADM5 +API version 2. Tests which are only performed against the newer +version specify the version number in the test description. + +\section{ovsec_kadm_init} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{An empty string realm is rejected.} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{The empty string is now passed as the realm field of the +parameters structure.} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{A realm containing invalid characters is rejected.} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{The invalid character is now passed as the realm field of the +parameters structure.} +} + +\numtest{2.5}{ +\Reason{A non-existent realm is rejected.} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{The non-existent realm is now passed as the realm field of the +parameters structure.} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{A bad service name representing an existing principal + (different from the client principal) is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{A bad service name representing a non-existent + principal is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{A bad service name identical to the (existing) client + name is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Reason{A null password causes password prompting.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{An empty-string causes password prompting} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{An incorrect password which is the password of another + user is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Reason{An incorrect password which isn't the password of any + user is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Reason{A null client_name is rejected.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +% Empty string client name is legal. +%\numtest{11}{ +%\Reason{An empty-string client_name is rejected.} +%} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Reason{A client_name referring to a non-existent principal in + the default realm is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Reason{A client_name referring to a non-existent principal + with the local realm specified explicitly is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Reason{A client_name referring to a non-existent principal in + a nonexistent realm is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Reason{A client_name referring to an existing principal in a + nonexistent realm is rejected.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Reason{Valid invocation.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Reason{Valid invocation (explicit client realm).} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Reason{Valid invocation (CHANGEPW_SERVICE).} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{19}{ +\Reason{Valid invocation (explicit service realm).} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{The explicit realm is now passed as the realm field of the +configuration parameters.} +} + +\numtest{20}{ +\Reason{Valid invocation (database access allowed after init).} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +%\numtest{21}{ +%\Reason{Init fails when called twice in a row.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{22}{ +\Reason{A null password causes master-key prompting.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{Obsolete.} +} + +\numtest{22.5}{ +\Reason{A empty string password causes master-key prompting.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{Obsolete.} +} + +%\numtest{23}{ +%\Reason{A non-null password causes reading from the kstash.} +%\Conditions{local} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{24}{ +\Reason{Null service name is ignored in local invocation.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{25}{ +\Reason{Non-null service name is ignored in local invocation.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +%\numtest{26}{ +%\Reason{Can't do ``get'' operation before calling init.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{27}{ +%\Reason{Can't do ``add'' operation before calling init.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{28}{ +%\Reason{Can't do ``modify'' operation before calling init.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{29}{ +%\Reason{Can't do ``delete'' operation before calling init.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{30}{ +\Reason{Can init after failed init attempt.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{31}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return BAD_STRUCT_VERSION when the mask bits are set to invalid values} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{32}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return BAD_STRUCT_VERSION when the mask bits are not set} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{33}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return OLD_STRUCT_VERSION when attempting to use an old/unsupported + structure version} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{34}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return NEW_STRUCT_VERSION when attempting to use a newer version of + of the structure then what is supported} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{35}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return BAD_API_VERSION when the mask bits are set to invalid values} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{36}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return BAD_API_VERSION when the mask bits are not set} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{37}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return OLD_LIB_API_VERSION when using an old/unsuppored + api version number} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{38}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return OLD_SERVER_API_VERSION attempting to use an + old/unsupported api version number} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{39}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return NEW_LIB_API_VERSION when using a newer api + version number then supported} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{40}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return NEW_SERVER_API_VERSION when using a newer api version + number then supported} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{41}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Return BAD_XXX_VERSION when the API and the structure + version numbers are reversed} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{42}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds when using valid api and struct version numbers and masks} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{43}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Returns two different server handle when called twice with same info} +} + +\numtest{44}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Returns two different server handles when called twice with + different info} +} + +\numtest{45}{ +\Priority{Bug fix, secure-install/3390} +\Reason{Returns SECURE_PRINC_MISSING when ADMIN_SERVICE does not +exist.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{46}{ +\Priority{Bug fix, secure-install/3390} +\Reason{Returns SECURE_PRINC_MISSING when CHANGEPW_SERVICE does not +exist.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{100}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the profile field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{101}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the kadmind_port field of the configuration parameters, +if set.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{102}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the admin_server field of the configuration parameters, +if set with only an admin server name.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{102.5}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the admin_server field of the configuratin parameters, +if set with a host name and port number.} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{103}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the dbname field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{104}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the admin_dbname field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{105}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the admin_lockfile field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{106}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the mkey_from_kbd field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{107}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the stash_file field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{108}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the mkey_name field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{109}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the max_life field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{110}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the max_rlife field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{111}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the expiration field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Status{Implemented} +\Conditions{local} +} + +\numtest{112}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the flags field of the configuration parameters, if +set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{113}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Obeys the keysalts and num_keysalts field of the configuration +parameters, if set.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{114}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Returns KADM5_BAD_SERVER_PARAMS if any client-only parameters +are specified to server-side init.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{115}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Returns KADM5_BAD_CLIENT_PARAMS if any client-only parameters +are specified to server-side init.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{116}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Two calls to init with clients having different privileges +succeedes, and both clients maintain their correct privileges.} +\Priority{Bug fix} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{117}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{The max_life field defaults to value specified in the API +Functional Specification when kdc.conf is unreadable.} +\Priority{Bug fix, krb5-admin/18} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{150}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{init_with_creds works when given an open ccache with a valid +credential for ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{151}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{init_with_creds works when given an open ccache with a valid +credential for CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{152}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{init_with_creds fails with KRB5_FCC_NOFILE (was + KADM5_GSS_ERROR) when given an open +ccache with no credentials.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{153}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{init_with_creds fails with KRB5_CC_NOTFOUND (was + KADM5_GSS_ERROR) when given an open +ccache without credentials for ADMIN_SERVICE or CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{154}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{If the KRB5_KDC_PROFILE environment variable is set to a filename +that does not exist, init fails with ENOENT.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\section{ovsec_kadm_destroy} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Valid invocation.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +%\numtest{2}{ +%\Reason{Valid invocation (``get'' not allowed after destroy).} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{3}{ +%\Reason{Valid invocation (``add'' not allowed after destroy).} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{4}{ +%\Reason{Valid invocation (``modify'' not allowed after destroy).} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{5}{ +%\Reason{Valid invocation (``delete'' not allowed after destroy).} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{6}{ +%\Reason{Fails if database not initialized.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +%\numtest{7}{ +%\Reason{Fails if invoked twice in a row.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{Database can be reinitialized after destroy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{client} +} + +\section{ovsec_kadm_create_principal} + +%In the tests below, ``getu'' refers to a user who has only ``get'' access, +%''addu'' refers to a user who has only ``add'' access, ``modifyu'' refers to +%a user who has only ``modify'' access, and ``deleteu'' refers to a user +%who has only ``delete'' access. ``amu'' refers to a user with ``add'' and +%''modify'' access. ``new_princ'' refers to a principal entry structure +%filled in as follows: +% +% krb5_parse_name("newuser", \&new_princ.principal); +% krb5_timeofday(\&new_princ.princ_expire_time); +% new_princ.princ_expire_time += 130; +% krb5_timeofday(\&new_princ.last_pwd_change); +% new_princ.last_pwd_change += 140; +% krb5_timeofday(\&new_princ.pw_expiration); +% new_princ.pw_expiration += 150; +% new_princ.max_life = 160; +% krb5_parse_name("usera", \&new_princ.mod_name); +% krb5_timeofday(\&new_princ.mod_date); +% new_princ.mod_date += 170; +% new_princ.attributes = 0xabcdabcd; +% new_princ.kvno = 180; +% new_princ.mkvno = 190; +% new_princ.policy = null; +% new_princ.aux_attributes = 0xdeadbeef; +% +%The offsets of 130 through 190 above are used to ensure that the +%fields are all known to be different from each other, so that +%accidentally switched fields can be detected. Some of the fields in +%this structure may be changed by the tests, but they should clean up +%after themselves. + +%\numtest{1}{ +%\Reason{Fails if database not initialized.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{Fails on null princ argument.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{Fails on null password argument.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Fails on empty-string password argument.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{Fails when mask contains undefined bit.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Reason{Fails when mask contains LAST_PWD_CHANGE bit.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{Fails when mask contains MOD_TIME bit.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{Fails when mask contains MOD_NAME bit.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Reason{Fails when mask contains MKVNO bit.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Reason{Fails when mask contains AUX_ATTRIBUTES bit.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Reason{Fails when mask contains POLICY_CLR bit.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Reason{Fails for caller with no access bits.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Reason{Fails when caller has ``get'' access and not ``add''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Reason{Fails when caller has ``modify'' access and not ``add''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Reason{Fails when caller has ``delete'' access and not ``add''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Reason{Fails when caller connected with CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Reason{Fails on attempt to create existing principal.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Reason{Fails when password is too short.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{19}{ +\Reason{Fails when password has too few classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{20}{ +\Reason{Fails when password is in dictionary.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{21}{ +\Reason{Nonexistent policy is rejected.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{22}{ +\Reason{Fails on invalid principal name.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{23}{ +\Reason{Valid invocation.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{24}{ +\Reason{Succeeds when caller has ``add'' access and another one.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +%\numtest{25}{ +%\Reason{Fails when password is too short, when override_qual is true.} +%} + +%\numtest{26}{ +%\Reason{Fails when password has too few classes, when +% override_qual is true.} +%} + +%\numtest{27}{ +%\Reason{Fails when password is in dictionary, when override_qual is +% true.} +%} + +\numtest{28}{ +\Reason{Succeeds when assigning policy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{29}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Allows 0 (never) for princ_expire_time.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{30}{ +\Reason{Allows 0 (never) for pw_expiration when there's no policy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{31}{ +\Reason{Allows 0 (never) for pw_expiration when there's a policy with + 0 for pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{32}{ +\Reason{Accepts 0 (never) for pw_expiration when there's a policy with + non-zero pw_max_life, and sets pw_expiration to zero.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{33}{ +\Reason{Accepts and sets non-zero pw_expiration when no policy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{34}{ +\Reason{Accepts and sets non-zero pw_expiration when there's a policy + with zero pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{35}{ +\Reason{Accepts and sets non-zero pw_expiration when there's a policy + with pw_max_life later than the specified pw_expiration.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{36}{ +\Reason{Accepts and sets non-zero pw_expiration greater than now_pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{37}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Sets pw_expiration to 0 (never) if there's no policy and no + specified pw_expiration.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{38}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Sets pw_expiration to 0 (never) if it isn't specified and the + policy has a 0 (never) pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{39}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Sets pw_expiration to now + pw_max_life if it isn't specified + and the policy has a non-zero pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{40}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Allows 0 (forever) for max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{41}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Doesn't modify or free mod_name on success.} +} + +\numtest{42}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Doesn't modify or free mod_name on failure.} +} + +\numtest{43}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{44}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_delete_principal} + +%\numtest{1}{ +%\Reason{Fails if database not initialized.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{Fails on null principal.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +% Empty string principal is legal. +%\numtest{3}{ +%\Reason{Fails on empty-string principal.} +%} + +% There is not invalid principal names +%\numtest{4}{ +%\Reason{Fails on invalid principal name.} +%} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails on nonexistent principal.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails when caller connected with CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if caller has ``add'' access and not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if caller has ``modify'' access and not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if caller has ``get'' access and not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if caller has no access bits.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Valid invocation.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Valid invocation (on principal with policy).} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_modify_principal} + +%\numtest{1}{ +%\Reason{Fails if database not initialized.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if user connected with CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{Fails on mask with undefined bit set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Fails on mask with PRINCIPAL set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails on mask with LAST_PWD_CHANGE set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Reason{Fails on mask with MOD_TIME set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{Fails on mask with MOD_NAME set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{Fails on mask with MKVNO set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails on mask with AUX_ATTRIBUTES set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Reason{Fails on nonexistent principal.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' access.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' access.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' access.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``modify'' access.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``modify'' and another access.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails when nonexistent policy is specified.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds when existent policy is specified.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{19}{ +\Reason{Updates policy count when setting policy from none.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{20}{ +\Reason{Updates policy count when clearing policy from set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{21}{ +\Reason{Updates policy count when setting policy from other policy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{21.5}{ +\Reason{Policy reference count remains unchanged when policy is + changed to itself.} +\Status{Implemented.} +} + +\numtest{22}{ +\Reason{Allows 0 (never) for pw_expiration when there's no policy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{23}{ +\Reason{Allows 0 (never) for pw_expiration when there's a policy with + 0 for pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{24}{ +\Reason{Accepts 0 (never) for pw_expiration when there's a policy with + non-zero pw_max_life, but actually sets pw_expiration to + last_pwd_change + pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{25}{ +\Reason{Accepts and sets non-zero pw_expiration when no policy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{26}{ +\Reason{Accepts and sets non-zero pw_expiration when there's a policy + with zero pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{27}{ +\Reason{Accepts and sets non-zero pw_expiration when there's a policy + with pw_max_life later than the specified pw_expiration.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{28}{ +\Reason{Accepts non-zero pw_expiration and limits it to last_pwd_change + + pw_max_life when it's later than last_pwd_change + non-zero + pw_max_life in policy.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{29}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Sets pw_expiration to 0 (never) when a policy is cleared and +no pw_expiration is specified.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{30}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Sets pw_expiration to 0 (never) if it isn't specified and the + new policy has a 0 (never) pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{31}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Sets pw_expiration to now + pw_max_life if it isn't specified + and the new policy has a non-zero pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{32}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts princ_expire_time change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + + + +\numtest{33}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts attributes change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{33.25}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts attributes change (KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PW_CHANGE).} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{33.5}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts attributes change (KRB5_DISALLOW_TGT_BASE).} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{33.75}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts attributes change (KRB5_PW_CHANGE_SERVICE).} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{34}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts max_life change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{35}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts kvno change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{36}{ +\Reason{Behaves correctly when policy is set to the same as it was + before.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{37}{ +\Reason{Behaves properly when POLICY_CLR is specified and there was no + policy before.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{38}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 0 (never) for princ_expire_time.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{39}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 0 for max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{40}{ +\Reason{Rejects null principal argument.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{41}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Doesn't modify or free mod_name on success.} +} + +\numtest{42}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Doesn't modify or free mod_name on failure.} +} + +\numtest{43}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{44}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{100}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Priority{bug-fix} +\Reason{Accepts max_rlife change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{101}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Rejects last_success change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{102}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Rejects last_failed change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{103}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Rejects fail_auth_count change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{103.5}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Rejects key_data change.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{104}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Accepts tl_data change when all types are greater than 256.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{105}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Returns KADM5_BAD_TL_TYPE when given tl_data with a type less +than 256.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\section{ovsec_kadm_rename_principal} + +%\numtest{1}{ +%\Reason{Fails if database not initialized.} +%\Status{Implemented} +%} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if user connected with CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' access and not ``add'' or +``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' access and not ``add'' or +``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' and ``add'' but not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' and ``delete'' but not ``add''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' and ``add'' but not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' and ``delete'' but not ``add.''} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'', ``get'' and ``add'', but not + ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'', ``get'' and ``delete'', but + not ``add''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' but not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``add''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``add'' and ``delete'', when that user +has non-name-based salt.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if target principal name exists.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Priority{bug fix} +\Reason{Returns NO_RENAME_SALT when asked to rename a principal whose +salt depends on the principal name.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\section{ovsec_kadm_chpass_principal} +\label{ovseckadmchpassprincipal} + +\subsection{Quality/history enforcement tests} + +This section lists a series of tests which will be run a number of +times, with various parameter settings (e.g., which access bits user +has, whether user connected with ADMIN_SERVICE or CHANGEPW_SERVICE, +etc.). The table following the +list of tests gives the various parameter settings under which the +tests should be run, as well which should succeed and which should +fail for each choice of parameter settings. + +\subsubsection{List of tests} + +The test number of each of these tests is an offset from the base +given in the table below. + +\numtest{1}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{With history setting of 1, change password to itself.} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{With history setting of 2 but no password changes since + principal creation, change password to itself.} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{With history setting of 2 and one password change since + principal creation, change password to itself + and directly previous password.} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{With a history setting of 3 and no password changes, + change password to itself.} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{With a history setting of 3 and 1 password change, + change password to itself or previous password.} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{With a history setting of 3 and 2 password changes, + change password to itself and the two previous passwords.} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Change to previously unused password when now - + last_pwd_change $<$ pw_min_life.} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Change to previously unused password that doesn't contain enough + character classes.} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Change to previously unused password that's too short.} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Change to previously unused password that's in the dictionary.} +} + +\subsubsection{List of parameter settings} + +In the table below, ``7 passes'' means that test 7 above passes and +the rest of the tests fail. + +\begin{tabular}{llllll} +Base & Modify access? & Own password? & Service & Pass/Fail \\ \hline +0 & No & Yes & ADMIN & all fail \\ +20 & No & Yes & CHANGEPW & all fail \\ +40 & No & No & ADMIN & all fail \\ +60 & No & No & CHANGEPW & all fail \\ +80 & Yes & Yes & ADMIN & 7 passes \\ +100 & Yes & Yes & CHANGEPW & all fail \\ +120 & Yes & No & ADMIN & 7 passes \\ +140 & Yes & No & CHANGEPW & all fail \\ +\end{tabular} + +\subsection{Other quality/history tests} + +\numtest{161}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{With history of 1, can change password to anything other than + itself that doesn't conflict with other quality + rules.} +} + +\numtest{162}{ +\Reason{With history of 2 and 2 password changes, can change password + to original password.} +} + +\numtest{163}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{With history of 3 and 3 password changes, can change password + to original password.} +} + +\numtest{164}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Can change password when now - last_pwd_change $>$ pw_min_life.} +} + +\numtest{165}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Can change password when it contains exactly the number of + classes required by the policy.} +} + +\numtest{166}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Can change password when it is exactly the length required by + the policy.} +} + +\numtest{167}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Can change password to a word that isn't in the dictionary.} +} + + +\subsection{Other tests} + +%\numtest{168}{ +%\Reason{Fails if database not initialized.} +%} + +\numtest{169}{ +\Reason{Fails for non-existent principal.} +} + +\numtest{170}{ +\Reason{Fails for null password.} +} + +\numtest{171}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for empty-string password.} +} + +\numtest{172}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Pw_expiration is set to now + max_pw_life if policy exists and + has non-zero max_pw_life.} +} + +\numtest{173}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Pw_expiration is set to 0 if policy exists and has zero + max_pw_life.} +} + +\numtest{174}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Pw_expiration is set to 0 if no policy.} +} + +\numtest{175}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{KRB5_KDC_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE bit is cleared when password is + successfully changed.} +} + +\numtest{176}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits, on other's password.} +} + +\numtest{177}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' but not ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +} + +\numtest{178}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +} + +\numtest{179}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' but not ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +} + +\numtest{180}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'' and ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{180.5}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``modify'' but not ``get'' access, on + other's password.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} +\numtest{180.625}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with modify when connecting with CHANGEPW_SERVICE on + others password} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} +\numtest{180.75}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with modify when connecting with CHANGEPW_SERVICE + on other's password which has expired} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +%\numtest{181}{ +%\Reason{Password that would succeed if override_qual were false fails +% if override_qual is true.} +%\Expected{Returns CANNOT_OVERRIDE.} +%} + +\numtest{182}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Can not change key of ovsec_adm/history principal.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{183}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{184}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{200}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Creates a key for the principal for each unique encryption +type/salt type in use.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\section{ovsec_kadm_chpass_principal_util} + +Rerun all the tests listed for ovsec_kadm_chpass_principal above in +Section \ref{ovseckadmchpassprincipal}. Verify that they succeed +and fail in the same circumstances. Also verify that in each failure +case, the error message returned in msg_ret is as specified in the +functional specification. + +Also, run the following additional tests. + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Null msg_ret is rejected.} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{New password is put into pw_ret, when it's prompted for.} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Priority{High} +Reason{New password is put into pw_ret, when it's supplied by the + caller.} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Successful invocation when pw_ret is null.} +} + + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_randkey_principal} + +\subsection{TOOSOON enforcement tests} + +This test should be run a number of times, as indicated in the table +following it. The table also indicates the expected result of each +run of the test. + +\test{ +\Reason{Change key when now - last_pwd_change $<$ pw_min_life.} +} + +\subsubsection{List of parameter settings} + +\begin{tabular}{llllll} +Number & Modify Access? & Own Key? & Service & Pass/Fail & Implemented? \\ \hline +1 & No & Yes & ADMIN & fail & Yes \\ +3 & No & Yes & CHANGEPW & fail & Yes \\ +5 & No & No & ADMIN & fail \\ +7 & No & No & CHANGEPW & fail \\ +9 & Yes & Yes & ADMIN & pass \\ +11 & Yes & Yes & CHANGEPW & fail \\ +13 & Yes & No & ADMIN & pass & Yes \\ +15 & Yes & No & CHANGEPW & fail & Yes \\ +\end{tabular} + +\subsection{Other tests} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Reason{Fails if database not initialized.} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Reason{Fails for non-existent principal.} +} + +\numtest{19}{ +\Reason{Fails for null keyblock pointer.} +} + +\numtest{20}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Pw_expiration is set to now + max_pw_life if policy exists and + has non-zero max_pw_life.} +} + +\numtest{21}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Pw_expiration is set to 0 if policy exists and has zero + max_pw_life.} +} + +\numtest{22}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Pw_expiration is set to 0 if no policy.} +} + +\numtest{23}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{KRB5_KDC_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE bit is cleared when key is + successfully changed.} +} + +\numtest{24}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits, on other's password.} +} + +\numtest{25}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' but not ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +\Vtwonote{Change-password instead of modify access.} +} + +\numtest{26}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +\Vtwonote{Change-password instead of modify access.} +} + +\numtest{27}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' but not ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +\Vtwonote{Change-password instead of modify access.} +} + +\numtest{28}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'' and ``modify'' access, on + other's password.} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{Change-password instead of modify access.} +} + +\numtest{28.25}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with get and modify access on others password + When conneceted with CHANGEPW_SERVICE} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{Change-password instead of modify access.} +} + +\numtest{28.5}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``modify'' but not ``get'' access, on + other's password.} +\Status{Implemented} +\Vtwonote{Change-password instead of modify access.} +} + +\numtest{29}{ +\Reason{The new key that's assigned is truly random. XXX not sure how + to test this.} +} + +\numtest{30}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for own key, no other access bits when connecting with CHANGEPW service} +\Status{Implemented} +} +\numtest{31}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for own key, no other access bits when connecting with ADMIM service} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{32}{ +\Reason{Cannot change ovsec_adm/history key} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{33}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{34}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{100}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{Returns a key for each unique encryption type specified in the +keysalts.} +} + +\section{ovsec_kadm_get_principal} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Fails for null ent.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{Fails for non-existent principal.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits, retrieving other principal.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' but not ``get'', getting principal + other than his own, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' but not ``get'', getting + principal other than his own, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``get'', getting + principal other than his own, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``get'', getting + principal other than his own, using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'', getting principal other than his + own, using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user without ``get'', retrieving self, using + ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user without ``get'', retrieving self, using + CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'', retrieving self, using + ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'', retrieving self, using + CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'', retrieving other user, using + ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'' and ``modify'', retrieving + other principal, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{100}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{If KADM5_PRINCIPAL_NORMAL_MASK is specified, the key_data and +tl_data fields are NULL/zero.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{101}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{If KADM5_KEY_DATA is specified, the key_data fields contain +data but the contents are all NULL.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{102}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{If KADM5_KEY_DATA is specified, the key_data fields contain +data and the contents are all non-NULL.} +\Conditions{local} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{103}{ +\Version{KADM5_API_VERSION_2} +\Reason{If KADM5_TL_DATA is specified, the tl_data field contains the +correct tl_data and no entries whose type is less than 256.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_create_policy} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Fails for mask with undefined bit set.} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if caller connected with CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{Fails for mask without POLICY bit set.} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Fails for mask with REF_COUNT bit set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{Fails for invalid policy name.} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for existing policy name.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{Fails for null policy name.} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for empty-string policy name.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 0 for pw_min_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts non-zero for pw_min_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 0 for pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts non-zero for pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Rejects 0 for pw_min_length.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts non-zero for pw_min_length.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Rejects 0 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 1 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 4 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Rejects 5 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{19}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Rejects 0 for pw_history_num.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{20}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 1 for pw_history_num.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{21}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 10 for pw_history_num.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{21.5}{ +\Reason{Rejects 11 for pw_history_num.} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{22}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{23}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' but not ``add''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{24}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' but not ``add.''} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{25}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``add.''} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{26}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``add.''} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{27}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'' and ``add.''} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{28}{ +\Reason{Rejects null policy argument.} +\Status{Implemented - untested} +} + +\numtest{29}{ +\Reason{Rejects pw_min_life greater than pw_max_life.} +} + +\numtest{30}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{31}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_delete_policy} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Fails for null policy name.} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for empty-string policy name.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{Fails for non-existent policy name.} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Fails for bad policy name.} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if caller connected with CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' but not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' but not ``delete''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' but not ``delete.''} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with only ``delete''.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``delete'' and ``add''.} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for policy with non-zero reference count.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_modify_policy} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Fails for mask with undefined bit set.} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails if caller connected with CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Reason{Fails for mask with POLICY bit set.} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Fails for mask with REF_COUNT bit set.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{Fails for invalid policy name.} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Reason{Fails for non-existent policy name.} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Reason{Fails for null policy name.} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for empty-string policy name.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 0 for pw_min_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts non-zero for pw_min_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 0 for pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts non-zero for pw_max_life.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 0 for pw_min_length.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts non-zero for pw_min_length.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Rejects 0 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 1 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 4 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Rejects 5 for pw_min_classes.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{19}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Rejects 0 for pw_history_num.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{20}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 1 for pw_history_num.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{21}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Accepts 10 for pw_history_num.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{22}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{23}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'' but not ``modify''.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{24}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' but not ``modify.''} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{25}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``modify.''} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{26}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``modify.''} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{27}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'' and ``modify.''} +} + +\numtest{28}{ +\Reason{Rejects null policy argument.} +} + +\numtest{29}{ +\Reason{Rejects change which makes pw_min_life greater than + pw_max_life.} +} + +\numtest{30}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{31}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\section{ovsec_kadm_get_policy} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Fails for null policy.} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{Fails for invalid policy name.} +} + +\numtest{3}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for empty-string policy name.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{4}{ +\Reason{Fails for non-existent policy name.} +} + +\numtest{5}{ +\Reason{Fails for null ent.} +} + +\numtest{6}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with no access bits trying to get other's + policy, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{7}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``add'' but not ``get'' trying to get + other's policy, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{8}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' but not ``get'' trying to get + other's policy, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{9}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``get'' trying to get + other's policy, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{10}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``delete'' but not ``get'' trying to get + other's policy, using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +\numtest{11}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with only ``get'', trying to get own policy, + using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{12}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with only ``get'', trying to get own policy, + using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{13}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``add'' and ``get'', trying to get own + policy, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +} + +\numtest{14}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``add'' and ``get'', trying to get own + policy, using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +} + +\numtest{15}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user without ``get'', trying to get own policy, + using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +} + +\numtest{16}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user without ``get'', trying to get own policy, + using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{17}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``get'', trying to get other's policy, + using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{18}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Fails for user with ``get'', trying to get other's policy, + using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +\Conditions{RPC} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{19}{ +\Reason{Succeeds for user with ``modify'' and ``get'', trying to get + other's policy, using ADMIN_SERVICE.} +} + +\numtest{20}{ +\Reason{Fails for user with ``modify'' and ``get'', trying to get + other's policy, using CHANGEPW_SERVICE.} +} + +\numtest{21}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns BAD_SERVER_HANDLE when a null server handle is passed in} +\Status{Implemented} +} + +\numtest{22}{ +\Priority{Low} +\Reason{Connects to correct server when mutliple handles exist} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_free_principal_ent} + +In addition to the tests listed here, a memory-leak detector such as +TestCenter, Purify or dbmalloc should be used to verify that the +memory freed by this function is really freed. + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Null princ succeeds.} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{Non-null princ succeeds.} +} + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_free_policy_ent} + +In addition to the tests listed here, a memory-leak detector such as +TestCenter, Purify or dbmalloc should be used to verify that the +memory freed by this function is really freed. + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Null policy succeeds.} +} + +\numtest{2}{ +\Reason{Non-null policy succeeds.} +} + + + +\section{ovsec_kadm_get_privs} + +\numtest{1}{ +\Reason{Fails for null pointer argument.} +} + +This test should be run with the 16 possible combinations of access +bits (since there are 4 access bits, there are $2^4 = 16$ possible +combinations of them): + +\numtest{2}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns correct bit mask for access bits of user.} +\Conditions{RPC} +} + +This test should be run locally: + +\numtest{3}{ +\Priority{High} +\Reason{Returns 0x0f.} +\Conditions{local} +} + +\end{document} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/fullpage.sty b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/fullpage.sty new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d5a2bf5b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/fullpage.sty @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +\marginparwidth 0pt +\oddsidemargin 0pt +\evensidemargin 0pt +\marginparsep 0pt + +\topmargin 0pt + +\textwidth 6.5in +\textheight 8.5 in diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/rcsid.sty b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/rcsid.sty new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3ad7826ff --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/kadm5/rcsid.sty @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +\def\rcs$#1: #2${\expandafter\def\csname rcs#1\endcsname{#2}} + +% example usage: +% \rcs$Version$ +% Version \rcsVersion diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5defaults.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5defaults.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..65d904ef6 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5defaults.rst @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.. _mitK5defaults: + +MIT Kerberos defaults +===================== + +General defaults +---------------- + +========================================== ============================= ==================== +Description Default Environment +========================================== ============================= ==================== +:ref:`keytab_definition` file |keytab| **KRB5_KTNAME** +Client :ref:`keytab_definition` file |ckeytab| **KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME** +Kerberos config file :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` |krb5conf|\ ``:``\ **KRB5_CONFIG** + |sysconfdir|\ ``/krb5.conf`` +KDC config file :ref:`kdc.conf(5)` |kdcdir|\ ``/kdc.conf`` **KRB5_KDC_PROFILE** +KDC database path (DB2) |kdcdir|\ ``/principal`` +Master key :ref:`stash_definition` |kdcdir|\ ``/.k5.``\ *realm* +Admin server ACL file :ref:`kadm5.acl(5)` |kdcdir|\ ``/kadm5.acl`` +OTP socket directory |kdcrundir| +Plugin base directory |libdir|\ ``/krb5/plugins`` +:ref:`rcache_definition` directory ``/var/tmp`` **KRB5RCACHEDIR** +Master key default enctype |defmkey| +Default :ref:`keysalt list<Keysalt_lists>` |defkeysalts| +Permitted enctypes |defetypes| +KDC default port 88 +Admin server port 749 +Password change port 464 +========================================== ============================= ==================== + + +Replica KDC propagation defaults +-------------------------------- + +This table shows defaults used by the :ref:`kprop(8)` and +:ref:`kpropd(8)` programs. + +========================== ================================ =========== +Description Default Environment +========================== ================================ =========== +kprop database dump file |kdcdir|\ ``/replica_datatrans`` +kpropd temporary dump file |kdcdir|\ ``/from_master`` +kdb5_util location |sbindir|\ ``/kdb5_util`` +kprop location |sbindir|\ ``/kprop`` +kpropd ACL file |kdcdir|\ ``/kpropd.acl`` +kprop port 754 KPROP_PORT +========================== ================================ =========== + + +.. _paths: + +Default paths for Unix-like systems +----------------------------------- + +On Unix-like systems, some paths used by MIT krb5 depend on parameters +chosen at build time. For a custom build, these paths default to +subdirectories of ``/usr/local``. When MIT krb5 is integrated into an +operating system, the paths are generally chosen to match the +operating system's filesystem layout. + +========================== ============= =========================== =========================== +Description Symbolic name Custom build path Typical OS path +========================== ============= =========================== =========================== +User programs BINDIR ``/usr/local/bin`` ``/usr/bin`` +Libraries and plugins LIBDIR ``/usr/local/lib`` ``/usr/lib`` +Parent of KDC state dir LOCALSTATEDIR ``/usr/local/var`` ``/var`` +Parent of KDC runtime dir RUNSTATEDIR ``/usr/local/var/run`` ``/run`` +Administrative programs SBINDIR ``/usr/local/sbin`` ``/usr/sbin`` +Alternate krb5.conf dir SYSCONFDIR ``/usr/local/etc`` ``/etc`` +Default ccache name DEFCCNAME ``FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%{uid}`` ``FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%{uid}`` +Default keytab name DEFKTNAME ``FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab`` ``FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab`` +========================== ============= =========================== =========================== + +The default client keytab name (DEFCKTNAME) typically defaults to +``FILE:/usr/local/var/krb5/user/%{euid}/client.keytab`` for a custom +build. A native build will typically use a path which will vary +according to the operating system's layout of ``/var``. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5features.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5features.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..584f7b893 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5features.rst @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +.. highlight:: rst + +.. toctree:: + :hidden: + + mitK5license.rst + +.. _mitK5features: + +MIT Kerberos features +===================== + +https://web.mit.edu/kerberos + + +Quick facts +----------- + +License - :ref:`mitK5license` + +Releases: + - Latest stable: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.17/ + - Supported: https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.16/ + - Release cycle: 9 -- 12 months + +Supported platforms \/ OS distributions: + - Windows (KfW 4.0): Windows 7, Vista, XP + - Solaris: SPARC, x86_64/x86 + - GNU/Linux: Debian x86_64/x86, Ubuntu x86_64/x86, RedHat x86_64/x86 + - BSD: NetBSD x86_64/x86 + +Crypto backends: + - builtin - MIT Kerberos native crypto library + - OpenSSL (1.0\+) - https://www.openssl.org + +Database backends: LDAP, DB2, LMDB + +krb4 support: Kerberos 5 release < 1.8 + +DES support: configurable (See :ref:`retiring-des`) + +Interoperability +---------------- + +`Microsoft` + +Starting from release 1.7: + +* Follow client principal referrals in the client library when + obtaining initial tickets. + +* KDC can issue realm referrals for service principals based on domain names. + +* Extensions supporting DCE RPC, including three-leg GSS context setup + and unencapsulated GSS tokens inside SPNEGO. + +* Microsoft GSS_WrapEX, implemented using the gss_iov API, which is + similar to the equivalent SSPI functionality. This is needed to + support some instances of DCE RPC. + +* NTLM recognition support in GSS-API, to facilitate dropping in an + NTLM implementation for improved compatibility with older releases + of Microsoft Windows. + +* KDC support for principal aliases, if the back end supports them. + Currently, only the LDAP back end supports aliases. + +* Support Microsoft set/change password (:rfc:`3244`) protocol in + kadmind. + +* Implement client and KDC support for GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG, which + allows a GSS application to request credential delegation only if + permitted by KDC policy. + + +Starting from release 1.8: + +* Microsoft Services for User (S4U) compatibility + + +`Heimdal` + +* Support for KCM credential cache starting from release 1.13 + +Feature list +------------ + +For more information on the specific project see https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects + +Release 1.7 + - Credentials delegation :rfc:`5896` + - Cross-realm authentication and referrals :rfc:`6806` + - Master key migration + - PKINIT :rfc:`4556` :ref:`pkinit` + +Release 1.8 + - Anonymous PKINIT :rfc:`6112` :ref:`anonymous_pkinit` + - Constrained delegation + - IAKERB https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-krb-wg-iakerb-02 + - Heimdal bridge plugin for KDC backend + - GSS-API S4U extensions https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246071 + - GSS-API naming extensions :rfc:`6680` + - GSS-API extensions for storing delegated credentials :rfc:`5588` + +Release 1.9 + - Advance warning on password expiry + - Camellia encryption (CTS-CMAC mode) :rfc:`6803` + - KDC support for SecurID preauthentication + - kadmin over IPv6 + - Trace logging :ref:`trace_logging` + - GSSAPI/KRB5 multi-realm support + - Plugin to test password quality :ref:`pwqual_plugin` + - Plugin to synchronize password changes :ref:`kadm5_hook_plugin` + - Parallel KDC + - GSS-API extentions for SASL GS2 bridge :rfc:`5801` :rfc:`5587` + - Purging old keys + - Naming extensions for delegation chain + - Password expiration API + - Windows client support (build-only) + - IPv6 support in iprop + +Release 1.10 + - Plugin interface for configuration :ref:`profile_plugin` + - Credentials for multiple identities :ref:`ccselect_plugin` + +Release 1.11 + - Client support for FAST OTP :rfc:`6560` + - GSS-API extensions for credential locations + - Responder mechanism + +Release 1.12 + - Plugin to control krb5_aname_to_localname and krb5_kuserok behavior :ref:`localauth_plugin` + - Plugin to control hostname-to-realm mappings and the default realm :ref:`hostrealm_plugin` + - GSSAPI extensions for constructing MIC tokens using IOV lists :ref:`gssapi_mic_token` + - Principal may refer to nonexistent policies `Policy Refcount project <https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Policy_refcount_elimination>`_ + - Support for having no long-term keys for a principal `Principals Without Keys project <https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Principals_without_keys>`_ + - Collection support to the KEYRING credential cache type on Linux :ref:`ccache_definition` + - FAST OTP preauthentication module for the KDC which uses RADIUS to validate OTP token values :ref:`otp_preauth` + - Experimental Audit plugin for KDC processing `Audit project <https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Audit>`_ + +Release 1.13 + + - Add support for accessing KDCs via an HTTPS proxy server using + the `MS-KKDCP + <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh553774.aspx>`_ + protocol. + - Add support for `hierarchical incremental propagation + <https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/Hierarchical_iprop>`_, + where replicas can act as intermediates between an upstream master + and other downstream replicas. + - Add support for configuring GSS mechanisms using + ``/etc/gss/mech.d/*.conf`` files in addition to + ``/etc/gss/mech``. + - Add support to the LDAP KDB module for `binding to the LDAP + server using SASL + <https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/wiki/Projects/LDAP_SASL_support>`_. + - The KDC listens for TCP connections by default. + - Fix a minor key disclosure vulnerability where using the + "keepold" option to the kadmin randkey operation could return the + old keys. `[CVE-2014-5351] + <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-5351>`_ + - Add client support for the Kerberos Cache Manager protocol. If + the host is running a Heimdal kcm daemon, caches served by the + daemon can be accessed with the KCM: cache type. + - When built on macOS 10.7 and higher, use "KCM:" as the default + cachetype, unless overridden by command-line options or + krb5-config values. + - Add support for doing unlocked database dumps for the DB2 KDC + back end, which would allow the KDC and kadmind to continue + accessing the database during lengthy database dumps. + +Release 1.14 + + * Administrator experience + + - Add a new kdb5_util tabdump command to provide reporting-friendly + tabular dump formats (tab-separated or CSV) for the KDC database. + Unlike the normal dump format, each output table has a fixed number + of fields. Some tables include human-readable forms of data that + are opaque in ordinary dump files. This format is also suitable for + importing into relational databases for complex queries. + - Add support to kadmin and kadmin.local for specifying a single + command line following any global options, where the command + arguments are split by the shell--for example, "kadmin getprinc + principalname". Commands issued this way do not prompt for + confirmation or display warning messages, and exit with non-zero + status if the operation fails. + - Accept the same principal flag names in kadmin as we do for the + default_principal_flags kdc.conf variable, and vice versa. Also + accept flag specifiers in the form that kadmin prints, as well as + hexadecimal numbers. + - Remove the triple-DES and RC4 encryption types from the default + value of supported_enctypes, which determines the default key and + salt types for new password-derived keys. By default, keys will + only created only for AES128 and AES256. This mitigates some types + of password guessing attacks. + - Add support for directory names in the KRB5_CONFIG and + KRB5_KDC_PROFILE environment variables. + - Add support for authentication indicators, which are ticket + annotations to indicate the strength of the initial authentication. + Add support for the "require_auth" string attribute, which can be + set on server principal entries to require an indicator when + authenticating to the server. + - Add support for key version numbers larger than 255 in keytab files, + and for version numbers up to 65535 in KDC databases. + - Transmit only one ETYPE-INFO and/or ETYPE-INFO2 entry from the KDC + during pre-authentication, corresponding to the client's most + preferred encryption type. + - Add support for server name identification (SNI) when proxying KDC + requests over HTTPS. + - Add support for the err_fmt profile parameter, which can be used to + generate custom-formatted error messages. + + * Developer experience: + + - Change gss_acquire_cred_with_password() to acquire credentials into + a private memory credential cache. Applications can use + gss_store_cred() to make the resulting credentials visible to other + processes. + - Change gss_acquire_cred() and SPNEGO not to acquire credentials for + IAKERB or for non-standard variants of the krb5 mechanism OID unless + explicitly requested. (SPNEGO will still accept the Microsoft + variant of the krb5 mechanism OID during negotiation.) + - Change gss_accept_sec_context() not to accept tokens for IAKERB or + for non-standard variants of the krb5 mechanism OID unless an + acceptor credential is acquired for those mechanisms. + - Change gss_acquire_cred() to immediately resolve credentials if the + time_rec parameter is not NULL, so that a correct expiration time + can be returned. Normally credential resolution is delayed until + the target name is known. + - Add krb5_prepend_error_message() and krb5_wrap_error_message() APIs, + which can be used by plugin modules or applications to add prefixes + to existing detailed error messages. + - Add krb5_c_prfplus() and krb5_c_derive_prfplus() APIs, which + implement the RFC 6113 PRF+ operation and key derivation using PRF+. + - Add support for pre-authentication mechanisms which use multiple + round trips, using the the KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED error + code. Add get_cookie() and set_cookie() callbacks to the kdcpreauth + interface; these callbacks can be used to save marshalled state + information in an encrypted cookie for the next request. + - Add a client_key() callback to the kdcpreauth interface to retrieve + the chosen client key, corresponding to the ETYPE-INFO2 entry sent + by the KDC. + - Add an add_auth_indicator() callback to the kdcpreauth interface, + allowing pre-authentication modules to assert authentication + indicators. + - Add support for the GSS_KRB5_CRED_NO_CI_FLAGS_X cred option to + suppress sending the confidentiality and integrity flags in GSS + initiator tokens unless they are requested by the caller. These + flags control the negotiated SASL security layer for the Microsoft + GSS-SPNEGO SASL mechanism. + - Make the FILE credential cache implementation less prone to + corruption issues in multi-threaded programs, especially on + platforms with support for open file description locks. + + * Performance: + + - On replica KDCs, poll the master KDC immediately after processing + a full resync, and do not require two full resyncs after the + master KDC's log file is reset. + +Release 1.15 + +* Administrator experience: + + - Add support to kadmin for remote extraction of current keys + without changing them (requires a special kadmin permission that + is excluded from the wildcard permission), with the exception of + highly protected keys. + + - Add a lockdown_keys principal attribute to prevent retrieval of + the principal's keys (old or new) via the kadmin protocol. In + newly created databases, this attribute is set on the krbtgt and + kadmin principals. + + - Restore recursive dump capability for DB2 back end, so sites can + more easily recover from database corruption resulting from power + failure events. + + - Add DNS auto-discovery of KDC and kpasswd servers from URI + records, in addition to SRV records. URI records can convey TCP + and UDP servers and master KDC status in a single DNS lookup, and + can also point to HTTPS proxy servers. + + - Add support for password history to the LDAP back end. + + - Add support for principal renaming to the LDAP back end. + + - Use the getrandom system call on supported Linux kernels to avoid + blocking problems when getting entropy from the operating system. + +* Code quality: + + - Clean up numerous compilation warnings. + + - Remove various infrequently built modules, including some preauth + modules that were not built by default. + +* Developer experience: + + - Add support for building with OpenSSL 1.1. + + - Use SHA-256 instead of MD5 for (non-cryptographic) hashing of + authenticators in the replay cache. This helps sites that must + build with FIPS 140 conformant libraries that lack MD5. + +* Protocol evolution: + + - Add support for the AES-SHA2 enctypes, which allows sites to + conform to Suite B crypto requirements. + +Release 1.16 + +* Administrator experience: + + - The KDC can match PKINIT client certificates against the + "pkinit_cert_match" string attribute on the client principal + entry, using the same syntax as the existing "pkinit_cert_match" + profile option. + + - The ktutil addent command supports the "-k 0" option to ignore the + key version, and the "-s" option to use a non-default salt string. + + - kpropd supports a --pid-file option to write a pid file at + startup, when it is run in standalone mode. + + - The "encrypted_challenge_indicator" realm option can be used to + attach an authentication indicator to tickets obtained using FAST + encrypted challenge pre-authentication. + + - Localization support can be disabled at build time with the + --disable-nls configure option. + +* Developer experience: + + - The kdcpolicy pluggable interface allows modules control whether + tickets are issued by the KDC. + + - The kadm5_auth pluggable interface allows modules to control + whether kadmind grants access to a kadmin request. + + - The certauth pluggable interface allows modules to control which + PKINIT client certificates can authenticate to which client + principals. + + - KDB modules can use the client and KDC interface IP addresses to + determine whether to allow an AS request. + + - GSS applications can query the bit strength of a krb5 GSS context + using the GSS_C_SEC_CONTEXT_SASL_SSF OID with + gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(). + + - GSS applications can query the impersonator name of a krb5 GSS + credential using the GSS_KRB5_GET_CRED_IMPERSONATOR OID with + gss_inquire_cred_by_oid(). + + - kdcpreauth modules can query the KDC for the canonicalized + requested client principal name, or match a principal name against + the requested client principal name with canonicalization. + +* Protocol evolution: + + - The client library will continue to try pre-authentication + mechanisms after most failure conditions. + + - The KDC will issue trivially renewable tickets (where the + renewable lifetime is equal to or less than the ticket lifetime) + if requested by the client, to be friendlier to scripts. + + - The client library will use a random nonce for TGS requests + instead of the current system time. + + - For the RC4 string-to-key or PAC operations, UTF-16 is supported + (previously only UCS-2 was supported). + + - When matching PKINIT client certificates, UPN SANs will be matched + correctly as UPNs, with canonicalization. + +* User experience: + + - Dates after the year 2038 are accepted (provided that the platform + time facilities support them), through the year 2106. + + - Automatic credential cache selection based on the client realm + will take into account the fallback realm and the service + hostname. + + - Referral and alternate cross-realm TGTs will not be cached, + avoiding some scenarios where they can be added to the credential + cache multiple times. + + - A German translation has been added. + +* Code quality: + + - The build is warning-clean under clang with the configured warning + options. + + - The automated test suite runs cleanly under AddressSanitizer. + +Release 1.17 + +* Administrator experience: + + - A new Kerberos database module using the Lightning Memory-Mapped + Database library (LMDB) has been added. The LMDB KDB module + should be more performant and more robust than the DB2 module, and + may become the default module for new databases in a future + release. + + - "kdb5_util dump" will no longer dump policy entries when specific + principal names are requested. + +* Developer experience: + + - The new krb5_get_etype_info() API can be used to retrieve enctype, + salt, and string-to-key parameters from the KDC for a client + principal. + + - The new GSS_KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_NAME name type allows enterprise + principal names to be used with GSS-API functions. + + - KDC and kadmind modules which call com_err() will now write to the + log file in a format more consistent with other log messages. + + - Programs which use large numbers of memory credential caches + should perform better. + +* Protocol evolution: + + - The SPAKE pre-authentication mechanism is now supported. This + mechanism protects against password dictionary attacks without + requiring any additional infrastructure such as certificates. + SPAKE is enabled by default on clients, but must be manually + enabled on the KDC for this release. + + - PKINIT freshness tokens are now supported. Freshness tokens can + protect against scenarios where an attacker uses temporary access + to a smart card to generate authentication requests for the + future. + + - Password change operations now prefer TCP over UDP, to avoid + spurious error messages about replays when a response packet is + dropped. + + - The KDC now supports cross-realm S4U2Self requests when used with + a third-party KDB module such as Samba's. The client code for + cross-realm S4U2Self requests is also now more robust. + +* User experience: + + - The new ktutil addent -f flag can be used to fetch salt + information from the KDC for password-based keys. + + - The new kdestroy -p option can be used to destroy a credential + cache within a collection by client principal name. + + - The Kerberos man page has been restored, and documents the + environment variables that affect programs using the Kerberos + library. + +* Code quality: + + - Python test scripts now use Python 3. + + - Python test scripts now display markers in verbose output, making + it easier to find where a failure occurred within the scripts. + + - The Windows build system has been simplified and updated to work + with more recent versions of Visual Studio. A large volume of + unused Windows-specific code has been removed. Visual Studio 2013 + or later is now required. + +`Pre-authentication mechanisms` + +- PW-SALT :rfc:`4120#section-5.2.7.3` +- ENC-TIMESTAMP :rfc:`4120#section-5.2.7.2` +- SAM-2 +- FAST negotiation framework (release 1.8) :rfc:`6113` +- PKINIT with FAST on client (release 1.10) :rfc:`6113` +- PKINIT :rfc:`4556` +- FX-COOKIE :rfc:`6113#section-5.2` +- S4U-X509-USER (release 1.8) https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246091 +- OTP (release 1.12) :ref:`otp_preauth` +- SPAKE (release 1.17) :ref:`spake` + +`PRNG` + +- modularity (release 1.9) +- Yarrow PRNG (release < 1.10) +- Fortuna PRNG (release 1.9) https://www.schneier.com/book-practical.html +- OS PRNG (release 1.10) OS's native PRNG diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5license.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5license.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e23edbfb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/mitK5license.rst @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +.. _mitK5license: + +MIT Kerberos License information +================================ + +.. toctree:: + :hidden: + + copyright.rst + +.. include:: notice.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/notice.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/notice.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9f9ff2ca2 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/notice.rst @@ -0,0 +1,1286 @@ +Copyright |copy| 1985-2019 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. + +All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are +met: + +* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR +A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT +HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, +SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT +LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +Downloading of this software may constitute an export of cryptographic +software from the United States of America that is subject to the +United States Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 CFR 730-774. +Additional laws or regulations may apply. It is the responsibility of +the person or entity contemplating export to comply with all +applicable export laws and regulations, including obtaining any +required license from the U.S. government. + +The U.S. government prohibits export of encryption source code to +certain countries and individuals, including, but not limited to, the +countries of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and residents and +nationals of those countries. + +Documentation components of this software distribution are licensed +under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. +(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) + +Individual source code files are copyright MIT, Cygnus Support, +Novell, OpenVision Technologies, Oracle, Red Hat, Sun Microsystems, +FundsXpress, and others. + +Project Athena, Athena, Athena MUSE, Discuss, Hesiod, Kerberos, Moira, +and Zephyr are trademarks of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology +(MIT). No commercial use of these trademarks may be made without +prior written permission of MIT. + +"Commercial use" means use of a name in a product or other for-profit +manner. It does NOT prevent a commercial firm from referring to the +MIT trademarks in order to convey information (although in doing so, +recognition of their trademark status should be given). + +------------------- + +The following copyright and permission notice applies to the +OpenVision Kerberos Administration system located in +``kadmin/create``, ``kadmin/dbutil``, ``kadmin/passwd``, +``kadmin/server``, ``lib/kadm5``, and portions of +``lib/rpc``: + + Copyright, OpenVision Technologies, Inc., 1993-1996, All Rights Reserved + + WARNING: Retrieving the OpenVision Kerberos Administration system source + code, as described below, indicates your acceptance of the following + terms. If you do not agree to the following terms, do not retrieve the + OpenVision Kerberos administration system. + + You may freely use and distribute the Source Code and Object Code + compiled from it, with or without modification, but this Source Code is + provided to you "AS IS" EXCLUSIVE OF ANY WARRANTY, INCLUDING, WITHOUT + LIMITATION, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A + PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR ANY OTHER WARRANTY, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. + IN NO EVENT WILL OPENVISION HAVE ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY LOST PROFITS, + LOSS OF DATA OR COSTS OF PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES, OR + FOR ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS + AGREEMENT, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE RESULTING FROM THE USE + OF THE SOURCE CODE, OR THE FAILURE OF THE SOURCE CODE TO PERFORM, OR FOR + ANY OTHER REASON. + + OpenVision retains all copyrights in the donated Source Code. OpenVision + also retains copyright to derivative works of the Source Code, whether + created by OpenVision or by a third party. The OpenVision copyright + notice must be preserved if derivative works are made based on the + donated Source Code. + + OpenVision Technologies, Inc. has donated this Kerberos Administration + system to MIT for inclusion in the standard Kerberos 5 distribution. + This donation underscores our commitment to continuing Kerberos + technology development and our gratitude for the valuable work which has + been performed by MIT and the Kerberos community. + +------------------- + + Portions contributed by Matt Crawford ``crawdad@fnal.gov`` were work + performed at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, which is operated + by Universities Research Association, Inc., under contract + DE-AC02-76CHO3000 with the U.S. Department of Energy. + +------------------- + +Portions of ``src/lib/crypto`` have the following copyright: + + Copyright |copy| 1998 by the FundsXpress, INC. + + All rights reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may require + a specific license from the United States Government. It is the + responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to + obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of FundsXpress. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. FundsXpress makes no representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +------------------- + +The implementation of the AES encryption algorithm in +``src/lib/crypto/builtin/aes`` has the following copyright: + + | Copyright |copy| 2001, Dr Brian Gladman ``brg@gladman.uk.net``, + Worcester, UK. + | All rights reserved. + + LICENSE TERMS + + The free distribution and use of this software in both source and binary + form is allowed (with or without changes) provided that: + + 1. distributions of this source code include the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer; + 2. distributions in binary form include the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer + in the documentation and/or other associated materials; + 3. the copyright holder's name is not used to endorse products + built using this software without specific written permission. + + DISCLAIMER + + This software is provided 'as is' with no explcit or implied warranties + in respect of any properties, including, but not limited to, correctness + and fitness for purpose. + +------------------- + +Portions contributed by Red Hat, including the pre-authentication +plug-in framework and the NSS crypto implementation, contain the +following copyright: + + | Copyright |copy| 2006 Red Hat, Inc. + | Portions copyright |copy| 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology + | All Rights Reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * Neither the name of Red Hat, Inc., nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS + IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A + PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER + OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +The bundled verto source code is subject to the following license: + + Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. + + Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person + obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files + (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, + including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, + publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, + and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, + subject to the following conditions: + + The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be + included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + + THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, + EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND + NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS + BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN + ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE + SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + +The MS-KKDCP client implementation has the following copyright: + + Copyright 2013,2014 Red Hat, Inc. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + distribution. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS + IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A + PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER + OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, + PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +The implementations of GSSAPI mechglue in GSSAPI-SPNEGO in +``src/lib/gssapi``, including the following files: + +.. parsed-literal:: + + lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_err_generic.et + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_accept_sec_context.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_acquire_cred.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_canon_name.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_compare_name.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_context_time.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_delete_sec_context.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_dsp_name.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_dsp_status.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_dup_name.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_exp_sec_context.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_export_name.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_glue.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_imp_name.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_imp_sec_context.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_init_sec_context.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_initialize.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inquire_context.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inquire_cred.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_inquire_names.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_process_context.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_buffer.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_cred.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_name.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_rel_oid_set.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_seal.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_sign.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_store_cred.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_unseal.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_userok.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_utils.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/g_verify.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/gssd_pname_to_uid.c + lib/gssapi/mechglue/mglueP.h + lib/gssapi/mechglue/oid_ops.c + lib/gssapi/spnego/gssapiP_spnego.h + lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c + +and the initial implementation of incremental propagation, including +the following new or changed files: + +.. parsed-literal:: + + include/iprop_hdr.h + kadmin/server/ipropd_svc.c + lib/kdb/iprop.x + lib/kdb/kdb_convert.c + lib/kdb/kdb_log.c + lib/kdb/kdb_log.h + lib/krb5/error_tables/kdb5_err.et + kprop/kpropd_rpc.c + kprop/kproplog.c + +are subject to the following license: + + Copyright |copy| 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc. + + Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a + copy of this software and associated documentation files (the + "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including + without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, + distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to + permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to + the following conditions: + + The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included + in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + + THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS + OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. + IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, + TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE + SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + +Kerberos V5 includes documentation and software developed at the +University of California at Berkeley, which includes this copyright +notice: + + | Copyright |copy| 1983 Regents of the University of California. + | All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND + ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +Portions contributed by Novell, Inc., including the LDAP database +backend, are subject to the following license: + + | Copyright |copy| 2004-2005, Novell, Inc. + | All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * The copyright holder's name is not used to endorse or promote products + derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" + AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +Portions funded by Sandia National Laboratory +and developed by the University of Michigan's +Center for Information Technology Integration, +including the PKINIT implementation, are subject +to the following license: + + | COPYRIGHT |copy| 2006-2007 + | THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN + | ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + + Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works + and redistribute this software and such derivative works + for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of + Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity + pertaining to the use of distribution of this software + without specific, written prior authorization. If the + above copyright notice or any other identification of the + University of Michigan is included in any copy of any + portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must + also be included. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION + FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY + PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF + MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE + REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE + FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR + CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING + OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN + IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + SUCH DAMAGES. + +------------------- + +The pkcs11.h file included in the PKINIT code has the +following license: + + | Copyright 2006 g10 Code GmbH + | Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus + + This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives + unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without + modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + + This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even + the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + PURPOSE. + +------------------- + +Portions contributed by Apple Inc. are subject to the following license: + + Copyright 2004-2008 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may require + a specific license from the United States Government. It is the + responsibility of any person or organization contemplating export to + obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of Apple Inc. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. Apple Inc. makes no representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +------------------- + +The implementations of UTF-8 string handling in src/util/support and +src/lib/krb5/unicode are subject to the following copyright and +permission notice: + + | The OpenLDAP Public License + | Version 2.8, 17 August 2003 + + Redistribution and use of this software and associated documentation + ("Software"), with or without modification, are permitted provided + that the following conditions are met: + + 1. Redistributions in source form must retain copyright statements + and notices, + 2. 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Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + 3. Neither the name of KTH nor the names of its contributors may be + used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without + specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY KTH AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY + EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL KTH OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE + LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF + ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +The KCM Mach RPC definition file used on macOS has the following copyright: + + | Copyright |copy| 2009 Kungliga Tekniska Högskola + | (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden). + | All rights reserved. + + Portions Copyright |copy| 2009 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + + 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND + ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + ARE DISCLAIMED. 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Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + distribution. + 3. Neither the name of the "Oracle America, Inc." nor the names of + its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products + derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS + IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A + PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR + PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + + Copyright |copy| 2006,2007,2009 + NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation). All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer as + the first lines of this file unmodified. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY NTT "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR + IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + IN NO EVENT SHALL NTT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + + Copyright 2000 by Carnegie Mellon University + + All Rights Reserved + + Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its + documentation for any purpose and without fee is hereby granted, + provided that the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that + both that copyright notice and this permission notice appear in + supporting documentation, and that the name of Carnegie Mellon + University not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to + distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. + + CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND + FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE FOR + ANY SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT + OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + + Copyright |copy| 2002 Naval Research Laboratory (NRL/CCS) + + Permission to use, copy, modify and distribute this software and its + documentation is hereby granted, provided that both the copyright + notice and this permission notice appear in all copies of the software, + derivative works or modified versions, and any portions thereof. + + NRL ALLOWS FREE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE IN ITS "AS IS" CONDITION AND + DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY OF ANY KIND FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER + RESULTING FROM THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + + Copyright |copy| 1991, 1992, 1994 by Cygnus Support. + + Permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation. + Cygnus Support makes no representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. + +------------------- + + Copyright |copy| 2006 Secure Endpoints Inc. + + Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person + obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation + files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without + restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, + modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies + of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is + furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + + The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be + included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + + THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, + EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND + NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS + BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN + ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN + CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE + SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + +Portions of the implementation of the Fortuna-like PRNG are subject to +the following notice: + + | Copyright |copy| 2005 Marko Kreen + | All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND + ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + SUCH DAMAGE. + +.. + + Copyright |copy| 1994 by the University of Southern California + + EXPORT OF THIS SOFTWARE from the United States of America may + require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to copy, modify, and distribute + this software and its documentation in source and binary forms is + hereby granted, provided that any documentation or other materials + related to such distribution or use acknowledge that the software + was developed by the University of Southern California. + + DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTY. 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Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + must display the following acknowledgement: + + This product includes software developed by the University of + California, Berkeley and its contributors. + + 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND + ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + + | Copyright |copy| 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. + | Copyright 1995 by Richard P. Basch. All Rights Reserved. + | Copyright 1995 by Lehman Brothers, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may + require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of Richard P. Basch, Lehman Brothers and M.I.T. not be used + in advertising or publicity pertaining to distribution of the software + without specific, written prior permission. Richard P. Basch, + Lehman Brothers and M.I.T. make no representations about the suitability + of this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without + express or implied warranty. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to ``src/lib/krb5/krb/strptime.c`` and +``src/include/k5-queue.h``. + + | Copyright |copy| 1997, 1998 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + | All rights reserved. + + This code was contributed to The NetBSD Foundation by Klaus Klein. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + must display the following acknowledgement: + + This product includes software developed by the NetBSD + Foundation, Inc. and its contributors. + + 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its + contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + from this software without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to Unicode library files in +``src/lib/krb5/unicode``: + + | Copyright 1997, 1998, 1999 Computing Research Labs, + | New Mexico State University + + Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a + copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), + to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation + the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, + and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the + Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + + The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in + all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + + THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, + FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL + THE COMPUTING RESEARCH LAB OR NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY BE LIABLE FOR ANY + CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT + OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR + THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to ``src/util/support/strlcpy.c``: + + Copyright |copy| 1998 Todd C. Miller ``Todd.Miller@courtesan.com`` + + Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + + THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to ``src/util/profile/argv_parse.c`` and +``src/util/profile/argv_parse.h``: + + Copyright 1999 by Theodore Ts'o. + + Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for + any purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that + the above copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all + copies. THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THEODORE TS'O (THE + AUTHOR) DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, + INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. + IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, + INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER + RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR + IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. (Isn't + it sick that the U.S. culture of lawsuit-happy lawyers requires + this kind of disclaimer?) + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to SWIG-generated code in +``src/util/profile/profile_tcl.c``: + + Copyright |copy| 1999-2000, The University of Chicago + + This file may be freely redistributed without license or fee provided + this copyright message remains intact. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to portiions of ``src/lib/rpc`` and +``src/include/gssrpc``: + + Copyright |copy| 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan. + All rights reserved. + + Copyright |copy| 2000 Dug Song ``dugsong@UMICH.EDU``. + All rights reserved, all wrongs reversed. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its + contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived + from this software without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +Implementations of the MD4 algorithm are subject to the following +notice: + + Copyright |copy| 1990, RSA Data Security, Inc. All rights reserved. + + License to copy and use this software is granted provided that + it is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD4 Message + Digest Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this + software or this function. + + License is also granted to make and use derivative works + provided that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA + Data Security, Inc. MD4 Message Digest Algorithm" in all + material mentioning or referencing the derived work. + + RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning + either the merchantability of this software or the suitability + of this software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as + is" without express or implied warranty of any kind. + + These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this + documentation and/or software. + +------------------- + +Implementations of the MD5 algorithm are subject to the following +notice: + + Copyright |copy| 1990, RSA Data Security, Inc. All rights reserved. + + License to copy and use this software is granted provided that + it is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message- + Digest Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this + software or this function. + + License is also granted to make and use derivative works + provided that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA + Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all + material mentioning or referencing the derived work. + + RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning + either the merchantability of this software or the suitability + of this software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as + is" without express or implied warranty of any kind. + + These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this + documentation and/or software. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to ``src/lib/crypto/crypto_tests/t_mddriver.c``: + + Copyright |copy| 1990-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1990. All + rights reserved. + + RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either + the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this + software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" + without express or implied warranty of any kind. + + These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this + documentation and/or software. + +------------------- + +Portions of ``src/lib/krb5`` are subject to the following notice: + + | Copyright |copy| 1994 CyberSAFE Corporation. + | Copyright 1990,1991,2007,2008 by the Massachusetts + Institute of Technology. + | All Rights Reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may + require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label + your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a + fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software. + Neither M.I.T., the Open Computing Security Group, nor + CyberSAFE Corporation make any representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. + +------------------- + +Portions contributed by PADL Software are subject to the following +license: + + Copyright (c) 2011, PADL Software Pty Ltd. + All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + + 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + + 3. Neither the name of PADL Software nor the names of its contributors + may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + without specific prior written permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY PADL SOFTWARE AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND + ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL PADL SOFTWARE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +The bundled libev source code is subject to the following license: + + All files in libev are Copyright (C)2007,2008,2009 Marc Alexander Lehmann. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are + met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following + disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided + with the distribution. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR + A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT + OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT + LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE + OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + + Alternatively, the contents of this package may be used under the terms + of the GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 or any later version, + in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable instead of the + above. If you wish to allow the use of your version of this package only + under the terms of the GPL and not to allow others to use your version of + this file under the BSD license, indicate your decision by deleting the + provisions above and replace them with the notice and other provisions + required by the GPL in this and the other files of this package. If you do + not delete the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this + file under either the BSD or the GPL. + +------------------- + +Files copied from the Intel AESNI Sample Library are subject to the +following license: + + Copyright |copy| 2010, Intel Corporation + All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above + copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following + disclaimer. + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above + copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following + disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials + provided with the distribution. + * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its + contributors may be used to endorse or promote products + derived from this software without specific prior written + permission. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND + CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, + INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE + DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS + BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, + EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON + ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR + TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF + THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to +``src/ccapi/common/win/OldCC/autolock.hxx``: + + Copyright (C) 1998 by Danilo Almeida. All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + are met: + + * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + + * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + distribution. + + THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS + "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT + LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS + FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, + INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR + SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to portions of +``src/plugins/preauth/spake/edwards25519.c`` and +``src/plugins/preauth/spake/edwards25519_tables.h``: + +The MIT License (MIT) + +Copyright (c) 2015-2016 the fiat-crypto authors (see the AUTHORS file). + +Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + +THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER +LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING +FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS +IN THE SOFTWARE. + +------------------- + +The following notice applies to portions of +``src/plugins/preauth/spake/edwards25519.c``: + +Copyright (c) 2015-2016, Google Inc. + +Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any +purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + +THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES +WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES +WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION +OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN +CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/ccselect.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/ccselect.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1253fe6bc --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/ccselect.rst @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +.. _ccselect_plugin: + +Credential cache selection interface (ccselect) +=============================================== + +The ccselect interface allows modules to control how credential caches +are chosen when a GSSAPI client contacts a service. For a detailed +description of the ccselect interface, see the header file +``<krb5/ccselect_plugin.h>``. + +The primary ccselect method is **choose**, which accepts a server +principal as input and returns a ccache and/or principal name as +output. A module can use the krb5_cccol APIs to iterate over the +cache collection in order to find an appropriate ccache to use. + +.. TODO: add reference to the admin guide for ccaches and cache + collections when we have appropriate sections. + +A module can create and destroy per-library-context state objects by +implementing the **init** and **fini** methods. State objects have +the type krb5_ccselect_moddata, which is an abstract pointer type. A +module should typically cast this to an internal type for the state +object. + +A module can have one of two priorities, "authoritative" or +"heuristic". Results from authoritative modules, if any are +available, will take priority over results from heuristic modules. A +module communicates its priority as a result of the **init** method. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/certauth.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/certauth.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8a7f7c5eb --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/certauth.rst @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.. _certauth_plugin: + +PKINIT certificate authorization interface (certauth) +===================================================== + +The certauth interface was first introduced in release 1.16. It +allows customization of the X.509 certificate attribute requirements +placed on certificates used by PKINIT enabled clients. For a detailed +description of the certauth interface, see the header file +``<krb5/certauth_plugin.h>`` + +A certauth module implements the **authorize** method to determine +whether a client's certificate is authorized to authenticate a client +principal. **authorize** receives the DER-encoded certificate, the +requested client principal, and a pointer to the client's +krb5_db_entry (for modules that link against libkdb5). It returns the +authorization status and optionally outputs a list of authentication +indicator strings to be added to the ticket. A module must use its +own internal or library-provided ASN.1 certificate decoder. + +A module can optionally create and destroy module data with the +**init** and **fini** methods. Module data objects last for the +lifetime of the KDC process. + +If a module allocates and returns a list of authentication indicators +from **authorize**, it must also implement the **free_ind** method +to free the list. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/clpreauth.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/clpreauth.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..38aa52e8b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/clpreauth.rst @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +Client preauthentication interface (clpreauth) +============================================== + +During an initial ticket request, a KDC may ask a client to prove its +knowledge of the password before issuing an encrypted ticket, or to +use credentials other than a password. This process is called +preauthentication, and is described in :rfc:`4120` and :rfc:`6113`. +The clpreauth interface allows the addition of client support for +preauthentication mechanisms beyond those included in the core MIT +krb5 code base. For a detailed description of the clpreauth +interface, see the header file ``<krb5/clpreauth_plugin.h>`` (or +``<krb5/preauth_plugin.h>`` before release 1.12). + +A clpreauth module is generally responsible for: + +* Supplying a list of preauth type numbers used by the module in the + **pa_type_list** field of the vtable structure. + +* Indicating what kind of preauthentication mechanism it implements, + with the **flags** method. In the most common case, this method + just returns ``PA_REAL``, indicating that it implements a normal + preauthentication type. + +* Examining the padata information included in a PREAUTH_REQUIRED or + MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED error and producing padata values for the + next AS request. This is done with the **process** method. + +* Examining the padata information included in a successful ticket + reply, possibly verifying the KDC identity and computing a reply + key. This is also done with the **process** method. + +* For preauthentication types which support it, recovering from errors + by examining the error data from the KDC and producing a padata + value for another AS request. This is done with the **tryagain** + method. + +* Receiving option information (supplied by ``kinit -X`` or by an + application), with the **gic_opts** method. + +A clpreauth module can create and destroy per-library-context and +per-request state objects by implementing the **init**, **fini**, +**request_init**, and **request_fini** methods. Per-context state +objects have the type krb5_clpreauth_moddata, and per-request state +objects have the type krb5_clpreauth_modreq. These are abstract +pointer types; a module should typically cast these to internal +types for the state objects. + +The **process** and **tryagain** methods have access to a callback +function and handle (called a "rock") which can be used to get +additional information about the current request, including the +expected enctype of the AS reply, the FAST armor key, and the client +long-term key (prompting for the user password if necessary). A +callback can also be used to replace the AS reply key if the +preauthentication mechanism computes one. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/general.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/general.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fba9bf6ea --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/general.rst @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +General plugin concepts +======================= + +A krb5 dynamic plugin module is a Unix shared object or Windows DLL. +Typically, the source code for a dynamic plugin module should live in +its own project with a build system using automake_ and libtool_, or +tools with similar functionality. + +A plugin module must define a specific symbol name, which depends on +the pluggable interface and module name. For most pluggable +interfaces, the exported symbol is a function named +``INTERFACE_MODULE_initvt``, where *INTERFACE* is the name of the +pluggable interface and *MODULE* is the name of the module. For these +interfaces, it is possible for one shared object or DLL to implement +multiple plugin modules, either for the same pluggable interface or +for different ones. For example, a shared object could implement both +KDC and client preauthentication mechanisms, by exporting functions +named ``kdcpreauth_mymech_initvt`` and ``clpreauth_mymech_initvt``. + +.. note: The profile, locate, and GSSAPI mechglue pluggable interfaces + follow different conventions. See the documentation for + those interfaces for details. The remainder of this section + applies to pluggable interfaces which use the standard + conventions. + +A plugin module implementation should include the header file +``<krb5/INTERFACE_plugin.h>``, where *INTERFACE* is the name of the +pluggable interface. For instance, a ccselect plugin module +implementation should use ``#include <krb5/ccselect_plugin.h>``. + +.. note: clpreauth and kdcpreauth module implementations should + include <krb5/preauth_plugin.h>. + +initvt functions have the following prototype:: + + krb5_error_code interface_modname_initvt(krb5_context context, + int maj_ver, int min_ver, + krb5_plugin_vtable vtable); + +and should do the following: + +1. Check that the supplied maj_ver argument is supported by the + module. If it is not supported, the function should return + KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP. + +2. Cast the supplied vtable pointer to the structure type + corresponding to the major version, as documented in the pluggable + interface header file. + +3. Fill in the structure fields with pointers to method functions and + static data, stopping at the field indicated by the supplied minor + version. Fields for unimplemented optional methods can be left + alone; it is not necessary to initialize them to NULL. + +In most cases, the context argument will not be used. The initvt +function should not allocate memory; think of it as a glorified +structure initializer. Each pluggable interface defines methods for +allocating and freeing module state if doing so is necessary for the +interface. + +Pluggable interfaces typically include a **name** field in the vtable +structure, which should be filled in with a pointer to a string +literal containing the module name. + +Here is an example of what an initvt function might look like for a +fictional pluggable interface named fences, for a module named +"wicker":: + + krb5_error_code + fences_wicker_initvt(krb5_context context, int maj_ver, + int min_ver, krb5_plugin_vtable vtable) + { + krb5_ccselect_vtable vt; + + if (maj_ver == 1) { + krb5_fences_vtable vt = (krb5_fences_vtable)vtable; + vt->name = "wicker"; + vt->slats = wicker_slats; + vt->braces = wicker_braces; + } else if (maj_ver == 2) { + krb5_fences_vtable_v2 vt = (krb5_fences_vtable_v2)vtable; + vt->name = "wicker"; + vt->material = wicker_material; + vt->construction = wicker_construction; + if (min_ver < 2) + return 0; + vt->footing = wicker_footing; + if (min_ver < 3) + return 0; + vt->appearance = wicker_appearance; + } else { + return KRB5_PLUGIN_VER_NOTSUPP; + } + return 0; + } + +Logging from KDC and kadmind plugin modules +------------------------------------------- + +Plugin modules for the KDC or kadmind daemons can write to the +configured logging outputs (see :ref:`logging`) by calling the +**com_err** function. The first argument (*whoami*) is ignored. If +the second argument (*code*) is zero, the formatted message is logged +at informational severity; otherwise, the formatted message is logged +at error severity and includes the error message for the supplied +code. Here are examples:: + + com_err("", 0, "Client message contains %d items", nitems); + com_err("", retval, "while decoding client message"); + +(The behavior described above is new in release 1.17. In prior +releases, the *whoami* argument is included for some logging output +types, the logged message does not include the usual header for some +output types, and the severity for syslog outputs is configured as +part of the logging specification, defaulting to error severity.) + +.. _automake: https://www.gnu.org/software/automake/ +.. _libtool: https://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/ diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/gssapi.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/gssapi.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..34fc9e484 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/gssapi.rst @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +GSSAPI mechanism interface +========================== + +The GSSAPI library in MIT krb5 can load mechanism modules to augment +the set of built-in mechanisms. + +.. note: The GSSAPI loadable mechanism interface does not follow the + normal conventions for MIT krb5 pluggable interfaces. + +A mechanism module is a Unix shared object or Windows DLL, built +separately from the krb5 tree. Modules are loaded according to the +``/etc/gss/mech`` or ``/etc/gss/mech.d/*.conf`` config files, as +described in :ref:`gssapi_plugin_config`. + +For the most part, a GSSAPI mechanism module exports the same +functions as would a GSSAPI implementation itself, with the same +function signatures. The mechanism selection layer within the GSSAPI +library (called the "mechglue") will dispatch calls from the +application to the module if the module's mechanism is requested. If +a module does not wish to implement a GSSAPI extension, it can simply +refrain from exporting it, and the mechglue will fail gracefully if +the application calls that function. + +The mechglue does not invoke a module's **gss_add_cred**, +**gss_add_cred_from**, **gss_add_cred_impersonate_name**, or +**gss_add_cred_with_password** function. A mechanism only needs to +implement the "acquire" variants of those functions. + +A module does not need to coordinate its minor status codes with those +of other mechanisms. If the mechglue detects conflicts, it will map +the mechanism's status codes onto unique values, and then map them +back again when **gss_display_status** is called. + + +Interposer modules +------------------ + +The mechglue also supports a kind of loadable module, called an +interposer module, which intercepts calls to existing mechanisms +rather than implementing a new mechanism. + +An interposer module must export the symbol **gss_mech_interposer** +with the following signature:: + + gss_OID_set gss_mech_interposer(gss_OID mech_type); + +This function is invoked with the OID of the interposer mechanism as +specified in ``/etc/gss/mech`` or in a ``/etc/gss/mech.d/*.conf`` +file, and returns a set of mechanism OIDs to be interposed. The +returned OID set must have been created using the mechglue's +gss_create_empty_oid_set and gss_add_oid_set_member functions. + +An interposer module must use the prefix ``gssi_`` for the GSSAPI +functions it exports, instead of the prefix ``gss_``. + +An interposer module can link against the GSSAPI library in order to +make calls to the original mechanism. To do so, it must specify a +special mechanism OID which is the concatention of the interposer's +own OID byte string and the original mechanism's OID byte string. + +Since **gss_accept_sec_context** does not accept a mechanism argument, +an interposer mechanism must, in order to invoke the original +mechanism's function, acquire a credential for the concatenated OID +and pass that as the *verifier_cred_handle* parameter. + +Since **gss_import_name**, **gss_import_cred**, and +**gss_import_sec_context** do not accept mechanism parameters, the SPI +has been extended to include variants which do. This allows the +interposer module to know which mechanism should be used to interpret +the token. These functions have the following signatures:: + + OM_uint32 gssi_import_sec_context_by_mech(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_OID desired_mech, gss_buffer_t interprocess_token, + gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle); + + OM_uint32 gssi_import_name_by_mech(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_OID mech_type, gss_buffer_t input_name_buffer, + gss_OID input_name_type, gss_name_t output_name); + + OM_uint32 gssi_import_cred_by_mech(OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_OID mech_type, gss_buffer_t token, + gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle); + +To re-enter the original mechanism when importing tokens for the above +functions, the interposer module must wrap the mechanism token in the +mechglue's format, using the concatenated OID. The mechglue token +formats are: + +* For **gss_import_sec_context**, a four-byte OID length in big-endian + order, followed by the mechanism OID, followed by the mechanism + token. + +* For **gss_import_name**, the bytes 04 01, followed by a two-byte OID + length in big-endian order, followed by the mechanism OID, followed + by the bytes 06, followed by the OID length as a single byte, + followed by the mechanism OID, followed by the mechanism token. + +* For **gss_import_cred**, a four-byte OID length in big-endian order, + followed by the mechanism OID, followed by a four-byte token length + in big-endian order, followed by the mechanism token. This sequence + may be repeated multiple times. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/hostrealm.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/hostrealm.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4d488ef7b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/hostrealm.rst @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +.. _hostrealm_plugin: + +Host-to-realm interface (hostrealm) +=================================== + +The host-to-realm interface was first introduced in release 1.12. It +allows modules to control the local mapping of hostnames to realm +names as well as the default realm. For a detailed description of the +hostrealm interface, see the header file +``<krb5/hostrealm_plugin.h>``. + +Although the mapping methods in the hostrealm interface return a list +of one or more realms, only the first realm in the list is currently +used by callers. Callers may begin using later responses in the +future. + +Any mapping method may return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE to defer +processing to a later module. + +A module can create and destroy per-library-context state objects +using the **init** and **fini** methods. If the module does not need +any state, it does not need to implement these methods. + +The optional **host_realm** method allows a module to determine +authoritative realm mappings for a hostname. The first authoritative +mapping is used in preference to KDC referrals when getting service +credentials. + +The optional **fallback_realm** method allows a module to determine +fallback mappings for a hostname. The first fallback mapping is tried +if there is no authoritative mapping for a realm, and KDC referrals +failed to produce a successful result. + +The optional **default_realm** method allows a module to determine the +local default realm. + +If a module implements any of the above methods, it must also +implement **free_list** to ensure that memory is allocated and +deallocated consistently. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5e7834635 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +For plugin module developers +============================ + +Kerberos plugin modules allow increased control over MIT krb5 library +and server behavior. This guide describes how to create dynamic +plugin modules and the currently available pluggable interfaces. + +See :ref:`plugin_config` for information on how to register dynamic +plugin modules and how to enable and disable modules via +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. + +.. TODO: update the above reference when we have a free-form section + in the admin guide about plugin configuration + + +Contents +-------- + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 2 + + general.rst + clpreauth.rst + kdcpreauth.rst + ccselect.rst + pwqual.rst + kadm5_hook.rst + kadm5_auth.rst + hostrealm.rst + localauth.rst + locate.rst + profile.rst + gssapi.rst + internal.rst + certauth.rst + kdcpolicy.rst + +.. TODO: GSSAPI mechanism plugins diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/internal.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/internal.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99e30bb79 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/internal.rst @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +Internal pluggable interfaces +============================= + +Following are brief discussions of pluggable interfaces which have not +yet been made public. These interfaces are functional, but the +interfaces are likely to change in incompatible ways from release to +release. In some cases, it may be necessary to copy header files from +the krb5 source tree to use an internal interface. Use these with +care, and expect to need to update your modules for each new release +of MIT krb5. + + +Kerberos database interface (KDB) +--------------------------------- + +A KDB module implements a database back end for KDC principal and +policy information, and can also control many aspects of KDC behavior. +For a full description of the interface, see the header file +``<kdb.h>``. + +The KDB pluggable interface is often referred to as the DAL (Database +Access Layer). + + +Authorization data interface (authdata) +--------------------------------------- + +The authdata interface allows a module to provide (from the KDC) or +consume (in application servers) authorization data of types beyond +those handled by the core MIT krb5 code base. The interface is +defined in the header file ``<krb5/authdata_plugin.h>``, which is not +installed by the build. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kadm5_auth.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kadm5_auth.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b4839617b --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kadm5_auth.rst @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +.. _kadm5_auth_plugin: + +kadmin authorization interface (kadm5_auth) +=========================================== + +The kadm5_auth interface (new in release 1.16) allows modules to +determine whether a client principal is authorized to perform an +operation in the kadmin protocol, and to apply restrictions to +principal operations. For a detailed description of the kadm5_auth +interface, see the header file ``<krb5/kadm5_auth_plugin.h>``. + +A module can create and destroy per-process state objects by +implementing the **init** and **fini** methods. State objects have +the type kadm5_auth_modinfo, which is an abstract pointer type. A +module should typically cast this to an internal type for the state +object. + +The kadm5_auth interface has one method for each kadmin operation, +with parameters specific to the operation. Each method can return +either 0 to authorize access, KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE to defer the +decision to other modules, or another error (canonically EPERM) to +authoritatively deny access. Access is granted if at least one module +grants access and no module authoritatively denies access. + +The **addprinc** and **modprinc** methods can also impose restrictions +on the principal operation by returning a ``struct +kadm5_auth_restrictions`` object. The module should also implement +the **free_restrictions** method if it dynamically allocates +restrictions objects for principal operations. + +kadm5_auth modules can optionally inspect principal or policy objects. +To do this, the module must also include ``<kadm5/admin.h>`` to gain +access to the structure definitions for those objects. As the kadmin +interface is explicitly not as stable as other public interfaces, +modules which do this may not retain compatibility across releases. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kadm5_hook.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kadm5_hook.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ece3eacfc --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kadm5_hook.rst @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.. _kadm5_hook_plugin: + +KADM5 hook interface (kadm5_hook) +================================= + +The kadm5_hook interface allows modules to perform actions when +changes are made to the Kerberos database through :ref:`kadmin(1)`. +For a detailed description of the kadm5_hook interface, see the header +file ``<krb5/kadm5_hook_plugin.h>``. + +The kadm5_hook interface has five primary methods: **chpass**, +**create**, **modify**, **remove**, and **rename**. (The **rename** +method was introduced in release 1.14.) Each of these methods is +called twice when the corresponding administrative action takes place, +once before the action is committed and once afterwards. A module can +prevent the action from taking place by returning an error code during +the pre-commit stage. + +A module can create and destroy per-process state objects by +implementing the **init** and **fini** methods. State objects have +the type kadm5_hook_modinfo, which is an abstract pointer type. A +module should typically cast this to an internal type for the state +object. + +Because the kadm5_hook interface is tied closely to the kadmin +interface (which is explicitly unstable), it may not remain as stable +across versions as other public pluggable interfaces. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kdcpolicy.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kdcpolicy.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..74f21f08f --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kdcpolicy.rst @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +.. _kdcpolicy_plugin: + +KDC policy interface (kdcpolicy) +================================ + +The kdcpolicy interface was first introduced in release 1.16. It +allows modules to veto otherwise valid AS and TGS requests or restrict +the lifetime and renew time of the resulting ticket. For a detailed +description of the kdcpolicy interface, see the header file +``<krb5/kdcpolicy_plugin.h>``. + +The optional **check_as** and **check_tgs** functions allow the module +to perform access control. Additionally, a module can create and +destroy module data with the **init** and **fini** methods. Module +data objects last for the lifetime of the KDC process, and are +provided to all other methods. The data has the type +krb5_kdcpolicy_moddata, which should be cast to the appropriate +internal type. + +kdcpolicy modules can optionally inspect principal entries. To do +this, the module must also include ``<kdb.h>`` to gain access to the +principal entry structure definition. As the KDB interface is +explicitly not as stable as other public interfaces, modules which do +this may not retain compatibility across releases. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kdcpreauth.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kdcpreauth.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ab7f3a902 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/kdcpreauth.rst @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +KDC preauthentication interface (kdcpreauth) +============================================ + +The kdcpreauth interface allows the addition of KDC support for +preauthentication mechanisms beyond those included in the core MIT +krb5 code base. For a detailed description of the kdcpreauth +interface, see the header file ``<krb5/kdcpreauth_plugin.h>`` (or +``<krb5/preauth_plugin.h>`` before release 1.12). + +A kdcpreauth module is generally responsible for: + +* Supplying a list of preauth type numbers used by the module in the + **pa_type_list** field of the vtable structure. + +* Indicating what kind of preauthentication mechanism it implements, + with the **flags** method. If the mechanism computes a new reply + key, it must specify the ``PA_REPLACES_KEY`` flag. If the mechanism + is generally only used with hardware tokens, the ``PA_HARDWARE`` + flag allows the mechanism to work with principals which have the + **requires_hwauth** flag set. + +* Producing a padata value to be sent with a preauth_required error, + with the **edata** method. + +* Examining a padata value sent by a client and verifying that it + proves knowledge of the appropriate client credential information. + This is done with the **verify** method. + +* Producing a padata response value for the client, and possibly + computing a reply key. This is done with the **return_padata** + method. + +A module can create and destroy per-KDC state objects by implementing +the **init** and **fini** methods. Per-KDC state objects have the +type krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata, which is an abstract pointer types. A +module should typically cast this to an internal type for the state +object. + +A module can create a per-request state object by returning one in the +**verify** method, receiving it in the **return_padata** method, and +destroying it in the **free_modreq** method. Note that these state +objects only apply to the processing of a single AS request packet, +not to an entire authentication exchange (since an authentication +exchange may remain unfinished by the client or may involve multiple +different KDC hosts). Per-request state objects have the type +krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq, which is an abstract pointer type. + +The **edata**, **verify**, and **return_padata** methods have access +to a callback function and handle (called a "rock") which can be used +to get additional information about the current request, including the +maximum allowable clock skew, the client's long-term keys, the +DER-encoded request body, the FAST armor key, string attributes on the +client's database entry, and the client's database entry itself. The +**verify** method can assert one or more authentication indicators to +be included in the issued ticket using the ``add_auth_indicator`` +callback (new in release 1.14). + +A module can generate state information to be included with the next +client request using the ``set_cookie`` callback (new in release +1.14). On the next request, the module can read this state +information using the ``get_cookie`` callback. Cookie information is +encrypted, timestamped, and transmitted to the client in a +``PA-FX-COOKIE`` pa-data item. Older clients may not support cookies +and therefore may not transmit the cookie in the next request; in this +case, ``get_cookie`` will not yield the saved information. + +If a module implements a mechanism which requires multiple round +trips, its **verify** method can respond with the code +``KRB5KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED`` and a list of pa-data in +the *e_data* parameter to be processed by the client. + +The **edata** and **verify** methods can be implemented +asynchronously. Because of this, they do not return values directly +to the caller, but must instead invoke responder functions with their +results. A synchronous implementation can invoke the responder +function immediately. An asynchronous implementation can use the +callback to get an event context for use with the libverto_ API. + +.. _libverto: https://fedorahosted.org/libverto/ diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/localauth.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/localauth.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6f396a9c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/localauth.rst @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +.. _localauth_plugin: + +Local authorization interface (localauth) +========================================= + +The localauth interface was first introduced in release 1.12. It +allows modules to control the relationship between Kerberos principals +and local system accounts. When an application calls +:c:func:`krb5_kuserok` or :c:func:`krb5_aname_to_localname`, localauth +modules are consulted to determine the result. For a detailed +description of the localauth interface, see the header file +``<krb5/localauth_plugin.h>``. + +A module can create and destroy per-library-context state objects +using the **init** and **fini** methods. If the module does not need +any state, it does not need to implement these methods. + +The optional **userok** method allows a module to control the behavior +of :c:func:`krb5_kuserok`. The module receives the authenticated name +and the local account name as inputs, and can return either 0 to +authorize access, KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE to defer the decision to other +modules, or another error (canonically EPERM) to authoritatively deny +access. Access is granted if at least one module grants access and no +module authoritatively denies access. + +The optional **an2ln** method can work in two different ways. If the +module sets an array of uppercase type names in **an2ln_types**, then +the module's **an2ln** method will only be invoked by +:c:func:`krb5_aname_to_localname` if an **auth_to_local** value in +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)` refers to one of the module's types. In this +case, the *type* and *residual* arguments will give the type name and +residual string of the **auth_to_local** value. + +If the module does not set **an2ln_types** but does implement +**an2ln**, the module's **an2ln** method will be invoked for all +:c:func:`krb5_aname_to_localname` operations unless an earlier module +determines a mapping, with *type* and *residual* set to NULL. The +module can return KRB5_LNAME_NO_TRANS to defer mapping to later +modules. + +If a module implements **an2ln**, it must also implement +**free_string** to ensure that memory is allocated and deallocated +consistently. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/locate.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/locate.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fca6a4da7 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/locate.rst @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +Server location interface (locate) +================================== + +The locate interface allows modules to control how KDCs and similar +services are located by clients. For a detailed description of the +ccselect interface, see the header file ``<krb5/locate_plugin.h>``. + +.. note: The locate interface does not follow the normal conventions + for MIT krb5 pluggable interfaces, because it was made public + before those conventions were established. + +A locate module exports a structure object of type +krb5plugin_service_locate_ftable, with the name ``service_locator``. +The structure contains a minor version and pointers to the module's +methods. + +The primary locate method is **lookup**, which accepts a service type, +realm name, desired socket type, and desired address family (which +will be AF_UNSPEC if no specific address family is desired). The +method should invoke the callback function once for each server +address it wants to return, passing a socket type (SOCK_STREAM for TCP +or SOCK_DGRAM for UDP) and socket address. The **lookup** method +should return 0 if it has authoritatively determined the server +addresses for the realm, KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE if it wants to let +other location mechanisms determine the server addresses, or another +code if it experienced a failure which should abort the location +process. + +A module can create and destroy per-library-context state objects by +implementing the **init** and **fini** methods. State objects have +the type void \*, and should be cast to an internal type for the state +object. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/profile.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/profile.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..209c0644a --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/profile.rst @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +.. _profile_plugin: + +Configuration interface (profile) +================================= + +The profile interface allows a module to control how krb5 +configuration information is obtained by the Kerberos library and +applications. For a detailed description of the profile interface, +see the header file ``<profile.h>``. + +.. note:: + + The profile interface does not follow the normal conventions + for MIT krb5 pluggable interfaces, because it is part of a + lower-level component of the krb5 library. + +As with other types of plugin modules, a profile module is a Unix +shared object or Windows DLL, built separately from the krb5 tree. +The krb5 library will dynamically load and use a profile plugin module +if it reads a ``module`` directive at the beginning of krb5.conf, as +described in :ref:`profile_plugin_config`. + +A profile module exports a function named ``profile_module_init`` +matching the signature of the profile_module_init_fn type. This +function accepts a residual string, which may be used to help locate +the configuration source. The function fills in a vtable and may also +create a per-profile state object. If the module uses state objects, +it should implement the **copy** and **cleanup** methods to manage +them. + +A basic read-only profile module need only implement the +**get_values** and **free_values** methods. The **get_values** method +accepts a null-terminated list of C string names (e.g., an array +containing "libdefaults", "clockskew", and NULL for the **clockskew** +variable in the :ref:`libdefaults` section) and returns a +null-terminated list of values, which will be cleaned up with the +**free_values** method when the caller is done with them. + +Iterable profile modules must also define the **iterator_create**, +**iterator**, **iterator_free**, and **free_string** methods. The +core krb5 code does not require profiles to be iterable, but some +applications may iterate over the krb5 profile object in order to +present configuration interfaces. + +Writable profile modules must also define the **writable**, +**modified**, **update_relation**, **rename_section**, +**add_relation**, and **flush** methods. The core krb5 code does not +require profiles to be writable, but some applications may write to +the krb5 profile in order to present configuration interfaces. + +The following is an example of a very basic read-only profile module +which returns a hardcoded value for the **default_realm** variable in +:ref:`libdefaults`, and provides no other configuration information. +(For conciseness, the example omits code for checking the return +values of malloc and strdup.) :: + + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <string.h> + #include <profile.h> + + static long + get_values(void *cbdata, const char *const *names, char ***values) + { + if (names[0] != NULL && strcmp(names[0], "libdefaults") == 0 && + names[1] != NULL && strcmp(names[1], "default_realm") == 0) { + *values = malloc(2 * sizeof(char *)); + (*values)[0] = strdup("ATHENA.MIT.EDU"); + (*values)[1] = NULL; + return 0; + } + return PROF_NO_RELATION; + } + + static void + free_values(void *cbdata, char **values) + { + char **v; + + for (v = values; *v; v++) + free(*v); + free(values); + } + + long + profile_module_init(const char *residual, struct profile_vtable *vtable, + void **cb_ret); + + long + profile_module_init(const char *residual, struct profile_vtable *vtable, + void **cb_ret) + { + *cb_ret = NULL; + vtable->get_values = get_values; + vtable->free_values = free_values; + return 0; + } diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/pwqual.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/pwqual.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..523b95c5a --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/plugindev/pwqual.rst @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +.. _pwqual_plugin: + +Password quality interface (pwqual) +=================================== + +The pwqual interface allows modules to control what passwords are +allowed when a user changes passwords. For a detailed description of +the pwqual interface, see the header file ``<krb5/pwqual_plugin.h>``. + +The primary pwqual method is **check**, which receives a password as +input and returns success (0) or a ``KADM5_PASS_Q_`` failure code +depending on whether the password is allowed. The **check** method +also receives the principal name and the name of the principal's +password policy as input; although there is no stable interface for +the module to obtain the fields of the password policy, it can define +its own configuration or data store based on the policy name. + +A module can create and destroy per-process state objects by +implementing the **open** and **close** methods. State objects have +the type krb5_pwqual_moddata, which is an abstract pointer type. A +module should typically cast this to an internal type for the state +object. The **open** method also receives the name of the realm's +dictionary file (as configured by the **dict_file** variable in the +:ref:`kdc_realms` section of :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`) if it wishes to use +it. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/resources.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/resources.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9d25f2ca6 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/resources.rst @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +Resources +========= + +Mailing lists +------------- + +* kerberos@mit.edu is a community resource for discussion and + questions about MIT krb5 and other Kerberos implementations. To + subscribe to the list, please follow the instructions at + https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/kerberos. +* krbdev@mit.edu is the primary list for developers of MIT Kerberos. + To subscribe to the list, please follow the instructions at + https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/krbdev. +* krb5-bugs@mit.edu is notified when a ticket is created or updated. + This list helps track bugs and feature requests. + In addition, this list is used to track documentation criticism + and recommendations for improvements. +* krbcore@mit.edu is a private list for the MIT krb5 core team. Send + mail to this list if you need to contact the core team. +* krbcore-security@mit.edu is the point of contact for security problems + with MIT Kerberos. Please use PGP-encrypted mail to report possible + vulnerabilities to this list. + + +IRC channels +------------ + +The IRC channel `#kerberos` on irc.freenode.net is a community +resource for general Kerberos discussion and support. + +The main IRC channel for MIT Kerberos development is `#krbdev` on +freenode. + +For more information about freenode, see https://freenode.net/. + + +Archives +-------- + +* The archive https://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/kerberos/ contains + past postings from the `kerberos@mit.edu` list. + +* The https://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/ contains past postings + from the `krbdev@mit.edu` list. + + +Wiki +---- + +The wiki at https://k5wiki.kerberos.org/ contains useful information +for developers working on the MIT Kerberos source code. Some of the +information on the wiki may be useful for advanced users or system +administrators. + +Web pages +--------- + +* https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/ is the MIT Kerberos software web page. + +* https://kerberos.org/ is the MIT Kerberos Consortium web page. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/rpc/design.tex b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/rpc/design.tex new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fbd60f914 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/rpc/design.tex @@ -0,0 +1,1037 @@ +\documentstyle[fullpage,12pt]{article} + +\title{GSS-API Extensions to Sun RPC} +\date{Draft---\today} +\author{Barry Jaspan} + +\setlength{\parskip}{.7\baselineskip} +\setlength{\parindent}{0pt} + +\makeatletter +\newcount\savecnt\savecnt=0 +\def\saveenum#1{\global\savecnt=\csname c@enum#1\endcsname} +\def\restoreenum#1{\csname c@enum#1\endcsname=\savecnt} +\makeatother + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%% Make _ actually generate an _, and allow line-breaking after it. +\let\underscore=\_ +\catcode`_=13 +\def_{\underscore\penalty75\relax} +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +\begin{document} + + +{\setlength{\parskip}{0pt}\maketitle\tableofcontents} + +\section{Introduction} + +This document describes the integration of GSS-API authentication and +security with Sun RPC. + +\section{Requirements} + +The requirements of the GSS-API authentication system for Sun RPC are: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item It must provide mutual authentication between RPC clients and +servers. + +\item It must provide for integrity checking and encryption of all +procedure arguments and results passed over the network. +\saveenum{i} +\end{enumerate} + +The following features are desired, but not mandatory: + +\begin{enumerate} +\restoreenum{i} +\item It should provide for integrity checking and encryption of all +``header information'' that specifies the program and procedure being +called. + +\item It should obey the Sun RPC protocol so that clients using +it can interoperate with existing servers. In this case, +``interoperate'' means that existing servers will return an error code +indicating that they do not understand the authentication flavor, but +not that they do not understand the request at all. + +\item It should require minimal or no changes to the standard Sun RPC +programming paradigm for either clients or servers so that existing +code can use it with little or no effort. + +\item It should operate correctly with all the standard Sun RPC +transport mechansims (e.g. UDP and TCP). +\saveenum{i} +\end{enumerate} + +\section{Functional Specification} + +This section describes the programmer's interface to the GSS-API +authentication flavor. Knowledge of standard Sun RPC programming is +assumed. + +\subsection{Client Side} + +A RPC client can select the GSS-API authentication flavor in the same +way it can select any other authentication flavor, by setting the +cl_auth field of the CLIENT structure to the appropriate value: + +\begin{verbatim} + clnt = clnt_create(server_host, PROG_NUM, PROG_VERS, protocol); + clnt->cl_auth = auth_gssapi_create(clnt, ...); +\end{verbatim} + +There are two functions that create GSS-API authentication flavor +structures for the cl_auth field, auth_gssapi_create and +auth_gssapi_create_default. + +\begin{verbatim} +AUTH *auth_gssapi_create(CLIENT *clnt, + OM_uint32 *major_status, + OM_uint32 *minor_status, + gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle, + gss_name_t target_name, + gss_OID mech_type, + int req_flags, + int time_req, + gss_OID *actual_mech_type, + int *ret_flags, + OM_uint32 *time_rec); +\end{verbatim} + +auth_gssapi_create creates a GSS-API authentication structure and +provides most of the flexibility of gss_init_sec_context. The +arguments have the same interpretation as those of +gss_init_sec_context with the same name, except: + +\begin{description} +\item[clnt] The CLIENT structure returned by client_create or one of +its relatives. It is not modified. +\end{description} + +auth_gssapi_create calls gss_init_sec_context as needed, passing each +generated token to and processing each token returned from the RPC +server specified by the RPC handle clnt. On return, if major_status +is GSS_S_COMPLETE, the context has been established, the returned AUTH +structure is valid, and all of the arguments filled in by +gss_init_sec_context have the correct values. If major_status is not +GSS_S_COMPLETE then it and minor_status contain error codes that can +be passed to gss_display_status and the returned value is NULL. + +\begin{verbatim} +AUTH *auth_gssapi_create_default(CLIENT *clnt, char *service_name); +\end{verbatim} + +auth_gssapi_create_default is a shorthand for auth_gssapi_create that +attempts to create a context that provides procedure call and result +integrity, using the default credentials and GSS-API mechanism. +service_name is parsed as a GSS-API ``service'' name and used as the +target name. The other arguments to auth_gssapi_create are as follows: + +\begin{verbatim} +auth_gssapi_create(clnt, + &dummy, + &dummy, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, + target_name, + GSS_C_NULL_OID, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, + 0, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL); +\end{verbatim} + +Note that if the underlying default mechanism does not support data +integrity (e.g. the trust mechanism), this function will fail. + +The GSS-API major and minor status codes can be interpreted with +auth_gssapi_display_status: + +\begin{verbatim} +void auth_gssapi_display_status(char *msg, OM_uint32 major, + OM_uint32 minor); +\end{verbatim} + +All of the error messages associated with the major and minor status +are displated on the standard error output, preceeded by the message +``GSS-API authentication error $<$msg$>$:''. + +\subsection{Server Side} + +\subsubsection{Service Name Registration} + +An application server must register the service name(s) that it will +use for GSS-API connections before any AUTH_GSSAPI requests will +succeed. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _auth_gssapi_name { + char *name; + gss_OID type; +} auth_gssapi_name; + +bool_t _svcauth_gssapi_set_names(auth_gssapi_name *names, int num); +\end{verbatim} + +names is an array of name specifications, each of which consists of a +null-terminated ASCII representation of a name and the GSS-API name +type that should be used to import it with gss_import_name. The +name type ``gss_nt_service_name'' is recommended. + +\subsubsection{Calling Client and Service Identification} + +Each application server's dispatch function is passed two arguments, +the transport mechanism (transp) and the RPC service request (rqstp). +If the service request's credential flavor (rq_cred.oa_flavor) is +AUTH_GSSAPI (300001)\footnote{The value 4 was originally used, but +300001 has been officially assigned by the IETF.}, then the call has +been authenticated. The rq_clntcred field of transp contains the +gss_name_t of the authenticated caller and can be passed to +gss_display_name to obtain a string represtation or gss_compare_name +to compare it with other names. The rq_svccred field of transp +contains the GSS-API context established with the caller and can be +passed to gss_inquire_context. + +\subsubsection{Error Logging} + +An application server can register a function to be called when a +failure occurs during GSS-API context establishment with +_svcauth_set_log_badauth_func. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef void (*auth_gssapi_log_badauth_func)(OM_uint32 major, + OM_uint32 minor, + struct sockaddr_in *raddr, + caddr_t data); + +void _svcauth_set_log_badauth_func(auth_gssapi_log_badauth_func func, + caddr_t data); +\end{verbatim} + +The function func is called each time gss_accept_sec_context fails. +The major and minor arguments indicate the GSS-API major and minor +status codes returned. The raddr field contains the INET socket that +the request came from, and the data field contains the data argument +of _svcauth_gssapi_set_log_badauth_func. + +An application server can register a function to be called when an RPC +request with an invalid verifier arrives with +_svcauth_set_log_badverf_func. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef void (*auth_gssapi_log_badverf_func)(gss_name_t client, + gss_name_t server, + struct svc_req *rqst, + struct rpc_msg *msg, + caddr_t data); + +void _svcauth_set_log_badverf_func(auth_gssapi_log_badverf_func func, + caddr_t data); +\end{verbatim} + +The function specified in func is called each time an invalid verifier +is received. The client and server fields identify the (falsely +claimed) originating client and the server it originally authenticated +to. The raddr and addrlen fields contain the INET socket that the +request (claims to have) come from, and data contains the data +argument of _svcauth_set_log_badverf_func. + +\section{Modifications to Sun RPC} + +The Sun RPC extensible authentication mechanism is designed to allow +different authentication systems to be integrated into Sun RPC easily. +Unfortunately, it has two drawbacks. First, the existing system has a +number of non-general design properties that are intended specifically +for Sun's Secure RPC, and second, the existing system has no concept +of or ability to perform authentication-flavor-specific operations on +function arguments and results passed over the wire. The first +problem merely makes the system confusing, since a number of features +touted as ``general'' do not make any sense for arbitrary +authentication systems. The second problem is more substantial, and +can only be corrected by modifications to Sun RPC internals. + +The following sections describe the necessary modifications to Sun +RPC. + +\subsection{Client Side Authentication, AUTH Structure} + +The AUTH structure (figure \ref{fig:auth}) encapsulates the data and +function pointers for an authentication flavor instance. It has been +changed in two ways. + +\begin{figure}[htbp] +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct { + struct opaque_auth ah_cred; + struct opaque_auth ah_verf; + union des_block ah_key; + struct auth_ops { + void (*ah_nextverf)(); + int (*ah_marshal)(); /* nextverf & serialize */ + int (*ah_validate)(); /* validate varifier */ + int (*ah_refresh)(); /* refresh credentials */ + int (*ah_wrap)(); /* encode data for wire */ + int (*ah_unwrap)(); /* decode data from wire */ + void (*ah_destroy)(); /* destroy this structure */ + } *ah_ops; + caddr_t ah_private; +} AUTH; +\end{verbatim} +\caption{The AUTH structure, with the new function pointers ah_wrap +and ah_unwrap.} +\label{fig:auth} +\end{figure} + +First, the new functions ah_wrap and ah_unwrap prepare function +arguments and results for transmission over the wire. The +authentication mechanism can use them to sign, encrypt, or perform any +other operation on the data. Their prototype is: + +\begin{verbatim} +bool_t ah_wrap(AUTH *auth, XDR *out_xdrs, xdrproc_t func, caddr_t ptr); +bool_t ah_unwrap(AUTH *auth, XDR *in_xdrs, xdrproc_t func, caddr_t ptr); +\end{verbatim} + +ah_wrap encodes function arguments for transmission. func and ptr are +the XDR procedure and pointer that serialize the arguments, and +out_xdrs is the xdr stream that the encoded arguments should be +written to. ah_unwrap decodes function arguments received from the +network. Its arguments are the converse of those to ah_wrap. + +It is the responsibility of RPC transport mechanisms to call an +authorization flavor's ah_wrap and ah_unwrap functions when function +arguments or results would normally be written to or read from the +wire. Authorization flavors that do not need to perform any encoding +or decoding can use the provided function authany_wrap for ah_wrap +and ah_unwrap; it consists of the single statement ``return +(*func)(out_xdrs, ptr)'' (or in_xdrs, as appropriate). + +Second, the function ah_refresh has been changed to take the RPC error +message that resulted in its being called as an argument. This is +necessary since the contents of the error message may dictate how +ah_refresh should go about correcting the authentication failure. + +\subsection{Client Side Transport Mechanisms} + +Each client side transport mechanism must be modified to call the +ah_wrap and ah_unwrap functions from the cl_auth field of the CLIENT +structure during the call and reply process. The modification is +fairly simple. For example, the UDP transport mechanism used to +encode procedure calls like this: + +\begin{verbatim} + if ((! XDR_PUTLONG(xdrs, (long *)&proc)) || + (! AUTH_MARSHALL(cl->cl_auth, xdrs)) || + (! (*xargs)(xdrs, argsp))) + return (cu->cu_error.re_status = RPC_CANTENCODEARGS); +\end{verbatim} + +The last function call in the conditional serializes the arguments +onto the xdr stream. This must be replaced with a call to the +appropriate ah_wrap function: + +\begin{verbatim} + if ((! XDR_PUTLONG(xdrs, (long *)&proc)) || + (! AUTH_MARSHALL(cl->cl_auth, xdrs)) || + (! AUTH_WRAP(cl->cl_auth, xdrs, xargs, argsp))) + return (cu->cu_error.re_status = RPC_CANTENCODEARGS); +\end{verbatim} + +AUTH_WRAP is a macro that takes the four arguments for an ah_wrap +function and extracts and calls the function pointer from the cl_auth +structure with the specified arguments. + +Similarly, the transport mechanism must unwrap procedure results. +Again, the UDP mechanism will be instructive. It used to deserialize +function results like this: + +\begin{verbatim} + reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_results.where = resultsp; + reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_results.proc = xresults; + + ok = xdr_replymsg(&reply_xdrs, &reply_msg); +\end{verbatim} + +The problem here is that xdr_replymsg deserializes an entire reply +message, including the results. Since xresults and resultsp are the +function and pointer to decode the results, they will be automatically +deserialized {\it without} ah_unwrap being invoked. The simplest +solution (which is also the normal method used by the TCP mechanism) +is to arrange to deserialize the function results explicitly: + +\begin{verbatim} + reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_results.where = NULL; + reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_results.proc = xdr_void; + + if ((! xdr_replymsg(&reply_xdrs, &reply_msg)) || + (! AUTH_UNWRAP(cl->cl_auth, reply_xdrs, xresults, + resultsp))) { + return (cu->cu_error.re_status = RPC_CANTENCODEARGS); + } +\end{verbatim} + +Since xdr_void does not read any data from the XDR stream, the +function results are still available when AUTH_UNWRAP is called. Note +that AUTH_UNWRAP should only be called on {\it successful} calls; if +the reply message status is not RPC_SUCCESS there are no arguments to +read. + +Currently, the UDP and TCP transport mechanisms has been +converted.\footnote{The ``raw'' mechanism, for direct connections, has +not been.} + +\subsection{Service Side Authentication, SVCAUTH and XPRT} + +Standard Sun RPC service-side authentication consists of a single +function per authentication flavor; there is no concept of an AUTH +structure containing function pointers and private data as with the +client side. Previously, nothing else was necessary, because each +flavor only did a single thing (authenticated individual calls in a +stateless manner). More functions and state are now required, +however; they are stored in the SVCAUTH structure, see figure +\ref{fig:svcauth}. + +\begin{figure}[htbp] +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct { + struct svc_auth_ops { + int (*svc_ah_wrap)(); + int (*svc_ah_unwrap)(); + } *svc_ah_ops; + caddr_t svc_ah_private; +} SVCAUTH; +\end{verbatim} +\caption{The new SVCAUTH structure.} +\label{fig:svcauth} +\end{figure} + +There is one SVCAUTH structure per authentication flavor (there is a +default, svc_auth_any, for existing authentication flavors that do not +need the extra functionality). The svc_ah_wrap and svc_ah_unwrap +perform the same logical function as their client-side counterparts. + +Just as with the client side, it is the responsibility of the +transport mechanism to call the svc_ah_wrap and svc_ah_unwrap +functions associated with the authentication flavor associated with +each RPC call at the appropriate time. Unfortunately, the transport +mechanism code does not have access to the RPC call structure +containing the authenticator flavor because the RPC call structure +itself is not passed as an argument to the necessary functions. The +present solution is to add another argument to the transport mechanism +structure, xp_auth, that stores the SVCAUTH of the {\it current} call +on that mechanism; see figure \ref{fig:xprt}. xp_auth is initialized +to svc_auth_any so that existing authentication mechanisms that do not +set the field will still operate correctly. \footnote{This is not an +great solution, because it forces each transport mechanism to be +single threaded. The correct solution is to store the SVCAUTH +associated with each RPC call in the RPC call structure; however, +doing so would require changing a lot of code to pass around the RPC +call structure that currently does not do so. Since other parts of +Sun RPC use the XPRT structure in a non-reentrant way, the present +solution does not make the situation any +worse.}$^{\mbox{,}}$\footnote{A somewhat irrelevant side effect of +adding SVCAUTH to XPRT is that the standard include file +$<$rpc/rpc.h$>$ had to be changed to include $<$rpc/svc_auth$>$ before +$<$rpc/svc.h$>$, whereas they used to be in the opposite order.} + +\begin{figure}[htbp] +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct { + int xp_sock; + u_short xp_port; /* associated port number */ + struct xp_ops { + bool_t (*xp_recv)(); /* receive incomming requests */ + enum xprt_stat (*xp_stat)(); /* get transport status */ + bool_t (*xp_getargs)(); /* get arguments */ + bool_t (*xp_reply)(); /* send reply */ + bool_t (*xp_freeargs)();/* free mem allocated for args */ + void (*xp_destroy)(); /* destroy this struct */ + } *xp_ops; + int xp_addrlen; /* length of remote address */ + struct sockaddr_in xp_raddr; /* remote address */ + struct opaque_auth xp_verf; /* raw response verifier */ + SVCAUTH *xp_auth; /* auth flavor of current req */ + caddr_t xp_p1; /* private */ + caddr_t xp_p2; /* private */ +} SVCXPRT; +\end{verbatim} +\caption{The modified XPRT structure, with the xp_auth field.} +\label{fig:xprt} +\end{figure} + +Finally, with the modified XPRT structure carrying around the +authentication flavor structure, the functions that serialize and +deserialize function arguments and results must be modified to use the +svc_ah_wrap and svc_ah_unwrap functions. Each service-side transport +mechanism has getargs and reply functions that must be modified to use +the SVCAUTH_UNWRAP and SVCAUTH_WRAP macros, respectively, in a manner +completely parallel to the client side. + +\subsection{Authenticated Service Identification, svc_req} + +Sun RPC provides the authenticated credentials of a client to the +application server via rq_clntcred (``cooked credentials'') field of +the service request (svc_req) structure. In many authentication +systems, services are also named entities, and there is no reason that +an RPC should be restricted to accepting connections as a single +authenticated service name. However, access control decisions may be +based on the service name a client authenticated to, so that +information must be available to the application server. + +Figure \ref{fig:svc-req} shows the modified service request structure +that contains a single new field, rq_svccred. Like rq_clntcred, the +authentication flavor is responsible for setting rq_svccred to the +``cooked'' service credentials associated with a given RPC call. +Authentication flavors that do not have the concept of service names +can of course leave this field blank. + +\begin{figure}[htbp] +\begin{verbatim} +struct svc_req { + u_long rq_prog; /* service program number */ + u_long rq_vers; /* service protocol version */ + u_long rq_proc; /* the desired procedure */ + struct opaque_auth rq_cred; /* raw creds from the wire */ + caddr_t rq_clntcred; /* read only cooked client cred */ + caddr_t rq_svccred; /* read only cooked svc cred */ + SVCXPRT *rq_xprt; /* associated transport */ +}; +\end{verbatim} +\caption{The modified svc_req structure, with the rq_svccred field.} +\label{fig:svc-req} +\end{figure} + + + +\subsection{Authentication Negotiation, no_dispatch} + +In order to avoid having to transmit a full set of authentication +information with every call, the service-side authentication mechanism +must save state between calls. Establishing that state may require +multiple messages between the client-side and service-side +authentication mechanisms. The client-side authentication mechanism +can make arbitrary RPC calls to the server simply by requiring the +programmer to specify the CLIENT structure to the authentication +flavor initialization routine. The service side, however, is more +complex. In the normal course of events, an RPC call comes in, is +authenticated, and is then dispatched to the appropriate procedure. +For client- and service-side authentication flavors to communicate +indepedent of the server implemented above the RPC layer, the +service-side flavor must be able to send a reply to the client +directly and {\it prevent} the call from being dispatched. + +This is implemented by a simple modification to the _authenticate +routine, which dispatches each RPC call to the appropriate +authentication flavor; see figure \ref{fig:authenticate}. It takes an +additional argument, no_dispatch, that instructs the mechanism not to +dispatch the RPC call to the specified procedure. + +\begin{figure}[htbp] +\begin{verbatim} + why=_authenticate(&r, &msg, &no_dispatch); + if (why != AUTH_OK) { + svcerr_auth(xprt, why); + goto call_done; + } else if (no_dispatch) { + goto call_done; + } +\end{verbatim} +\caption{A call to the modified _authenticate.} +\label{fig:authenticate} +\end{figure} + +If _authenticate sets no_dispatch to true, the call is considered +finished and no procedure dispatch takes place. Presumably, an +authentication flavor that sets no_dispatch to true also replies to +the RPC call with svc_sendreply. Authentication flavors that do not +modify no_dispatch implicitly leave it set to false, so the normal +dispatch takes place. + +\subsection{Affected Files} + +Table \ref{tab:modfiles} lists the files that were +affected for each of the modifications described in previous sections. + +\begin{table}[htbp] +\centering +\caption{Files modified for each change to Sun RPC.} +\label{tab:modfiles} +\begin{tabular}{ll} +AUTH structure & auth.h \\ + & auth_none.c \\ + & auth_exit.c \\ + & auth_any.c \\ +Client Transport Mechanisms & clnt_udp.c \\ + & clnt_tcp.c \\ +SVCAUTH and XPRT structures & rpc.h \\ + & svc.h \\ + & svc_auth.h \\ + & svc.c \\ + & svc_auth.c \\ + & svc_auth_any.c \\ + & svc_auth_unix.c \\ +Server Transport Mechanisms & svc_udp.c \\ + & svc_tcp.c +\end{tabular} +\end{table} + +\section{GSS-API Authentication Flavor} + +The following sections describe the implemetation of the GSS-API +authentication flavor for Sun RPC. + +\subsection{Authentication Algorithms} +\label{sec:algorithms} + +\subsubsection{Context Initiation} + +The client creates a GSS-API context with the server each time it +calls auth_gssapi_create. The context is created using the standard +gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context function calls. The +generated tokens are passed between the client and server as arguments +and results of normal RPC calls. + +The client side, in auth_gssapi_create, performs the following steps +to initiate a context: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item\label{item:process-token} The client calls gss_init_sec_context. +On the first such call, no input token is provided; on subsequent +calls, the token received from the server is provided. + +\item If gss_init_sec_context produces an output token: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item The client transmits the token to the server, identifying itself +with client_handle if it has already been received (see next step). +The return value from the server will contain a client_handle and one +or both of a token and a signed initial sequence number. + +\item If this is the first response from the server, the client_handle +is stored for subsequent calls. Otherwise, the client_handle should be +the same as returned on the previous call. + +\item If the response contains a signed initian sequence number but +the context is not yet established, then the response also contains a +token that will established the context. The signed initial sequence +number is stored. + +\item If the response contains a token, step \ref{item:process-token} +repeated. +\end{enumerate} + +\item The signed initial sequence number is verified using the +established context. +\end{enumerate} + +The server side, in _svcauth_gssapi, performs the following steps to +initiate a context: + +\begin{enumerate} +\item If a call arrives with no client_handle, a new client_handle is +allocated and stored in the database. Otherwise, the client's +previous state is is looked up in the database. + +\item The received token is passed to gss_accept_sec_context. If an +output token is generated, it is returned to the client. Note that +since the application server may have registered multiple service +names and there is no way to determine {\it a priori} which service a +token is for, _svcauth_gssapi calls gss_accept_sec_context once for +each registered credential until one of them succeedes. The code +assumes that GSS_S_FAILURE is the only error that can result from a +credential mismatch, so any other error terminates the loop +immediately. + +\item If the context is established, the server signs an initial +sequence number and returns it to the client. +\end{enumerate} + +Note that these algorithms require context establishment to be +synchronous. If gss_init_sec_context returns GSS_S_COMPLETE upon +processing a token, it will either produce a token or not. If it +does, then gss_accept_sec_context will return GSS_S_COMPLETE when that +token is processed; if it does not, then gss_accept_sec_context +already returned GSS_S_COMPLETE (and presumably returned the token +that caused gss_init_sec_context to return GSS_S_COMPLETE when +processed). The reverse is also true. + +\subsubsection{RPC Calls} + +After the GSS-API context is established, both the server and the +client posess a client handle and a corresponding sequence number. +Each call from the client contains the client handle as the +``credential'' so that the server can identify which context to apply +to the call. + +Each client call and server response includes a ``verifier'' that +contains the sealed current sequence number.\footnote{In a future +version, the verifier will also contain a signature block for the call +header, including the procedure number called.} The sequence number +prevents replay attacks\footnote{Although some GSS-API mechanisms +provide replay detection themselves, not all of them do; explicitly +including the sequence number in the RPC therefore provides better +end-to-end security}, but by itself it does not prevent splicing +attacks. + +Each procedure argument and result block consists of the current +sequence number and the actual serialized argument string, all sealed +with gss_seal. Combining the sequence number with the argument/result +data prevents splicing attacks. + +The sequence number is incremented by one for each RPC call and by one +for each response. The client and server will both reject messages +that do not contain the expected sequence number. Packets +retransmitted by the client should use the {\it same} sequence number +as the original packet, since even if the server receives multiple +copies only one will be honored. + +\subsection{RPC Call Credential Structure} + +Every message transmitted from the client to the server has a +credentials (cb_cred) field of the type auth_gssapi_creds: + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _auth_gssapi_creds { + bool_t auth_msg; + gss_buffer_desc client_handle; +}; +\end{verbatim} + +The auth_msg field indicates whether the message is intended for the +authentication mechanism for the actual server. Any message whose +auth_msg field is true is processed by the authentication mechanism; +any message whose auth_msg is false is passed to the application +server's dispatch function if authentication suceeds. All messages +must have an auth_msg of true until the context is established, since +authentication cannot succeed until it is. + +The client_handle field contains the client handle obtained from the +first call to the server. On the first call, this field is empty. + +\subsection{GSS-API Authentication Flavor Procedures} + +The GSS-API authentication flavor uses standard RPC calls over the +client handle it is provided for the interactions described in +\ref{sec:algorithms}. All of the following procedures require the +auth_msg field in the credentials to be true; otherwise, the +server-side authentication flavor will simply attempt to authenticate +the caller and pass the call to the application server. The +server-side authentication flavor uses the no_dispatch variable to +indicate that it has handled the call. + +\subsubsection{AUTH_GSSAPI_INIT, AUTH_GSSAPI_CONTINUE_INIT} + +Context initiation is performed via AUTH_GSSAPI_INIT and +AUTH_GSSAPI_CONTINUE_INIT. The former is used to transfer the first +token generated by gss_init_sec_context, when no client handle is +included in the credentials; the latter is used on subsequent calls, +when a client handle is included. + +Both procedures take an argument of type auth_gssapi_init_arg and +return results of the type auth_gssapi_init_res. + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _auth_gssapi_init_arg { + u_long version; + gss_buffer_desc token; +} auth_gssapi_init_arg; +\end{verbatim} + +\begin{description} +\item[version] Three versions are presently defined. + +\begin{description} +\item[1] The original version, as described in this document + +\item[2] In earlier versions of Secure there was a bug in the GSS-API +library that affected the contents of accept_sec_context output +tokens. A client specifies version 2 to indicate that it expects the +correct (fixed) behavior. If the server indicates AUTH_BADCRED or +AUTH_FAILED it does not understand this version, so the client should +fall back to version 1. + +\item[3] Version three indicates that channel bindings are in use. +The client must specify channel bindings with the version, and the +server will as well. If the server indicates AUTH_BADCRED or +AUTH_FAILED it does not understand this version, so the client should +fall back to version 2 (and cease specifying channel bindings). + +\item[4] The previous versions all used the old GSS-API krb5 mechanism +oid; this version uses the new one specified in the RFC. +\end{description} + +\item[token] The token field contains the token generated by +gss_init_sec_context. +\end{description} + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _auth_gssapi_init_res { + u_long version; + gss_buffer_desc client_handle; + gss_buffer_desc token; + OM_uint32 gss_major, gss_minor; + gss_buffer_desc signed_isn; +} auth_gssapi_init_res; +\end{verbatim} + +\begin{description} +\item[version] There are two versions currently defined. +\begin{description} +\item[1] The original version, as described in this document. This is +the response version for {\it both} versions 1 and 2. The Secure 1.1 +server will always return this version. + +\item[3] Version three indicates that the server specified channel +bindings in response to a call arg version number of three. The +server must not specify this version unless the client does. +\end{description} + +\item[client_handle] The client_handle field contains the client +handle that the client must use in the credentials field in all +subsequent RPC calls. In response to AUTH_GSSAPI_CONTINUE_INIT, it is +the same client handle that arrived in the credentials. + +\item[gss_major, gss_minor] The GSS-API error codes that resulted from +processing the auth_gssapi_init_arg. If gss_major is GSS_S_COMPLETE, +the argument token was processed successfully. Otherwise, gss_major +and gss_minor contain the relevant major and minor status codes, and +the context currently being negotiated is no longer valid. + +\item[token] In any response that the client is expecting another +token (i.e.: gss_init_sec_context last returned GSS_S_CONTINUE), the +token field contains the output token from gss_accept_sec_context. If +the client is not expecting a token and this field is not empty, an +error has occurred. + +\item[signed_isn] If the client is not expecting another token (i.e.: +the previous call to gss_init_sec_context yielded a token and returned +GSS_S_COMPLETE) or the supplied token completes the context, the +signed_isn field contains the signed initial sequence number. The +server expects the first RPC call to have a sequence number one +greater than the initial sequence number (so that the signed_isn block +cannot be replayed). If the client is expecting another token and the +signed_isn field is not empty, an error has occurred. +\end{description} + +\subsubsection{AUTH_GSSAPI_DESTROY} + +Context tear-down is performed via AUTH_GSSAPI_DESTROY. This +procedure takes no arguments and returns no results; it merely informs +the server that the client wishes to destroy the established context. + +When a client wishes to tear down an established context between +itself and a server, auth_gssapi_destroy first calls the +AUTH_GSSAPI_DESTROY procedure. The server authenticates the message +and immediately sends a ``success'' response with no results. The +client and server then both independently call gss_delete_sec_context +and discard the context-destruction token that is generated. + +No RPC error checking is performed by either the client or the server. +The client waits a brief time for a success response from the server, +but if none arrives it destroys the context anyway since presumably +the user is waiting for the application to exit. The server similar +ignores any RPC errors since it knows that the client will ignore any +errors that are reported. + +\subsection{RPC Call Authentication Implementation} + +Once the context has been established, all subsequent RPC calls are +authenticated via the verifier described in section +\ref{sec:algorithms}. + +auth_gssapi_marshall, invoked via AUTH_MARSHALL while the RPC call is +being created on the client side, serializes the client_handle +obtained during context initiation {\it in plaintext} as the +credentials and serializes the current sequence number, sealed with +gss_seal, as the verifier. + +auth_gssapi_wrap, invoked next via AUTH_WRAP, serializes a sealed +token containing both the sequence number of the current call and the +serialized arguments. + +_svcauth_gssapi, invoked on the server side by _authenticate, uses the +client_handle contained in the credentials to look up the correct +context and verifies the sequence number provided in the verifier; if +the sequence number is not correct, it declares a potential replay +attack.\footnote{Retransmitted packets will appear as replay attacks, +of course.} The response verifier is set to the serialized sealed +incremented sequence number. + +svc_auth_gssapi_unwrap, invoked when either the application server or +_svcauth_gssapi (in response to an AUTH_GSSAPI authentication flavor +message) attempts to read its arguments, deserialzes and unseals the +block containing the current sequence number and serialized arguments. +If the sequence number is incorrect, it declares a splicing attack; +otherwise, it unserializes the arguments into the original structure. + +svc_auth_gssapi_wrap, invoked when either the application server or +_svcauth_gssapi attempts to write its response, performs the same +operation as auth_gssapi_wrap. + +auth_gssapi_validate, invoked by the client-side RPC mechanism when +an RPC_SUCCESS response is received, verifies that the returned sequence +number is one greater than the previous value sent by +auth_gssapi_marshall. + +Finally, auth_gssapi_unwrap, invokved by the client-side RPC mechanism +after auth_gssapi_validate succeeds, performs the same operation as +svc_auth_gssapi_unwrap. + +If an RPC request generates an error message (a status of other than +RPC_SUCCESS), auth_gssapi_refresh is called. If the error status is +AUTH_REJECTEDVERF, then the server rejected the sequence number as +invalid or replayed. The client guesses that, on some previous call, +the server received a message but the server's response did not make +it back to the client; this could happen if the packet got lost or if +the server was being debugged and the client timed out waiting for it. +As a result, the server is expected a higher sequence number than the +client sent. auth_gssapi_refresh increments the sequence number and +returns true so that the call will be tried again. The transport +mechanism will only call auth_gssapi_refresh twice for each RPC +request, so if some other error occurred an infinite loop will not +result; however, it is unlikely the the client and server will be able +to resynchronize after such an event. + +\subsection{Client State Information} + +The client-side GSS-API authentication flavor maintains an +auth_gssapi_data structure for each authentication instance: + +\begin{verbatim} +struct auth_gssapi_data { + bool_t established; + CLIENT *clnt; + gss_ctx_id_t context; + gss_buffer_desc client_handle; + u_long seq_num; + int def_cred; + + /* pre-serialized ah_cred */ + u_char cred_buf[MAX_AUTH_BYTES]; + u_long cred_len; +}; +\end{verbatim} + +The established field indicates whether the authentication context +between the client and server has been established. It is set to true +when gss_init_sec_context returns GSS_S_COM\-PLETE. When this field is +false, the auth_gssapi functions marshall, validate, wrap, and unwrap +mimic the ``no authentication'' flavor since there is no context with +which to perform authentication functions.\footnote{This field is +necessary because, when auth_gssapi_create calls clnt_call to make an +RPC call, it has to have set the client's authentication flavor to +AUTH_GSSAPI; otherwise, the service-side RPC mechanism will not know +to dispatch the call to _svcauth_gssapi. However, with the client's +authentication flavor set, all of the authentication flavor's +functions will be automatically invoked, even though they are not +ready to operate.} + +The clnt field contains the RPC client structure that can be used to +communicate with the GSS-API authentication flavor on the server. + +The context field contains the context structure created by +gss_init_sec_context. + +The client_handle field contains the client handle used on all RPC +calls except the first one; the handle is obtained as the result of +the first call. + +The sequence_number field contains the sequence number that will be +used when transmitting RPC calls to the server and verifing the +server's responses after the context is initialized. + +The def_cred field is true if gss_init_sec_context created a default +credential, in which case the authentication mechanism is responsible +for releasing the default credential that gets automatically +allocated. + +The cred_buf and cred_len fields contain the pre-serialized +credentials structure used in each call. This provides a small +performance enhancement since the credentials structure does not +change very often; the same pre-serialized version can be used on +virtually every call. + +\subsection{Server State Information} +\label{sec:server-state} + +The server-side GSS-API authentication flavor maintains an +svcauth_gssapi_data structure for each established or partially +established context: + +\begin{verbatim} +typedef struct _svc_auth_gssapi_data { + bool_t established; + gss_ctx_id_t context; + gss_name_t client_name, server_name; + gss_cred_id_t server_creds; + + u_long expiration; + u_long seq_num; + u_long key; + + SVCAUTH svcauth; +} svc_auth_gssapi_data; +\end{verbatim} + +The established field indicates whether the context is fully +established. + +The context field contains the context created by +gss_accept_sec_context. + +The client_name field contains the client's authenticated name, as +returned by gss_accept_sec_context. _svcauth_gssapi sets the ``cooked +credentials'' field of the RPC call structure to this value after the +call is authenticated; the application server can use it to perform +authorization. + +The server_name field contains the service name that the client +established a context with. This is useful if the application server +registered more than one service name with the library; it allows the +server to determine which service the client chose. + +The server_creds field contains the service credentials that the +client established a context with. It is used to avoid having to scan +through the server_creds_list multiple times in the case that context +establishment requires more than one round-trip to the server. + +The expiration field contains the expiration time of the context, as a +Unix timestamp. If a context has no expiration (time_rec is +GSS_C_INDEFINITE), the expiration time is set to 24 hours in the +future. When the structure is created, before the context is +established, the expiration time is initialized to small duration +(currently 5 minutes) so that partially created and abandoned contexts +will be expired quickly. + +The seq_num field is the current sequence number for the client. + +The key field is the client's key into the hash table (see below). +The client_handle field sent to the client is the key treated as an +arbitrary four-byte string. + +The svcauth field is a kludge that allows the svc_auth_gssapi +functions to access the per-client data structure while processing a +call. One SVCAUTH structure is allocated for each client structure, +and the svc_ah_private field is set to the corresponding client. The +client's svcauth field is then set to the new SVCAUTH structure, so +that client_data->svcauth->svc_ah_private == client_data. As each +request is processed, the transport mechanism's xp_auth field is set +to the client's svcauth field; thus, the server-side functions that +dispatch to server-side authentication flavors can access an +appropriate SVCAUTH structure, and the server-side authentication +function that is called can determine the appropriate per-client +structure from the SVCAUTH structure. + +The per-client structures are all stored both in a BSD 4.4 db library +hash table and b-tree. The hash table maps client handles (key +fields) the client structures, and is used to look up client +structures based on the client_handle field of a call's credentials +structure. The b-tree stores the client structures as keys, sorted by +their expiration time. Each time _svcauth_gssapi is activated, it +traverses the tree and destroys all client structures that have +expired. + +\end{document} diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/thread-safe.txt b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/thread-safe.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2aa49cf73 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/thread-safe.txt @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +[May be out of date. Last significant update: Jan 2005.] + +In general, it's assumed that the library initialization function (if +initialization isn't delayed) and the library finalization function +are run in some thread-safe fashion, with no other parts of the +library in question in use. (If dlopen or dlsym in one thread starts +running the initializer, and then dlopen/dlsym in another thread +returns and lets you start accessing functions or data in the library +before the initializer is finished, that really seems like a +dlopen/dlsym bug.) + +It's also assumed that if library A depends on library B, then library +B's initializer runs first, and its finalizer last, whether loading +dynamically at run time or at process startup/exit. (It appears that +AIX 4.3.3 may violate this, at least when we use gcc's +constructor/destructor attributes in shared libraries.) + +Support for freeing the heap storage allocated by a library has NOT, +in general, been written. There are hooks, but often they ignore some +of the library's local storage, mutexes, etc. + +If shared library finalization code doesn't get run at all at dlclose +time, or if we can't use it because the execution order is wrong, then +you'll get memory leaks. Deal with it. + +Several debugging variables that are not part of our official API are +not protected by mutexes. In general, the only way to set them is by +changing the sources and recompiling, which obviously has no run-time +thread safety issues, or by stopping the process under a debugger, +which we blithely assert is "safe enough". + +Debug code that we don't normally enable may be less thread safe than +might be desired. For example, multiple printf calls may be made, +with the assumption that the output will not be intermixed with output +from some other thread. Offhand, I'm not aware of any cases where +debugging code is "really" unsafe, as in likely to crash the program +or produce insecure results. + +Various libraries may call assert() and abort(). This should only be +for "can't happen" cases, and indicate programming errors. In some +cases, the compiler may be able to infer that the "can't happen" cases +really can't happen, and drop the calls, but in many cases, this is +not possible. + +There are cases (e.g., in the com_err library) where errors arising +when dealing with other errors are handled by calling abort, for lack +of anything better. We should probably clean those up someday. + +Various libraries call getenv(). This is perfectly safe, as long as +nothing is calling setenv or putenv or what have you, while multiple +threads are executing. Of course, that severely curtails the ability +to control our libraries through that "interface". + +Various libraries call the ctype functions/macros (isupper, etc). It +is assumed that the program does not call setlocale, or does so only +while the program is still single-threaded or while calls into the +Kerberos libraries are not in progress. + +The Windows thread safety support is unfinished. + +I'm assuming that structure fields that are never written to (e.g., +after a structure has been initialized and *then* made possibly +visible to multiple threads) are safe to read from one thread while +another field is being updated by another thread. If that's not the +case, some more work is needed (and I'd like details on why it's not +safe). + +---------------- + +libcom_err + +Issues: + +The callback hook support (set_com_err_hook, reset_com_err_hook, and +calls to com_err and com_err_va) uses a mutex to protect the handle on +the hook function. As a side effect of this, if a callback function +is registered which pops up a window and waits for the users' +acknowledgement, then other errors cannot be reported by other threads +until after the acknowledgement. This could be fixed with +multiple-reader-one-writer type locks, but that's a bit more +complicated. + +The string returned by error_message may be per-thread storage. It +can be passed off between threads, but it shouldn't be in use by any +thread by the time the originating thread calls error_message again. + +Error tables must no longer be in use (including pointers returned by +error_message) when the library containing them is unloaded. + +Temporary: A flag variable has been created in error_message.c which +is used to try to catch cases where remove_error_table is called after +the library finalization function. This generally indicates +out-of-order execution of the library finalization functions. The +handling of this flag is not thread-safe, but if the finalization +function is called, other threads should in theory be finished with +this library anyways. + +Statics: error_message.c, com_err.c, covered above. + +---------------- + +libprofile (and its use in libkrb5) + +Does no checks to see if it's opened multiple instances of the same +file under different names. Does not guard against trying to open a +file while another thread or process is in the process of replacing +it, or two threads trying to update a file at the same time. The +former should be pretty safe on UNIX with atomic rename, but on +Windows there's a race condition; there's a window (so to speak) where +the filename does not correspond to an actual file. + +Statics: prof_file.c, a list of opened config files and their parse +trees, and a mutex to protect it. + +---------------- + +libk5crypto + +Uses of the Yarrow code from the krb5 crypto interface are protected +by a single mutex. Initialization of the Yarrow state will be done +once, the first time these routines are called. Calls directly to the +Yarrow functions are not protected. + +Uses ctype macros; what happens if the locale is changed in a +multi-threaded program? + +Debug var in pbkdf2.c. + +Statics: pbkdf2.c: debug variable. + +Statics: prng.c: Global Yarrow data and mutex. + +Statics: crypto_libinit.c: library initializer aux data. + +---------------- + +libkrb5 + +(TBD) + +Uses: ctype macros + +Uses: getaddrinfo, getnameinfo. According to current specifications, +getaddrinfo should be thread-safe; some implementations are not, and +we're not attempting to figure out which ones. NetBSD 1.6, for +example, had an unsafe implementation. + +Uses: res_ninit, res_nsearch. If these aren't available, the non-'n' +versions will be used, and they are sometimes not thread-safe. + +Uses: mkstemp, mktemp -- Are these, or our uses of them, likely to be +thread-safe? + +Uses: sigaction + +The use of sigaction is in the code prompting for a password; we try +to catch the keyboard interrupt character being used and turn it into +an error return from that function. THIS IS NOT THREAD-SAFE. + +Uses: tcgetattr, tcsetattr. This is also in the password-prompting +code. These are fine as long as no other threads are accessing the +same terminal at the same time. + +Uses: fopen. This is thread-safe, actually, but a multi-threaded +server is likely to be using lots of file descriptors. On 32-bit +Solaris platforms, fopen will not work if the next available file +descriptor number is 256 or higher. This can cause the keytab code to +fail. + +Statics: prompter.c: interrupt flag + +Statics: ccdefops.c: default operations table pointer + +Statics: ktdefname.c: variable to override default keytab name, NO +LOCKING. DON'T TOUCH THESE VARIABLES, at least in threaded programs. + +Statics: conv_creds.c: debug variable + +Statics: sendto_kdc.c: debug variable, in export list for KDC + +Statics: parse.c: default realm cache, changed to not cache + +Statics: krb5_libinit.c: lib init aux data + +Statics: osconfig.c: various internal variables, probably should be const + +Statics: init_ctx.c: "brand" string; not written. + +Statics: cc_memory.c: list of caches, with mutex. + +Statics: c_ustime.c: last timestamp, to implement "microseconds must +always increment" + +Statics: ktbase.c, ccbase.c, rc_base.c: type registries and mutexes. + +---------------- + +libgssapi_krb5 + +(TBD) + +Uses: ctype macros + +Statics: acquire_cred.c: name of keytab to use, and mutex. + +Statics: gssapi_krb5.c: + +Statics: init_sec_context.c: + +Statics: set_ccache.c: + +Statics: gssapi_generic.c: OID definitions, non-const by +specification. We probably could make them const anyways. + +The keytab name saved away by krb5_gss_register_acceptor_identity is +global and protected by a mutex; the ccache name stored by +gss_krb5_ccache_name is per-thread. This inconsistency is due to the +anticipated usage patterns. + +The old ccache name returned by gss_krb5_ccache_name if the last +parameter is not a null pointer is also stored per-thread, and will be +discarded at the next call to that routine from the same thread, or at +thread termination. + +Needs work: check various objects for thread safety + +---------------- + +libgssrpc + +New version is in place. Ignore it for now? + +---------------- + +libkadm5* +libkdb5 + +Skip these for now. We may want the KDC libraries to be thread-safe +eventually, so the KDC can take better advantage of hyperthreaded or +multiprocessor systems. + +---------------- + +libapputils +libss + +Used by single-threaded programs only (but see above re KDC). Don't +bother for now. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/threads.txt b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/threads.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..956fb9ed0 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/threads.txt @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +Thread safety in the MIT Kerberos libraries + +The return value from krb5_cc_default_name is a handle on internal +storage from the krb5_context. It is valid only until +krb5_cc_set_default_name or krb5_free_context is called. If +krb5_cc_set_default_name may be called, the calling code must ensure +that the storage returned by krb5_cc_default_name is no longer in use +by that time. + +Any use of krb5_context must be confined to one thread at a time by +the application code. + +Uses of credentials caches, replay caches, and keytabs may happen in +multiple threads simultaneously as long as none of them destroys the +object while other threads may still be using it. (Any internal data +modification in those objects will be protected by mutexes or other +means, within the krb5 library.) + +The simple, exposed data structures in krb5.h like krb5_principal are +not protected; they should not be used in one thread while another +thread might be modifying them. (TO DO: Build a list of which calls +keep references to supplied data or return references to +otherwise-referenced data, as opposed to everything making copies.) + + + +[ This part is a little outdated already. ] + + // Between these two, we should be able to do pure compile-time + // and pure run-time initialization. + // POSIX: partial initializer is PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, + // finish does nothing + // Windows: partial initializer is zero/empty, + // finish does the actual work and runs at load time + // debug: partial initializer sets one magic value, + // finish verifies, sets a new magic value + k5_mutex_t foo_mutex = K5_MUTEX_PARTIAL_INITIALIZER; + int k5_mutex_finish_init(k5_mutex_t *); + // for dynamic allocation + int k5_mutex_init(k5_mutex_t *); + // Must work for both kinds of allocation, even if it means adding + // a flag. + int k5_mutex_destroy(k5_mutex_t *); + // + // Per library, one function to finish the static mutex + // initialization. + // + // A second function called at various possible "first" entry + // points which either calls pthread_once on the first function + // (POSIX), or checks some flag set by the first function (Windows, + // debug support), and possibly returns an error. + // + // A third function for library termination calls mutex_destroy on + // each mutex for the library. + // + // + int k5_mutex_lock(k5_mutex_t *); + int k5_mutex_unlock(k5_mutex_t *); + // Optional (always defined, but need not do anything): + void k5_mutex_assert_locked(k5_mutex_t *); + void k5_mutex_assert_unlocked(k5_mutex_t *); + + + k5_key_t key; + int k5_key_create(k5_key_t *, void (*destructor)(void *)); + void *k5_getspecific(k5_key_t); + int k5_setspecific(k5_key_t, const void *); + ... stuff to signal library termination ... + +This is **NOT** an exported interface, and is subject to change. + +On many platforms with weak reference support, we can declare certain +symbols to be weak, and test the addresses before calling them. The +references generally will be non-null if the application pulls in the +pthread support. Sometimes stubs are present in the C library for +some of these routines, and sometimes they're not functional; if so, +we need to figure out which ones, and check for the presence of some +*other* routines. + +AIX 4.3.3 doesn't support weak references. However, it looks like +calling dlsym(NULL) causes the pthread library to get loaded, so we're +going to just go ahead and link against it anyways. + +On Tru64 we also link against the thread library always. + + +For now, the basic model is: + + If weak references are supported, use them. + Else, assume support is present; if that means explicitly pulling in + the thread library, so be it. + + + +The locking described above may not be sufficient, at least for good +performance. At some point we may want to switch to read/write locks, +so multiple threads can grovel over a data structure at once as long +as they don't change it. + + +See also notes in src/include/k5-thread.h. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/README b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/README new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4bed11b0f --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/README @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +How to deploy the Doxygen output in Sphinx project. +==================================================== + +The text below is meant to give the instructions on how to incorporate MIT Kerberos API reference documentation into Sphinx document hierarchy. The Sphinx API documentation can be constructed with (Part B) or without (Part A) the bridge to the original Doxygen HTML output. + +Pre-requisites: +- python 2.5+ with Cheetah, lxml and xml extension modules installed; +- For part B only: + - Sphinx "doxylink" extension; + - Doxygen HTML output + + +Part A: Transforming Doxygen XML output into reStructuredText (rst) without the bridge to Doxygen HTML output. + +1. Delete lines containing text "Doxygen reference" from the template files func_document.tmpl and type_document.tmpl; + +2. In the Doxygen configuration file set GENERATE_XML to YES. Generate Doxygen XML output; + +3. Suppose the Doxygen XML output is located in doxy_xml_dir and the desired output directory is rst_dir. + Run: + python doxy.py -i doxy_xml_dir -o rst_dir -t func + This will result in the storing of the API function documentation files in rst format in the rst_dir. The file names are constructed based on the function name. For example, the file for krb5_build_principal() will be krb5_build_principal.rst + + Run: + python doxy.py -i doxy_xml_dir -o rst_dir -t typedef + It is similar to the API function conversion, but for data types. The result will be stored under rst_dir/types directory + + Alternatively, running + python doxy.py -i doxy_xml_dir -o rst_dir + or + python doxy.py -i doxy_xml_dir -o rst_dir -t all + converts Doxygen XML output into reStructuredText format files both for API functions and data types; + +4. In appdev/index.rst add the following section to point to the API references: + + .. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + refs/index.rst + +5. Copy the content of rst_dir into appdev/refs/api/ directory and rst_dir/types into appdev/refs/types directory; + +6. Rebuild Sphinx source: + sphinx-build source_dir build_dir + + + + +Part B: Bridge to Doxygen HTML output. + +1. Transform Doxygen XML output into reStructuredText. + In src/Doxygen configuration file request generation of the tag file and XML output: + GENERATE_TAGFILE = krb5doxy.tag + GENERATE_XML = YES + +2. Modify Sphinx conf.py file to point to the "doxylink" extension and Doxygen tag file: + extensions = ['sphinx.ext.autodoc', 'sphinxcontrib.doxylink'] + doxylink = { ' krb5doxy' : ('/tmp/krb5doxy.tag, ' doxy_html_dir ') } + + where doxy_html_dir is the location of the Doxygen HTML output + +3. Continue with steps 3 - 6 of Part A. diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/define_document.tmpl b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/define_document.tmpl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ca56d866c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/define_document.tmpl @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.. highlightlang:: c + +.. $composite.macro_reference($composite.name): + +#set $title = $composite.name +$title +#echo ''.join(['=']*len($title)) # + +.. +.. data:: $composite.name +.. + +#if $composite.short_description is not None and len($composite.short_description) +$composite.short_description +#end if + +$composite.long_description + +#if $composite.name_signature is not None and len($composite.name_signature) +#echo ''.join(['=']*(len($composite.name_signature)+4)) + '== ======================' # +``$composite.name_signature`` ``$composite.initializer`` +#echo ''.join(['=']*(len($composite.name_signature)+4)) + '== ======================' # +#else +#echo ''.join(['=']*(len($composite.name)+4)) + '=== ======================' # +``$composite.name`` ``$composite.initializer`` +#echo ''.join(['=']*(len($composite.name)+4)) + '=== ======================' # +#end if diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/docmodel.py b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/docmodel.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e5d4d11bc --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/docmodel.py @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +''' + Copyright 2011 by the Massachusetts + Institute of Technology. All Rights Reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may + require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label + your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a + fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software. + M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. +''' +import re + +from Cheetah.Template import Template + +class Attribute(object): + def __init__(self, **argkw): + self.definition = argkw.get('definition') + self.name = argkw.get('name') + self.type = argkw.get('type') + self.typeId = argkw.get('typeId') + self.short_description = argkw.get('short_description') + self.long_description = argkw.get('long_description') + self.version = argkw.get('version') + + def __repr__(self): + result = list() + for (attr,value) in self.__dict__.iteritems(): + result.append('%s=%s' % (attr,value)) + return 'Attribute: %s' % ','.join(result) + + +class CompositeType(): + def __init__(self, **argkw): + self.category = 'composite' + self.definition = argkw.get('definition') + self.name = argkw.get('name') + self.name_signature = argkw.get('name_signature') + self.Id = argkw.get('Id') + self.initializer = argkw.get('initializer') + self.active = argkw.get('active', False) + self.version = argkw.get('version') + self.return_type = argkw.get('return_type') + self.short_description = argkw.get('short_description') + self.long_description = argkw.get('long_description') + self.friends = argkw.get('friends') + self.type = argkw.get('type') + self.attributes = self._setAttributes(argkw.get('attributes')) + + def __repr__(self): + result = list() + for (attr,value) in self.__dict__.iteritems(): + if attr == 'attributes': + if value is not None: + attributes = ['%s' % a for a in value] + value = '\n %s' % '\n '.join(attributes) + + result.append('%s: %s' % (attr,value)) + result = '\n'.join(result) + + return result + + def _setAttributes(self, attributes): + result = None + if attributes is not None: + result = list() + for a in attributes: + result.append(Attribute(**a)) + + return result + + def struct_reference(self, name): + result = re.sub(r'_', '-', name) + result = '_%s-struct' % result + + return result + + def macro_reference(self, name): + result = re.sub(r'_', '-', name) + result = '_%s-data' % result + + return result + +class Parameter(object): + def __init__(self, **argkw): + self.seqno = argkw.get('seqno') + self.name = argkw.get('name') + self.direction = argkw.get('direction') + self.type = argkw.get('type') + self.typeId = argkw.get('typeId') + self.description = argkw.get('description') + self.version = argkw.get('version') + + def __repr__(self): + content = (self.name,self.direction,self.seqno,self.type,self.typeId,self.description) + return 'Parameter: name=%s,direction=%s,seqno=%s,type=%s,typeId=%s,descr=%s' % content + +class Function(object): + def __init__(self, **argkw): + self.category = 'function' + self.name = argkw.get('name') + self.Id = argkw.get('Id') + self.active = argkw.get('active', False) + self.version = argkw.get('version') + self.parameters = self._setParameters(argkw.get('parameters')) + self.return_type = argkw.get('return_type') + self.return_description = argkw.get('return_description') + self.retval_description = argkw.get('retval_description') + self.warn_description = argkw.get('warn_description') + self.sa_description = argkw.get('sa_description') + self.notes_description = argkw.get('notes_description') + self.version_num = argkw.get('version_num') + self.short_description = argkw.get('short_description') + self.long_description = argkw.get('long_description') + self.deprecated_description = argkw.get('deprecated_description') + self.friends = argkw.get('friends') + + def _setParameters(self, parameters): + result = None + if parameters is not None: + result = list() + for p in parameters: + result.append(Parameter(**p)) + + return result + + def getObjectRow(self): + result = [str(self.Id), + self.name, + self.category] + + return ','.join(result) + + def getObjectDescriptionRow(self): + result = [self.Id, + self.active, + self.version, + self.short_description, + self.long_description] + + return ','.join(result) + + def getParameterRows(self): + result = list() + for p in self.parameters: + p_row = [self.Id, + p.name, + p.seqno, + p.type, + p.typeId, + p.description, + p.version] + result.append(','.join(p_row)) + + return '\n'.join(result) + + def __repr__(self): + lines = list() + lines.append('Category: %s' % self.category) + lines.append('Function name: %s' % self.name) + lines.append('Function Id: %s' % self.Id) + parameters = [' %s' % p for p in self.parameters] + lines.append('Parameters:\n%s' % '\n'.join(parameters)) + lines.append('Function return type: %s' % self.return_type) + lines.append('Function return type description:\n%s' % self.return_description) + lines.append('Function retval description:\n%s' % self.retval_description) + lines.append('Function short description:\n%s' % self.short_description) + lines.append('Function long description:\n%s' % self.long_description) + lines.append('Warning description:\n%s' % self.warn_description) + lines.append('See also description:\n%s' % self.sa_description) + lines.append('NOTE description:\n%s' % self.notes_description) + lines.append('Version introduced:\n%s' % self.version_num) + lines.append('Deprecated description:\n%s' % self.deprecated_description) + result = '\n'.join(lines) + + return result + + +class DocModel(object): + def __init__(self, **argkw): + if len(argkw): + self.name = argkw['name'] + if argkw['category'] == 'function': + self.category = 'function' + self.function = Function(**argkw) + elif argkw['category'] == 'composite': + self.category = 'composite' + self.composite = CompositeType(**argkw) + + def __repr__(self): + obj = getattr(self,self.category) + return str(obj) + + def signature(self): + param_list = list() + for p in self.function.parameters: + if p.type is "... " : + param_list.append('%s %s' % (p.type,' ')) + else: + param_list.append('%s %s' % (p.type, p.name)) + param_list = ', '.join(param_list) + result = '%s %s(%s)' % (self.function.return_type, + self.function.name, param_list) + + return result + + def save(self, path, template_path): + f = open(template_path, 'r') + t = Template(f.read(),self) + out = open(path, 'w') + out.write(str(t)) + out.close() + f.close() + + +class DocModelTest(DocModel): + def __init__(self): + doc_path = '../docutil/example.yml' + argkw = yaml.load(open(doc_path,'r')) + super(DocModelTest,self).__init__(**argkw) + + def run_tests(self): + self.test_save() + + def test_print(self): + print('testing') + print(self) + + + def test_save(self): + template_path = '../docutil/function2edit.html' + + path = '/var/tsitkova/Sources/v10/trunk/documentation/test_doc.html' + + self.save(path, template_path) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + tester = DocModelTest() + tester.run_tests() diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxy.py b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxy.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c82f88eb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxy.py @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +''' + Copyright 2011 by the Massachusetts + Institute of Technology. All Rights Reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may + require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label + your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a + fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software. + M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. +''' +import sys +import os +import re +from optparse import OptionParser + + +from doxybuilder_types import * +from doxybuilder_funcs import * + + +def processOptions(): + usage = "\n\t\t%prog -t type -i in_dir -o out_dir" + description = "Description:\n\tProcess doxygen output for c-types and/or functions" + parser = OptionParser(usage=usage, description=description) + + parser.add_option("-t", "--type", type="string", dest="action_type", help="process typedef and/or function. Possible choices: typedef, func, all. Default: all.", default="all") + parser.add_option("-i", "--in", type="string", dest="in_dir", help="input directory") + parser.add_option("-o", "--out", type="string", dest= "out_dir", help="output directory. Note: The subdirectory ./types will be created for typedef") + + (options, args) = parser.parse_args() + action = options.action_type + in_dir = options.in_dir + out_dir = options.out_dir + + + if in_dir is None or out_dir is None: + parser.error("Input and output directories are required") + + if action == "all" or action == "typedef": + builder = DoxyBuilderTypes(in_dir, out_dir) + builder.run_all() + + if action == "all" or action == "func" or action == "function": + builder = DoxyBuilderFuncs(in_dir, out_dir) + builder.run_all() + + +if __name__ == '__main__': + parser = processOptions() + + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxybuilder_funcs.py b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxybuilder_funcs.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9a11977ae --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxybuilder_funcs.py @@ -0,0 +1,594 @@ +''' + Copyright 2011 by the Massachusetts + Institute of Technology. All Rights Reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may + require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label + your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a + fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software. + M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. +''' +import sys +import re + +from collections import defaultdict +from xml.sax import make_parser +from xml.sax.handler import ContentHandler +from docmodel import * + +exclude_funcs = ['krb5_free_octet_data'] + +class DocNode(object): + """ + Represents the structure of xml node. + """ + def __init__(self, name): + """ + @param node: name - the name of a node. + @param attributes: a dictionary populated with attributes of a node + @param children: a dictionary with lists of children nodes. Nodes + in lists are ordered as they appear in a document. + @param content: a content of xml node represented as a list of + tuples [(type,value)] with type = ['char'|'element']. + If type is 'char' then the value is a character string otherwise + it is a reference to a child node. + """ + self.name = name + self.content = list() + self.attributes = dict() + self.children = defaultdict(list) + + def walk(self, decorators, sub_ws, stack=[]): + result = list() + decorator = decorators.get(self.name, decorators['default']) + stack.append(decorators['default']) + decorators['default'] = decorator + + for (obj_type,obj) in self.content: + if obj_type == 'char': + if obj != '': + result.append(obj) + else: + partial = obj.walk(decorators,1, stack) + if partial is not None: + result.append(' %s ' % partial) + decorators['default'] = stack.pop() + result = decorator(self, ''.join(result)) + if result is not None: + if sub_ws == 1: + result = re.sub(r'[ ]+', r' ', result) + else: + result = result.strip() + + return result + + def getContent(self): + decorators = {'default': lambda node,value: value} + result = self.walk(decorators, 1) + if len(result) == 0: + result = None + + return result + + def __repr__(self): + result = ['Content: %s' % self.content] + + for (key,value) in self.attributes.iteritems(): + result.append('Attr: %s = %s' % (key,value)) + for (key,value) in self.children.iteritems(): + result.append('Child: %s,%i' % (key,len(value))) + + return '\n'.join(result) + +class DoxyContenHandler(ContentHandler): + def __init__(self, builder): + self.builder = builder + self.counters = defaultdict(int) + self._nodes = None + self._current = None + + def startDocument(self): + pass + + def endDocument(self): + import sys + + def startElement(self, name, attrs): + if name == self.builder.toplevel: + self._nodes = [] + + if name == 'memberdef': + kind = attrs.get('kind') + if kind is None: + raise ValueError('Kind is not defined') + self.counters[kind] += 1 + + if self._nodes is None: + return + + node = DocNode(name) + for (key,value) in attrs.items(): + node.attributes[key] = value + if self._current is not None: + self._current.children[name].append(node) + self._nodes.append(self._current) + self._current = node + + def characters(self, content): + + if self._current is not None: + self._current.content.append(('char',content.strip())) + + def endElement(self, name): + if name == self.builder.toplevel: + assert(len(self._nodes) == 0) + self._nodes = None + self.builder.document.append(self._current) + self._current = None + else: + if self._nodes is not None: + node = self._current + self._current = self._nodes.pop() + self._current.content.append(('element',node)) + + +class XML2AST(object): + """ + Translates XML document into Abstract Syntax Tree like representation + The content of document is stored in self.document + """ + def __init__(self, xmlpath, toplevel='doxygen'): + self.document = list() + self.toplevel = toplevel + self.parser = make_parser() + handler = DoxyContenHandler(self) + self.parser.setContentHandler(handler) + filename = 'krb5_8hin.xml' + filepath = '%s/%s' % (xmlpath,filename) + self.parser.parse(open(filepath,'r')) + + +class DoxyFuncs(XML2AST): + def __init__(self, path): + super(DoxyFuncs, self).__init__(path,toplevel='memberdef') + self.objects = list() + + def run(self): + for node in self.document: + self.process(node) + + def process(self, node): + node_type = node.attributes['kind'] + if node_type == 'function': + data = self._process_function_node(node) + else: + return + + if 'name' in data and data['name'] in exclude_funcs: + return + self.objects.append(DocModel(**data)) + + def save(self, templates, target_dir): + for obj in self.objects: + template_path = templates[obj.category] + outpath = '%s/%s.rst' % (target_dir,obj.name) + obj.save(outpath, template_path) + + + def _process_function_node(self, node): + f_name = node.children['name'][0].getContent() + f_Id = node.attributes['id'] + f_ret_type = self._process_type_node(node.children['type'][0]) + f_brief = node.children['briefdescription'][0].getContent() + f_detailed = node.children['detaileddescription'][0] + detailed_description = self._process_description_node(f_detailed) + return_value_description = self._process_return_value_description(f_detailed) + retval_description = self._process_retval_description(f_detailed) + warning_description = self._process_warning_description(f_detailed) + seealso_description = self._process_seealso_description(f_detailed) + notes_description = self._process_notes_description(f_detailed) + f_version = self._process_version_description(f_detailed) + deprecated_description = self._process_deprecated_description(f_detailed) + param_description_map = self.process_parameter_description(f_detailed) + f_definition = node.children['definition'][0].getContent() + f_argsstring = node.children['argsstring'][0].getContent() + + function_descr = {'category': 'function', + 'name': f_name, + 'Id': f_Id, + 'return_type': f_ret_type[1], + 'return_description': return_value_description, + 'retval_description': retval_description, + 'sa_description': seealso_description, + 'warn_description': warning_description, + 'notes_description': notes_description, + 'short_description': f_brief, + 'version_num': f_version, + 'long_description': detailed_description, + 'deprecated_description': deprecated_description, + 'parameters': list()} + + parameters = function_descr['parameters'] + for (i,p) in enumerate(node.children['param']): + type_node = p.children['type'][0] + p_type = self._process_type_node(type_node) + if p_type[1].find('...') > -1 : + p_name = '' + else: + p_name = None + p_name_node = p.children.get('declname') + if p_name_node is not None: + p_name = p_name_node[0].getContent() + (p_direction,p_descr) = param_description_map.get(p_name,(None,None)) + + param_descr = {'seqno': i, + 'name': p_name, + 'direction': p_direction, + 'type': p_type[1], + 'typeId': p_type[0], + 'description': p_descr} + parameters.append(param_descr) + result = Function(**function_descr) + print(result, file=self.tmp) + + return function_descr + + def _process_type_node(self, type_node): + """ + Type node has form + <type>type_string</type> + for build in types and + <type> + <ref refid='reference',kindref='member|compound'> + 'type_name' + </ref></type> + postfix (ex. *, **m, etc.) + </type> + for user defined types. + """ + type_ref_node = type_node.children.get('ref') + if type_ref_node is not None: + p_type_id = type_ref_node[0].attributes['refid'] + else: + p_type_id = None + p_type = type_node.getContent() + # remove some macros + p_type = re.sub('KRB5_ATTR_DEPRECATED', '', p_type) + p_type = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV_C', '', p_type) + p_type = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV_WRONG', '', p_type) + p_type = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV', '', p_type) + p_type = p_type.strip() + + return (p_type_id, p_type) + + def _process_description_node(self, node): + """ + Description node is comprised of <para>...</para> sections + """ + para = node.children.get('para') + result = list() + if para is not None: + decorators = {'default': self.paragraph_content_decorator} + for e in para: + result.append(str(e.walk(decorators, 1))) + result.append('\n') + result = '\n'.join(result) + + return result + + def return_value_description_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'simplesect': + if node.attributes['kind'] == 'return': + cont = set() + cont = node.getContent() + return value + else: + return None + + def paragraph_content_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'para': + return value + '\n' + elif node.name == 'simplesect': + if node.attributes['kind'] == 'return': + return None + elif node.name == 'ref': + if value.find('()') >= 0: + # functions + return ':c:func:' + '`' + value + '`' + else: + # macro's + return ':data:' + '`' + value + '`' + elif node.name == 'emphasis': + return '*' + value + '*' + elif node.name == 'itemizedlist': + return '\n' + value + elif node.name == 'listitem': + return '\n\t - ' + value + '\n' + elif node.name == 'computeroutput': + return '**' + value + '**' + else: + return None + + def parameter_name_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'parametername': + direction = node.attributes.get('direction') + if direction is not None: + value = '%s:%s' % (value,direction) + return value + + elif node.name == 'parameterdescription': + return None + else: + return value + + def parameter_description_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'parameterdescription': + return value + elif node.name == 'parametername': + return None + else: + return value + + def process_parameter_description(self, node): + """ + Parameter descriptions reside inside detailed description section. + """ + para = node.children.get('para') + result = dict() + if para is not None: + for e in para: + + param_list = e.children.get('parameterlist') + if param_list is None: + continue + param_items = param_list[0].children.get('parameteritem') + if param_items is None: + continue + for it in param_items: + decorators = {'default': self.parameter_name_decorator} + direction = None + name = it.walk(decorators,0).split(':') + if len(name) == 2: + direction = name[1] + + decorators = {'default': self.parameter_description_decorator, + 'para': self.paragraph_content_decorator} + description = it.walk(decorators, 0) + result[name[0]] = (direction,description) + return result + + + def _process_return_value_description(self, node): + result = None + ret = list() + + para = node.children.get('para') + if para is not None: + for p in para: + simplesect_list = p.children.get('simplesect') + if simplesect_list is None: + continue + for it in simplesect_list: + decorators = {'default': self.return_value_description_decorator, + 'para': self.parameter_name_decorator} + result = it.walk(decorators, 1) + if result is not None: + ret.append(result) + return ret + + + def _process_retval_description(self, node): + """ + retval descriptions reside inside detailed description section. + """ + para = node.children.get('para') + + result = None + ret = list() + if para is not None: + + for e in para: + param_list = e.children.get('parameterlist') + if param_list is None: + continue + for p in param_list: + kind = p.attributes['kind'] + if kind == 'retval': + + param_items = p.children.get('parameteritem') + if param_items is None: + continue + + + for it in param_items: + param_descr = it.children.get('parameterdescription') + if param_descr is not None: + val = param_descr[0].children.get('para') + + if val is not None: + val_descr = val[0].getContent() + + else: + val_descr ='' + + decorators = {'default': self.parameter_name_decorator} + + name = it.walk(decorators, 1).split(':') + + val = name[0] + result = " %s %s" % (val, val_descr) + ret.append (result) + return ret + + def return_warning_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'simplesect': + if node.attributes['kind'] == 'warning': + return value + else: + return None + + def _process_warning_description(self, node): + result = None + para = node.children.get('para') + if para is not None: + for p in para: + simplesect_list = p.children.get('simplesect') + if simplesect_list is None: + continue + for it in simplesect_list: + decorators = {'default': self.return_warning_decorator, + 'para': self.paragraph_content_decorator} + result = it.walk(decorators, 1) + # Assuming that only one Warning per function + if result is not None: + return result + return result + + def return_seealso_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'simplesect': + if node.attributes['kind'] == 'see': + return value + else: + return None + + def _process_seealso_description(self, node): + result = None + para = node.children.get('para') + if para is not None: + for p in para: + simplesect_list = p.children.get('simplesect') + if simplesect_list is None: + continue + for it in simplesect_list: + decorators = {'default': self.return_seealso_decorator, + 'para': self.paragraph_content_decorator} + result = it.walk(decorators, 1) + return result + + def return_version_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'simplesect': + if node.attributes['kind'] == 'version': + return value + else: + return None + + def _process_version_description(self, node): + result = None + para = node.children.get('para') + if para is not None: + for p in para: + simplesect_list = p.children.get('simplesect') + if simplesect_list is None: + continue + for it in simplesect_list: + decorators = {'default': self.return_version_decorator, + 'para': self.paragraph_content_decorator} + result = it.walk(decorators, 1) + if result is not None: + return result + return result + + def return_notes_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'simplesect': + if node.attributes['kind'] == 'note': + # We indent notes with an extra tab. Do it for all paragraphs. + return value.replace("\n ", "\n\n\t "); + else: + return None + + def _process_notes_description(self, node): + result = None + para = node.children.get('para') + if para is not None: + for p in para: + simplesect_list = p.children.get('simplesect') + if simplesect_list is None: + continue + for it in simplesect_list: + decorators = {'default': self.return_notes_decorator, + 'para': self.paragraph_content_decorator} + result = it.walk(decorators, 1) + if result is not None: + return result + return result + + def return_deprecated_decorator(self, node, value): + if node.name == 'xrefsect': + if node.attributes['id'].find('deprecated_') > -1: + xreftitle = node.children.get('xreftitle') + if xreftitle[0] is not None: + xrefdescr = node.children.get('xrefdescription') + deprecated_descr = "DEPRECATED %s" % xrefdescr[0].getContent() + return deprecated_descr + else: + return None + + def _process_deprecated_description(self, node): + result = None + para = node.children.get('para') + if para is not None: + for p in para: + xrefsect_list = p.children.get('xrefsect') + if xrefsect_list is None: + continue + for it in xrefsect_list: + decorators = {'default': self.return_deprecated_decorator, + 'para': self.paragraph_content_decorator} + result = it.walk(decorators, 1) + if result is not None: + return result + return result + + def break_into_lines(self, value, linelen=82): + breaks = range(0,len(value),linelen) + [len(value)] + result = list() + for (start,end) in zip(breaks[:-1],breaks[1:]): + result.append(value[start:end]) + result = '\n'.join(result) + + return result + + def _save(self, table, path = None): + if path is None: + f = sys.stdout + else: + f = open(path, 'w') + for l in table: + f.write('%s\n' % ','.join(l)) + if path is not None: + f.close() + + + +class DoxyBuilderFuncs(DoxyFuncs): + def __init__(self, xmlpath, rstpath): + super(DoxyBuilderFuncs,self).__init__(xmlpath) + self.target_dir = rstpath + outfile = '%s/%s' % (self.target_dir, 'out.txt') + self.tmp = open(outfile, 'w') + + def run_all(self): + self.run() + templates = {'function': 'func_document.tmpl'} + self.save(templates, self.target_dir) + + def test_run(self): + self.run() + +if __name__ == '__main__': + builder = DoxyBuilderFuncs(xmlpath, rstpath) + builder.run_all() + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxybuilder_types.py b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxybuilder_types.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..947971a94 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/doxybuilder_types.py @@ -0,0 +1,381 @@ +''' + Copyright 2011 by the Massachusetts + Institute of Technology. All Rights Reserved. + + Export of this software from the United States of America may + require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + + WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label + your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a + fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software. + M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + or implied warranty. +''' + +import sys +import os +import re + +from lxml import etree + +from docmodel import * + +exclude_types = [ 'TRUE', 'FALSE', 'KRB5_ATTR_DEPRECATED', + 'KRB5_CALLCONV', 'KRB5_CALLCONV_C', 'KRB5_CALLCONV_WRONG', + 'KRB5_GENERAL__', 'KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_REFERRAL', + 'KRB5_OLD_CRYPTO', + 'KRB5INT_BEGIN_DECLS', 'KRB5INT_END_DECLS', + 'krb5_cc_ops', 'krb5_octet_data' ] + +class DoxyTypes(object): + def __init__(self, xmlpath): + self.xmlpath = xmlpath + + def run_compound(self, filename, include=None): + path = '%s/%s' % (self.xmlpath,filename) + tree = etree.parse(path) + root = tree.getroot() + + brief_node = root.xpath('./compounddef/briefdescription')[0] + brief_description = self._get_brief_description(brief_node) + details_node = root.xpath('./compounddef/detaileddescription')[0] + detailed_description = self._get_detailed_description(details_node) + + fields = list() + for node in root.iterfind(".//memberdef[@kind]"): + data = {} + kind = node.attrib['kind'] + if include is None or kind in include: + if kind == 'variable': + data = self._process_variable_node(node) + else: + pass + fields.append(data) + + result = {'brief_description': brief_description, + 'detailed_description': detailed_description, + 'attributes': fields} + + return result + + + + def run(self, filename, include=None): + """ + Parses xml file generated by doxygen. + + @param filename: doxygen xml file name + @param include: members sections to include, in None -- include all + """ + path = '%s/%s' % (self.xmlpath,filename) + tree = etree.parse(path) + root = tree.getroot() + result = list() + for node in root.iterfind(".//memberdef[@kind]"): + data = {} + kind = node.attrib['kind'] + if include is None or kind in include: + if kind == 'typedef': + data = self._process_typedef_node(node) + elif kind == 'variable': + data = self._process_variable_node(node) + elif kind == 'define': + data = self._process_define_node(node) + if 'name' in data and data['name'] in exclude_types: + continue + result.append(data) + return result + + + def _process_typedef_node(self, node): + t_name = node.xpath('./name/text()')[0] + + t_Id = node.attrib['id'] + t_definition = node.xpath('./definition/text()')[0] + t_type = self._process_type_node(node.xpath("./type")[0]) + brief_node = node.xpath('./briefdescription')[0] + t_brief = self._get_brief_description(brief_node) + details_node = node.xpath('./detaileddescription')[0] + t_detailed = self._get_detailed_description(details_node) + # remove macros + t_definition = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV_C', '', t_definition) + t_definition = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV', '', t_definition) + t_definition = re.sub('\*', '\\*', t_definition) + # handle fp + if t_type[1].find('(') >= 0: + t_type = (t_type[0],None) + + typedef_descr = {'category': 'composite', + 'definition': t_definition, + 'name': t_name, + 'Id': t_Id, + 'initializer': '', + 'type': t_type[1], + 'short_description': t_brief, + 'long_description': t_detailed, + 'attributes': list() + } + if t_type[0] is not None : + filename = '%s.xml' % t_type[0] + path = '%s/%s' % (self.xmlpath,filename) + if not os.path.exists(path): + # nothing can be done + return typedef_descr + + compound_info = self.run_compound(filename) + if compound_info is not None: + brief_description = compound_info.get('brief_description') + if brief_description is not None and len(brief_description): + # override brief description + typedef_descr['short_description'] = brief_description + detailed_description = compound_info.get('detailed_description') + if detailed_description is not None and len(detailed_description): + # check if this is not a duplicate + if detailed_description.find(t_detailed) < 0: + typedef_descr['long_description'] = '%s\n%s' % \ + (detailed_description, + typedef_descr['long_description']) + typedef_descr['attributes'] = compound_info['attributes'] + return typedef_descr + + def _process_variable_node(self, node): + v_name = node.xpath('./name/text()')[0] + v_Id = node.attrib['id'] + v_definition = node.xpath('./definition/text()')[0] + v_type = self._process_type_node(node.xpath("./type")[0]) + brief_node = node.xpath('./briefdescription')[0] + v_brief = self._get_brief_description(brief_node) + details_node = node.xpath('./detaileddescription')[0] + detailed_description = self._get_detailed_description(details_node) + # remove macros + v_definition = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV_C', '', v_definition) + v_definition = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV', '', v_definition) + v_definition = re.sub('\*', '\\*', v_definition) + + variable_descr = {'category': 'variable', + 'definition': v_definition, + 'name': v_name, + 'Id': v_Id, + 'initializer': '', + 'type': v_type[1], + 'short_description': v_brief, + 'long_description': detailed_description, + 'attributes': list() + } + + return variable_descr + + def _process_define_node(self, node): + d_name = node.xpath('./name/text()')[0] + d_initializer = '' + d_type = '' + d_signature = '' + + # Process param/defname node + if len(node.xpath('./param/defname')) > 0: + prm_str = '' + prm_list = list() + for p in node.xpath("./param"): + x = self._process_paragraph_content(p) + if x is not None and len(x): + prm_list.append(x) + if prm_list is not None: + prm_str = prm_str.join(prm_list) + d_signature = " %s (%s) " % (d_name , prm_str) + d_signature = re.sub(', \)', ')', d_signature).strip() + + if len(node.xpath('./initializer')) > 0: + len_ref = len(node.xpath('./initializer/ref')) + if len(node.xpath('./initializer/ref')) > 0: + d_type = self._process_type_node(node.xpath("./initializer/ref")[0]) + if len(d_type) > 0: + len_text = len(node.xpath('./initializer/text()')) + if len_text == 0 and d_type[1]: + d_initializer = d_type[1] + if len_text > 0 and len(node.xpath('./initializer/text()')[0]) > 0: + d_initializer = node.xpath('./initializer/text()')[0] + d_type[1] + if len_text > 1: + if node.xpath('./initializer/text()')[1] is not None: + d_initializer = d_initializer + node.xpath('./initializer/text()')[1] + else: + d_initializer = node.xpath('./initializer/text()')[0] + d_Id = node.attrib['id'] + brief_node = node.xpath('./briefdescription')[0] + d_brief = self._get_brief_description(brief_node) + details_node = node.xpath('./detaileddescription')[0] + detailed_description = self._get_detailed_description(details_node) + # Condense multiline macros, stripping leading whitespace. + d_initializer = re.sub(" *\\\\\n *", " ", d_initializer) + + define_descr = {'category': 'composite', + 'definition': '', + 'name': d_name, + 'name_signature': d_signature, + 'Id': d_Id, + 'initializer': d_initializer, + 'type': '', + 'short_description': d_brief, + 'long_description': detailed_description, + 'attributes': list() + } + + return define_descr + + + def _get_brief_description(self, node): + result = list() + for p in node.xpath("./para"): + x = self._process_paragraph_content(p) + if x is not None and len(x): + result.append(x) + result = '\n'.join(result) + + return result + + + def _get_detailed_description(self, node): + """ + Description node is comprised of <para>...</para> sections. + There are few types of these sections: + a) Content section + b) Return value section -- skip + c) Parameter list section -- skip + @param node: detailed description node + """ + result = list() + for p in node.xpath("./para"): + if len(p.xpath("./simplesect[@kind='return']")): + continue + elif len(p.xpath("./parameterlist[@kind='param']")): + continue + else: + x = self._process_paragraph_content(p) + result.append(x) + result = '\n'.join(result) + + return result + + def _process_paragraph_content(self, node): + + result = list() + content = node.xpath(".//text()") + for e in content: + if node is e.getparent(): + result.append(e.strip()) + elif e.getparent().tag == 'ref': + if e.is_tail: + result.append(e.strip()) + elif e.strip().find('(') > 0: + result.append(':c:func:`%s`' % e.strip()) + elif e.isupper(): + result.append(':c:data:`%s`' % e.strip()) + else: + result.append(':c:type:`%s`' % e.strip()) + elif e.getparent().tag == 'emphasis': + if e.is_tail: + result.append(e.strip()) + else: + result.append('*%s*' % e.strip()) + elif e.getparent().tag == 'computeroutput': + if e.is_tail: + result.append(e.strip()) + else: + result.append('*%s*' % e.strip()) + elif e.getparent().tag == 'defname': + result.append('%s, ' % e.strip()) + elif e.getparent().tag == 'linebreak': + result.append('\n*%s*\n' % e.strip()) + + result = ' '.join(result) + + return result + + def _process_type_node(self, node): + """ + Type node has form + <type>type_string</type> + for build in types and + <type> + <ref refid='reference',kindref='member|compound'> + 'type_name' + </ref></type> + postfix (ex. *, **m, etc.) + </type> + for user defined types. + """ + p_id = node.xpath("./ref/@refid") + if len(p_id) == 1: + p_id = p_id[0] + elif len(p_id) == 0: + p_id = None + p_type = ' '.join(node.xpath(".//text()")) + + # remove macros + p_type = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV_C', ' ', p_type) + p_type = re.sub('KRB5_CALLCONV', ' ', p_type) + + return (p_id,p_type) + + def save(self, obj, templates, target_dir): + template_path = templates[obj.category] + outpath = '%s/%s.rst' % (target_dir,obj.name) + obj.save(outpath, template_path) + + + +class DoxyBuilderTypes(DoxyTypes): + def __init__(self, xmlpath, rstpath): + self.templates = { 'composite': 'type_document.tmpl'} + self.target_dir = rstpath + + super(DoxyBuilderTypes,self).__init__(xmlpath) + + def run_all(self): + self.process_typedef_nodes() + self.process_define_nodes() + + def test_run(self): + filename = 'krb5_8hin.xml' + self.run(filename) + + def process_variable_nodes(self): + filename = 'struct__krb5__octet__data.xml' + result = self.run(filename, include=['variable']) + + def process_typedef_nodes(self): + # run parser for typedefs + filename = 'krb5_8hin.xml' + result = self.run(filename, include=['typedef']) + target_dir = '%s/types' % (self.target_dir) + if not os.path.exists(target_dir): + os.makedirs(target_dir, 0o755) + for t in result: + obj = DocModel(**t) + self.save(obj, self.templates, target_dir) + + def process_define_nodes(self): + # run parser for define's + filename = 'krb5_8hin.xml' + result = self.run(filename, include=['define']) + target_dir = '%s/macros' % (self.target_dir) + if not os.path.exists(target_dir): + os.makedirs(target_dir, 0o755) + for t in result: + obj = DocModel(**t) + tmpl = {'composite': 'define_document.tmpl'} + self.save(obj, tmpl, target_dir) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + + builder = DoxyBuilderTypes( xml_inpath, rst_outpath) + builder.run_all() diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/func_document.tmpl b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/func_document.tmpl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..49860589f --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/func_document.tmpl @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +#if $function.short_description is not None + #set $title = $function.name + ' - ' + $function.short_description +#else + #set $title = $function.name +#end if +$title +#echo ''.join(['=']*len($title)) # + +.. + +.. c:function:: $signature + +.. + + +:param: + +#for $param in $function.parameters: + #if $param.name is '' + #continue + #end if + #if $param.direction is not None + #set name_description = '**[%s]** **%s**' % ($param.direction, $param.name) + #else + #set name_description = '**%s**' % $param.name + #end if + #if $param.description is not None + #set $description= ' - ' + $param.description + #else + #set $description='' + #end if + $name_description$description + +#end for + +.. + +#if len($function.retval_description) > 0 + +:retval: +#for $retval in $function.retval_description: + - $retval +#end for +#end if + +#if len($function.return_description) > 0 + +:return: +#for $retval in $function.return_description: + - $retval +#end for +#end if + +.. + +#if $function.deprecated_description is not None + +$function.deprecated_description +#end if + + + + +#if $function.long_description is not None + + +$function.long_description + +#end if + + +.. + +#if $function.sa_description is not None +.. seealso:: + $function.sa_description +#end if + + +#if $function.warn_description is not None or $function.notes_description is not None + + +#if $function.warn_description is not None +.. warning:: + + $function.warn_description +#end if + +#if $function.notes_description is not None +.. note:: + + $function.notes_description +#end if + +#end if + +#if $function.version_num is not None +.. note:: + + $function.version_num +#end if + diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/type_document.tmpl b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/type_document.tmpl new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5987fa762 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/tools/type_document.tmpl @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +.. highlightlang:: c + +.. $composite.struct_reference($composite.name): + +#set $title = $composite.name +$title +#echo ''.join(['=']*len($title)) # + +.. +.. c:type:: $composite.name +.. + +#if $composite.short_description is not None and len($composite.short_description) +$composite.short_description +#end if + +$composite.long_description + +Declaration +------------ + +$composite.definition + +#if $composite.Id is not None +#if len($composite.attributes) + +Members +--------- + +#end if + +#for $attr in $composite.attributes: +#if $attr.name is not None +.. c:member:: $attr.type $composite.name.$attr.name + + $attr.short_description +#if $attr.long_description is not None + $attr.long_description +#end if + +#end if +#end for +#end if diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..233c3ef55 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +For users +========= + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 2 + + pwd_mgmt.rst + tkt_mgmt.rst + user_config/index.rst + user_commands/index.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/pwd_mgmt.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/pwd_mgmt.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ed7d459f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/pwd_mgmt.rst @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +Password management +=================== + +Your password is the only way Kerberos has of verifying your identity. +If someone finds out your password, that person can masquerade as +you---send email that comes from you, read, edit, or delete your files, +or log into other hosts as you---and no one will be able to tell the +difference. For this reason, it is important that you choose a good +password, and keep it secret. If you need to give access to your +account to someone else, you can do so through Kerberos (see +:ref:`grant_access`). You should never tell your password to anyone, +including your system administrator, for any reason. You should +change your password frequently, particularly any time you think +someone may have found out what it is. + + +Changing your password +---------------------- + +To change your Kerberos password, use the :ref:`kpasswd(1)` command. +It will ask you for your old password (to prevent someone else from +walking up to your computer when you're not there and changing your +password), and then prompt you for the new one twice. (The reason you +have to type it twice is to make sure you have typed it correctly.) +For example, user ``david`` would do the following:: + + shell% kpasswd + Password for david: <- Type your old password. + Enter new password: <- Type your new password. + Enter it again: <- Type the new password again. + Password changed. + shell% + +If ``david`` typed the incorrect old password, he would get the +following message:: + + shell% kpasswd + Password for david: <- Type the incorrect old password. + kpasswd: Password incorrect while getting initial ticket + shell% + +If you make a mistake and don't type the new password the same way +twice, kpasswd will ask you to try again:: + + shell% kpasswd + Password for david: <- Type the old password. + Enter new password: <- Type the new password. + Enter it again: <- Type a different new password. + kpasswd: Password mismatch while reading password + shell% + +Once you change your password, it takes some time for the change to +propagate through the system. Depending on how your system is set up, +this might be anywhere from a few minutes to an hour or more. If you +need to get new Kerberos tickets shortly after changing your password, +try the new password. If the new password doesn't work, try again +using the old one. + + +.. _grant_access: + +Granting access to your account +------------------------------- + +If you need to give someone access to log into your account, you can +do so through Kerberos, without telling the person your password. +Simply create a file called :ref:`.k5login(5)` in your home directory. +This file should contain the Kerberos principal of each person to whom +you wish to give access. Each principal must be on a separate line. +Here is a sample .k5login file:: + + jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + david@EXAMPLE.COM + +This file would allow the users ``jennifer`` and ``david`` to use your +user ID, provided that they had Kerberos tickets in their respective +realms. If you will be logging into other hosts across a network, you +will want to include your own Kerberos principal in your .k5login file +on each of these hosts. + +Using a .k5login file is much safer than giving out your password, +because: + +* You can take access away any time simply by removing the principal + from your .k5login file. + +* Although the user has full access to your account on one particular + host (or set of hosts if your .k5login file is shared, e.g., over + NFS), that user does not inherit your network privileges. + +* Kerberos keeps a log of who obtains tickets, so a system + administrator could find out, if necessary, who was capable of using + your user ID at a particular time. + +One common application is to have a .k5login file in root's home +directory, giving root access to that machine to the Kerberos +principals listed. This allows system administrators to allow users +to become root locally, or to log in remotely as root, without their +having to give out the root password, and without anyone having to +type the root password over the network. + + +Password quality verification +----------------------------- + +TODO diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/tkt_mgmt.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/tkt_mgmt.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ec7f1e7c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/tkt_mgmt.rst @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +Ticket management +================= + +On many systems, Kerberos is built into the login program, and you get +tickets automatically when you log in. Other programs, such as ssh, +can forward copies of your tickets to a remote host. Most of these +programs also automatically destroy your tickets when they exit. +However, MIT recommends that you explicitly destroy your Kerberos +tickets when you are through with them, just to be sure. One way to +help ensure that this happens is to add the :ref:`kdestroy(1)` command +to your .logout file. Additionally, if you are going to be away from +your machine and are concerned about an intruder using your +permissions, it is safest to either destroy all copies of your +tickets, or use a screensaver that locks the screen. + + +Kerberos ticket properties +-------------------------- + +There are various properties that Kerberos tickets can have: + +If a ticket is **forwardable**, then the KDC can issue a new ticket +(with a different network address, if necessary) based on the +forwardable ticket. This allows for authentication forwarding without +requiring a password to be typed in again. For example, if a user +with a forwardable TGT logs into a remote system, the KDC could issue +a new TGT for that user with the network address of the remote system, +allowing authentication on that host to work as though the user were +logged in locally. + +When the KDC creates a new ticket based on a forwardable ticket, it +sets the **forwarded** flag on that new ticket. Any tickets that are +created based on a ticket with the forwarded flag set will also have +their forwarded flags set. + +A **proxiable** ticket is similar to a forwardable ticket in that it +allows a service to take on the identity of the client. Unlike a +forwardable ticket, however, a proxiable ticket is only issued for +specific services. In other words, a ticket-granting ticket cannot be +issued based on a ticket that is proxiable but not forwardable. + +A **proxy** ticket is one that was issued based on a proxiable ticket. + +A **postdated** ticket is issued with the invalid flag set. After the +starting time listed on the ticket, it can be presented to the KDC to +obtain valid tickets. + +Ticket-granting tickets with the **postdateable** flag set can be used +to obtain postdated service tickets. + +**Renewable** tickets can be used to obtain new session keys without +the user entering their password again. A renewable ticket has two +expiration times. The first is the time at which this particular +ticket expires. The second is the latest possible expiration time for +any ticket issued based on this renewable ticket. + +A ticket with the **initial flag** set was issued based on the +authentication protocol, and not on a ticket-granting ticket. +Application servers that wish to ensure that the user's key has been +recently presented for verification could specify that this flag must +be set to accept the ticket. + +An **invalid** ticket must be rejected by application servers. +Postdated tickets are usually issued with this flag set, and must be +validated by the KDC before they can be used. + +A **preauthenticated** ticket is one that was only issued after the +client requesting the ticket had authenticated itself to the KDC. + +The **hardware authentication** flag is set on a ticket which required +the use of hardware for authentication. The hardware is expected to +be possessed only by the client which requested the tickets. + +If a ticket has the **transit policy** checked flag set, then the KDC +that issued this ticket implements the transited-realm check policy +and checked the transited-realms list on the ticket. The +transited-realms list contains a list of all intermediate realms +between the realm of the KDC that issued the first ticket and that of +the one that issued the current ticket. If this flag is not set, then +the application server must check the transited realms itself or else +reject the ticket. + +The **okay as delegate** flag indicates that the server specified in +the ticket is suitable as a delegate as determined by the policy of +that realm. Some client applications may use this flag to decide +whether to forward tickets to a remote host, although many +applications do not honor it. + +An **anonymous** ticket is one in which the named principal is a +generic principal for that realm; it does not actually specify the +individual that will be using the ticket. This ticket is meant only +to securely distribute a session key. + + +.. _obtain_tkt: + +Obtaining tickets with kinit +---------------------------- + +If your site has integrated Kerberos V5 with the login system, you +will get Kerberos tickets automatically when you log in. Otherwise, +you may need to explicitly obtain your Kerberos tickets, using the +:ref:`kinit(1)` program. Similarly, if your Kerberos tickets expire, +use the kinit program to obtain new ones. + +To use the kinit program, simply type ``kinit`` and then type your +password at the prompt. For example, Jennifer (whose username is +``jennifer``) works for Bleep, Inc. (a fictitious company with the +domain name mit.edu and the Kerberos realm ATHENA.MIT.EDU). She would +type:: + + shell% kinit + Password for jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <-- [Type jennifer's password here.] + shell% + +If you type your password incorrectly, kinit will give you the +following error message:: + + shell% kinit + Password for jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <-- [Type the wrong password here.] + kinit: Password incorrect + shell% + +and you won't get Kerberos tickets. + +By default, kinit assumes you want tickets for your own username in +your default realm. Suppose Jennifer's friend David is visiting, and +he wants to borrow a window to check his mail. David needs to get +tickets for himself in his own realm, EXAMPLE.COM. He would type:: + + shell% kinit david@EXAMPLE.COM + Password for david@EXAMPLE.COM: <-- [Type david's password here.] + shell% + +David would then have tickets which he could use to log onto his own +machine. Note that he typed his password locally on Jennifer's +machine, but it never went over the network. Kerberos on the local +host performed the authentication to the KDC in the other realm. + +If you want to be able to forward your tickets to another host, you +need to request forwardable tickets. You do this by specifying the +**-f** option:: + + shell% kinit -f + Password for jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU: <-- [Type your password here.] + shell% + +Note that kinit does not tell you that it obtained forwardable +tickets; you can verify this using the :ref:`klist(1)` command (see +:ref:`view_tkt`). + +Normally, your tickets are good for your system's default ticket +lifetime, which is ten hours on many systems. You can specify a +different ticket lifetime with the **-l** option. Add the letter +**s** to the value for seconds, **m** for minutes, **h** for hours, or +**d** for days. For example, to obtain forwardable tickets for +``david@EXAMPLE.COM`` that would be good for three hours, you would +type:: + + shell% kinit -f -l 3h david@EXAMPLE.COM + Password for david@EXAMPLE.COM: <-- [Type david's password here.] + shell% + +.. note:: + + You cannot mix units; specifying a lifetime of 3h30m would + result in an error. Note also that most systems specify a + maximum ticket lifetime. If you request a longer ticket + lifetime, it will be automatically truncated to the maximum + lifetime. + + +.. _view_tkt: + +Viewing tickets with klist +-------------------------- + +The :ref:`klist(1)` command shows your tickets. When you first obtain +tickets, you will have only the ticket-granting ticket. The listing +would look like this:: + + shell% klist + Ticket cache: /tmp/krb5cc_ttypa + Default principal: jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + Valid starting Expires Service principal + 06/07/04 19:49:21 06/08/04 05:49:19 krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + shell% + +The ticket cache is the location of your ticket file. In the above +example, this file is named ``/tmp/krb5cc_ttypa``. The default +principal is your Kerberos principal. + +The "valid starting" and "expires" fields describe the period of time +during which the ticket is valid. The "service principal" describes +each ticket. The ticket-granting ticket has a first component +``krbtgt``, and a second component which is the realm name. + +Now, if ``jennifer`` connected to the machine ``daffodil.mit.edu``, +and then typed "klist" again, she would have gotten the following +result:: + + shell% klist + Ticket cache: /tmp/krb5cc_ttypa + Default principal: jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + Valid starting Expires Service principal + 06/07/04 19:49:21 06/08/04 05:49:19 krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + 06/07/04 20:22:30 06/08/04 05:49:19 host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + shell% + +Here's what happened: when ``jennifer`` used ssh to connect to the +host ``daffodil.mit.edu``, the ssh program presented her +ticket-granting ticket to the KDC and requested a host ticket for the +host ``daffodil.mit.edu``. The KDC sent the host ticket, which ssh +then presented to the host ``daffodil.mit.edu``, and she was allowed +to log in without typing her password. + +Suppose your Kerberos tickets allow you to log into a host in another +domain, such as ``trillium.example.com``, which is also in another +Kerberos realm, ``EXAMPLE.COM``. If you ssh to this host, you will +receive a ticket-granting ticket for the realm ``EXAMPLE.COM``, plus +the new host ticket for ``trillium.example.com``. klist will now +show:: + + shell% klist + Ticket cache: /tmp/krb5cc_ttypa + Default principal: jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + Valid starting Expires Service principal + 06/07/04 19:49:21 06/08/04 05:49:19 krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + 06/07/04 20:22:30 06/08/04 05:49:19 host/daffodil.mit.edu@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + 06/07/04 20:24:18 06/08/04 05:49:19 krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + 06/07/04 20:24:18 06/08/04 05:49:19 host/trillium.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM + shell% + +Depending on your host's and realm's configuration, you may also see a +ticket with the service principal ``host/trillium.example.com@``. If +so, this means that your host did not know what realm +trillium.example.com is in, so it asked the ``ATHENA.MIT.EDU`` KDC for +a referral. The next time you connect to ``trillium.example.com``, +the odd-looking entry will be used to avoid needing to ask for a +referral again. + +You can use the **-f** option to view the flags that apply to your +tickets. The flags are: + +===== ========================= + F Forwardable + f forwarded + P Proxiable + p proxy + D postDateable + d postdated + R Renewable + I Initial + i invalid + H Hardware authenticated + A preAuthenticated + T Transit policy checked + O Okay as delegate + a anonymous +===== ========================= + +Here is a sample listing. In this example, the user *jennifer* +obtained her initial tickets (**I**), which are forwardable (**F**) +and postdated (**d**) but not yet validated (**i**):: + + shell% klist -f + Ticket cache: /tmp/krb5cc_320 + Default principal: jennifer@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + + Valid starting Expires Service principal + 31/07/05 19:06:25 31/07/05 19:16:25 krbtgt/ATHENA.MIT.EDU@ATHENA.MIT.EDU + Flags: FdiI + shell% + +In the following example, the user *david*'s tickets were forwarded +(**f**) to this host from another host. The tickets are reforwardable +(**F**):: + + shell% klist -f + Ticket cache: /tmp/krb5cc_p11795 + Default principal: david@EXAMPLE.COM + + Valid starting Expires Service principal + 07/31/05 11:52:29 07/31/05 21:11:23 krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM + Flags: Ff + 07/31/05 12:03:48 07/31/05 21:11:23 host/trillium.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM + Flags: Ff + shell% + + +Destroying tickets with kdestroy +-------------------------------- + +Your Kerberos tickets are proof that you are indeed yourself, and +tickets could be stolen if someone gains access to a computer where +they are stored. If this happens, the person who has them can +masquerade as you until they expire. For this reason, you should +destroy your Kerberos tickets when you are away from your computer. + +Destroying your tickets is easy. Simply type kdestroy:: + + shell% kdestroy + shell% + +If :ref:`kdestroy(1)` fails to destroy your tickets, it will beep and +give an error message. For example, if kdestroy can't find any +tickets to destroy, it will give the following message:: + + shell% kdestroy + kdestroy: No credentials cache file found while destroying cache + shell% diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7ce86a14c --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +.. _user_commands: + +User commands +============= + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + kdestroy.rst + kinit.rst + klist.rst + kpasswd.rst + krb5-config.rst + ksu.rst + kswitch.rst + kvno.rst + sclient.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kdestroy.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kdestroy.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..becfcef89 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kdestroy.rst @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +.. _kdestroy(1): + +kdestroy +======== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kdestroy** +[**-A**] +[**-q**] +[**-c** *cache_name*] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The kdestroy utility destroys the user's active Kerberos authorization +tickets by overwriting and deleting the credentials cache that +contains them. If the credentials cache is not specified, the default +credentials cache is destroyed. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-A** + Destroys all caches in the collection, if a cache collection is + available. May be used with the **-c** option to specify the + collection to be destroyed. + +**-q** + Run quietly. Normally kdestroy beeps if it fails to destroy the + user's tickets. The **-q** flag suppresses this behavior. + +**-c** *cache_name* + Use *cache_name* as the credentials (ticket) cache name and + location; if this option is not used, the default cache name and + location are used. + + The default credentials cache may vary between systems. If the + **KRB5CCNAME** environment variable is set, its value is used to + name the default ticket cache. + +**-p** *princ_name* + If a cache collection is available, destroy the cache for + *princ_name* instead of the primary cache. May be used with the + **-c** option to specify the collection to be searched. + + +NOTE +---- + +Most installations recommend that you place the kdestroy command in +your .logout file, so that your tickets are destroyed automatically +when you log out. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +FILES +----- + +|ccache| + Default location of Kerberos 5 credentials cache + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kinit(1)`, :ref:`klist(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e12e88a37 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kinit.rst @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +.. _kinit(1): + +kinit +===== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kinit** +[**-V**] +[**-l** *lifetime*] +[**-s** *start_time*] +[**-r** *renewable_life*] +[**-p** | -**P**] +[**-f** | -**F**] +[**-a**] +[**-A**] +[**-C**] +[**-E**] +[**-v**] +[**-R**] +[**-k** [-**t** *keytab_file*]] +[**-c** *cache_name*] +[**-n**] +[**-S** *service_name*] +[**-I** *input_ccache*] +[**-T** *armor_ccache*] +[**-X** *attribute*\ [=\ *value*]] +[*principal*] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kinit obtains and caches an initial ticket-granting ticket for +*principal*. If *principal* is absent, kinit chooses an appropriate +principal name based on existing credential cache contents or the +local username of the user invoking kinit. Some options modify the +choice of principal name. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-V** + display verbose output. + +**-l** *lifetime* + (:ref:`duration` string.) Requests a ticket with the lifetime + *lifetime*. + + For example, ``kinit -l 5:30`` or ``kinit -l 5h30m``. + + If the **-l** option is not specified, the default ticket lifetime + (configured by each site) is used. Specifying a ticket lifetime + longer than the maximum ticket lifetime (configured by each site) + will not override the configured maximum ticket lifetime. + +**-s** *start_time* + (:ref:`duration` string.) Requests a postdated ticket. Postdated + tickets are issued with the **invalid** flag set, and need to be + resubmitted to the KDC for validation before use. + + *start_time* specifies the duration of the delay before the ticket + can become valid. + +**-r** *renewable_life* + (:ref:`duration` string.) Requests renewable tickets, with a total + lifetime of *renewable_life*. + +**-f** + requests forwardable tickets. + +**-F** + requests non-forwardable tickets. + +**-p** + requests proxiable tickets. + +**-P** + requests non-proxiable tickets. + +**-a** + requests tickets restricted to the host's local address[es]. + +**-A** + requests tickets not restricted by address. + +**-C** + requests canonicalization of the principal name, and allows the + KDC to reply with a different client principal from the one + requested. + +**-E** + treats the principal name as an enterprise name. + +**-v** + requests that the ticket-granting ticket in the cache (with the + **invalid** flag set) be passed to the KDC for validation. If the + ticket is within its requested time range, the cache is replaced + with the validated ticket. + +**-R** + requests renewal of the ticket-granting ticket. Note that an + expired ticket cannot be renewed, even if the ticket is still + within its renewable life. + + Note that renewable tickets that have expired as reported by + :ref:`klist(1)` may sometimes be renewed using this option, + because the KDC applies a grace period to account for client-KDC + clock skew. See :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` **clockskew** setting. + +**-k** [**-i** | **-t** *keytab_file*] + requests a ticket, obtained from a key in the local host's keytab. + The location of the keytab may be specified with the **-t** + *keytab_file* option, or with the **-i** option to specify the use + of the default client keytab; otherwise the default keytab will be + used. By default, a host ticket for the local host is requested, + but any principal may be specified. On a KDC, the special keytab + location ``KDB:`` can be used to indicate that kinit should open + the KDC database and look up the key directly. This permits an + administrator to obtain tickets as any principal that supports + authentication based on the key. + +**-n** + Requests anonymous processing. Two types of anonymous principals + are supported. + + For fully anonymous Kerberos, configure pkinit on the KDC and + configure **pkinit_anchors** in the client's :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`. + Then use the **-n** option with a principal of the form ``@REALM`` + (an empty principal name followed by the at-sign and a realm + name). If permitted by the KDC, an anonymous ticket will be + returned. + + A second form of anonymous tickets is supported; these + realm-exposed tickets hide the identity of the client but not the + client's realm. For this mode, use ``kinit -n`` with a normal + principal name. If supported by the KDC, the principal (but not + realm) will be replaced by the anonymous principal. + + As of release 1.8, the MIT Kerberos KDC only supports fully + anonymous operation. + +**-I** *input_ccache* + + Specifies the name of a credentials cache that already contains a + ticket. When obtaining that ticket, if information about how that + ticket was obtained was also stored to the cache, that information + will be used to affect how new credentials are obtained, including + preselecting the same methods of authenticating to the KDC. + +**-T** *armor_ccache* + Specifies the name of a credentials cache that already contains a + ticket. If supported by the KDC, this cache will be used to armor + the request, preventing offline dictionary attacks and allowing + the use of additional preauthentication mechanisms. Armoring also + makes sure that the response from the KDC is not modified in + transit. + +**-c** *cache_name* + use *cache_name* as the Kerberos 5 credentials (ticket) cache + location. If this option is not used, the default cache location + is used. + + The default cache location may vary between systems. If the + **KRB5CCNAME** environment variable is set, its value is used to + locate the default cache. If a principal name is specified and + the type of the default cache supports a collection (such as the + DIR type), an existing cache containing credentials for the + principal is selected or a new one is created and becomes the new + primary cache. Otherwise, any existing contents of the default + cache are destroyed by kinit. + +**-S** *service_name* + specify an alternate service name to use when getting initial + tickets. + +**-X** *attribute*\ [=\ *value*] + specify a pre-authentication *attribute* and *value* to be + interpreted by pre-authentication modules. The acceptable + attribute and value values vary from module to module. This + option may be specified multiple times to specify multiple + attributes. If no value is specified, it is assumed to be "yes". + + The following attributes are recognized by the PKINIT + pre-authentication mechanism: + + **X509_user_identity**\ =\ *value* + specify where to find user's X509 identity information + + **X509_anchors**\ =\ *value* + specify where to find trusted X509 anchor information + + **flag_RSA_PROTOCOL**\ [**=yes**] + specify use of RSA, rather than the default Diffie-Hellman + protocol + + **disable_freshness**\ [**=yes**] + disable sending freshness tokens (for testing purposes only) + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +FILES +----- + +|ccache| + default location of Kerberos 5 credentials cache + +|keytab| + default location for the local host's keytab. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`klist(1)`, :ref:`kdestroy(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/klist.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/klist.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88e457846 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/klist.rst @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.. _klist(1): + +klist +===== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**klist** +[**-e**] +[[**-c**] [**-l**] [**-A**] [**-f**] [**-s**] [**-a** [**-n**]]] +[**-C**] +[**-k** [**-t**] [**-K**]] +[**-V**] +[*cache_name*\|\ *keytab_name*] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +klist lists the Kerberos principal and Kerberos tickets held in a +credentials cache, or the keys held in a keytab file. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-e** + Displays the encryption types of the session key and the ticket + for each credential in the credential cache, or each key in the + keytab file. + +**-l** + If a cache collection is available, displays a table summarizing + the caches present in the collection. + +**-A** + If a cache collection is available, displays the contents of all + of the caches in the collection. + +**-c** + List tickets held in a credentials cache. This is the default if + neither **-c** nor **-k** is specified. + +**-f** + Shows the flags present in the credentials, using the following + abbreviations:: + + F Forwardable + f forwarded + P Proxiable + p proxy + D postDateable + d postdated + R Renewable + I Initial + i invalid + H Hardware authenticated + A preAuthenticated + T Transit policy checked + O Okay as delegate + a anonymous + +**-s** + Causes klist to run silently (produce no output). klist will exit + with status 1 if the credentials cache cannot be read or is + expired, and with status 0 otherwise. + +**-a** + Display list of addresses in credentials. + +**-n** + Show numeric addresses instead of reverse-resolving addresses. + +**-C** + List configuration data that has been stored in the credentials + cache when klist encounters it. By default, configuration data + is not listed. + +**-k** + List keys held in a keytab file. + +**-i** + In combination with **-k**, defaults to using the default client + keytab instead of the default acceptor keytab, if no name is + given. + +**-t** + Display the time entry timestamps for each keytab entry in the + keytab file. + +**-K** + Display the value of the encryption key in each keytab entry in + the keytab file. + +**-V** + Display the Kerberos version number and exit. + +If *cache_name* or *keytab_name* is not specified, klist will display +the credentials in the default credentials cache or keytab file as +appropriate. If the **KRB5CCNAME** environment variable is set, its +value is used to locate the default ticket cache. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +FILES +----- + +|ccache| + Default location of Kerberos 5 credentials cache + +|keytab| + Default location for the local host's keytab file. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kinit(1)`, :ref:`kdestroy(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kpasswd.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kpasswd.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0583bbd05 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kpasswd.rst @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +.. _kpasswd(1): + +kpasswd +======= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kpasswd** [*principal*] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The kpasswd command is used to change a Kerberos principal's password. +kpasswd first prompts for the current Kerberos password, then prompts +the user twice for the new password, and the password is changed. + +If the principal is governed by a policy that specifies the length +and/or number of character classes required in the new password, the +new password must conform to the policy. (The five character classes +are lower case, upper case, numbers, punctuation, and all other +characters.) + + +OPTIONS +------- + +*principal* + Change the password for the Kerberos principal principal. + Otherwise, kpasswd uses the principal name from an existing ccache + if there is one; if not, the principal is derived from the + identity of the user invoking the kpasswd command. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kadmin(1)`, :ref:`kadmind(8)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/krb5-config.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/krb5-config.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2c09141a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/krb5-config.rst @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.. _krb5-config(1): + +krb5-config +=========== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**krb5-config** +[**-**\ **-help** | **-**\ **-all** | **-**\ **-version** | **-**\ **-vendor** | **-**\ **-prefix** | **-**\ **-exec-prefix** | **-**\ **-defccname** | **-**\ **-defktname** | **-**\ **-defcktname** | **-**\ **-cflags** | **-**\ **-libs** [*libraries*]] + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +krb5-config tells the application programmer what flags to use to compile +and link programs against the installed Kerberos libraries. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-**\ **-help** + prints a usage message. This is the default behavior when no options + are specified. + +**-**\ **-all** + prints the version, vendor, prefix, and exec-prefix. + +**-**\ **-version** + prints the version number of the Kerberos installation. + +**-**\ **-vendor** + prints the name of the vendor of the Kerberos installation. + +**-**\ **-prefix** + prints the prefix for which the Kerberos installation was built. + +**-**\ **-exec-prefix** + prints the prefix for executables for which the Kerberos installation + was built. + +**-**\ **-defccname** + prints the built-in default credentials cache location. + +**-**\ **-defktname** + prints the built-in default keytab location. + +**-**\ **-defcktname** + prints the built-in default client (initiator) keytab location. + +**-**\ **-cflags** + prints the compilation flags used to build the Kerberos installation. + +**-**\ **-libs** [*library*] + prints the compiler options needed to link against *library*. + Allowed values for *library* are: + + ============ =============================================== + krb5 Kerberos 5 applications (default) + gssapi GSSAPI applications with Kerberos 5 bindings + kadm-client Kadmin client + kadm-server Kadmin server + kdb Applications that access the Kerberos database + ============ =============================================== + +EXAMPLES +-------- + +krb5-config is particularly useful for compiling against a Kerberos +installation that was installed in a non-standard location. For example, +a Kerberos installation that is installed in ``/opt/krb5/`` but uses +libraries in ``/usr/local/lib/`` for text localization would produce +the following output:: + + shell% krb5-config --libs krb5 + -L/opt/krb5/lib -Wl,-rpath -Wl,/opt/krb5/lib -L/usr/local/lib -lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kerberos(7)`, cc(1) diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..29487a838 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/ksu.rst @@ -0,0 +1,400 @@ +.. _ksu(1): + +ksu +=== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**ksu** +[ *target_user* ] +[ **-n** *target_principal_name* ] +[ **-c** *source_cache_name* ] +[ **-k** ] +[ **-r** time ] +[ **-pf** ] +[ **-l** *lifetime* ] +[ **-z | Z** ] +[ **-q** ] +[ **-e** *command* [ args ... ] ] [ **-a** [ args ... ] ] + + +REQUIREMENTS +------------ + +Must have Kerberos version 5 installed to compile ksu. Must have a +Kerberos version 5 server running to use ksu. + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +ksu is a Kerberized version of the su program that has two missions: +one is to securely change the real and effective user ID to that of +the target user, and the other is to create a new security context. + +.. note:: + + For the sake of clarity, all references to and attributes of + the user invoking the program will start with "source" + (e.g., "source user", "source cache", etc.). + + Likewise, all references to and attributes of the target + account will start with "target". + +AUTHENTICATION +-------------- + +To fulfill the first mission, ksu operates in two phases: +authentication and authorization. Resolving the target principal name +is the first step in authentication. The user can either specify his +principal name with the **-n** option (e.g., ``-n jqpublic@USC.EDU``) +or a default principal name will be assigned using a heuristic +described in the OPTIONS section (see **-n** option). The target user +name must be the first argument to ksu; if not specified root is the +default. If ``.`` is specified then the target user will be the +source user (e.g., ``ksu .``). If the source user is root or the +target user is the source user, no authentication or authorization +takes place. Otherwise, ksu looks for an appropriate Kerberos ticket +in the source cache. + +The ticket can either be for the end-server or a ticket granting +ticket (TGT) for the target principal's realm. If the ticket for the +end-server is already in the cache, it's decrypted and verified. If +it's not in the cache but the TGT is, the TGT is used to obtain the +ticket for the end-server. The end-server ticket is then verified. +If neither ticket is in the cache, but ksu is compiled with the +**GET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD** define, the user will be prompted for a +Kerberos password which will then be used to get a TGT. If the user +is logged in remotely and does not have a secure channel, the password +may be exposed. If neither ticket is in the cache and +**GET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD** is not defined, authentication fails. + + +AUTHORIZATION +------------- + +This section describes authorization of the source user when ksu is +invoked without the **-e** option. For a description of the **-e** +option, see the OPTIONS section. + +Upon successful authentication, ksu checks whether the target +principal is authorized to access the target account. In the target +user's home directory, ksu attempts to access two authorization files: +:ref:`.k5login(5)` and .k5users. In the .k5login file each line +contains the name of a principal that is authorized to access the +account. + +For example:: + + jqpublic@USC.EDU + jqpublic/secure@USC.EDU + jqpublic/admin@USC.EDU + +The format of .k5users is the same, except the principal name may be +followed by a list of commands that the principal is authorized to +execute (see the **-e** option in the OPTIONS section for details). + +Thus if the target principal name is found in the .k5login file the +source user is authorized to access the target account. Otherwise ksu +looks in the .k5users file. If the target principal name is found +without any trailing commands or followed only by ``*`` then the +source user is authorized. If either .k5login or .k5users exist but +an appropriate entry for the target principal does not exist then +access is denied. If neither file exists then the principal will be +granted access to the account according to the aname->lname mapping +rules. Otherwise, authorization fails. + + +EXECUTION OF THE TARGET SHELL +----------------------------- + +Upon successful authentication and authorization, ksu proceeds in a +similar fashion to su. The environment is unmodified with the +exception of USER, HOME and SHELL variables. If the target user is +not root, USER gets set to the target user name. Otherwise USER +remains unchanged. Both HOME and SHELL are set to the target login's +default values. In addition, the environment variable **KRB5CCNAME** +gets set to the name of the target cache. The real and effective user +ID are changed to that of the target user. The target user's shell is +then invoked (the shell name is specified in the password file). Upon +termination of the shell, ksu deletes the target cache (unless ksu is +invoked with the **-k** option). This is implemented by first doing a +fork and then an exec, instead of just exec, as done by su. + + +CREATING A NEW SECURITY CONTEXT +------------------------------- + +ksu can be used to create a new security context for the target +program (either the target shell, or command specified via the **-e** +option). The target program inherits a set of credentials from the +source user. By default, this set includes all of the credentials in +the source cache plus any additional credentials obtained during +authentication. The source user is able to limit the credentials in +this set by using **-z** or **-Z** option. **-z** restricts the copy +of tickets from the source cache to the target cache to only the +tickets where client == the target principal name. The **-Z** option +provides the target user with a fresh target cache (no creds in the +cache). Note that for security reasons, when the source user is root +and target user is non-root, **-z** option is the default mode of +operation. + +While no authentication takes place if the source user is root or is +the same as the target user, additional tickets can still be obtained +for the target cache. If **-n** is specified and no credentials can +be copied to the target cache, the source user is prompted for a +Kerberos password (unless **-Z** specified or **GET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD** +is undefined). If successful, a TGT is obtained from the Kerberos +server and stored in the target cache. Otherwise, if a password is +not provided (user hit return) ksu continues in a normal mode of +operation (the target cache will not contain the desired TGT). If the +wrong password is typed in, ksu fails. + +.. note:: + + During authentication, only the tickets that could be + obtained without providing a password are cached in in the + source cache. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-n** *target_principal_name* + Specify a Kerberos target principal name. Used in authentication + and authorization phases of ksu. + + If ksu is invoked without **-n**, a default principal name is + assigned via the following heuristic: + + * Case 1: source user is non-root. + + If the target user is the source user the default principal name + is set to the default principal of the source cache. If the + cache does not exist then the default principal name is set to + ``target_user@local_realm``. If the source and target users are + different and neither ``~target_user/.k5users`` nor + ``~target_user/.k5login`` exist then the default principal name + is ``target_user_login_name@local_realm``. Otherwise, starting + with the first principal listed below, ksu checks if the + principal is authorized to access the target account and whether + there is a legitimate ticket for that principal in the source + cache. If both conditions are met that principal becomes the + default target principal, otherwise go to the next principal. + + a) default principal of the source cache + b) target_user\@local_realm + c) source_user\@local_realm + + If a-c fails try any principal for which there is a ticket in + the source cache and that is authorized to access the target + account. If that fails select the first principal that is + authorized to access the target account from the above list. If + none are authorized and ksu is configured with + **PRINC_LOOK_AHEAD** turned on, select the default principal as + follows: + + For each candidate in the above list, select an authorized + principal that has the same realm name and first part of the + principal name equal to the prefix of the candidate. For + example if candidate a) is ``jqpublic@ISI.EDU`` and + ``jqpublic/secure@ISI.EDU`` is authorized to access the target + account then the default principal is set to + ``jqpublic/secure@ISI.EDU``. + + * Case 2: source user is root. + + If the target user is non-root then the default principal name + is ``target_user@local_realm``. Else, if the source cache + exists the default principal name is set to the default + principal of the source cache. If the source cache does not + exist, default principal name is set to ``root\@local_realm``. + +**-c** *source_cache_name* + + Specify source cache name (e.g., ``-c FILE:/tmp/my_cache``). If + **-c** option is not used then the name is obtained from + **KRB5CCNAME** environment variable. If **KRB5CCNAME** is not + defined the source cache name is set to ``krb5cc_<source uid>``. + The target cache name is automatically set to ``krb5cc_<target + uid>.(gen_sym())``, where gen_sym generates a new number such that + the resulting cache does not already exist. For example:: + + krb5cc_1984.2 + +**-k** + Do not delete the target cache upon termination of the target + shell or a command (**-e** command). Without **-k**, ksu deletes + the target cache. + +**-z** + Restrict the copy of tickets from the source cache to the target + cache to only the tickets where client == the target principal + name. Use the **-n** option if you want the tickets for other then + the default principal. Note that the **-z** option is mutually + exclusive with the **-Z** option. + +**-Z** + Don't copy any tickets from the source cache to the target cache. + Just create a fresh target cache, where the default principal name + of the cache is initialized to the target principal name. Note + that the **-Z** option is mutually exclusive with the **-z** + option. + +**-q** + Suppress the printing of status messages. + +Ticket granting ticket options: + +**-l** *lifetime* **-r** *time* **-pf** + The ticket granting ticket options only apply to the case where + there are no appropriate tickets in the cache to authenticate the + source user. In this case if ksu is configured to prompt users + for a Kerberos password (**GET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD** is defined), the + ticket granting ticket options that are specified will be used + when getting a ticket granting ticket from the Kerberos server. + +**-l** *lifetime* + (:ref:`duration` string.) Specifies the lifetime to be requested + for the ticket; if this option is not specified, the default ticket + lifetime (12 hours) is used instead. + +**-r** *time* + (:ref:`duration` string.) Specifies that the **renewable** option + should be requested for the ticket, and specifies the desired + total lifetime of the ticket. + +**-p** + specifies that the **proxiable** option should be requested for + the ticket. + +**-f** + option specifies that the **forwardable** option should be + requested for the ticket. + +**-e** *command* [*args* ...] + ksu proceeds exactly the same as if it was invoked without the + **-e** option, except instead of executing the target shell, ksu + executes the specified command. Example of usage:: + + ksu bob -e ls -lag + + The authorization algorithm for **-e** is as follows: + + If the source user is root or source user == target user, no + authorization takes place and the command is executed. If source + user id != 0, and ``~target_user/.k5users`` file does not exist, + authorization fails. Otherwise, ``~target_user/.k5users`` file + must have an appropriate entry for target principal to get + authorized. + + The .k5users file format: + + A single principal entry on each line that may be followed by a + list of commands that the principal is authorized to execute. A + principal name followed by a ``*`` means that the user is + authorized to execute any command. Thus, in the following + example:: + + jqpublic@USC.EDU ls mail /local/kerberos/klist + jqpublic/secure@USC.EDU * + jqpublic/admin@USC.EDU + + ``jqpublic@USC.EDU`` is only authorized to execute ``ls``, + ``mail`` and ``klist`` commands. ``jqpublic/secure@USC.EDU`` is + authorized to execute any command. ``jqpublic/admin@USC.EDU`` is + not authorized to execute any command. Note, that + ``jqpublic/admin@USC.EDU`` is authorized to execute the target + shell (regular ksu, without the **-e** option) but + ``jqpublic@USC.EDU`` is not. + + The commands listed after the principal name must be either a full + path names or just the program name. In the second case, + **CMD_PATH** specifying the location of authorized programs must + be defined at the compilation time of ksu. Which command gets + executed? + + If the source user is root or the target user is the source user + or the user is authorized to execute any command (``*`` entry) + then command can be either a full or a relative path leading to + the target program. Otherwise, the user must specify either a + full path or just the program name. + +**-a** *args* + Specify arguments to be passed to the target shell. Note that all + flags and parameters following -a will be passed to the shell, + thus all options intended for ksu must precede **-a**. + + The **-a** option can be used to simulate the **-e** option if + used as follows:: + + -a -c [command [arguments]]. + + **-c** is interpreted by the c-shell to execute the command. + + +INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS +------------------------- + +ksu can be compiled with the following four flags: + +**GET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD** + In case no appropriate tickets are found in the source cache, the + user will be prompted for a Kerberos password. The password is + then used to get a ticket granting ticket from the Kerberos + server. The danger of configuring ksu with this macro is if the + source user is logged in remotely and does not have a secure + channel, the password may get exposed. + +**PRINC_LOOK_AHEAD** + During the resolution of the default principal name, + **PRINC_LOOK_AHEAD** enables ksu to find principal names in + the .k5users file as described in the OPTIONS section + (see **-n** option). + +**CMD_PATH** + Specifies a list of directories containing programs that users are + authorized to execute (via .k5users file). + +**HAVE_GETUSERSHELL** + If the source user is non-root, ksu insists that the target user's + shell to be invoked is a "legal shell". *getusershell(3)* is + called to obtain the names of "legal shells". Note that the + target user's shell is obtained from the passwd file. + +Sample configuration:: + + KSU_OPTS = -DGET_TGT_VIA_PASSWD -DPRINC_LOOK_AHEAD -DCMD_PATH='"/bin /usr/ucb /local/bin" + +ksu should be owned by root and have the set user id bit turned on. + +ksu attempts to get a ticket for the end server just as Kerberized +telnet and rlogin. Thus, there must be an entry for the server in the +Kerberos database (e.g., ``host/nii.isi.edu@ISI.EDU``). The keytab +file must be in an appropriate location. + + +SIDE EFFECTS +------------ + +ksu deletes all expired tickets from the source cache. + + +AUTHOR OF KSU +------------- + +GENNADY (ARI) MEDVINSKY + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kerberos(7)`, :ref:`kinit(1)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kswitch.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kswitch.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..010332e6a --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kswitch.rst @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +.. _kswitch(1): + +kswitch +======= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kswitch** +{**-c** *cachename*\|\ **-p** *principal*} + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kswitch makes the specified credential cache the primary cache for the +collection, if a cache collection is available. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-c** *cachename* + Directly specifies the credential cache to be made primary. + +**-p** *principal* + Causes the cache collection to be searched for a cache containing + credentials for *principal*. If one is found, that collection is + made primary. + + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +FILES +----- + +|ccache| + Default location of Kerberos 5 credentials cache + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kinit(1)`, :ref:`kdestroy(1)`, :ref:`klist(1)`, +:ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..88607dfc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/kvno.rst @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +.. _kvno(1): + +kvno +==== + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**kvno** +[**-c** *ccache*] +[**-e** *etype*] +[**-q**] +[**-h**] +[**-P**] +[**-S** *sname*] +[**-U** *for_user*] +[**--u2u** *ccache*] +*service1 service2* ... + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +kvno acquires a service ticket for the specified Kerberos principals +and prints out the key version numbers of each. + + +OPTIONS +------- + +**-c** *ccache* + Specifies the name of a credentials cache to use (if not the + default) + +**-e** *etype* + Specifies the enctype which will be requested for the session key + of all the services named on the command line. This is useful in + certain backward compatibility situations. + +**-q** + Suppress printing output when successful. If a service ticket + cannot be obtained, an error message will still be printed and + kvno will exit with nonzero status. + +**-h** + Prints a usage statement and exits. + +**-P** + Specifies that the *service1 service2* ... arguments are to be + treated as services for which credentials should be acquired using + constrained delegation. This option is only valid when used in + conjunction with protocol transition. + +**-S** *sname* + Specifies that the *service1 service2* ... arguments are + interpreted as hostnames, and the service principals are to be + constructed from those hostnames and the service name *sname*. + The service hostnames will be canonicalized according to the usual + rules for constructing service principals. + +**-U** *for_user* + Specifies that protocol transition (S4U2Self) is to be used to + acquire a ticket on behalf of *for_user*. If constrained + delegation is not requested, the service name must match the + credentials cache client principal. + +**--u2u** *ccache* + Requests a user-to-user ticket. *ccache* must contain a local + krbtgt ticket for the server principal. The reported version + number will typically be 0, as the resulting ticket is not + encrypted in the server's long-term key. + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +FILES +----- + +|ccache| + Default location of the credentials cache + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kinit(1)`, :ref:`kdestroy(1)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/sclient.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/sclient.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1e3d38f82 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_commands/sclient.rst @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +.. _sclient(1): + +sclient +======= + +SYNOPSIS +-------- + +**sclient** *remotehost* + + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +sclient is a sample application, primarily useful for testing +purposes. It contacts a sample server :ref:`sserver(8)` and +authenticates to it using Kerberos version 5 tickets, then displays +the server's response. + +ENVIRONMENT +----------- + +See :ref:`kerberos(7)` for a description of Kerberos environment +variables. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kinit(1)`, :ref:`sserver(8)`, :ref:`kerberos(7)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/index.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/index.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ad0dc1a72 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/index.rst @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +User config files +================= + +The following files in your home directory can be used to control the +behavior of Kerberos as it applies to your account (unless they have +been disabled by your host's configuration): + +.. toctree:: + :maxdepth: 1 + + kerberos.rst + k5login.rst + k5identity.rst diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/k5identity.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/k5identity.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cf5d95e56 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/k5identity.rst @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +.. _.k5identity(5): + +.k5identity +=========== + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The .k5identity file, which resides in a user's home directory, +contains a list of rules for selecting a client principals based on +the server being accessed. These rules are used to choose a +credential cache within the cache collection when possible. + +Blank lines and lines beginning with ``#`` are ignored. Each line has +the form: + + *principal* *field*\=\ *value* ... + +If the server principal meets all of the field constraints, then +principal is chosen as the client principal. The following fields are +recognized: + +**realm** + If the realm of the server principal is known, it is matched + against *value*, which may be a pattern using shell wildcards. + For host-based server principals, the realm will generally only be + known if there is a :ref:`domain_realm` section in + :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` with a mapping for the hostname. + +**service** + If the server principal is a host-based principal, its service + component is matched against *value*, which may be a pattern using + shell wildcards. + +**host** + If the server principal is a host-based principal, its hostname + component is converted to lower case and matched against *value*, + which may be a pattern using shell wildcards. + + If the server principal matches the constraints of multiple lines + in the .k5identity file, the principal from the first matching + line is used. If no line matches, credentials will be selected + some other way, such as the realm heuristic or the current primary + cache. + + +EXAMPLE +------- + +The following example .k5identity file selects the client principal +``alice@KRBTEST.COM`` if the server principal is within that realm, +the principal ``alice/root@EXAMPLE.COM`` if the server host is within +a servers subdomain, and the principal ``alice/mail@EXAMPLE.COM`` when +accessing the IMAP service on ``mail.example.com``:: + + alice@KRBTEST.COM realm=KRBTEST.COM + alice/root@EXAMPLE.COM host=*.servers.example.com + alice/mail@EXAMPLE.COM host=mail.example.com service=imap + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +kerberos(1), :ref:`krb5.conf(5)` diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/k5login.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/k5login.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8a9753da3 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/k5login.rst @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +.. _.k5login(5): + +.k5login +======== + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The .k5login file, which resides in a user's home directory, contains +a list of the Kerberos principals. Anyone with valid tickets for a +principal in the file is allowed host access with the UID of the user +in whose home directory the file resides. One common use is to place +a .k5login file in root's home directory, thereby granting system +administrators remote root access to the host via Kerberos. + + +EXAMPLES +-------- + +Suppose the user ``alice`` had a .k5login file in her home directory +containing just the following line:: + + bob@FOOBAR.ORG + +This would allow ``bob`` to use Kerberos network applications, such as +ssh(1), to access ``alice``'s account, using ``bob``'s Kerberos +tickets. In a default configuration (with **k5login_authoritative** set +to true in :ref:`krb5.conf(5)`), this .k5login file would not let +``alice`` use those network applications to access her account, since +she is not listed! With no .k5login file, or with **k5login_authoritative** +set to false, a default rule would permit the principal ``alice`` in the +machine's default realm to access the ``alice`` account. + +Let us further suppose that ``alice`` is a system administrator. +Alice and the other system administrators would have their principals +in root's .k5login file on each host:: + + alice@BLEEP.COM + + joeadmin/root@BLEEP.COM + +This would allow either system administrator to log in to these hosts +using their Kerberos tickets instead of having to type the root +password. Note that because ``bob`` retains the Kerberos tickets for +his own principal, ``bob@FOOBAR.ORG``, he would not have any of the +privileges that require ``alice``'s tickets, such as root access to +any of the site's hosts, or the ability to change ``alice``'s +password. + + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +kerberos(1) diff --git a/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/kerberos.rst b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/kerberos.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..56412f099 --- /dev/null +++ b/roms/edk2/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl/krb5/doc/user/user_config/kerberos.rst @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +.. _kerberos(7): + +kerberos +======== + +DESCRIPTION +----------- + +The Kerberos system authenticates individual users in a network +environment. After authenticating yourself to Kerberos, you can use +Kerberos-enabled programs without having to present passwords or +certificates to those programs. + +If you receive the following response from :ref:`kinit(1)`: + +kinit: Client not found in Kerberos database while getting initial +credentials + +you haven't been registered as a Kerberos user. See your system +administrator. + +A Kerberos name usually contains three parts. The first is the +**primary**, which is usually a user's or service's name. The second +is the **instance**, which in the case of a user is usually null. +Some users may have privileged instances, however, such as ``root`` or +``admin``. In the case of a service, the instance is the fully +qualified name of the machine on which it runs; i.e. there can be an +ssh service running on the machine ABC (ssh/ABC@REALM), which is +different from the ssh service running on the machine XYZ +(ssh/XYZ@REALM). The third part of a Kerberos name is the **realm**. +The realm corresponds to the Kerberos service providing authentication +for the principal. Realms are conventionally all-uppercase, and often +match the end of hostnames in the realm (for instance, host01.example.com +might be in realm EXAMPLE.COM). + +When writing a Kerberos name, the principal name is separated from the +instance (if not null) by a slash, and the realm (if not the local +realm) follows, preceded by an "@" sign. The following are examples +of valid Kerberos names:: + + david + jennifer/admin + joeuser@BLEEP.COM + cbrown/root@FUBAR.ORG + +When you authenticate yourself with Kerberos you get an initial +Kerberos **ticket**. (A Kerberos ticket is an encrypted protocol +message that provides authentication.) Kerberos uses this ticket for +network utilities such as ssh. The ticket transactions are done +transparently, so you don't have to worry about their management. + +Note, however, that tickets expire. Administrators may configure more +privileged tickets, such as those with service or instance of ``root`` +or ``admin``, to expire in a few minutes, while tickets that carry +more ordinary privileges may be good for several hours or a day. If +your login session extends beyond the time limit, you will have to +re-authenticate yourself to Kerberos to get new tickets using the +:ref:`kinit(1)` command. + +Some tickets are **renewable** beyond their initial lifetime. This +means that ``kinit -R`` can extend their lifetime without requiring +you to re-authenticate. + +If you wish to delete your local tickets, use the :ref:`kdestroy(1)` +command. + +Kerberos tickets can be forwarded. In order to forward tickets, you +must request **forwardable** tickets when you kinit. Once you have +forwardable tickets, most Kerberos programs have a command line option +to forward them to the remote host. This can be useful for, e.g., +running kinit on your local machine and then sshing into another to do +work. Note that this should not be done on untrusted machines since +they will then have your tickets. + +ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES +--------------------- + +Several environment variables affect the operation of Kerberos-enabled +programs. These include: + +**KRB5CCNAME** + Default name for the credentials cache file, in the form + *TYPE*:*residual*. The type of the default cache may determine + the availability of a cache collection. ``FILE`` is not a + collection type; ``KEYRING``, ``DIR``, and ``KCM`` are. + + If not set, the value of **default_ccache_name** from + configuration files (see **KRB5_CONFIG**) will be used. If that + is also not set, the default *type* is ``FILE``, and the + *residual* is the path /tmp/krb5cc_*uid*, where *uid* is the + decimal user ID of the user. + +**KRB5_KTNAME** + Specifies the location of the default keytab file, in the form + *TYPE*:*residual*. If no *type* is present, the **FILE** type is + assumed and *residual* is the pathname of the keytab file. If + unset, |keytab| will be used. + +**KRB5_CONFIG** + Specifies the location of the Kerberos configuration file. The + default is |sysconfdir|\ ``/krb5.conf``. Multiple filenames can + be specified, separated by a colon; all files which are present + will be read. + +**KRB5_KDC_PROFILE** + Specifies the location of the KDC configuration file, which + contains additional configuration directives for the Key + Distribution Center daemon and associated programs. The default + is |kdcdir|\ ``/kdc.conf``. + +**KRB5RCACHETYPE** + Specifies the default type of replay cache to use for servers. + Valid types include ``dfl`` for the normal file type and ``none`` + for no replay cache. The default is ``dfl``. + +**KRB5RCACHEDIR** + Specifies the default directory for replay caches used by servers. + The default is the value of the **TMPDIR** environment variable, + or ``/var/tmp`` if **TMPDIR** is not set. + +**KRB5_TRACE** + Specifies a filename to write trace log output to. Trace logs can + help illuminate decisions made internally by the Kerberos + libraries. For example, ``env KRB5_TRACE=/dev/stderr kinit`` + would send tracing information for :ref:`kinit(1)` to + ``/dev/stderr``. The default is not to write trace log output + anywhere. + +**KRB5_CLIENT_KTNAME** + Default client keytab file name. If unset, |ckeytab| will be + used). + +**KPROP_PORT** + :ref:`kprop(8)` port to use. Defaults to 754. + +Most environment variables are disabled for certain programs, such as +login system programs and setuid programs, which are designed to be +secure when run within an untrusted process environment. + +SEE ALSO +-------- + +:ref:`kdestroy(1)`, :ref:`kinit(1)`, :ref:`klist(1)`, +:ref:`kswitch(1)`, :ref:`kpasswd(1)`, :ref:`ksu(1)`, +:ref:`krb5.conf(5)`, :ref:`kdc.conf(5)`, :ref:`kadmin(1)`, +:ref:`kadmind(8)`, :ref:`kdb5_util(8)`, :ref:`krb5kdc(8)` + +BUGS +---- + +AUTHORS +------- + +| Steve Miller, MIT Project Athena/Digital Equipment Corporation +| Clifford Neuman, MIT Project Athena +| Greg Hudson, MIT Kerberos Consortium +| Robbie Harwood, Red Hat, Inc. + +HISTORY +------- + +The MIT Kerberos 5 implementation was developed at MIT, with +contributions from many outside parties. It is currently maintained +by the MIT Kerberos Consortium. + +RESTRICTIONS +------------ + +Copyright 1985, 1986, 1989-1996, 2002, 2011, 2018 Masachusetts +Institute of Technology |
